Managing Stock Option Expense: The Manipulation of Option‐Pricing Model Assumptions*

This paper examines whether firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense in their financial statements manage that expense downward more than firms that do not recognize the expense by adjusting option‐pricing model assumptions. To examine this issue, I collect option‐pricing model assumptions from fiscal year 2002 for both a sample of firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense (“recognizing firms”) and a sample of control firms that do not (“disclosing firms”). The empirical results suggest that recognizing firms manage the recognized stock‐based compensation expense reported in their financial statements downward more than do firms that only disclose the expense. Additional analyses reveal that recognizing firms assume a lower level of volatility than disclosing firms in the option‐pricing model calculations; however, I find no evidence that recognizing firms manage the dividend yield and risk‐free interest rate assumptions more than disclosing firms. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(R), which requires the expensing of the fair value of stock options, so these results may be of interest to capital‐market participants and the FASB as they assess the reliability of stock option expense as determined by option‐pricing models.     

Accounting Choices and Risk Management: SFAS No. 115 and U.S. Bank Holding Companies*

This paper provides evidence that regulatory contracts affect firms' accounting choices and risk‐management decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether an exogenous shock to regulatory risk induced by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, “Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities” (SFAS 1993), encouraged U.S. banks to deviate from portfolio and risk benchmarks when they adopted the standard. Because we cannot observe relevant benchmarks, we model portfolio and risk decisions as functions of macroeconomic and firm‐specific factors using data from a period when regulatory capital was immune to SFAS No. 115 accounting. We examine a sample of 230 publicly traded banks and find that (1) irrespective of adoption timing, banks classified too few securities available for sale (AFS) relative to estimated benchmarks; (2) weaker banks that adopted the standard early classified far more securities as AFS relative to benchmarks; (3) banks altered the size of their securities portfolios along with the levels of interest‐rate risk and credit risk as regulatory capital decreased; and (4) the level of interest‐rate risk on banks' loan portfolios increased at the time of SFAS No. 115 adoption. We also explore the 1995 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) amnesty when firms could “readopt” SFAS No. 115. We find that banks used the 1995 FASB amnesty to undo strategic initial SFAS No. 115 adoption decisions. Taken together, our findings suggest that SFAS No. 115 caused some of the accounting and economic consequences predicted by bankers, analysts, and academics.     

美国股票期权会计的最新进展及其启示

美国财务会计准则委员会颁布的最新的股票期权会计准则要求公众公司和私人公司均采用公允价值法计量股票期权,并且为股票期权的计量提供了新的定价模型。本文试图通过分析新准则的出台背景、内容和特点,探讨我国在制定股票期权会计准则的过程中可以吸收和借鉴的有益经验。     

POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND KMT PARTY‐OWNED ENTERPRISES IN TAIWAN

This article will study how the existence of KMT party‐owned enterprises (POEs) and their development are related to Taiwan's democratization. POEs are profit‐making enterprises managed by the KMT, the former ruling party. All previous studies about the relationship between democratization and POEs only draw attention to the economic resource aspects of POEs. But the POEs were also KMT political resources in the form of enterprises and became policy tools to the ruling party. This study will argue that the existence of the POEs was a factor that maintained the KMT government and supported its stable management during the process of democratization. Moreover, POEs as political resources enabled Lee Teng‐hui as KMT chairman to demonstrate strong leadership and push ahead with the completion of democratization. But Lee's political mobilization of POEs expanded money politics and perpetuated these enterprises as one of the “authoritarian legacies” in Taiwan's democratic politics.     

On Commitment Toward Knowledge Templates in Global Standard Setting: The Case of the FASB‐IASB Revenue Project

This article explores commitment to knowledge templates, in this case competing measurement models, in global standard‐setting processes. In particular, I examine the positions of board members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on a proposal to use fair value accounting in the measurement of revenue. The proposal to measure revenue at fair value was deliberated between 2002 and 2008 as part of the joint revenue project of the FASB and the IASB. I analyze narratives of the board proceedings on the revenue project, which reveal the positions of board members over the life of the proposal. To make sense of these positions, I use Durocher and Gendron's (2014) framework on epistemic commitment, which speaks to one's allegiance to knowledge templates. The analysis shows that individual board member commitment to different knowledge templates is fairly static despite dynamic and contentious debate on this particular proposal. While stable, board member reactions to the proposed shift toward fair value fall into recognizable patterns showing how commitment to different templates entails prioritizing of different core principles and appeals to higher authorities. Finally, the analysis shows how commitment to knowledge templates varies depending on the professional affiliations of board members. For instance, the analysis shows relatively greater consistency of commitment between board members affiliated with academia and corporate preparers than between auditors. Overall, the study indicates the importance of micro‐level features in explaining the development of macro‐level accounting policy. These features are crucial to enhancing our broader understanding of the way in which accounting standards and rules ultimately develop.     

The Eternal Debate Over Conservatism and Prudence: A Historical Perspective on the Conceptualization of Asymmetry in Financial Accounting Theory*

The recent revisions of conceptual frameworks (CFs) by the IASB and the FASB included changes to the status of prudence/conservatism, accompanied by a broader debate about the meaning and role of asymmetry in financial accounting theory (FinAT). This paper adopts a historical perspective to identify possible sources of the current controversies by examining how the discourse on asymmetry has developed over time. For this purpose, we trace the conceptualization of asymmetry in FinAT building from the 19th century until 2018, covering contributions to the US FinAT literature and the conceptual reasoning of standard setters (and their constituents) in the United States and at the international level. We identify four distinct constructs of asymmetry (ultra-, specified, discretionary, and neutral asymmetry) developed in FinAT under the headings of “conservatism” and/or “prudence.” Our analysis reveals that the respective historical circumstances strongly influenced which notion and role of asymmetry were commonly accepted in FinAT, while the arguments underlying the debates were going in circles and were characterized by an increasing level of abstraction over time. We conclude that the controversy about asymmetry is partially due to conceptual ambiguity but also due to different assumptions about the objective of financial reporting and attributes of the preparer, which are indicative of two conflicting paradigms shaping the FinAT discourse on asymmetry. Our findings point to gaps and limitations in the deductive CFs currently employed by the IASB and FASB. Our study highlights future research potential regarding the construction of the preparer in standard setting and analyses of the ways in which deductive CFs (fail to) translate into consistent standards.     

An Economic Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Services: The Trade‐off between Competition Crossovers and Knowledge Spillovers*

In this paper, I present a model in which both markets for audit services and nonaudit services (NAS) are oligopolistic. Accounting firms providing both audit services and NAS will employ oligopolistic competition in each of these markets. In addition to auditors' gaining “knowledge spillovers” from auditing to consulting or vice versa, oligopolistic competition in one market will influence the counterpart in the other market ‐ what I call “competition crossovers”. Although scope economies due to knowledge spillovers (for example, cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, such benefits can entice accounting firms to adopt strategies (for example, price reductions) to compete aggressively in the audit market so that some, or all, firms become worse off. A trade‐off arises between these two economic forces in the two oligopolistic markets. Given the trade‐off between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers, accounting firms may not reduce their audit prices, even though supplying NAS enables firms to decrease auditing costs — a nontrivial impact of oligopolistic competition in two markets on audit pricing. The empirical implication of my results is that because of competition‐crossover effects between the auditing and consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence for knowledge‐spillover benefits is likely to be difficult. Control variables for “audit‐market concentration” concerned with competition‐crossover effects and “auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge‐spillover benefits should be included in audit‐fee regressions to increase the power of empirical tests. With regard to policy implications, my analyses help explain the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on “market segmentation” and, hence, the profitability of accounting firms.     

Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*

Accounting discretion and the principle of conservatism are two salient features embedded in financial reporting systems. Arguably, the practice of conservative accounting choices can never be well understood without incorporating their effect on future periods (the intertemporal effect). This paper provides one explanation for managerial conservatism in a two‐period agency model with hidden information (a binary project type) and hidden actions (the agent's efforts). A piece‐wise linear incentive scheme with accounting earnings as the performance measure is employed. The agent's discretion is the choice of a depreciation method. Discretion is valuable if and only if the agent's marginal productivity of a “bad” project is greater than that of a “good” project, but not to an extreme degree. A conservative depreciation method decreases current compensation in exchange for a “bet” on future compensation and, hence, serves as a commitment device for the agent to signal that the prospect is indeed good. The accounting mechanism replicates the performance of the optimal direct mechanism.     

Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico

In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.     

Words and Numbers: Financialization and Accounting Standard Setting in the United Kingdom

How is it possible that British policymakers resisted market‐based measurement for decades while financial economic concepts of decision making and valuation still gained widespread acceptance as a justification for accounting standard setting? This study introduces the concept of “technologies of financialization” to develop the theorizing of the rise of finance in the domain of accounting. Based on a genealogical history of narrative reporting in the United Kingdom, it demonstrates how references to qualitative reporting techniques helped to address recurring crises of measurement from 1969 to 1993, and ultimately contributed to the practical acceptance of market‐based measurement in the UK standard‐setting context. The data are interpreted through a cultural economy framework that directs attention to the power of referring to financial reporting as a combination of words and numbers in sustaining its theoretical redefinition “from below”—that is, by relating it to the experience of practicing accountants rather than accounting theory. As a technology of financialization, narrative reporting made financial economic ideals of market‐based measurement, decision usefulness, and future orientation appear operable in a real‐life reporting context. Whenever measurement reached its practical limits, narratives were relied on to explain the impact of price‐level changes, frame economic decisions, and relate unobservable future cash flows to present‐day strategies and resources. The insight into how narrative reporting practices have been laced into the reasoning of capital markets for over 40 years is timely because it illustrates that narratives can also play a more encompassing role and drive the turn toward wider corporate accountability on social and environmental impacts while hard measurements in this area are still being figured out.     

CEO Hedging Opportunities and the Weighting of Performance Measures in Compensation Contracts

This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting‐based and stock‐based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting‐based performance measures receive more weight, whereas stock‐based performance measures receive less weight in determining executive compensation. Moreover, these results are more pronounced when managerial hedging needs are high. Regarding the effects of earnings management resulting from accounting‐based incentives, we find that good auditing and strong governance mechanisms strengthen the benefit of placing more weight on accounting‐based performance measures. Taken together, our findings suggest that corporate boards shift the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts in response to managerial hedging opportunities, which is consistent with optimal contracting.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.     

Accounting Quality,Stock Price Delay,and Future Stock Returns*

In frictionless capital markets with complete information and rational investors, stock prices adjust to new information instantaneously and completely. However, a substantial body of research studies information imperfections such as asymmetric information and incomplete information. Information imperfections potentially hinder timely price discovery and are likely associated with delayed stock price adjustment to information. Our first research question therefore is whether the quality of accounting information (or “accounting quality”) is one such information imperfection that is associated with cross‐sectional variation in stock price delay. We define accounting quality as the precision with which financial reports convey information to equity investors about the firm’s expected cash flows. Poor accounting quality is likely associated with higher expected returns through uncertainty about stock valuation parameters and incomplete information. Our second research question therefore is whether the accounting quality component of price delay is associated with higher future stock returns. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that poor accounting quality is associated with delayed price adjustment and higher future stock returns. Thus, accounting quality plays a role in timely stock price discovery.     

PCAOB Inspections: Public Accounting Firms on “Trial”

The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.     

The Worth of Fair Value Accounting: Dissonance between Users and Standard Setters

Investors and analysts are designated as the primary users of financial reports by standard setters, yet we know very little about their use of accounting information and about their relationship with standard setters. This paper explores how investors and analysts evaluate the usefulness of fair values to their work. Standard setters typically presume that investors and analysts view accounting as a practice of valuation and, therefore, favor the greater use of fair value measurement. However, using interview evidence, it is shown here that investors and analysts expect accounting to provide them with insights into the performance of a business, and are quite cautious about the limits of using fair values in financial reports. Overall, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between accounting and its users. It adds specifically to research which has analyzed the disconnect between users and standard setters in terms of standard setters ignoring user needs (Young 2006 ), and in terms of users being indifferent about, or uncritical of, outcomes of standard‐setting processes (Durocher, Fortin, and Cote 2007 ; Durocher and Gendron 2011 ). The paper suggests a re‐theorization of the disconnect between the two groups that involves thinking away from tension, or blame. Drawing on the work of David Stark ( 2009 ), the situation observed is conceptualized as one of “dissonance,” where the different ways of evaluating fair values coexist without being involved in a fierce contest. That is, even though the principles of valuation and performance differ, this difference does not lead to open disagreement and political lobbying from investors and analysts. Consequences of this dissonance to our understandings of the (absence of) worth of fair values in capital markets are discussed.     

Cross‐Country Evidence on Labor Market Institutions and Young Adult Employment through the Financial Crisis

I develop and analyze a set of cross‐country facts regarding employment and wage setting institutions over the decade surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. Among long‐industrialized countries, young adult employment declined more than prime age employment over this time period. I show that differences in countries' wage setting institutions strongly predict variations in the magnitude of declines in young adult employment. Both unconditionally and conditional on changes in macroeconomic conditions, young adult employment declined 5 percentage points less in countries where wage setting is driven by collective bargaining arrangements than in countries with statutory wage floors. Evidence on the evolution of legislated minimum wage rates and of an asymmetry in the relationship between growth and young adult employment suggest an important role for a standard “wage rigidity” mechanism.     

SARIT AND THAILAND'S “PRO-AMERICAN POLICY”

The idea of “pro-Americanism,” appearing at the same time as America's sense of world mission, is a phenomenon of the post World War II period, and for this reason has a very short history. The basic point is that “pro-Americanism”fluctuates according to American conditions, but fundamentally it is controlled by the internal conditions of the “pro-American”country. At the same time, as in most diplomatic relations, “pro-Americanism”is too a basically unstable condition and by trying to stabilize it and make it permanent, both American and the other countries undergo severe stresses. The “pro-American”relationship which ties the United States with numerous small countries in a chiefly bilateral relationship is certainly not immutable. How should the changes be measured and in what context should they be viewed? I shall take the case of Thailand, the most “pro-American”of the Southeast Asian countries. I shall be looking at political leadership as the basic key to the changes, and from this angle the main problem of this article is how to evaluate the part played by Sarit.     

CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay

Prior studies on Japanese executive compensation have been constrained by the lack of longitudinal data on individual CEO pay. Using unique 10-year panel data on individual CEO's salary and bonus of Japanese firms from 1986 to 1995, we present the first estimates on pay-performance relations for Japanese CEO compensation. Specifically we find consistently that Japanese CEO's cash compensation is sensitive to firm performance (especially accounting measures), and that the “semi-elasticity” of CEO's cash compensation with respect to ROA is 1.3 to 1.4, which is in general agreement with prior estimates elsewhere. As such, our estimates do not support that Japanese corporate governance is unusually defunct with regard to the significance and size of the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting profitability. On the other hand, to be consistent with the literature on Japanese corporate governance that tends to downplay the role of shareholders and stress the role of banks and employees, we find that stock market performance tends to play a less important role in the determination of Japanese CEO compensation. Finally, we find that the bonus system makes CEO compensation more responsive to firm performance in Japan. The finding is in contrast to the literature on compensation for regular employees in Japan which often argues that bonus is a disguised base wage. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (1) (2006) 1–19.     

The New Deal and Modern Memory

The “Great Recession,” which began at year‐end 2007, was precipitated by plunging real estate values, followed by borrower defaults and financial crisis for the public and private institutions that supplied loanable funds to the mortgage market. With economic growth not yet returned to trend, three years on more than 9% of the American labor force remains unemployed. Current macroeconomic events, perhaps inevitably, have been compared to those of the Great Depression of 1929–1933, both in terms of severity and of the efficacy of the public policies adopted ostensibly to restore prosperity. In this article, I review the literature on the New Deal, paying particular attention to modern scholarship emphasizing the role of presidential politics and antibusiness political rhetoric in deepening and prolonging the Great Depression. The parallels between then and now suggest that the two economic contractions had similar causes and elicited equally counterproductive policy responses.     

The London Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 and the End of the Great Depression

In this paper I analyze the London Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933, an almost forgotten episode in U.S. monetary history. I study how the Conference shaped dollar policy during the second half of 1933 and early 1934. I use daily data to investigate the way in which the Conference and related policies associated to the gold standard affected commodity prices, bond prices, and the stock market. My results show that the Conference itself did not impact commodity prices or the stock market. However, it had a small effect on bond prices. I do find that the events associated with the abandonment of the gold standard impacted prices in a significant way, even before the actual monetary and currency channels were at work. These results are consistent with the “change in regime” hypothesis of Sargent (1983).