How the P* Model Rationalizes Monetary Targeting: A Comment on Svensson

In this comment, we answer the question posed in Svensson’s (2000) paper ‘Does the P* Model Provide any Rationale for Monetary Targeting?’– in contrast to him ‐‐ in the affirmative. We argue that a strategy of monetary targeting can be rationalized within the P* framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate that money growth targeting is a special form of inflation forecast targeting based on a ‘limited’ information set. In contrast to ‘full information’ inflation forecast targeting, monetary growth targeting is likely to be more robust under changing conditions of the real world.     

人民币升值压力与货币政策:基于货币模型的实证分析

利用1994年1月至2008年1月的月度数据,采用外汇市场压力的货币模型,构建了人民币外汇市场升值压力指数,并利用向量自回归方法研究了中央银行国内信贷变化、中美相对经济增长率变化、中国利率水平变化与外汇市场压力之间的相互作用,探讨了美国基础货币增长、美国利率水平变化等外生变量对人民币升值压力的影响。发现中国中央银行国内信贷与人民币升值压力呈现负向关系,而中国经济增长和国内利率水平与人民币升值压力呈正向关系。当人民币升值压力增加时,货币当局的反应是减少其净国内信贷,而国内利率水平的变化则并不显著地反映人民币升值压力的变化。     

Expanding Exports and the Structure of the Domestic Economy: A Monetary Analysis*

This paper analyzes the dynamic adjustments of a small, open economy faced with the certain prospect of a future export (resources) boom. It is shown how the adjustment occurs in three phases. First, the initial expectation generates an immediate (discrete) appreciation of the exchange rate. Secondly, prior to the export boom, the exchange rate continues to appreciate gradually, while a dissimulation of bond holdings by domestic residents occurs, After the boom, the exchange rate gradually appreciates further while the balance of trade moves into surplus and domestic residents begin to accumulate bond holdings. These adjustments are rejected in the movement of the relative price of traded to non-traded goods and the implications of this for the structural adjustment of domestic industry are discussed.     

Better Monetary Control May Decrease the Distortion of Stabilisation Policy: A Comment

Higher uncertainty about the effects of policy instruments reduces a policymaker's inclination to actively engage in shaping economic policy. If a credibility problem exists, then this is beneficial. However, in the case where the policymaker has private information about an economic shock, higher uncertainty is costly. Hence, the policymaker faces a trade-off when he decides on the degree of control of monetary instruments. It is shown that the optimal degree of uncertainty about the effects of policy depends on the economic preferences of the policymaker and the magnitude of the variance of the shock which is private information.     

企业对政府创新科技政策的响应机理研究:基于回声模型

资源基础理论同样适用于企业对创新科技政策的响应过程.在复杂适应系统视角下,企业政策响应受到认知力、规模、决策者偏好、利益、创新能力、研发需要和其它企业等因素的影响.基于回声模型,探讨了企业响应创新科技政策的行为机制,刻画了各种因素在政策响应过程中的作用,明确了各项行为的触发条件,最后分析了企业响应政策的行为匹配模式和自适应响应流程.结果发现,资源依赖是企业响应政策的根本,自组织进化是政策被企业良性响应的重要保障.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.     

“A note on soil depth,failing markets and agricultural pricing”: Comment

Bulte and van Soest [Bulte, E., van Soest, D. 1999. A note on soil depth, failing markets and agricultural pricing. Journal of Development Economics 58, 245-254.] argue that higher agricultural output prices result in greater soil conservation when labor markets function well but have ambiguous effects when labor markets are absent. The latter result is not attributable to labor market failure but rather occurs whenever labor supply is less than perfectly elastic. Consistent with the more general model presented here, empirical evidence from a number of developing countries suggests that well-functioning labor markets are associated with decreases in investment in soils.     

股价波动、社会福利与货币政策制定——基于中国DSGE模型的模拟分析

文章构建了一个包含股票市场财富效应和稳态股利水平且反映中国现实特征的DSGE模型,通过扩展的货币政策泰勒规则,考察了面对技术冲击、利率冲击和股票市场冲击时,中央银行应如何制定货币政策以保持产出、价格和股票市场的稳定,并尽可能地降低社会福利损失.结果表明,货币政策考虑股价波动能够有效降低社会福利损失;中央银行存在多重调控目标时需要注意区分冲击的类型来相机抉择,在利率冲击下,货币政策应当对股价波动做出反应,而在技术冲击和股票市场冲击下,则需要在各个经济变量之间进行权衡.     

通货膨胀目标制并不能解决我国货币政策低效率问题——一个基于政策时滞和扰动冲击的研究

本文在一个引入时滞、政策传导扰动和中介目标的货币政策模型中，分析了通货膨胀目标制的实施与货币政策效率之间的关系。我们发现，由于货币政策的时滞和货币政策传导机制的不畅，中央银行无法及时地对经济中的扰动做出正确的估计，尽管可以利用中间目标变量和其他参考变量的实际值对目标值的偏离所给出的信息来适当调整货币政策，但仍然无法对冲击及时做出正确的响应；再加上中央银行货币政策执行中的财政占优、金融占优和外部占优问题，使得中央银行无法执行其意愿的政策，因此通货膨胀目标制的引入无助于解决货币政策的低效率问题。     

Vision,Value, and Pluralism: A Comment on Analytical Political Economy

The choice of value theory reflects one’s vision of how markets function within a capitalist market economy. This choice is crucial for understanding how pluralism will play a part in prompting a paradigm shift within the discipline of economics. What is lacking in recent discussions of pluralism is how the various theories of value and distribution relate to each other. Uniting heterodox economists in this way will support the development of criteria for teaching and research, both of which facilitate a paradigm shift. A consensus would avoid the methodological issues associated with analytical political economy which advocates mathematical modeling and applications for unifying the schools of thought.

This article suggests a way to relate the theories of value and distribution, as reflective of the differences in vision of how markets function within a capitalist market economy and discusses a few of the challenges for creating a consensus.     

内生城市增长理论模型与实证研究述评

自从哈罗-多马构建经济增长模型以来,索洛进一步优化经济增长模型,随后新经济增长理论对索洛模型中的"索洛余项"展开丰富的讨论,深入挖掘和论证影响经济增长的各种因素.理论界将经济增长理论可划分为外生增长理论和内生增长理论的.城市作为现代经济活动中的重要单元,城市增长对一个国家或地区经济增长具有重要作用.     

Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'État

We present a model of coups in autocracies. Assuming that policy choices cannot be observed but are correlated with the short-run performance of the economy we find that: (a) the threat of a coup disciplines autocrats; (b) coups are more likely in recessions; (c) increasing per capita income has an ambiguous effect on the probability of a coup. The implications of the model are consistent with the evidence. On average, one recession in the previous year increases the probability of a coup attempt by 47 percent. By contrast, the effect of the level of per capita income is weak.     

Interrogating Sickonomics,from Diagnosis to Cure: A Response to Hodgson

Hodgson's review of our books argues against us that marginalism neither adopted methodological individualism nor excluded the social from economics. Thus, he finds a partial solution to sickonomics in abandoning the term methodological individualism and using both structures and individuals as analytical starting point(s), revisiting Marshallian marginalism dressed up in socio-institutional clothing. He also denies any relationship between the current malaise in economics and the marginal revolution, as we claim, focusing exclusively on institutional developments since the Second World War. We show Hodgson is either partial or wrong on all of these counts. Firstly, his alternative to methodological individualism is untenable. Secondly, institutions, although implicitly present in Marshallian and Walrasian economics, play no substantive analytical role and as such are superfluous. Finally, although institutional factors help explain the sickness of modern economics (in addition to socioeconomic, ideological, political, and intellectual factors), the intellectual roots of this decay lie in the conceptual framework established around the marginal revolution.