Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case.     

Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities

A standard assumption in the economics of law enforcement is that the probability of a violator being punished depends only on the resources devoted to enforcement. However, it is often true that the productivity of enforcement resources decreases with the number of violators. In this paper, an individual who violates the law provides a positive externality for other offenders because the probability of being punished decreases with the number of individuals violating the law. This externality explains the existence of correlation between individuals’ decisions to break a law. The model evaluates the implications when determining the socially optimal enforcement expenditure, focusing specifically on the case of neighborhood crime. In particular, using a parametrized functional form, I show that neighborhood externalities will enhance or impede enforcement, depending on the crime rate.     

Profiling,Screening, and Criminal Recruitment

We model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups, and a criminal organization (e.g., drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. Our model best describes smuggling or terrorism activities at borders, airports, and other security checkpoints. The most effective law enforcement policy imposes only moderate restrictions on the officer's ability to profile. In contrast to models of decentralized crime, requiring equal treatment never improves the effectiveness of law enforcement.     

Is property crime caused by drug use or by drug enforcement policy?

The relationships among drug offenses, prorperty crime, and the allocation of police resources are investigated in a structural model using data from Florida countries. Law enforcement resources are scarce, and as efforts to combat drug crime increase the amount of these resources allocated to property crime is reduced. This reallocation of police resources results in reduced deterrence for property crime and, as a result, an increase in these crimes. The evidence presented suggests that rising property crimes in Florida are at least partially the result of drug enforcement policy.     

On the optimality of escalating penalties for repeat offences against the academic honour code

Although academic dishonesty has a long history in academia, its pervasiveness has recently reached an alarming level. Academic dishonesty not only undermines the purpose of education and the assessment process but also threatens the creditability of academic records. We propose a framework for analysing students’ behaviour with respect to academic policies and honour codes. We draw an analogy between law enforcement and academic integrity enforcement and highlight similarities and differences. The proposed framework captures major determinants of academic dishonesty reported in the literature, namely detection probability, punishment severity, class average and record of academic deviance. The framework models both students’ development of nonacademic skills to improve their grades and teaching assistants’ development of detection skills, which both affect the detection probability. Our analysis demonstrates that the optimality of escalating penalties is conditional on the offenders and academic policy enforcers learning. Use-case scenarios are presented to facilitate the implementation of our results in classrooms.     

Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning

This article modifies a standard model of law enforcement toallow for learning by doing. We incorporate the process of enforcementlearning by assuming that the agency's current marginal costis a decreasing function of its past experience of detectingand convicting. The agency accumulates data and information(on criminals, on opportunities of crime), enhancing the abilityof future apprehension at a lower marginal cost. We focus onthe impact of enforcement learning on optimal compliance rules.In particular, we show that the optimal fine could be less thanmaximal and the optimal probability of detection could be higherthan otherwise. It is also suggested that the optimal imprisonmentsentence could be higher than otherwise.     

Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate

This paper develops a model of racial profiling by law enforcement officers when officers observe both an individual's race as well as a noisy signal of his or her guilt that depends on whether or not a crime has been committed. The model shows that given officers observe such a guilt signal, data regarding the guilt rate among those investigated from each race will not be sufficient for determining whether racially unequal investigation rates are due to statistical discrimination or racial bias on the part of officers. The model also reveals that when racially unequal investigation rates are due to statistical discrimination, imposing a colorblind policy on officers can increase, decrease, or have little effect on the crime rate, depending on specific characteristics of the jurisdiction and the crime in question.     

Mixed markets and crime

This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targets and the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit.The paper's key results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less-protected targets suffer. Second, an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing. This is an instance of a political incentive externality, where private policing affects the objective function of the government. Specifically, it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the Samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good. Third, the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing. In effect, private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening. This, in turn, may lead to an increase in the severity of crime. Fourth, the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient, and, in some situations, mixing may reduce the utility of all targets.     

The effects of the BSE outbreak on the security values of US agribusiness and food processing firms

Economic studies using aggregate data generally find that higher taxes are the most effective policy to reduce drunk driving while criminologists report strong evidence supporting law enforcement measures in policy evaluations. This paper evaluates these differing perspectives using the aggregate data that is typically used in the economic literature. OLS and fixed effects models show that police can affect the probability of arrest for drunk driving and, in combination with evidence from DUI deterrence experiments, this suggests that the failure of economic models to detect deterrence reflects the lack of systematic and sustained police efforts against DUI.     

Determinants of the long-term yield in Canada: an open economy VAR approach

An assumption of many national drug control policies is the existence of a causal relationship between illegal drug use and violent crime. However, robust empirical findings supporting this relationship are scarce. Alternatively, there is extensive research, much of it in economics, which suggests that there may actually be a stronger causal relationship between drug enforcement/control/prohibition and violent crime than drug use and criminal violence. The paper presents some of the research pertaining to the relationship between illegal drugs and violent crime. In addition, a violent crime model is empirically tested using data from 24 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States to determine the nature and strength of this relationship.     

State enforcement of federal standards: Implications for interstate pollution

This paper explores the relationship between interstate air pollution and the division of power between federal and state agencies in setting and enforcing standards. In the context of the US Clean Air Act we argue that the EPA is able to monitor the adoption of technology-based standards more closely than it can monitor state-level enforcement, and that this causes an effective division of control between federal and state agencies. Our analysis offers three main insights into the interstate pollution problem in this setting. First, states have an incentive to enforce standards less stringently on firms located close to downwind borders, and this leads to excessive interstate pollution in equilibrium. Second, there can arise an inherent substitutability in the regulatory problem between strict standards and compliance effort, and this creates a strategic linkage between the federal policy on standards and state policies on enforcement. In particular, a tighter federal standard can induce less selective enforcement but can also lead to less enforcement overall. Third, states will attempt to neutralize the impact of location-based federal standards (that specifically target interstate pollution) in a way that actually exacerbates the underlying enforcement problem.     

Urban Crime and Labor Mobility

Two municipalities within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) determine the level of local law enforcement. Enforcement reduces and diverts crime. The former confers a spillover benefit; the latter a spillover cost. When labor is mobile, welfare necessarily declines: if enforcement is too high (low) under labor immobility, it is raised (reduced) further under mobility. If municipalities have different enforcement costs, mobility reduces welfare for the high‐cost municipality and for the MSA, but the effect is ambiguous on the low‐cost municipality. Finally, when residents choose between productive and criminal activities, enforcement is more likely to be overprovided.     

Criminal mobility,fugitives, and extradition rules

Two countries set their enforcement noncooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing a crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after committing a crime in a country must be extradited. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, significant enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed on. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries to coordinate on the efficient outcome.     

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ILLICIT DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND PROPERTY CRIMES

Some justify the law enforcement emphasis on controlling illicit drug markets by contending that drug users attempting to finance their habits often are responsible for property crime. Yet, in Florida at least, the increased effort to control drug markets has been accompanied by increasing property crime. The fact is that law enforcement resources are scarce, and many resources now being devoted to enforcing drug laws have been shifted away from enforcing laws pertaining to other crimes. This has reduced deterrence for property crime and, as a result, such crime has increased. Thus, the resource reallocations accompanying strong drug law enforcement lead to more property crime.     

REGULATORY DEALING: TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION VERSUS ENFORCEMENT STRINGENCY OF EMISSION TAXES

We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in “exchange” for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58)     

An Integrated Strategy to Reduce Monitoring and Enforcement Costs

A policy of effective environmental protection, inthe present political atmosphere, will requirelow-cost monitoring and enforcement (M&E) strategiesthat do not rely on draconian penalties. Infinite oreven very high penalties for environmental violationsare socially and politically unacceptable.Environmental violations are often classed as civiloffenses, and the occurrence of a violation may bethought insufficient to establish intent. If penaltiesare upper-bounded and each firm is inspected randomly,compliance cannot be maintained with arbitrarily smallinspection probabilities and, hence, small agencycosts. In this paper we examine possibilities forreducing agency M&E costs, including the requirementfor self-reports of effluents and the adjustment ofthe inspection probability to reflect a firm'scompliance or reporting reputation.     

Private law enforcement,fine sharing,and tax collection: Theory and historical evidence

This paper contributes to the literature on private law enforcement by proposing a novel solution to the problem of underenforcement by monopolistic enforcers. Monopolistic enforcers underinvest in enforcement because they ignore the social benefits of deterrence. We show that this problem can be partially resolved by combining law enforcement with tax collection because a joint enforcer-collector will have an interest in reducing the crime rate in order to maximize his tax income. In support of the theory, we discuss two historical examples of this practice: decentralized law enforcement under European feudalism, and centralized law enforcement in the Ottoman Empire.     

The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable

This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. I employ a model in which there are two types of offenders—a low-wealth type and a high-wealth type. The consequence of the unobservability of wealth depends on whether the enforcement authority would employ fines alone, or would also impose imprisonment sentences, if wealth were observable. In the former case, the inability to observe wealth lowers social welfare. But in the latter case, the unobservability of wealth does not lower social welfare. In both cases, offering offenders a choice of sanctions can induce high-wealth offenders to pay higher fines even though their wealth is unobservable. Specifically, a relatively high imprisonment sentence must accompany the payment of a low fine, so that high-wealth offenders will prefer to pay a higher fine and bear a lower (possibly no) imprisonment sentence.     

政府行为规范、政策供给水平与私营企业发展——来自中国省级面板数据的证据

文章利用1996~2003年省级水平的面板数据,研究了地方政府的行为规范、政策供给水平与私营企业发展之间的关系。研究结果发现,当政府行为缺乏有效约束时,由(地方)政府任意解释(执行)相关的法律和政策,削弱了法律(政策)的可执行特征,对私营企业发展产生了显著抑制。与字面意义上的"制度(政策)完善"相比,实际感知到的"制度(政策)执行"扮演着更为关键的角色。     

Impatience,reputation and offending

Reconviction rates for offenders are high despite sentence severity increasing with the number of convictions. The standard one-shot model of crime provides little scope for exploring ‘persistence effects’, although recent papers by Emons and others have sought to put offending decisions into a more dynamic setting. This article develops a simple two-period model of offending in which criminal convictions act as an adverse signal in labour markets. Ordinary and multinomial logistic regression modelling is used to test the predictions of the theoritical model and explore the link between unemployment and convictions. The empirical results, which are based on longitudinal data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS) in the UK, strongly support the view that, ceteris paribus, individuals with previous convictions are at higher risk of being unemployed.