Federal reserve monetary policy and the non-linearity of the Taylor rule

We propose and estimate a generalized Taylor rule for the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) to find out how the Fed funds rate is sensitive to changes in inflation and output gap variables in the post war period. We find that Fed's monetary policy has only reacted significantly to changes in inflation when they were between approximately 6.5–8.5%. However, the policy stance change on these changes was relatively small. The findings suggest that the US Fed has been too averse to change from its current monetary policy stance, and that it has not reacted noticeably to changes in the US economic activity, as measured by the output gap. The generalized functional form for the monetary policy rule suggests that similar non-linearity exists in the directional change of the Fed rate.     

BEN BERNANKE AND THE ZERO BOUND

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money‐financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero‐bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision‐making. (JEL E52, E58)     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

The comovement between monetary and fiscal policy instruments during the post-war period in the U.S.

This paper empirically studies the dynamic relationship between monetary and fiscal policies by analyzing the comovements between the Fed funds rate and the primary deficit/output ratio. Simple economic thinking establishes that a negative correlation between Fed rate and deficit arises whenever the two policy authorities share a common stabilization objective. However, when budget balancing concerns lead to a drastic deficit reduction the Fed may reduce the Fed rate in order to smooth the impact of fiscal policy, which results in a positive correlation between these two policy instruments. The empirical results show (i) a significant negative comovement between Fed rate and deficit and (ii) that deficit and output gap Granger-cause the Fed funds rate during the post-Volcker era, but the opposite is not true.     

TALKING LESS AND MOVING THE MARKET MORE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECB AND THE FED

This paper examines and compares the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and their effectiveness. First, we find that the surprise components of both monetary policy actions and statements have important but differing effects on asset prices, with unexpected communication having a much greater impact on longer‐term interest rates. Second, both the ECB and the Fed have proven to be equally successful in moving their domestic asset prices using either monetary policy or news shocks. However, the response of the American yield curve to the surprise component of Fed's statements is larger than the reaction of the European term structure to ECB's announcements. This result is intimately related to the amplitude of the policy rate cycle that is much larger in the US than in the euro area combined with the bounded support of the news shock. Third, we analyze the cross‐effects and show that the Fed has been more able to move the European interest rates of all maturities than the ECB to move American rates. This finding is tied to the predominance of dollar fixed income assets rather than to an attempt of the ECB to mimic the Fed.     

POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The theory of opportunistic political business cycles predicts incumbent politicians will alter their economic policies to spur short-run growth to attract additional votes for the upcoming election. There has not been much emphasis on the possibility of historical political business cycles prior to the Keynesian Revolution. No study has yet undertaken a systematic approach to testing for policy cycles during this period. Our study will bridge this gap by considering cycles in monetary policy for the periods of 1879–1914 until the start of Fed operations, and 1914–1932 until abandonment of the gold standard. To properly test for political cycles, it is necessary to develop reaction functions for the Treasury and compare against the reaction function later held by the Fed. This also reveals that creation of an independent monetary authority to be insulated from political pressures changed the manner in which policy was directed, aside from political issues. The evidence is not consistent, however, with monetary cycles closely tied to electoral concerns.     

Asymmetric monetary policy rules for the euro area and the US

We analyse the implications of asymmetric monetary policy rules by estimating Markov-switching DSGE models for the euro area (EA) and the US. The estimations show that until mid-2014 the ECB’s response to inflation was more forceful when inflation was above than below the central bank’s aim. Since then, the ECB’s policy can be characterised as symmetric, and we quantify the macroeconomic implications of this policy change. We uncover asymmetries also in the Fed’s policy, which has responded more strongly in times of crisis. We compute optimal simple rules for the EA and the US in an environment with the effective lower bound and a low neutral real rate, and find that it prescribes a stronger response to inflation and the output gap when inflation is below target compared to when it is above target. We document its stabilisation properties had this optimal rule been implemented over the last two decades.     

FINANCIAL MARKET RESPONSES TO MONETARY POLICY CHANGES IN THE 1990S

The operating target for monetary policy in the United States has changed from borrowings in the late 1980s to a target range for the fed funds rate to a specific fed funds target. In addition, secrecy about the policy target has largely disappeared, and since 1994 policy targets have been announced immediately. This article explores the impact of policy decisions on short-term interest rates as the policy announcements have changed. The authors find that the policy changes had a larger impact when the Fed moved to a specific emphasis on the fed funds rate. However, since the Fed began to announce the targets, policy changes have had a lesser effect on rates.     

REFORMING THE FED: ITS INDEPENDENCE AND LESSONS FROM HUMPHREY-HAWKINS

The last session of Congress witnessed renewed calls for reforming the Federal Reserve System so as to better coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. This paper examines how the current institutional structure, established by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, performed when the supply-side tax cuts were implemented during 1981 and 1982. The findings reveal that authorities barely discussed the necessary policy coordination at the Humphrey-Hawkins hearings. Further, the record reveals that Fed Chairman Volcker refused to utilize the Fed's independence to publicly oppose the supply-side tax cuts.     

HOW DID UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY AFFECT ECONOMIC FORECASTS?

We study how unconventional monetary policy announcements affected professional forecasters' predictions of bond rates, gross domestic product growth and inflation using data from the monthly survey by the Wall Street Journal. We find that unconventional monetary policy (UMP) announcements moved predicted bond rates in the direction the Fed intended. UMP announcements had differential impacts on forecasters' predictions; they also tended to move growth and inflation predictions in directions opposite those the Fed intended due to Fed information effects. A policy implication of our study is that the Fed should communicate economic projections to the public separately from monetary policy announcements to mitigate Fed information effects. (JEL E52, E58)     

The link between the federal funds rate and banking system distress: An empirical investigation

We investigate the association between deviations of the monetary policy rate from its benchmark, and systemic risk between 2001 and 2017. We adopt an impulse response function framework that uses the local projections method model proposed by Jorda (2005). We find that paying interest on reserves by the Fed beginning in 2008 introduced a monetary policy regime shift between the period that the Fed did not pay interest on reserves and the period that it did. Consequently, while we identify a positive and significant link between deviations of the policy rate from its benchmark and systemic risk in the former period, this link was broken in the latter period. During the former period, upsurges in the fed funds rate raised bank costs and increased bank distress. In contrast, during the latter period, interest payment on reserves exceeded the policy rate, except for 2009Q1, and as a result, banks did not expand lending in response to the Fed's reserve injections, instead, holding large amounts of excess reserves. This practice produced greater bank profitability and reduced bank liquidity risk and credit risk, without increasing systemic risk.     

Why has US monetary policy become ineffective lately?

Some recent studies show that US monetary policy has lost its stimulative traction, especially since the early 1980s. They argue that the Fed’s forward guidance has enabled economic agents to anticipate the changes in interest rates more accurately. As a result, it is harder to find truly exogenous monetary policy shocks, which has made monetary policy ineffective. In this article, we find that anomalous economic behaviours of financial institutions might be the true reason for the ineffective monetary policy. Our structural vector autoregressive model shows that increases in the US money supply mostly flowed into the financial sector to increase its profits instead of stimulating the real sector of the economy through business investment.     

Monetary policy: Why money matters (and interest rates don’t)

Since the late 1980s the Fed has implemented monetary policy by adjusting its target for the overnight federal funds rate. Money’s role in monetary policy has been tertiary, at best. Indeed, several influential economists suggest that money is irrelevant for monetary policy because central banks affect economic activity and inflation by (i) controlling a very short-term nominal interest rate and (ii) influencing financial market participants’ expectation of the future policy rate. I offer an alternative perspective: Money is essential for monetary policy because it is essential for controlling the price level, and the monetary authority’s ability to control interest rates is greatly exaggerated.     

Are monetary-policy reaction functions asymmetric?: The role of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve

This paper investigates the implications of a nonlinear Phillips curve for the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules. Combined with a quadratic loss function, the optimal policy is also nonlinear, with the policy-maker increasing interest rates by a larger amount when inflation or output are above target than the amount it will reduce them when they are below target. Specifically, the main prediction of our model is that such a source of nonlinearity leads to the inclusion of the interaction between expected inflation and the output gap in an otherwise linear Taylor rule. We find empirical support for this type of asymmetries in the interest rate-setting behaviour of four European central banks but none for the US Fed.     

Federal Reserve communications and newswire coverage

In this article, we explore the determinants of newswire coverage of Federal Reserve (Fed) communications. Our sample covers all 344 forward-looking communications made in the period May 1999 to May 2004. We find, first, that there is a higher likelihood of newswire coverage for monetary policy reports and speeches by Chairman Greenspan than for testimony and speeches by other Fed members. Furthermore, communications with an explicit monetary policy inclination or tone different from the current interest rate path are particularly likely to be covered. However, the release of important macroeconomic news reduces the likelihood of newswire coverage. Second, speeches by regional Fed presidents are relatively less likely to be reported than speeches by Board members. Nevertheless, newswire coverage of Fed president speeches is more likely if central bank communication is stale. Finally, our results indicate that Ben Bernanke played a distinguished role even before his Chairmanship.     

OPTIMAL EDUCATION POLICIES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

We consider the optimal education policies of a small economy whose government has a limited budget. Initially, the economy is closed and the government chooses its education policy to maximize welfare under autarky. When the economy trades with the rest of the world the government chooses a new education policy that maximizes welfare under trade. Is it ever optimal for the government to choose its new policy so that it reverses the economy's comparative advantage? We find that if the budget stays fixed when it is optimal to ‘move up the skills chain’ it is not feasible. In such a case, a foreign loan is welfare improving. A move in the opposite direction can be optimal, and when it is optimal it is also feasible.     

DID TIME INCONSISTENCY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT INFLATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE FOMC TRANSCRIPTS

We use evidence from detailed records of FOMC deliberations to argue that time inconsistency theory can help explain the excessive monetary expansion that characterized Arthur Burns's tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman (1970–1978). The records suggest that the Fed perceived a Phillips curve tradeoff and political pressures that made it difficult to adopt disinflationary policies; the tendency toward excessively expansionary policy was exacerbated by the short-run planning horizon the Committee faced in each of its meetings. We argue that comparative static predictions of the time inconsistency model are consistent with the rise of inflation during the Burns years and its subsequent fall.