索丽生副部长在全国水利技术监督工作会议上的讲话

在举国上下深入学习贯彻党的十六大和十六届三中全会精神的重要时刻，我们在这里召开全国水利技术监督工作会议。这次会议的主题是：认真贯彻党的十六大和十六届三中全会精神，以“三个代表”重要思想为指导，落实《水法》和国家有关标准化、认证认可、计量、质量工作的方针政策，总结交流近几年水利技术监督工作的新进展、新经验，研究部署新时期水利技术监督工作，为实现水利现代化和可持续发展提供强有力的技术支持和保障。会议还将表彰在水利技术监督工作中涌现出的先进集体和先进个人。借此机会，我谨代表水利部和汪恕诚部长向获得表彰的先进集体和先进个人表示热烈祝贺!向长期从事水利标准化、认证认可、计量和质量工作以及所有关心、支持水利技术监督工作的同志们表示衷心感谢和亲切问候!下面，我讲三点意见。     

在中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招标投标研究分会第三届理事会第四次会议上的工作报告

中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招标投标研究分会第三届理事会第四次会议，今天在四川省成都市召开了。首先，我代表建筑市场与招标投标研究分会，向出席我们这次会议的各位领导和与会的全体同志表示热烈的欢迎和诚挚的谢意!向为我们这次会议顺利召开做了大量周密而细致的准备工作，提供热情而周到服务的四川省建设工程招标投标总站的同志们表示衷心的感谢!     

国家质检总局党组书记李传卿在全国标准化工作会议上的讲话 〈2004年2月24日（节选）〉

国家标准委召开的这次全国标准化工作会议，是贯彻党的十六届三中全会和中央经济工作会议精神的具体举措，是贯彻家宝总理批示要求和吴仪副总理到总局视察时的讲话精神，落实全国质量监督、检验检疫两个局长会议精神的实际行动。这次会议对于加快标准化工作的改革和发展，充分发挥标准化工作的基础作用，开创标准化工作新局面，具有十分重要的意义。近年来，通过全系统的共同努力，标准化工作在促进国民经济和社会发展中显示了越来越重要的作用，标准化工作的重要性、有效性和权威性得到了社会的广泛认同。在此，我谨代表总局党组、代表长江局长向各位代表并通过你们向辛勤工作在全国标准化战线上的广大干部职工表示衷心的感谢并致以诚挚的问候。下面，我先讲几点意见。供同志们参考。     

办好《冶金财会》为推进钢铁工业健康发展服务

同志们： 一年一度的《冶金财会》通讯工作会议，今天在八钢召开。首先，我代表《冶金财会》杂志社及全体与会代表向为这次会议精心筹划、热情服务的八钢领导和全体会务工作人员、服务人员表示衷心的感谢!向前来参加会议的全体代表表示热烈欢迎和问候!     

团结一心扎实工作努力开创机械工业标准化工作新局面

机械工业标准化工作会议今天在海口召开，这是机械联合会成立以来召开的第一次标准化工作会议。本次会议的主要任务是：贯彻党的十六大会议精神，落实全国标准化工作会议、全国采用国际标准会议和全国工业规划会议提出的标准化任务，总结一年来的标准化工作，分析当前标准化工作面临的形势，部署明年标准化工作。一、２００２年机械工业标准化工作的简要回顾２００２年，对机械工业标准化工作来说是不平凡的一年。随着政府经济管理的内容、形式、方法的变化，机械联合会协助政府管理机械工业标准化工作的任务不断明确。自２０００年底国家质…     

在中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招投标研究分会第四届理事会第一次扩大会议上的工作报告

各位理事、各位代表、同志们：中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招标投标研究分会第四届理事会第一次会议今天在武汉市召开了。首先，我代表建筑市场与招标投标研究分会，向出席我们这次会议的建设部和中国土木工程学会的领导同志，向湖北省建设厅、武汉市建委的领导同志和与会全体同志表示热烈的欢迎，并致以崇高的敬意!向为我们这次会议顺利召开做了大量周密细致的准备工作，提供热情周到服务的武汉市建设工程交易中心的领导和同志们表示衷心的感谢!     

总结经验 承前启后 继往开来

各位代表、同志们：在中国施工企业管理协会第24次年会召开之际，我代表国家发展和改革委员会对本次大会的召开表示祝贺，预祝会议取得圆满成功。向各位代表，并通过你们向辛勤工作在工程建设第一线的广大干部职工表示亲切问候!     

办好《冶金财会》 为推进钢铁工业健康发展服务——在2011年《冶金财会》通讯工作会议上的报告

<正>同志们:一年一度的《冶金财会》通讯工作会议,今天在八钢召开。首先,我代表《冶金财会》杂志社及全体与会代表向为这次会议精心筹划、热情服务的八钢领导和全体会务工作人员、服务人员表示衷心的感谢!向前来参加会议的全体代表表示热烈欢迎和问候!     

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中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招标投标研究分会第四届理事会第一次会议: 欣闻我会第四届理事会第一次会议于12月15 日在武汉召开,我因事不能到会。谨向大会的召开表示热烈的祝贺,向与会全体代表表示亲切的问候和良好的祝愿!     

中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招标投标研究分会第四届理事会第二次会议工作报告

2006年10月11日各位理事、各位代表、同志们:中国土木工程学会建筑市场与招标投标研究分会第四届理事会第二次会议今天在安徽省合肥市召开了。首先,我代表建筑市场与招标投标研究分会,向出席我们这次会议的安徽省建设厅的领导同志,向全体与会代表和同志们表示热烈的欢迎,并致以崇高的敬意!向为我们这次会议顺利召开做了大量周密细致的准备工作,提供热情周到服务的安徽省招标办和安徽省招投标协会的领导和全体工作人员表示衷心的感谢!这次理事会的议题主要有以下五个方面:一是听取和审议“分会”第四届理事会第二次会议的工作报告;二是听取和…     

小车“超人”再定位

尽管已经进入中国快20年,铃木的口碑仍只是在小型车领域传播,出于品牌向上的考虑,它终于推出了自己的B级车。     

Globalization, new ecologies, new zoologies, and the purported death of the eclectic paradigm

This paper provides a commentary to John Mathews' article in issue 23(1) of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management. I discuss how globalisation is fundamentally altering the milieu within which international business is conducted, and this new ‘ecology’ may indeed require scholars to consider a new ‘zoology’ of firms in the future. However, his specific suggestions are based on sparse evidence, and his alternative to the eclectic paradigm is founded on a misunderstanding of some fundamental concepts.     

Bureaucracy,economic regulation,and the incentive limits of the firm

This paper uses a transactions cost perspective to examine the development of organizational tendencies that plague the governance of unregulated subsidiaries by regulated parent companies. By focussing on what Williamson (1985) calls the ‘incentive limits’ of firms, conditions that should exacerbate the problems facing these firms as they diversify are identified. Empirical testing of hypotheses drawn from this discussion is conducted using a sample of nonutility, nonregulated subsidiaries of 54 electric utilities. The analysis, using both linear regression and event history methods, confirms the connection between the characteristics of the regulated parent company and subsidiary performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of how further research might extend the state of knowledge on the topic of the economic losses of bureaucracy.     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antitrust,the Rule of Reason,and Democracy

Professor Barnes responds to William Curran's fictional dialogue between Senator John Sherman and philosopher John Rawls, with a fictional letter from Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Professor Barnes discusses the importance of the anarcho-socialist movement of the late nineteenth century to the adoption of the Sherman Act, the historical and logical inevitability of adoption of a rule of reason in antitrust law, the relevance of efficiency to the rule of reason, and the relationship between competition and the promotion of democratic ideals.     

Partial monitoring,adverse selection,and the internal efficiency of the firm

The paper investigates an adverse selection model with monitoring of managerial effort. In contrast to the literature, we assume that the manager can be punished only if his effort is below a certain level that is monitored by the principal. Surprisingly, the optimal labor contract may induce an equilibrium effort which is lower than in the standard model without monitoring. This result holds for any discrete distribution of managerial types. In the continuous type case, the optimal contracts for high-quality (low-quality) managers are purely output-dependent (effort-dependent).     

Leaders,laggards, and the pursuit of foreign knowledge

This paper analyzes how firms in different technological and market share positions use foreign R&D to augment their technological capabilities. Technology transfer issues and absorptive capacity arguments are examined to analyze the different technological capabilities of leading and lagging firms. In addition, a new strategic rationale (in terms of non‐dominant market share firms) that has not been considered in prior studies analyzing knowledge‐seeking FDI is offered. From a panel dataset which includes information on all foreign R&D investments made by publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms (from 1974 to 1994), I show that Japanese firms investing in foreign R&D tend to be the non‐dominant market share firms, but also the technologically leading firms across fairly diverse industries. By considering both the technological and market share positions of firms, this study reveals important characteristics that influence when firms use foreign R&D as part of a strategy to augment their technological capabilities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.