Taxation for Low Cost Wood Fiber*

Abstract . If forest industry taxation is to be put on a sound economic basis, the Federal Government, the largest land owner, should pay the same taxes as any other landowner, so that the social and economic effects of taxation are realized. Specialists report that the form of the property tax preferred for the taxation of the property of the forest industry, under most circumstances, is land value taxation, not the property tax based on income realized at some point In the future which presumed the continued existence of virgin forests. This paper recognizes that the forest industry now is based on harvests of tree crops and proposes a further development of the land value taxation principle in the form of a forest tax composed of a land value tax combined with a tax on tree growth which increases as growth as a percentage of volume growth decreases with the tree's increasing age.     

Factor taxation and labor supply in a dynamic one-sector growth model

This paper studies a class of AK-type growth models with factor income taxes, public capital stock and labor–leisure trade offs. While a higher capital tax rate reduces economic growth in the short run, the long-term growth effect is ambiguous and remains ambiguous even if the level of tax rate is larger than the degree of government externality. A higher labor income tax rate has ambiguous growth effects both in the short and long runs. However, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply is sufficiently small, a higher labor tax rate always lowers economic growth in the long run, despite the existence of productive government taxation.     

生产性公共支出、最优税收与经济增长

本文在严成樑和龚六堂(2009)的基础上将消费性公共支出内生到家庭的效用函数中,在一个DGE框架下求解竞争性均衡问题,以此来考察生产性公共支出和税收对经济增长的影响。结论表明,生产性支出具有正的产出效应;生产性支出对家庭私人消费、公共消费的影响取决于政府设定的平滑税率。根据经验分析可知,生产性支出对经济的促进作用不如人口效应大,其中,基本建设支出并未对经济起到促进作用,可能已凸显出过度投资、重复建设等问题,这一现象在东西部地区更为明显;教育支出的增加促进了经济增长,并且在东中部地区较明显,而在西部地区仍未体现出来。     

The heterogeneous impact of taxation on economic development: New insights from a panel cointegration approach

In this paper, we study the role of taxation on long-run income performance. In the theoretical part of the study, we develop a stylized model based on Barro (1990), in which income taxation has two contradictory roles in the standard Solow (1956) setup: on the one hand, taxation appropriates resources that would otherwise be used for physical capital accumulation, and on the other, it is the source of government spending, which is used to support private production. In the empirical part of the study, the impact of consumption tax, personal income tax, corporate profit tax and property tax on income is estimated using the common correlated effects (CCE) panel cointegration approach, which allows for cross-sectional dependencies and provides both panel- and country-specific results. The panel findings for 30 OECD countries for the period of 1995–2016 indicate that only consumption tax has a statistically significant negative effect on long-run income. However, because the type and sign of the tax coefficients are heterogeneous for the country-specific results, we conclude that taxation has heterogeneous effects on income.     

Lowering the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate: Why the Debate?

In an effort to attract new investors and retain existing producers, governments use corporate tax rates as a policy tool for industrial recruitment, resulting in inter‐state tax competition. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth and GDP growth are the two policy outcomes gauged in inter‐state tax competition. The assumption is that lower corporate taxes lead to increases in FDI, which results in capital formation that generates GDP growth. This 60‐nation panel study tests that assumption through examining economic indicators contingent on taxation, such as FDI and mergers and acquisitions among multinational corporations between 1999 and 2009. The results suggest that reduced corporate tax rates can increase FDI but decrease annual GDP growth. The main policy implication is that tax competition may attract investment, but may not promote overall economic growth, offering support for value‐extraction theories.     

Political Economy of Property Tax Reform: Hawaii's Experiment with Split‐Rate Property Taxation

Economic theory suggests that switching from a general property tax to a split‐rate tax increases land use efficiency and stimulates urban core development while preserving the environment and reducing urban sprawl. Under split‐rate property taxation, land is typically taxed at a significantly higher rate than improvements. Beginning in 1965 Hawaii experimented with a statewide split‐rate property tax system to encourage economic growth and effect land reform. The experiment was ended in 1977. Following the transfer of property taxing powers to the counties in 1978, some counties brought back the split‐rate property tax at times. Since 2006, Kauai County has adopted the unusual practice of taxing improvements at a higher rate than land for most property classes. This article chronicles and explains the rationale behind Hawaii's state and county experiments with split‐rate property taxation.     

Property taxation and the demand for housing: An econometric analysis

There is disagreement among economists regarding the effect of a local increase in property taxation on the housing market. In defining the price of housing services studies of the demand for housing have treated the property tax exclusively as an excise tax on housing consumption. Two recent theoretical developments suggest this is a misrepresentation of the tax. One theory holds that the excise effects of property taxation may be shifted backward to the factors employed in the production of housing. The other theory concludes that the property tax is not an excise, but rather serves as an efficient price for local public services. To investigate these hypotheses, data from the Annual Housing Survey were employed to estimate a housing demand model which included the net effective property tax rate among the set of independent variables. In addition to revealing the property tax-housing demand relationship, the model provides more reliable estimates of income and price elasticities by eliminating specification errors found in previous studies. Results indicate that the property tax reduces the housing consumption of central city homeowners, but does not distort the suburban housing market.     

深化税制改革 推进经济发展方式转型

中共中央在《关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议》中提出了构建有利于转变经济发展方式的财税体制的重要任务。在回顾了近年来税收超增长、税负高水平与经济转型的现实矛盾以及结构性减税效应的基础上,提出了扩大增值税征收范围、开征环保税、改革个人所得税、加强收入分配调节、推动产业结构调整等建议,以进一步发挥税收推进经济发展方式转型的职能作用,最终构建有利于转变经济发展方式的财税体制。     

PRESUMPTIVE TAXATION METHODS: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

This paper reviews the empirical literature studying the effect of the introduction of presumptive taxation methods on taxpayers’ behavior. Although the concept of presumptive taxation entails numerous alternative methods to determine tax liabilities, I survey two main areas of the literature: indirect tax assessment methods and presumptive minimum taxes. The review investigates efficiency and equity implications of presumptive taxation methods. Conflicting conclusions emerge about the effectiveness of presumptive policy tools in achieving different goals, such as the increase of voluntary tax compliance, the growth of tax revenues, and the reduction of shadow economy and fiscal evasion.     

促进我国绿色经济发展的税制改革研究

本文在对我国绿色经济发展现状和目前税收政策进行分析的基础之上,综合运用经济发展理论和财政学理论,探讨了适合中国目前经济发展的税制改革路径。得出结论,我国现行税制尚存在诸多弊端,在可持续发展的目标下有待进一步完善,并建议应当综合绿色经济发展要求和社会税负能力,推行优化流转税系、完善所得税系、健全辅助税系等方面的措施改革。     

美国区域合作的财税规则及其经验启示

随着区域经济一体化的发展和公共事务的增长,美国作为区域合作先发国家,已经形成较为成熟的财税规则,包括多元化财政融资、区域合作财税优惠、合作组织财政职能、财税收益分配补偿、财税争议纠纷处理等规则。我国可吸取美国的有益经验,逐步扩大地方税权,加强财税规则顶层设计;加大国家财政支持,构建多元化融资模式;搭建区域合作组织平台,负责资金运营与维护;实施区域合作税收优惠,进一步优化合作环境;合理平衡区际财税利益,构筑多元纠纷裁决机制。     

拉弗曲线与税收行为中的混沌特征

本文研究了税收中拉弗曲线（Laffer curve）隐含的混沌特征。分析表明，在拉弗曲线平滑上升的表面现象背后，隐藏着一种无序的状态或混沌特征，因此，在经济发展、税基扩大的情况下，应慎重提高税率，防止税收的大起大落。     

Sooner or Later? – Paradoxical Investment Effects of Capital Gains Taxation under Simultaneous Investment and Abandonment Flexibility

This paper analyzes the impact of capital gains taxation on investment timing decisions for risky investment projects with entry and exit flexibility under differential tax rates for ordinary income and capital gains. We investigate whether capital gains taxation influences immediate and delayed investments asymmetrically, given the optimal abandonment decision. If capital gains taxation induces a lock-in effect, this effect is anticipated in the investment timing decision. In contrast to prior research, our numerical simulations show that this lock-in effect of capital gains taxation can induce normal as well as paradoxical effects on investment timing under simultaneous entry and exit flexibility. A paradoxical timing effect, i.e., investment accelerated by capital gains taxation, especially emerges for high liquidation proceeds or, more conservative tax accounting, low interest rates, and low volatilities. In these cases, capital gains taxation reduces the value of the option to invest and hereby increases the propensity to invest immediately. As a second paradoxical tax effect, capital gains taxation may favor delayed real investment over financial investment. Facing these results, tax legislators should not use capital gains taxation as a short-term tax policy instrument to influence investors' timing decisions.     

财税政策影响产业升级的理论机制分析——基于地方政府竞争视角

财税政策通过促进关键生产要素流入可促进产业升级。通过构建动态模型分析地方政府财税竞争对要素流动、社会福利及产业升级的影响。研究发现,提高生产要素的税率不仅会导致该生产要素外流,还会导致其他生产要素外流;在税率变化冲击下,要素存量调整至新的均衡状态与生产函数凹性和调整成本函数凸性有关;对发达地区落后产业实行高综合税率以及新兴产业实行低综合税率会促进地区产业升级,对落后地区实行低综合税率会促进地区经济发展和产业升级;政府的财税协调有利于地区间实现产业升级和提高社会福利水平;地区居民对企业的持股份额会影响地区福利水平。     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

Jealousy and underconsumption in a one-sector model with wealth preference

The present paper examines the effects of consumption externalities on economic performance in a one-sector model with wealth preference. The presence of the wealth preference generates a wealth effect in consumption growth, which plays a crucial role for consumption externalities to have impacts on the economy. Our main findings are: (i) regardless of the assumption of inelastic labor supply, the distortionary effect of consumption externalities stays in the long run; (ii) the income tax as well as the consumption tax can modify the efficiency; and (iii) the numerical simulations supplement theoretical findings.     

Factor substitution and taxation in a finance constrained economy

In this paper, we examine the effects of constant-rate factor taxation on macroeconomic stability in the Woodford (1986) model. Our focus is on how the degree of factor substitution, as measured by the elasticity of factor substitution (EOS) in production, affects different balanced-budget tax rules. Analytically, we show that indeterminacy can occur under capital income taxation only when the EOS is very low, whereas indeterminacy under labor income taxation is not subject to the EOS restriction. This finding is robust when we tax all of the factor incomes with equal rates. Thus, in terms of macroeconomic stability, taxing capital income is preferred to taxing labor income.     

Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment

We consider a representative agent, infinite-horizon economy where production requires private and public capital. The supply of public capital is financed through distortionary taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is time inconsistent. We therefore introduce explicitly the constraint that at no point in time the revision of the original tax plan is desirable. We completely characterize the (third best) tax plan that satisfies this constraint, and estimate the difference in tax rate between the second and third best policy for a wide range of parameters. For some of these the difference between the second and third best tax rates is large, and so are the associated rates of economic growth.     

On Optimal Taxation of Housing

This paper studies the question of optimal taxation of housing, when the set of tax instruments at the government's disposal is not artificially restricted. There are two groups of persons, who differ in earning abilities and in tastes, and two types of housing goods (high- and low-quality). The paper characterizes the Pareto-efficient allocations that are attainable through the tax policy. It demonstrates that optimality calls for differential tax treatment of housing and that the required tax rates are nonlinear. It derives conditions under which consumption of housing by the poor must be subsidized. It also notes the circumstances under which taxation, rather than subsidization, is the required policy.     

TAXING LAND VALUE IS JUST ANOTHER QUESTIONABLE TAX

There has recently been much public debate about the introduction of a land value tax. To its supporters such a tax promises to achieve several goals simultaneously. On closer inspection, however, the arguments in favour of land value taxation are not convincing. On the contrary, the economic foundations on which proponents of this tax rely are dubious, and there are significant legal, moral and practical problems with land value taxation.