论房地产按揭制度的法律性质

按揭作为一种担保制度，巳广泛运用于我国的房地产贷款业务中，按揭就其实质而言属于抵押担保，但它在具体操作上与我国传统的房地产抵押担保业务又有一定差异。特别是对未建成住房的按揭贷款业务，在房屋建成之前，借款人不能取得预购房屋的物权，取得的只是对开发商的债权，此时实际上只能是债权质押，而非住房抵押，只能房屋建成后才能改为住房抵押。因此笼统地称按揭贷款为低押贷款是不确切的。     

什么是让与担保

是指债务人或第三人为担保债务人的债务，将担保标的物的权利移转于债权人，于债务清偿后，标的物应返还于债务人或第三人，于债务不履行时，担保权人可就该标的物优先受偿。     

股权让与担保的识别与内外部效力分析

股权让与担保因具备稳固融资交易秩序、提供信用度等优势，被广泛运用于现代担保实践中，但是现行相关法律及司法解释无法适用现实交易。准确界定股权让与担保的交易模式需在考虑相关因素的同时把握整体，关注其与社会经济目的的迎合。文章阐述了股权让与担保的识别，分析了股权让与担保资格的取得，研究了股权让与担保的内外部效力。     

证券信用交易“让与担保”法律困境及对策

证券信用交易是海外资本市场颇受投资者欢迎的一种交易制度,但因其保证金的杠杆作用,也容易产生风险倍增的效应。为对证券信用交易进行风险控制,海外发达国家地区均设立了“让与担保”法律制度。而在中国证券信用交易“让与担保”制度的实施尚存在着法律障碍,为解决其困境,需对现存法律担保制度进行创新性思考及探索。     

股权让与担保的涉税问题研究北大核心CSSCI

股权让与担保面临着缴纳高额税款的风险,在股权让与担保设立、股权返还、股权清算处置环节,纳税负担可能远高于作为主合同的利息负担。但其高额税负的合理性存疑,具体表现在不符合实质课税原则、净所得课税原则、税收中性原则等方面,给债权人带来了较大的税务风险。为此,建议参考行政许可制度,以登记备案证明股权让与担保之实,由股权让与担保申请登记人承担举证责任。     

房地产按揭权法律性质探析

在分析按揭、房地产按揭涵义的基础上，探讨房地产按揭关系中产生的按揭权的法律性质及其与权利质押、抵押权的区别。     

融资融券担保制度研究

融资融券交易在我国较长时间内一直被明令禁止,随着我国新《证券法》的实施,我国开始允许融资融券交易,并颁布了一系列的规范性文件以促进融资融券交易的开展。作为融资融券交易中十分重要的担保制度,我国主要对保证金的比率、管理、维持等做了一系列的规定。根据对上述规定及相关担保制度理论的分析,我国融资融券担保制度的性质应为让与担保。因而从我国现行法律制度看,其合法性备受质疑。     

进口押汇项下的信托收据与让与担保问题探析

进口押汇是商业银行为进口商提供的一项十分重要的短期贸易融资产品。针对该业务,我国目前还没有相应的的法律规定,论文借鉴英美法上的信托收据和大陆法上的让与担保制度,对如何完善银行在进口押汇项下的权益提出了相应建议。     

美国次贷危机给中国住房社会保障的启示

美国次贷危机的发生,给正在改革和发展中的中国住房社会保障提供了一些启示,如何能既满足中国中低收入者购房的需求,又不至于给银行信贷业带来巨大的危险,这需要不断地探索与思考。     

A Model of Mortgage Default

In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zero‐profit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loan‐to‐value ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable‐rate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.     

Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information

This article analyzes mortgage-market equilibrium when borrower default costs are private information. By applying the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is shown that asymmetric information regarding default costs distorts the contract choices available in the mortgage market, preventing safe borrowers (those with high default costs) from fully satisfying their demand for mortgage debt. Large loans are available for a substantial interest-rate premium, but only risky borrowers find this premium worth paying. The article builds on an empirical literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage pricing. That literature provides evidence against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower decisions. The article takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information, which has important implications for market equilibrium.     

A Proportional Hazards Model of Commercial Mortgage Default with Originator Bias

A proportional hazards model with competing risks is specified and is extended to correct for the possibility of originator bias. The model is used to examine the ability of option-theoretic models of mortgage pricing to forecast commercial mortgage defaults. Among the findings, those especially of interest include the influence of contemporaneous loan-to-value and debt-service-coverage ratios on commercial mortgage default probabilities. The paper also finds that option-theoretic models of mortgage pricing are quite capable of producing default estimates that fit the actual default rates well, especially when the model is corrected for originator bias.     

A Neural Network Analysis of Mortgage Choice

There exists today an unanswered question as to whether, and the degree to which, borrower characteristics impact the choice between fixed and adjustable rate mortgages. In this paper, we apply a neural network analysis to supply evidence that answers this question. We find evidence that the characteristics of a borrower's net worth, marital status and education level and whether a co-borrower is involved contribute in a significant way to the neural network's ability to determine mortgage choice. Further, we show how, because of the facility of neural networks in modeling intrasample differences, they achieve material and statistically significant accuracy gains over qualitative choice models in predicting whether a borrower will choose a fixed or adjustable rate mortgage.     

次贷危机冲击下国内银行房贷政策的重新审视

次贷危机发生的根源在于美国有关房贷公司和银行为了追求高额利润,不顾高风险,对还款能力明显不足的客户,甚至是“三无”客户（无收入、无工作、无资产）发放次级住房删甲贷款（Subprime Loan）。而投行、评级机构和保险公司等中介机构也为了追求超额利润不负责任地将这些贷款“包装”为固定收益证券CDO（Collaferalised Bond Obligation）,甚至将部分CDO评为AAA级,行销全世界。目前国内个人住房抵押贷款市场中存在的风险尚未被充分揭示,一旦房价普遍下跌,或经济增长减缓,风险就会逐渐显露,并威胁到银行房贷资产的安全。     

Optimal Mortgage Refinancing with Regime Switches

A model of rational mortgage refinancing is developed where the drift and volatility of interest rate process switch between two regimes. Because of the possibility of a regime shift, the optimal refinancing policy is characterized by the different threshold of interest differential for each regime. Numerical simulation demonstrates that the optimal refinancing threshold in each regime can be smaller or larger than the threshold under single-regime models. Finally, we evaluate the predictions of the model, based on the estimated parameters for a two-regime model to capture the evolution of the mortgage rates in the US. Our model can produce both late and early refinancing, which is consistent with the observed refinancing behavior. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.     

固定利率住房抵押贷款违约行为及其定价研究

固定利率住房抵押贷款的信用风险主要是违约风险,基于理性期权的定价模型往往会低估借款人的违约概率.通过分析违约成本及非理性违约因素,可以确定借款人违约时贷款机构收回的现金流,得到固定利率住房抵押贷款定价的期望值模型,并得出模型的求解方法.     

Reverse Mortgage Loans: A Quantitative Analysis

Reverse mortgage loans (RMLs) allow older homeowners to borrow against housing wealth without moving. Despite rapid growth in this market, only 1.9% of eligible homeowners had RMLs in 2013. In this paper, we analyze reverse mortgages in a calibrated life‐cycle model of retirement. The average welfare gain from RMLs is $252 per homeowner, and $1,770 per RML borrower. Bequest motives, uncertainty about health and expenses, and loan costs account for low demand. According to the model, the Great Recession's impact differs across age, income, and wealth distributions, with a threefold increase in RML demand for lowest income and oldest households.     

欧洲按揭贷款证券化（上）——写给评估师

一、引言上世纪六十年代,美国政府为了扩大住房按揭贷款融资采取了一项公共政策,即资产证券化。而资产证券化进入欧洲是在上世纪九十年代初,发行量和交易量直到1997/98年才有显著增加,但与资产证券化国际市场7万亿美元的交易量相比,欧洲资产证券化市场规模仍属于中等水平。计算过去五年的总发行量,欧洲资产证券化市场总额约为5500亿欧元,占不到全球市场10%的份额。资产证券化可以这样定义:将贷款、应收账款以及其他金融资产组合起来,并用它们所产生的现金流或经济价值去支持相关证券的支付。发行商发行“有资产担保的证券”(A B S),出售给…