我国公用事业运营和监管改革研究

我国公用事业正处于规模扩张和制度变革并举的新阶段。这个阶段公用事业改革核心是处理好非网络环节、网络环节和监管环节之间的关系。在开放竞争、健全监管的基础上推进民营改革。非网络环节引导和推动各类资本进入。加强市场结构评估和监管，着力营造多元投资主体、多家企业相互竞争的格局；网络环节注重发挥政府投资的拉动和引导功能．健全和推行特许经营制度，加强市场行为评估和监管。建立开放条件平等、接入价格合理、设施使用充分的制度；监管环节着力实现政企分离、政监分离，健全中央和地方两级监管机构．科学配置监管权。确保终端用户能够以合理价格取得充分、可靠、满意的公用事业产品和服务。     

自然垄断产业垄断的"自然性"探析

一般认为,在自然垄断产业中的竞争性业务领域中,应当放松管制,引入竞争,而网络部分的生产经营则依然是自然垄断的领域,政府在这一领域仍然要实行进入管制,限制竞争,以获取规模经济或范围经济带来的利益。本文认为,在自然垄断领域中是否应当保持进入管制政策,不能简单地按照传统的理论假设进行推论,而是要对有关产业管制的成本和收益进行实证分析。本文提出了应当在自然垄断领域内引入竞争的理论假说,并用电信产业的统计数据对这个假说的理论模型进行了验证。     

Telecommunications in West Germany : The transformation of the technical and political framework

The most recognizable characteristic of the West German telecommunication infrastructure is the far-reaching isolation of networks, transmission services and terminal equipment. The completion plans of the West German PTT intend to end this separation. Using the telephone network as a base, all services will be integrated so that they are available from the telephone socket, acting as a communication socket for all transmission purposes. Concerning the political and legal framework, the main characteristic of the West German telecommunication sector is its high degree of regulation. This pattern of regulation is likely to change in 1988/89 with a new telecommunication law. The draft of this law proposes the deregulation of all transmission services (except the voice transmission service) and all terminal equipment markets. Networks shall continue to be owned by the West German PTT.     

Implications of regulation for entry and investment in the local loop

A number of countries around the world are trying to promote competition at the local loop as demand for higher bandwidth to the home increases. Different technologies (xDSL, cable modems, and wireless local loop) offer alternative solutions and the issue for regulators is to design a framework that promotes competition and investment. Regulators can promote competition in a number of ways, but two “pure” strategies are services and infrastructure competition. This paper models the regulator and incumbent–entrant interactions explicitly in order to understand how the structure of the voice services might evolve under different regulatory frameworks. Our analysis suggests that a “mix” of infrastructure and service competition like the one promoted in Netherlands, stimulates investment by incumbents and entrants alike and offers better consumer benefits. The message for policy makers is that the introduction of “sunset clauses” provides new entrants with strong incentives to invest while allowing them to enter in service competition and to acquire important knowledge about their new market.     

Should telecoms liberalisation stop at call termination?

In recent years concerns about the degree of competition in the provision of telecommunications call termination services have emerged. While the general consensus is that call origination is becoming more and more competitive, regulatory attention to call termination has widened in scope beyond the incumbent public telephone operators, leading to direct regulation of mobile termination charges in some countries and a debate on whether regulation should also be extended to “non-dominant” networks. This paper assesses whether these concerns are justified, extending the analysis to review the economic literature on reciprocal setting of termination charges between network operators. We conclude that while ex ante regulation of call termination simplifies the work of regulators it does not appear justifiable in all circumstances.     

Competition Policy under Laissez-Faireism: Market Power and its Treatment in Hong Kong

The paper describes the current competition policy framework in Hong Kong: how it came into existence, what business practices are prohibited, and how the enforcement system works. Recent cases in the telecommunications industry are used to illustrate the sectoral approach, a unique feature of Hong Kong's competition policy. We argue that a sectoral approach faces two fundamental drawbacks. First, due to having different ``rules of the game' for different sectors, the allocation of resources may be distorted in the long run. Second, since the relevant regulatory agencies perform dual roles both as competition policy enforcer and as traditional regulator of natural monopolies, the impartiality of their competition decisions may not be credibly conveyed to the public. We also address other specific problems associated with the sectoral approach, such as the exclusion of structural issues, narrow coverage of sectors, and the lack of public enforcement. We conclude that an overall competition law can better promote competition and economic efficiency in Hong Kong.     

Lessons from the deregulation transition in Chile's local telephony market

There is no experience in the world where entry to local telephony has been as significant as in Chile. This paper addresses two related questions: (i) whether the local telephony segment in Chile is competitive enough so as to deregulate rates and (ii) whether competition thus far achieved could be at risk in the case where asymmetric regulation is ended. The paper suggests that the market is competitive enough, that the regulation mechanism is extremely costly, and that subsidizing entry in order to have infrastructure competition is not necessary. It concludes that deregulation of consumer's rates would be in their own consumers’ interest.     

Regulatory inertia versus ICT dynamics: The case of product innovations

This article conjectures that the legacy industry-specific regulation that has governed the telecommunications sector for a long time is in basic conflict with the dynamics and product innovations that characterize the modern information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Reasons for the failure of legacy regulation to promote product innovations are explained and proposals for alternatives, such as deregulation and regulatory reform are discussed. Both regulation and competition policy are more difficult for ICT than for other sectors. Therefore both, regulation and competition policy may need reforms in order to deal with new problems. The most drastic and most realistic alternative to legacy-type regulation remains deregulation and a move to competition policy. Symmetric regulation, smart regulation, quasi-Coasean approaches and subsidies all have some limited applicability to specific situations, but are all associated with complications that have to be resolved, while competition policy is a comprehensive alternative. Last-mile access and gatekeeper access are analyzed as two main areas of legacy regulation, which are in danger of being exported to other ICT areas. Such exports may negatively affect the dynamics of the ICT industry. Rather than being exported, legacy regulations should be reduced in order to enhance product innovations.     

The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment incentives

The paper reviews how the question of access pricing has been fully investigated by the theoretical literature in a static context. On the other hand, there is no developed analysis of the linkage between access pricing and incentives to invest. This paper argues that some useful literature in related areas can be brought to bear on the issue of “races” to build infrastructures, on the relationship between infrastructure and service competition, and on two-way network competition.     

On regulations for 5G: Micro licensing for locally operated networks

Future 5G networks aim at providing new high-quality wireless services to meet stringent and case-specific needs of various vertical sectors beyond traditional mobile broadband offerings. 5G is expected to disrupt the mobile communication business ecosystem and open the market to drastically new sharing based network operational models. 5G technical features of network slicing and small cell deployments in higher carrier frequencies will lower the investment barrier for new entrants to deploy local radio access networks and offer vertical specific services in specific areas and allow them lease the remaining required infrastructure on demand from mobile network operators (MNO) or infrastructure vendors. To realize the full vision of 5G to benefit the society and promote competition, innovation and emergence of new services when the 5G end-to-end network spans across different stakeholders administrative domains, the existing regulations governing the mobile communication business ecosystem are being refined. This paper provides a tutorial overview on how 5G innovations impact mobile communications and reviews the regulatory elements relevant to 5G development for locally deployed networks. This paper expands the recent micro licensing model for local spectrum authorization in future 5G systems and provides guidelines for the development of the key micro licensing elements. This local micro licensing model can open the mobile market by allowing different stakeholders to deploy local small cell networks with locally issued spectrum licenses ensuring pre-defined quality guarantees for the vertical sectors’ case specific needs.     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

Information resources : A nation's stake in telecommunications

The major trend affecting worldwide economic development is the growing level of information-intensive activities throughout all sectors of increasingly global markets. This paper analyses the crucial role of telecommunications in a nation's productive processes. It examines the salient market force of services in virtually all sectors of national economies, describes how VANs enhance the quality and utility of basic communications channels, and analyses future network growth as a country's economy and society become increasingly computerized. The author discusses the importance of competition and recommends that restrictive regulatory regimes should respond to dynamic technological change.     

Triple play: How do we secure future benefits?

Recent technological developments make it possible to provide all telecommunications services (TV, telephony and internet) via the TV cable and fixed telephony network. Moreover, a new infrastructure based on optical fibre (to the home) is emerging in some places, which may in the future replace both existing networks. Making use of the available economic literature, the paper analyzes some of the consequences of the emergence of one electronic communications market. It focuses on two policy issues: the consequences of convergence of technologies and competition between networks for regulation in the short and medium runs, and the role of public investment in the rollout of optical fibre. It concludes that the present state of regulation may have some undesirable effects in the face of convergence and that public investment in a new general purpose infrastructure may have important advantages.     

Competition reform and household welfare: A microsimulation analysis of the telecommunication sector in Ethiopia

This paper presents a novel simulation method for estimating the likely welfare effects of policy reforms aimed at increasing competition in strategic economic sectors such as mobile phone services. The proposed method relies on a partial equilibrium simulation approach and estimates the welfare impacts on current consumers and the potential welfare effects among new consumers brought into the market by changes in prices due to competition. This approach is applied to the information and communication technology (ICT) sector in Ethiopia, one of the three countries in the world with a monopoly in the market for mobile phone services. Based on household budget survey data for 2015/16 and departing from a baseline reform scenario that dilutes the market share of the state-owned monopoly to 45 percent, the simulation model estimates a 25.3 percent reduction in the price of mobile services and an increase in 5.7 million new users of mobile services. The predicted drop in prices and increased users would generate a combined relative welfare gain of 1.18 percent (1.09 percent among current users and 0.09 percent among new users), that could be translated into a 0.31 percentage point decline in the national poverty rate and equivalent to lifting about 275,000 people out of poverty. Alternative reform scenarios that dilute the market share of the monopoly to 75 percent and to 30 percent are expected to reduce poverty rate in 0.13 and 0.52 percentage points, respectively. The method proposed in this study represents a useful tool for promoting competition reforms in developing countries, particularly in sectors known for excluding significant segments of the population because of high consumer prices.     

Market Power in China: Manifestations, Effects and Legislation

This paper presents a picture of market power in China – its current situation, manifestations, causes, damaging effects and related economic laws and regulations. China is in a transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy. Market power in China is reflected largely in administrative monopolies inherited from the old system, as well as in economic monopolies created by the new system. Administrative monopolies are worse than economic monopolies in terms of the distortion of transaction behavior and the preclusion of market competition. They have become a pressing issue facing China in its economic and social development. China has been developing a legislative framework on market competition, but this framework currently appears weak and powerless in the face of the administrative monopolies. However, the introduction of an anti-monopoly law will undoubtedly be helpful in enhancing the market competition mechanism.     

Municipal electric utilities’ role in telecommunications services

Municipal electric utilities (MEUs) are increasingly expanding into telecommunications services. Such entry is interesting in several respects. First, MEUs marry two potential pathways for the growth of telecommunications access infrastructure and services: public ownership of last-mile facilities and electric power company expansion into telecommunications. Second, municipalities are key early adopters of next generation access technology in the form of both fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) and broadband wireless (e.g., WiMax) systems. Third, MEUs are at the nexus of the debate over the proper role for local government in promoting broadband Internet access. Most homes in the United States are served by investor-owned local telephone and cable television providers, using company-owned wireline infrastructure. These providers have generally opposed municipal entry, arguing that it will crowd out private investment and represents an unfair and less efficient form of competition. A number of states have acted to limit—or in some cases—to promote such entry. Before engaging in this debate, it is necessary to have a clearer picture of the current state of municipal entry and the local demographic, cost, industry, and policy factors that influence its evolution. To address this need, this paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of MEUs that provide communications services to the public. This analysis shows that MEUs are more likely to offer such services if they also provide internal communication services to support their electric utility operations (scope economies); are relatively close to metropolitan areas (lower backhaul costs); are in markets with fewer competitive alternatives (cable modem and DSL service availability limited); and which are less encumbered by regulatory barriers to entry (in communities in states which do not restrict municipal entry into telecommunication services). Of these results, the competitive impacts are the least straight-forward to interpret, suggesting richer dynamics and avenues for further research.     

Local competition and the role of regulation: the EU debate and Britain's experience

Competition in local access networks and local loop unbundling have been central in the 1999 review of the EU communications regulatory framework. These issues also figure high on national policy agendas. Competition in local access is thought to stimulate internet penetration and the development of e-commerce and interactive applications, all key elements for the move towards a ‘new economy’. Following an analysis of different ways to promote competition in local access networks and a review of the respective EU debate, this paper then concentrates on the relevant developments in Britain. At a broader level, it explores the interplay between EU debates and British policies and actions and the scope for harmonisation of national regulatory regimes. At a more specific level, the paper assesses the evolution of local access competition and relates this to the role of regulation and the question of facilities- vs. services-based entry. It is argued that the introduction of new market restructuring initiatives, such as local loop unbundling, requires a larger involvement by regulators, particularly in the early stages, rather than just a reliance on general competition rules.     

Telecommunications infrastructure competition: The costs of delay

This paper examines the experience of the USA, the UK and other OECD countries that introduced infrastructure competition, principally for long-distance telephone service, during the 1980s. The results show that competition has generally brought lower prices, greater variety of service, faster innovation, higher usage and productivity gains, and increased output both in telecommunications and in other sectors of the economy. The evidence is now convincing that the economic benefits from competition outweigh the highly visible costs and disruptions to established organizations and relations. Other countries can learn from the pioneers' experience to reduce the uncertainties and costs resulting from the transition to competition.     

EC competition law and the convergence of the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors

This article surveys how convergence is dealt with in the main areas of EC competition law. First, under Article 90 EC Treaty, the Commission has not yet reached a solution to the problems of TOs holding exclusive rights over cable TV networks or providing broadcasting services over their telecommunications networks. Secondly, while the Commission has largely upheld certain policy lines in individual decisions, it has reached markedly different outcomes in the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors. The Commission has not been able successfully to integrate non-economic factors in its competition law analysis. Third, State aid problems are likely to arise in relation with production subsidies and compulsory broadcasting fees. In the end, competition law must still evolve to deal with convergence, but in doing so it is likely to pre-empt regulatory options.