How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance

To ascertain whether the form of managerial compensation affects a firm's long-term operating performance, we track IPOs for 5 years after the expiration of the stabilization period. New public companies perform better when managers receive a balanced combination of stock option grants and equity ownership. Firms with unbalanced compensation arrangements, large option grants and little equity ownership or vice versa do not perform as well. This empirical finding is consistent with a theoretical explanation based on managerial risk aversion and the alignment of managerial and owner incentives.     

Costs of broad-based stock option plans

We generate estimates of the costs of broad-based stock option programs under varying assumptions about why firms use these pay schemes. We show that, if accounting considerations alone drive option grants, a typical firm in our sample incurs between 50 cents and one dollar of real costs in order to increase reported pre-tax net income by one dollar. This cost is reduced, but is still quite substantial, if accounting leads firms to grant options rather than restricted stock. We also show that, if option grants are efficient, the patterns in our data are consistent with firms using these grants to attract and retain employees.     

Discussion of “Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?”

The objective of the Landsman, Peasnel, Pope and Yeah paper (in this issue) is to compare, for current shareholders, the value relevance of four methods of accounting for employee stock options (ESOs). My discussion provides a unifying framework for the theoretical analyses and the link between the theoretical analyses and the empirical investigation.     

Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options

We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC. Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC.     

Optimal exercise of executive stock options

Valuing executive stock options is a challenging problem, because the standard risk-neutral valuation of those options is not appropriate; the executive is not allowed to trade the stock of the firm, so is not operating in a complete market. As this paper shows, an executive holding many American-style call options on his firm’s stock will optimally exercise the options bit by bit, whereas a risk-neutral valuation of the options would assume that all are exercised at the same time. Comparative statics of the optimal exercise policy show many surprising features.      

Offering stock options to gauge managerial talent

Besides the commonly cited reasons for the use of stock options, including motivating employees, conserving cash, exploiting favorable accounting and tax treatment, and retaining managers, we demonstrate a complementary benefit of option-based compensation: options also prove efficient in matching managerial pay to ability. Options are useful because they force a manager to put his pay on the line. If a manager wants to overstate his worth to the firm, he must naturally also overstate the firm's worth with him at the helm. As a result, the firm offers a generous package of stock options in lieu of cash for assertions of high ability. Since both the likelihood of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial ability, only a gifted manager takes such a gamble.     

Investor sentiment and value and growth stock index options

The paper examines the relationship between both individual and institutional investor sentiment measures and the risk-neutral skewness (RNS) of seven stock index options comprising either growth or value stocks. It provides novel evidence that growth index option prices are affected by sentiment measures. The regression results indicate a significantly positive relationship between sentiment measures and the RNS estimated from four growth index options and a negative relationship with two value index options. The results are economically significant since an associated long–short trading strategy yields high abnormal returns with a Sharpe ratio of up to 1.1 and zero exposure to systematic risk. These high abnormal returns provide evidence of a value premium type anomaly in the index options markets.     

Valuation and incentive effects of hurdle rate executive stock options

Traditional executive stock options are often criticized for inherently weak links between pay and performance. Hurdle rate executive stock options represent a viable improvement. However, valuing these options presents extraordinary analytic difficulties. With a constant dividend yield the strike price becomes a path-dependent function of the stock price and exact analytic valuation is intractable. To solve this problem, we apply the Monte Carlo valuation approach developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (Rev Financ Stud 4:113–147, 2001) to estimate the value of path-dependent American options. We also extend the methodology to incorporate the theoretical framework by Ingersoll (J Bus 79:453–487, 2006) to permit subjective valuation influenced by an executive’s risk aversion.

Stock options and capital structure

We show that value-maximizing CEOs compensated with stock options prefer debt to equity. Our pecking order result does not depend on managerial risk aversion, managerial firm-specific human capital, or asymmetric information. Moreover, our result holds at least weakly regardless of the distribution of firm cash flows and strictly as long as the support of the cash flow distribution is big enough to bring all features of the stock option contract into play with positive probability JEL Classification Numbers: G0, G3 An earlier version of this paper was completed while Page was visiting CERMSEM at Paris 1 and the University of Warwick. Page gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of CERMSEM, Paris 1 and Warwick. Page also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies and the Culverhouse College of Business at the University of Alabama. Both authors are grateful to seminar participants in the Financial Markets Group Workshop at LSE for many helpful comments and both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose detailed and insightful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper     

Trading volume in options and common stock around quarterly earnings announcements

This study examines trading in call and put options around quarterly earnings announcements and investigates whether the existence of these options affects the common stock trading volume response to these announcements. We find that the options trading volume reaction to earnings announcements is larger than the corresponding reaction in common stock. Consistent with the idea that options provide an alternative vehicle for trading on information, the existence of these options lowers the level of trading in common stock. Options also appear to offer investors an alternative method of taking short positions, as shown by the symmetric stock market trading volume reaction to good versus bad news for firms with listed options. In contrast, firms without listed options exhibit a larger trading volume response to good news than to bad news of similar magnitude.     

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.     

The Treatment of Non-Recurring Items in the Income Statement and their Consistency with FASB Concept Statements

This study provides evidence on the consistency of Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 30 (APB, 1973) classification criteria with the objectives of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Concept Statements Nos 1 and 2 (FASB, 1978, 1980). It is hypothesized that the current APB 30 requirement to classify items of a non-recurring nature in the operating section of the income statement decreases the predictive ability of income before extraordinary items. A random sample of 50 firms with non-recurring adjustments to income, which were included in the operating section of the income statement, was selected from Standard and Poor's Corporation Records. Naive models were used to generate earnings per share forecasts for the year in which the adjustment to income occurred, the prior year and subsequent year.
The results indicate a statistically significant decrease in the predictive ability of earnings per share before extraordinary items associated with the year that the adjustment occurred and a significant increase in the variability of earnings per share. Also, differences in predictive ability were noted between small and large firms and firms with positive and negative adjustments to income.
The results of this study also imply that the managers of most firms with negative adjustments to income are not using the adjustments to smooth income for either the purpose of decreasing the variability of earnings or increasing predictability. The results are more consistent with the 'big bath' theory. These conclusions appear to be more relevant for smaller firms than larger firms.     

An Examination of Comment Letters Filed in the U.S. Financial Accounting Standard-Setting Process by Institutional Interest Groups

With the advent of some form of IASC-type harmonized accounting standards likely, it has been suggested that they are likely to be based to a large extent on U.S. accounting standards promulgated by the FASB. This study of the content of comments filed on twenty controversial FASB accounting standards by four institutions in the United States is timely. Those comments are assumed to represent the views of financial-statement users, attestors and preparers: FEI, IMA, AIMR, and AICPA. The adopted standards' requirements are also examined in the context of these comments to provide insights about accounting characteristics on which the FASB has aligned with different interest groups. These characteristics include uniformity in accounting methods, disclosure, volatility in financial reporting, and conservatism. The results indicate that AIMR, in representing users, is the most constant in its positions. The two preparer organizations (FEI and IMA) took user-oriented positions on some issues, but showed a strong tendency to oppose costly disclosures and requirements associated with volatility. Comments from the AICPA were diverse but the study revealed an overall bias toward user views. Overall, the FASB aligned most closely with users and the AICPA. FASB tended to adopt standards that led to greater uniformity but compromised on costly disclosures and requirements associated with volatility and conservatism.     

Real (adaptation) options and the valuation of equity: some empirical evidence

Data from 1,374 firms across four broad industrial groupings are used to assess the contribution that real (adaptation) options make to overall equity values. The analysis indicates that real (adaptation) options make a significant contribution to the equity value of firms with a market to book ratio (of equity) of around unity or less. As the market to book ratio grows beyond this level, however, the contribution made by real (adaptation) options decays quickly away and equity values are mainly comprised of the present value of the dividends that firms are expected to pay. This means that for around one in every five of the firms in our sample real (adaptation) options make a significant contribution to overall equity value. Thus, while linear equity valuation models would seem to be appropriate for the substantial majority of firms on which our sample is based, there is a sizeable minority of firms where real (adaptation) options have a significant impact on equity values. For this latter group of firms there will be a non-linear relationship between equity value and its determining variables. This has important implications for the regression procedures that are applied in this area of accounting research.     

Some calculations for Israeli options

Recently Kifer (2000) introduced the concept of an Israeli (or Game) option. That is a general American-type option with the added possibility that the writer may terminate the contract early inducing a payment exceeding the holders claim had they exercised at that moment. Kifer shows that pricing and hedging of these options reduces to evaluating a saddle point problem associated with Dynkin games. In this short text we give two examples of perpetual Israeli options where the solutions are explicit.Received: December 2002, Mathematics Subject Classification: 90A09, 60J40, 90D15JEL Classification: G13, C73I would like to express thanks to Chris Rogers for a valuable conversation.     

Issues arising for accounting harmonization: The case of stock options in Italy

In Italy, national generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) regulations coexist, despite differences that lead to their antagonist forms of accounting relativism. In this context, the two accounting systems provide for different representations of stock options plans, with significant effects on year-end income measures. This study therefore considers the emblematic case of stock options with the goal of demonstrating, on the basis of the dominant accounting principles and conventional wisdom in Italy, that the aforementioned difference cannot be explained by reasons connected with the accounting conceptual framework of reference in each system. Rather, inquiries should focus on weaknesses in national GAAP.     

Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?

We use a residual income valuation framework to compare equity valuation implications of four approaches to employee stock options (ESOs) accounting: APB 25 “recognize nothing”, SFAS 123 (revised) “recognize ESO expense”, FASB Exposure Draft “recognize and expense ESO asset” and “recognize ESO asset and liability”. Theoretical analysis shows only grant date recognition of an asset and liability, and subsequent marking-to-market of the liability, results in accounting numbers that capture the dilution effects of ESOs on current shareholder value. Out-of-sample equity market value prediction tests and in-sample comparisons of model explanatory power also support the “recognize ESO asset and liability” method.     

Inconsistency in U.S. Accounting Standards: The Treatment of Interest

Consistency is an essential part of financial reporting: it applies both to the continuous use of the same accounting principles by an entity from period to period, and to consistency between various accounting principles used by the same entity. In the development of accounting standards, risks to users of inconsistencies can be reduced by good disclosure requirements, particularly so between various pronouncements. A study examining the treatment of interest found inconsistencies in two-thirds of the relevant U.S. GAAP pronouncements.