The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem

Contrary to Miller and Modigliani [1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433], payout policy is not irrelevant and investment policy is not the sole determinant of value, even in frictionless markets. MM ask “Do companies with generous distribution policies consistently sell at a premium above those with niggardly payouts?” But MM's analysis does not address this question because the joint effect of their assumptions is to mandate 100% free cash flow payout in every period, thereby rendering “niggardly payouts” infeasible and forcing distributions to a global optimum. Irrelevance obtains, but in an economically vacuous sense because the firm's opportunity set is artificially constrained to payout policies that fully distribute free cash flow. When MM's assumptions are relaxed to allow retention, payout policy matters in exactly the same sense that investment policy does. Moreover (i) the standard Fisherian model is empirically refutable, predicting that firms will make large payouts in present value terms, (ii) only when payout policy is optimized will the present value of distributions equal the PV of project cash flows, (iii) the NPV rule for investments is not sufficient to ensure value maximization, rather an analogous rule for payout policy is also necessary, and (iv) Black's [1976. The dividend puzzle. Journal of Portfolio Management 2, 5–8] “dividend puzzle” is a non-puzzle because it is rooted in the mistaken idea that MM's irrelevance theorem applies to payout/retention decisions, which it does not.     

When Capital Follows Profitability: Non-linear Residual Income Dynamics

Economic reasoning suggests that capital follows profitability. This study introduces into residual income valuation capital follows profitability investment dynamics whereby capital investments are guided by the profitability of underlying investment opportunities. These investment dynamics predict convex versus linear relations between future and current residual income, with slope and convexity dependent on investment opportunity. We test these predictions against the linear information dynamics (LID) proposed by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1996), with supportive results. These findings point the way to further development of links between firm value and the economics of value creation.     

Optimal payout ratio under uncertainty and the flexibility hypothesis: Theory and empirical evidence

Following the dividend flexibility hypothesis used by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), Blau and Fuller (2008), and others, we theoretically extend the proposition of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) optimal payout policy in terms of the flexibility dividend hypothesis. In addition, we also introduce growth rate, systematic risk, and total risk variables into the theoretical model.To test the theoretical results derived in this paper, we use the data collected in the US from 1969 to 2009 to investigate the impact of the growth rate, systematic risk, and total risk on the optimal payout ratio in terms of the fixed-effect model. We find that based on flexibility considerations, a company will reduce its payout when the growth rate increases. In addition, we find that a nonlinear relationship exists between the payout ratio and the risk. In other words, the relationship between the payout ratio and the risk is negative (or positive) when the growth rate is higher (or lower) than the rate of return on total assets. Our theoretical model and empirical results can therefore be used to identify whether flexibility or the free cash flow hypothesis should be used to determine the dividend policy.     

Dividend policy: Reconciling DD with MM

Miller and Modigliani [1961. Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433] establish the irrelevance of dividend policy in a perfect capital market. DeAngelo and DeAngelo [2006. The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 293–315.] suggest the Miller-Modigliani analysis is flawed and consequently their central conclusion is incorrect. The purpose of this paper is to show the vital role played by stock repurchases and agency costs in reconciling the two opposing views.     

Discussion of “Forward Versus Trailing Earnings in Equity Valuation”

The focus of this discussion is on the empirical implications of Yee (2004, this issue). Yee's key contribution is the introduction of belief dependency into the model developed in Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995, 1996), and Ohlson and Zhang (1998). Yee's primary conclusion is that accruals that do not incorporate beliefs about unobservable information lead to contemporaneous accounting data that are not sufficient for valuation but often belief-free accruals can lead to forward earnings that may be valuation sufficient. Yee (2004) provides an alternative theoretical model of the relation between firm value, trailing earnings, and forward earnings. This model may be used (1) to re-interpret the results of numerous empirical studies of the relation between market metrics, trailing earnings, and forward earnings, and (2) as the basis for framing further hypotheses and empirical studies.     

An empirical assessment of the Feltham-Ohlson models considering the sign of abnormal earnings

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the Feltham-Ohlson models, distinguishing between firms with positive and negative abnormal earnings. Abnormal earnings persistence and conservatism parameters differ for these two groups; this implies different earnings prediction models and valuation functions for both profit-making and loss-making firms. The analysis refers to the period 1991-1999 and uses a sample of Spanish firms quoted on the Madrid S.E. The results suggest that our contextual approach is more useful than the non-contextual one to predict future abnormal earnings and explain current prices. Although the Ohlson (1995) model is accurate in forecasting future abnormal earnings and stock prices, the results improve when firms with negative abnormal earnings are valued using a temporary model and firms with positive abnormal earnings using a more permanent one. The Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model generates the lowest forecast errors in the prediction of positive abnormal earnings, but it produces the least accurate results in forecasting prices.     

The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends and the Tax Differential Theory of Dividend Policy: A Case Revisited

One of the most controversial areas in finance concerns the relevance or irrelevance of dividend policy. Survey results reported by researchers indicate that corporate chief financial officers believe that dividend policy does affect stock prices. One factor that could cause dividend policy to matter is possible tax effects. However, although many maintain that tax treatment would favor low payout, Miller and Scholes argue that tax policy is irrelevant. The latest change in the tax code, which removed the lower capital gains tax rate, provides a unique opportunity to examine the relevance of tax policy alone. This study revisits the Citizens Utilities case, which was used by Long and Poterba. We conclude that the market for Citizens Utilities shares indicates that tax policy does influence value.     

Linear Information Dynamics,Dividend Irrelevance,Corporate Valuation and the Clean Surplus Relationship

This paper adopts the linear information dynamics framework pioneered in Ohlson (1979) and Garman and Ohlson (1980) (and subsequently used in, in particular, Ohlson, 1989, 1995 and Feltham and Ohlson, 1995) for thinking about desirable properties of earnings numbers in the context of the market valuation of firms, where such valuations are fundamentally based on expected future dividends. The first purpose of this paper is to consider the valuation-relevance of clean surplus earnings when there are two distinct components of clean surplus earnings whose evolutions are governed, along with book value and dividends, by a system of linear information dynamics, and dividend irrelevancy holds. The system of linear information dynamics assumed ensures that corporate value is a linear combination of the two components of clean surplus earnings, book value and dividends. One question becomes—under what circumstances are clean surplus earnings (combined with book value and dividends) sufficient for corporate valuation without a knowledge of the breakdown of clean surplus earnings into its separate components? This paper develops the conditions defining these circumstances. At the other extreme, another question can be asked—under what circumstances is one component of clean surplus earnings irrelevant to corporate valuation? This paper identifies some conditions that identify these latter circumstances. The second purpose of the paper is to identify implications of these results for both the traditional arguments about the desirability of measuring earnings on a clean surplus basis and also the more contemporary issues surrounding FRS3. A third purpose is to discuss the implications of the overall analysis for the empirical testing of the relationship between market prices and earnings numbers, and for empirically-justified definitions of maintainable earnings.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence

Bhattacharyya (2007 ) develops a model in which compensation contracts motivate high‐quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low‐quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. In equilibrium, the model shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. Results of tests of US data show that executive compensation is positively (negatively) associated with earnings retention (dividend payout). Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy is perhaps best understood by considering the payout ratio (dividends divided by earnings), rather than the level of cash dividends alone.     

Book Value,Residual Earnings,and Equilibrium Firm Value with Asymmetric Information

The residual income valuation model (RIM) by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) assumes that investors are risk-neutral with homogenous beliefs. Thus, the present value of expected dividends represents firm value. The purpose of the present study is to derive a RIM in a market setting of the Kyle (1985) type. Since traders are asymmetrically informed in the Kyle setting, firm value is no longer equivalent to the present value of the firm's expected dividends. In the present model, the informed investor observes a signal about the firm's profitability, which the market maker (who sets the price) is unable to observe. The market maker infers the informed investor's private signal based on the total order flow, which is an informative but noisy signal. The analysis identifies the equilibrium firm value as a linear function of current book value, current residual income, and the aggregate order flow.     

Inherent Virtue or Inevitable Evil: The Effects of Directors' and Officers' Insurance on Firm Value

Whether directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance improves firm value is a controversial issue. We perform a literature review about the effect of D&O insurance and find mixed results. The proponents of D&O insurance believe it enhances corporate monitoring and improves firm value, while the opponents of D&O insurance argue that it creates a moral hazard problem and diminishes firm value. Against this backdrop, we argue that the trade‐off between the monitoring and moral hazard effects depends on the information acquired by the outside directors. Using a sample of listed Canadian firms, we find that (1) a change in D&O insurance coverage has no net effect on a firm's subsequent value when we ignore the information acquired by outside directors, (2) an increase in D&O insurance coverage improves a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are well informed, and (3) an increase in D&O insurance coverage reduces a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are poorly informed. Our findings are robust to endogeneity checks and have important implications for the regulation of D&O insurance.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence from New Zealand

Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.     

Dynamic risk, accounting-based valuation and firm fundamentals

This study extends the accounting-based valuation framework of Ohlson (Contemp Acc Res 11(2):661–687, 1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (Acc Rev 74(2):165–183, 1999) to incorporate dynamic expectations about the level of systematic risk in the economy. Our model explains recent empirical findings documenting a strong negative association between changes in economy-wide risk and future stock returns. Importantly, the model also generates costs of capital that are solely a linear function of accounting variables and other firm fundamentals, including the book-to-market ratio, the earnings-to-price ratio, the forward earnings-to-price ratio, size and the dividend yield. This result provides a theoretical rationale for the inclusion of these popular variables in cost of capital (expected return) computations by the accounting and finance literatures and obviates the need to estimate costs of capital from unobservable (future) covariances. The model also generates an accounting return decomposition in the spirit of Vuolteenaho (J Finance 57(1):233–264, 2002). Empirically, we find that costs of capital generated by our model are significantly associated with future returns both in and out of sample in contrast to standard benchmark models. We further obtain significantly lower valuation errors in out-of-sample tests than traditional models that ignore dynamic risk expectations.     

The Valuation of Assets under Moral Hazard

The design of managerial incentive contracts is examined in a setting in which economic agents are risk averse, and the actions of managers can affect asset returns which contain both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. It is shown that in the absence of moral hazard, owners of assets will insure managers against idiosyncratic risks, but with moral hazard, contracts will depend on both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. The traditional recommendation of asset pricing models, namely, to focus only on systematic risks, is thus proved to be valid only when there is no moral hazard. The major empirically testable predictions of the model are (1) managerial incentive contracts will generally depend on systematic as well as idiosyncratic risks, (2) idiosyncratic risks will generally be important in investment decisions, (3) the managers of firms with relatively high levels of idiosyncratic risks will have compensations that are less dependent on their firms' excess returns, and (4) the compensations of managers of larger firms will be relatively more dependent on the excess returns of their firms.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and acquisition outcomes

We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.     

Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Approach

This article presents a continuous-time agency model in thepresence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk-averseagent and a risk-neutral principal. Under the model setup, weshow that the optimal controls are constant over time, and thusthe optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in thefinal outcome. We also show that when a moral hazard problemadds to an adverse selection problem, the monotonicity conditionwell known in the pure adverse selection literature needs tobe modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for informationrevelation. The model is applied to a few managerial compensationproblems involving managerial project selection and capitalbudgeting decisions. We argue that in the third-best world,the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and thesensitivity of the contract depends on interactions betweenthe managerial cost and the firm’s production functions.Contrary to conventional wisdom, sometimes the higher the volatility,the higher the sensitivity of the contract. The firm receivinggood news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less thanit does with bad news. We also examine the effects of the observabilityof the volatility on corporate investment decisions.     

The Sources of Financing Constraints

Which financial frictions drive firms’ financing constraints? We structurally estimate dynamic firm financing models embedding many financial frictions, on panels of public firms and private firms. We focus on limited enforcement, moral hazard, and trade-off models and assess which models rationalize best observed corporate policies across various samples. Our tests, based on empirical policy function benchmarks, favor trade-off models for larger public firms, limited commitment models for smaller public firms, and moral hazard models for Private firms. Our estimates suggest significant financing constraints due to agency frictions and highlight the importance of identifying their sources for firm valuation.     

Corporate Payout Policy,Cash Savings,and the Cost of Consistency: Evidence from a Structural Estimation

We develop a dynamic structural model to better understand how corporate payout policy is determined in conjunction with other corporate decisions. In a first‐best model, a manager maximizes equity value by choosing the firm's optimal financing, investment, dividends, and cash holdings. By using simulated method of moments, we show that, on average, firms excessively smooth their payout while making corporate savings overly volatile and retaining excess cash. We then extend the model to capture the effect of a manager, who perceives a cost to cutting payouts. Estimating the model, we infer the magnitude of this cost. We find that a managerial preference for consistent payout explains the smooth payout and high volatility of cash holdings.     

Agency costs of free cash flow and conditional conservatism

This study investigates whether agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are associated with conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that conditional conservatism improves ex ante efficient investment decisions and facilitates ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions. As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF. Using excess cash as a proxy for the agency costs of FCF, I provide evidence that firms with higher agency costs of FCF incorporate losses in a timelier manner relative to gains compared to their counterparts. Additionally, the association between excess cash and conditional conservatism predictably varies with the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms that mitigate FCF problems, such as debt or dividend payouts or repurchases. Further investigation suggests that greater conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of overinvestment among firms bearing high agency costs of FCF, demonstrating the ability of conservatism to reduce agency costs of FCF.