The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks.     

Gradient dynamics in population games: Some basic results

When each player in a population game continuously adjusts her action to move up the payoff gradient, then the state variable (the action distribution) obeys a nonlinear partial differential equation. We find conditions that render gradient adjustment myopically optimal and analyze two broad classes of population games. For one class, we use known results to establish the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the PDE. In some cases, these solutions exhibit shock waves or rarefaction waves. For a second class, we use a local form of Nash equilibrium to characterize the steady state solutions of the PDE and find sufficient conditions for asymptotic convergence.     

The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games

The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided.     

Estimation of market power in the presence of firm level inefficiencies

“The quiet life hypothesis” (QLH) by Hicks (1935) argues that, due to management’s subjective cost of reaching optimal profits, firms use their market power to allow inefficient allocation of resources. Increasing competitive pressure is therefore likely to force management to work harder to reach optimal profits. Another hypothesis, which also relates market power to efficiency is “the efficient structure hypothesis” (ESH) by Demsetz (1973). ESH argues that firms with superior efficiencies or technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are assumed to gain larger market shares which lead to higher concentration. Ignoring the efficiency levels of the firms in a market power model might cause both estimation and interpretation problems. Unfortunately, the literature on market power measurement largely ignores this relationship. In the context of a dynamic setting, we estimate the market power of US airlines in two city-pairs by both allowing inefficiencies of the firms and not allowing inefficiencies of the firms. Using industry level cost data, we estimate the cost function parameters and time-varying efficiencies. An instrumental variables version of the square root Kalman filter is used to estimate time-varying conduct parameters.     

Instability in the cobweb model under the BNN dynamic

The cobweb model where firms choose between rational and naive forecasting strategies has a 2-cycle when the slope of supply is greater than the slope of demand for a number of different dynamics describing the evolution of strategy choices. This paper proves that the 2-cycle is exponentially unstable under the learning dynamic of Brown et al. (1950). Issues arising in the analysis of piecewise smooth discrete time maps are discussed.     

Property taxes and home prices: A tale of two cities

We explore the influence of property taxes on home prices, taking advantage of a policy experiment of property taxation in Shanghai and in Chongqing starting from January 2011. Using the approach suggested by Hsiao, Ching and Wan (2012) we estimate hypothetical home prices in the absence of property taxation for Shanghai and Chongqing using home prices in other cities and provinces. We show that the OLS generates consistent estimators when the price series are non-stationary I(1) processes. We apply the model to a panel of average home prices of 31 cities and provinces in China, and find the property-tax experiment lowered the Shanghai average home price by 11%–15% but raised the Chongqing average home prices by 10%–12%. An examination of the policy details and data on prices by home types suggests the post-treatment price increase in Chongqing can be driven by a spillover effect from high-end to low-end properties.     

Finite sample multivariate structural change tests with application to energy demand models

This paper considers finite sample motivated structural change tests in the multivariate linear regression model with application to energy demand models, in which case commonly used structural change tests remain asymptotic. As in Dufour and Kiviet [1996. Exact tests for structural change in first-order dynamic models. Journal of Econometrics 70, 39–68], we account for intervening nuisance parameters through a two-stage maximized Monte Carlo test procedure. Our contributions can be classified into five categories: (i) we extend tests for which a finite-sample theory has been supplied for Gaussian distributions to the non-Gaussian context; (ii) we show that Bai et al. [1998. Testing and dating common breaks in multi-variate time series. The Review of Economic Studies 65 (3), 395–432] test severely over-rejects and propose exact variants of this test; (iii) we consider predictive break test approaches which generalize tests in Dufour [1980. Dummy variables and predictive tests for structural change. Economics Letters 6, 241–247] and Dufour and Kiviet [1996. Exact tests for structural change in first-order dynamic models. Journal of Econometrics 70, 39–68]; (iv) we propose exact (non-Bonferonni based) extensions of the multivariate outliers test from Wilks [1963. Multivariate statistical outliers. Sankhya Series A 25, 407–426] to models with covariates; (v) we apply these tests to the energy demand system analyzed by Arsenault et al. [1995. A total energy demand model of Québec: forecasting properties. Energy Economics 17 (2), 163–171]. For two out of the six industrial sectors analyzed over the 1962–2000 period, break and further goodness-of-fit and diagnostic tests allow to identify (and correct) specification problems arising from historical regulatory changes or (possibly random) industry-specific effects. The procedures we propose have potential useful applications in statistics, econometrics and finance (e.g. event studies).     

Demand and supply estimation biases due to omission of durability

We build a dynamic equilibrium model of a durable goods oligopoly with a competitive secondary market to evaluate the bias in estimating the structural parameters of demand and supply when durability is omitted. We simulate data from our dynamic model and use them to estimate the model’s static counterpart. We find that the static estimate of the elasticity of demand is an overestimate of the true elasticity and that the static estimate of the markup is an underestimate. Our results provide a benchmark on the magnitude and sign of the bias when static models are used for economic inference.     

What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed.     

Sequential bargaining with common values

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this game which is unique if offers are required to be strictly increasing. Equilibrium agreement is reached gradually and non-deterministically. The better informed player obtains a rent.     

On the equivalence of location choice models: Conditional logit, nested logit and Poisson

It is well understood that the two most popular empirical models of location choice - conditional logit and Poisson - return identical coefficient estimates when the regressors are not individual specific. We show that these two models differ starkly in terms of their implied predictions. The conditional logit model represents a zero-sum world, in which one region’s gain is the other regions’ loss. In contrast, the Poisson model implies a positive-sum economy, in which one region’s gain is no other region’s loss. We also show that all intermediate cases can be represented as a nested logit model with a single outside option. The nested logit turns out to be a linear combination of the conditional logit and Poisson models. Conditional logit and Poisson elasticities mark the polar cases and can therefore serve as boundary values in applied research.