Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, North-South Trade, and Biological Diversity

In the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of GATT (1 January 1995) it was agreed to harmonise intellectual property rights (IPR) on an international level and to include the option for patent protection for all life forms such as plants and animals (Article 27 (3) b). Patenting, however, leads to considerable conflicts between international trade and protection of biological diversity, which can be illustrated by the example of seed production. We make use of a three-stage game to show the strategic incentives for implementation of two different property rights regimes (patents and farmers' rights) on competition and biodiversity. We show that the Southern government has no incentive to acknowledge international patents, even if farmers' rights do exist. The Northern producer will always dominate in the output market if patents are applied, but without farmers' rights biodiversity will not be maintained by the Southern government. Thus total payoff of the northern firm is maximized, if both IPR regimes are implemented. However, if only farmers' rights are valid, biodiversity will be maximal.     

Innovation,Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights with International Capital Movement

This paper extends the established Helpman (1993 ) model by introducing international capital movement, and obtains new results concerning the welfare implications of tightening intellectual property rights (IPR) in the South. First, if separated capital markets in the North and the South are integrated, enforcement of IPR would have more desirable welfare effects in both regions. Second, when international capital movement is allowed, the North always gains from the tightening of IPR if the imitation rate is sufficiently high. This implies that the North's demand on the South to tighten IPR becomes stronger as the integration of international capital markets progresses.     

EFFECTS OF STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN'S 1994 PATENT REFORM

Does strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) in terms of a longer patent life induce more patents? This article investigates the responses of high‐technology firms to Taiwan’s 1994 patent reform. Empirical analyses reveal that firms’ patenting propensity rose gradually before patent reform and showed an increase after patent reform, tending to support the viewpoint that stronger IPR can induce more patents. However, this cannot lead to lasting effect. Furthermore, patenting capability can serve as the access ticket for potential entrants to a science park under the circumstance of stronger IPR protections. These new entrants are found to have a better post‐entry performance in patenting relative to the incumbents in the short run. (JEL O14, O31)     

企业知识产权战略系统论

系统性是事物的根本属性。任何事物,无不以系统的方式存在。系统论视角下的企业知识产权战略呈现复杂的系统交织关系。它既是知识产权战略系统的一个组成部分,又是企业战略的一个子系统;并且其本身是一个包括版权战略、商标战略、专利战略、知识产权人才战略等相对独立又彼此交融的子系统构成的系统整体;同时,它又可具体分为导入、管理与释放等战略阶段。运用系统论方法,有助于对企业知识产权战略进行准确科学的定位。     

“创意”的知识产权保护之探析

以知识创新为典型特征的创意产业应当受到知识产权法律制度的保护,但现行知识产权制度对“创意”的保护在著作权、专利权、商标法等方面有诸多局限。创意应回归到知识产权范畴才能得到有效保护,而其他法律制度的构建也能为创意提供有力保护。     

Intellectual property rights and quality improvement

This paper explores why theories about the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on foreign direct investment (FDI) and innovation have reached mixed conclusions. In our model, Northern firms innovate to improve the quality of existing products and may later shift production to the South through FDI. Southern firms may then imitate the products of multinationals. We find that imitation can increase FDI and innovation for quality improvements, whereas the opposite occurs when innovators develop new varieties. Hence, stronger IPR protection, by reducing imitation, may shift innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products.     

知识产权密集型产业专利联盟运营模式创新研究

基于商务模式创新视角,提出了知识产权密集型产业专利联盟的6种专利运营模式,包括专利谈判模式、专利许可模式、产业合作模式、知识产权与产业发展论坛模式、专利联盟与专利运营中心协同模式以及品牌共享与合作模式。围绕传统型企业与知识产权密集型企业之间的商标诉讼案,剖析了其负面影响,提出了权利冲突的解决方案。最后,从食品产业专利联盟运营层面,提出设立淮安捆蹄地理标志品牌保护推广平台和缘文化传播公共平台。     

Intellectual property rights and the upgrading of the global value chain status

The present paper explores how intellectual property rights (IPR) protection affects an economy’s status in global value chains (GVC) by introducing IPR protection into the sequential production model. We find that a suitable IPR protection system that matches the phase of economic and technological development a country has reached is the key for developing countries to upgrade their status in GVC, which are dominated by multinational firms from developed countries. Empirical analysis with multinational panel data for 55 countries from 2005 to 2015 provides evidence in support of the predictions of this model, although the GVC‐enhancing effects of IPR protection are heterogeneous for developing and developed countries. The empirical conclusions are robust after using the instrumental variable method and controlling for endogeneity.     

Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth

The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, innovation and growth? In a common law system an explicitly dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with endogenous skill acquisition. We focus on two issues: (a) the over-protection versus the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We show that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. We also provide a simple “rule of thumb” indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.     

Entry,reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement

We examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U‐shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.     

The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies*

We construct a two‐country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product‐cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long‐run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North–South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global‐growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North–South wage gap.     

知识产权保护的技术创新效应——基于技术交易市场视角和省级面板数据的实证分析

文章利用1997-2008年省级面板数据,以技术市场成交额占当地GDP的比重来衡量地区知识产权保护水平,采用系统广义矩估计和门槛回归方法实证分析了知识产权保护对技术创新的影响。研究结果表明,加强知识产权保护能够显著促进技术创新;知识产权保护与研发物质资本和人力资本投入之间分别具有互补性和替代性;我国大部分地区已经跨越了知识产权保护水平的门槛值,加强知识产权保护不会阻碍技术创新。因此,要提高我国的自主创新能力,进一步加强知识产权保护不容懈怠。     

基于3D打印技术的网络知识产权制度变革

3D打印技术与现代信息技术的结合,使得网络知识产权制度发生改变。其最大变化在于,进一步丰富了网络邻接权和网络专利权制度体系。因此,有必要构建模型制作者权,完善网络邻接权法;同时加强对CAD文件专利权的保护,运用专利权控制CAD模型的生产过程,制定网络专利权的合理使用规则,建立网络服务提供者侵犯专利权的责任机制,进而推动形成网络专利法的制度体系。     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

SUSTAINING THE GOOSE THAT LAYS THE GOLDEN EGG: A CONTINUOUS TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER

This paper proposes a simple model of the trade-offs perceived by innovating firms when investing in countries with limited intellectual property rights (IPR). The model allows for a continuous treatment of technology transfer and production cost gains occurring through FDI. While it does not consider possible changes in rates of innovation caused by changes in IPR in developing countries, it allows one to uncover a potentially non-monotonic relationship between welfare and IPR in the recipient country.     

Intellectual property rights,technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

The impact of patent protection on US pharmaceutical exports to developing countries

This article provides evidence that patent protection can have a positive effect on trade, by analysing the impact of the implementation of intellectual property rights (IPR) in developing countries on the US exports of pharmaceutical products, following intense lobbying efforts from the US pharmaceutical industry to have the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement included in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A gravity model using panel data from 1995 to 2010 suggests that the implementation of minimum standards of patent protection has increased US exports of pharmaceuticals to 108 nonadvanced countries.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth

Interest in links between protection of intellectual property and growth has been revived by developments in new growth theory and by the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. The relationship between the strength of a country’s intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime and rate of growth is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint, reflecting the variety of channels through which technology can be acquired and their differing importance at different stages of development. We investigate the impact of IPR protection on economic growth in a panel of 79 countries using threshold regression analysis. We show that whilst the effect of IPR protection on growth depends upon the level of development, it is positively and significantly related to growth for low‐ and high‐income countries, but not for middle‐income countries. This suggests that, although IPR protection encourages innovation in high‐income countries, and technology flows to low‐income countries, middle‐income countries may have offsetting losses from reduced scope for imitation.     

Intellectual property rights and skills accumulation: A product-cycle model of FDI and outsourcing

This study investigates the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South on innovation, skills accumulation, wage inequality, and patterns of production based on a North–South general-equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI) and international outsourcing. We find that stronger Southern IPR protection raises the extent of outsourcing and reduces the extent of FDI. This increases the proportion of unskilled Southerners and mitigates Southern wage inequality. In the North, stronger Southern IPR protection raises the proportion of skilled Northerners and wage inequality. The effects of international specialization, R&D cost, and Northern population are also examined.