Vertically Related Markets,Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy

This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms competing in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's market share is sufficiently high, full nationalization is optimal and the resulting profit margin is positive. However, complete privatization is never optimal. Numerical simulations reveal both the diverse optimal privatization regimes and the patterns of optimal privatization levels with varying numbers of the domestic and foreign downstream firms.     

Dynamics of firm's network community associations and firm's innovation performance

ABSTRACT

R&D network structures have crucial impacts on firm's innovation performance. However, most previous studies have been based on the whole or ego network perspective, few studies have investigated the influence of community structure that a firm is engaged in on its innovation performance, and it is still unclear how a firm's relation to network community affect its innovation performance. This research aims to address this gap by focusing on the dynamics of firm's network community associations, empirically investigate the relationship between dynamics of firm's network community associations and its innovation performance. Based on the unbalanced panel data of smartphone R&D network during year 2004–2017, the results demonstrate that change in community member associations and movement across communities both have inverted-U-shaped effects on firm's innovation performance. Moreover, innovation openness depth has moderating effects on the relationships between dynamics of firm's network community associations and its innovation performance.     

Impact of coopetition in the alliance portfolio and coopetition experience on firm innovation

This paper examines two interrelated questions: to what extent does coopetition in a firm's alliance portfolio impact the firm's innovation performance? And to what extent does a firm's coopetition experience influence the relationship between coopetition in the alliance portfolio and innovation performance? Conceptually, we advance the concepts of balanced coopetition in a firm's alliance portfolio and coopetition experience and suggest that both balanced coopetition and coopetition experience contribute to firm's innovation outcomes. Results based on a longitudinal data of firms from the semiconductor industry show that moderate to high levels of balanced-strong coopetition in a firm's alliance portfolio positively impact the firm's coopetition-based innovation performance. Further, coopetition experience contributes to innovation performance and positively moderates the relationship between balanced-strong coopetition and innovation performance.     

Vertically Related Markets: Export Rivalry Between DC and LDC Firms*

We present a model of export rivalry in vertically related markets where a DC firm produces a high-quality good as well as a key input utilized by an LDC firm to produce a low-quality export good. the DC firm acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting the price of the input and the quantity of its export good. We show that the DC firm's decision on vertical supply depends on the cost, demand, and quality parameters of both producers, and that the LDC government should tax either its final good exports or its key input imports.     

The relationship between business diversification and productivity: considering the impact of process innovation at different corporate life cycles

This paper investigates the link between a firm's process innovation (PI) and its segment productivity at different life cycles. The results show that business diversification is negatively associated with a firm's productivity, and further reveal that a firm's PI moderates the above relationship. In addition, the corporate life cycle literature builds blocks for this study to explain that the involvement of administrative costs varies across life cycles when diversified firms get mature and bigger. Our empirical evidence indicates that the potential costs of a complex organisational structure contingent on business diversification at a firm's mature life cycle could be alleviated by the conduct of process innovation. As process innovation at different life cycles may alter managerial incentive that leads to different firm performance, the managerial implication is that diversified firms should appropriately engage in process innovation to prevent unfavourable liability from the development of their businesses.     

Business type,industry value chain,and R&D performance: Evidence from high-tech firms in an emerging market

This study focuses on how the business type and technological learning mode, which a high-tech firm chooses based on its core competence, influence the firm's R&D strategies, which in turn affect firm performance. This study also explores how the interaction between a firm's business type and industry value chain stage affects the relationship between R&D investments and operating performance. We suggest that the linkage of R&D investments and operating performance will increase gradually, when firms move from contract manufacturing to own brand business. R&D investments can contribute more to performance when firms adopt the hybrid business type. Furthermore, R&D investments generate more significant benefits for the own brand companies than the contract manufacturers at the same stage of the industry value chain. R&D investments of the downstream contract manufacturers have a negative impact on firm performance. Regardless of business type, firms in the upstream (midstream) stage of the industry value chain outperform downstream stage firms in deriving benefits from R&D activities. Finally, the lagged effects of R&D investments on operating performance are affected by the interaction between business type and industry value chain.     

Firm Heterogeneity,Contract Enforcement,and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.     

SHAREHOLDERS' UNANIMITY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS*

When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its optimal level of investment. In contrast, with binding borrowing constraints, constrained shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.     

Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance in China

We investigate the relationship between venture capital (VC) networks and investment performance in China. Distinct features of China's VC networks are captured in our econometric model through the inclusion of an index of network stability and a dummy variable that indicates a VC firm's connections with the Chinese state. Our econometric analysis shows that a VC firm's position in its network, its network stability and close connections with the state all contribute to its investment performance. Comparison with the findings in Hochberg et al. (2007) indicates that networks are more important for investment performance in China than in the US. Moreover, our analysis suggests that familiarity with local culture and customs and understanding of the idiosyncrasies of China's markets and institutions are important for the success of a VC firm in China.     

Information transmission during the trial: The role of punitive damages and legal costs

This paper studies an incomplete information model in which a preventable accident occurred. The judge determining punitive damages observes the firm's (defendant) investment decisions, but is uninformed about the firm's experience adopting safety measures. Our model allows firms to file an appeal if the judge's verdict is incorrect, which the judge may accept or reject. We identify under which conditions a separating equilibrium exists where the firm's investment decisions signal its type to the judge, who responds with a correct verdict, thus avoiding future appeals. Our paper also finds conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists whereby the firm's investment in precaution conceals its type from the judge, who can respond with an incorrect verdict thus giving rise to appeals. Furthermore, we show that the separating equilibrium is more likely to arise if the percentage of revenue that defendants are required to pay in punitive damages decreases, if the punitive‐to‐compensatory ratio increases, and if the legal cost of filing an appeal increases.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

Dumping And Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness Of Cost‐Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information*

We argue that the rise of antidumping protection and the proliferation of voluntary export restraints (VERs) are fundamentally interrelated. We show that both can be explained by a cost‐based definition of dumping when the domestic government has incomplete information about the foreign firm's costs. Given that its costs are only imperfectly observed and knowing the government's incentives to protect, efficient foreign firms will voluntarily restrain their exports prior to the antidumping investigation. In turn, the VER distorts the government's perception of the foreign firm's efficiency and leads to undesirably high duties regardless of the foreign firm's efficiency.     

Foreign direct investment in vertically related markets

We study an MNE's choice of FDI mode in a vertically related market with local input sourcing. We show how the market's vertical structure and trading features affect this choice. An MNE's incentives to expand through cross-border acquisition rather than through greenfield investment are stronger in markets with higher upstream bargaining power, upstream concentration and unobservable contract terms. The opposite holds in markets in which wholesale price contracts, instead of two-part tariffs, are used. Our welfare analysis suggests that the host country should not always welcome FDI and should discourage FDI through acquisition.     

产业政策对企业跨界经营行为的影响

基于2006—2015年中国A股上市公司的数据,研究了产业政策对企业跨界经营行为的影响。结果表明:产业政策会引导企业通过跨界经营进入政策支持行业;通过有关联跨界进入政策支持行业的企业的经营绩效会显著提高,而无关联跨界反而会降低企业价值;在产业政策的引导作用下,企业为了政策寻租而采取的无关联跨界行为,既不利于自身的长远发展,又会降低产业政策的效果。     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and investment timing

This paper examines how the presence of an abandonment option affects a firm's investment decision in general, and its operating leverage in particular. We show that the value of the abandonment option is a decreasing function of the firm's operating leverage. Upon the introduction of the abandonment option, the firm as such optimally lowers its operating leverage. We further show that there are direct and indirect effects of the abandonment option on the firm's optimal investment trigger, which act against each other. First, the ability to shut down production offers downside protection to the firm, thereby making the firm more eager to exercise the investment option. This is the negative direct effect that pushes down the investment trigger. Second, introducing the abandonment option to the firm induces the firm to lower its operating leverage, thereby making the firm more reluctant to exercise the investment option. This is the positive indirect effect that lifts up the investment trigger. We numerically verify that the overall effect of the abandonment option on the firm's optimal investment trigger is negative.     

Absorptive capacity and firm performance: an integrative framework of benefits and downsides

Research underscores the important role a firm's absorptive capacity plays in developing knowledge, promoting open innovation, managing alliances, facilitating organisational learning, creating strategic variety, and enhancing financial performance. However, prior research often overlooks how absorptive capacity could increase a firm's costs associated with building this capacity, perpetuate and even increase inertia because of reduced variety and limited organisational search, handicap internal knowledge development, and complicate knowledge sharing. Research also ignores the growing complexity of absorptive capacity, a factor that could reduce a firm's gains from exploiting external knowledge. Our discussion builds on the knowledge-based view to provide an integrative framework for the performance effects of absorptive capacity. Based on different benefits and downsides of absorptive capacity at multiple levels of analysis, it points to an inverted U-shaped relationship between absorptive capacity and a firm's financial performance, highlighting several promising avenues for future research.     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.     

Vertical integration,escalating commitment and technological performance: evidence from firms in the US computer industry

We set out in this study to analyse the impact on the technological performance of firms arising from their vertical integration, along with their escalating commitment to capital investment. Our findings reveal a positive relationship between vertical integration and the technological performance of such firms. A positive correlation is also found to exist between vertical integration and escalating commitment to capital investment; in other words, a firm's rising commitment to its capital investment may well strengthen the positive effects of vertical integration on the technological performance of the firm. More importantly, the interactive effects on technological performance will tend to differ, largely dependent on the type of vertical integration. The findings of this study also indicate that vertical integration can effectively neutralise the threat to exit barriers resulting from a firm's escalating commitment to its prior investment.     

Preemptive bribery and incomplete information: Does prior knowledge matter?

This paper studies bribery between a firm and a supervisor who monitors the firm for regulatory compliance. Bribery occurs preemptively, that is before the supervisor exerts costly effort to discover the firm's level of noncompliance and collect evidence for successful prosecution. In contrast to previous papers, preemptive bribery is modeled as a Bayesian signaling game because the supervisor is uninformed about the firm's level of noncompliance. We show that under normal informational assumptions, some (possibly all) firms always engage in preemptive bribery. However, if knowledge of the firm's level of noncompliance has implications for the supervisor's ability to collect evidence and prosecute (prior knowledge), preemptive bribery can be completely eliminated. Results which apply to preemptive bribery under complete information do not apply here.