Information disclosure and exchange media

When commitment is lacking, intertemporal trade is facilitated with the use of exchange media—interpreted broadly to include monetary and collateral assets. We study the properties of a model commonly used to motivate monetary exchange, extended to include a physical asset whose expected short-run return is subject to a news shock, but whose expected long-run return is stable. The nondisclosure of news enhances the asset?s property as an exchange medium, and generally improves social welfare. When a nondisclosure policy is infeasible, the framework admits a role for government debt, including fiat money. When lump-sum taxation is not permitted, fiat money may still improve welfare—but only if its circulation is supported by a cash-in-advance constraint.     

Private takings

This paper examines the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling, Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Kelo can be interpreted as supporting eminent domain as a means of transferring property rights from one set of private agents—landowners—to another private agent—a developer. Under voluntary exchange, where the developer sequentially acquires property rights from landowners via bargaining, a holdout problem arises. Eminent domain gives all of the bargaining power to the developer and, as a result, eliminates the holdout problem. This is the benefit of Kelo. However, landowners lose all their bargaining power and, as a result, their property investments become more inefficient. This is the cost of Kelo. A policy of eminent domain increases social welfare compared to voluntary sequential exchange only when the holdout problem is severe, and this occurs only if the developer has very little bargaining power. We propose an alternative government policy that eliminates the holdout problem but does not affect the bargaining power of the various parties. This alternative policy strictly dominates a policy of eminent domain, which implies that eminent domain is an inefficient way to transfer property rights between private agents.     

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, C71.     

Whither Monetary Economics?

I argue that monetary economics should be pursued by applying implementation theory to models which contain explicit frictions that make money essential. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that models in which real balances are assumed to be productive—models with money in utility or production functions or with cash-in-advance constraints—contain hidden inconsistencies. Second, I argue that the approach advocated is capable of providing new insights about some of the main issues in monetary economics: the effects of monetary shocks, the welfare cost of inflation, and the roles of inside and outside money.     

Price Discrimination in Public Healthcare

Could a public healthcare system use price discrimination—paying medical service providers different fees, depending on the service provider's quality—lead to improvements in social welfare? We show that differentiating medical fees by quality increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing (i.e. quality‐invariant fee schedules) whenever hospitals and doctors have private information about their own ability. We also show that by moving from uniform to differentiated medical fees, the public healthcare system can effectively incentivise good doctors and hospitals (i.e. low‐cost‐types) to provide even higher levels of quality than they would under complete information. In the socially optimal quality‐differentiated medical fee system, low‐cost‐type medical‐service providers enjoy a rent due to their informational advantage. Informational rent is socially beneficial because it gives service providers a strong incentive to invest in the extra training required to deliver high‐quality services at low cost, providing yet another efficiency gain from quality‐differentiated medical fees.     

Costs of change and political polarization

We study a two-period model of policy-making where (i) changes of current policies impose costs on all individuals that increase linearly with the magnitude of the policy shift and (ii) political power changes over time. We show that policy polarization is minimal for intermediate marginal costs. In turn, welfare is a single-peaked function of the marginal cost. One interpretation is that societies with political institutions that impose positive but moderate costs on political reforms simultaneously achieve the highest welfare and the lowest policy polarization.     

Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one׳s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.     

Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions

Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey in J Finance 16(1):8–37, 1961), but repeated experimental studies find more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional probability of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy—despite the fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders—but respond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incentives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations than most of the existing models we consider.     

Testing competing models of loss aversion: an adversarial collaboration

This paper reports an ‘adversarial collaboration’—a project carried out by two individuals or research groups who, having proposed conflicting hypotheses, seek to resolve their dispute. It describes an experiment which investigates whether, when individuals consider giving up money in exchange for goods, they construe money outlays as losses or as foregone gains. This issue bears on the explanation of the widely observed disparity between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) valuations of costs and benefits, which has proved problematic for contingent valuation studies. The results of the experiment are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that money outlays are perceived as losses.     

Duopoly pricing and waiting lines

The paper deals with a model of duopoly pricing in the context of firms providing services to consumers. Each of the firms has a waiting line of customers arriving randomly. The service provided by both firms is identical and the service time of both firms is assumed to obey the same distribution. Different consumers have different time costs and have to decide whether or not to join one of the lines. It is shown that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is such that the two firms charge in general different prices. One of the firms specializes in servicing individuals with high cost of time (and the other the rest). Moreover, some examples of non-existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium and permanent oscillations of prices are shown.     

Transfer principles in income redistribution

Dalton's principle of transfer for income redistribution says that society will be better off when a unit of income in transferred from a richer to a poorer individual. This paper investigates the conjunction of a natural extension of Dalton's principle — which says that any combination of a socially desirable transfer with its inverse at uniformly higher levels of income will have positive social benefit — and a traditional utilitarian-egalitarian formulation of social welfare. The transfer principles involved in the extension of Dalton's rule correspond to stochastic dominance relations between income distributions with a common mean, and lead to the conclusion that, when ? and g are income distributions, the social welfare of ? is larger than that of g if $\text{Σe}{}^{\mathrm{-ax}}\text{?(x)<Σe}{}^{\mathrm{-ax}}\text{g(x)}$ for all positive a. This conclusion is intimately connected with a measure of income inequality studied by Kolm.     

Buffer stocks,exchange rates and deviations from purchasing power parity

In this paper an extension of the Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate reduced form is presented and estimated for four bilateral exchange rates with data from the recent floating experience. The extension incorporates two features: a more sophisticated modelling of money demand, using theCarr andDarby money demand specification, and allowing for deviations from purchasing power parity. The estimated results are supportive of our extended specification and we conclude by arguing that care should be taken in specifying the underlying structural relationships in asset reduced form exchange rate equations.     

Mandating behavioral conformity in social groups with conformist members

Social interaction among individuals with a preference for conformity gives rise to coordination externalities which are not internalized in a non-cooperative setting. Mandating behavioral conformity, by centrally imposing a common, group-wide action, internalizes these coordination externalities, but also comes at a cost of restraining individuals’ self-regarding goals. We explore a framework of social interaction among privately informed individuals with conformist preferences to examine when mandating behavioral conformity improves group welfare. Our analysis elucidates how the desirability of mandating behavioral conformity is shaped by the group's socio-economic structure. We find that mandating behavioral conformity is not desirable in social groups that are ex ante homogeneous—either with respect to members’ contribution to group welfare or their innate conformist tendency. In contrast, mandating behavioral conformity can be beneficial in those ex ante heterogeneous social groups where the individuals who contribute most to group welfare also exhibit the strongest preference for conformity.     

Does Money Always Make People Happy?

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with private information, in which the use of fiat money and the rampant moral hazard incentives sustain each other. It is shown that there is a monetary equilibrium, despite the fact that the rate of return on the nonmonetary asset is significantly higher than the rate of economic growth in the nonmonetary case; the valuation of money is not necessarily Pareto-improving, but rather can be harmful to almost all generations; an inflationary policy can improve the welfare of all generations except the initial one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E41.     

Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefit Provision with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement

We determine the optimal combination of a universal benefit and categorical benefit when individuals differ in their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. The categorical benefit is conditioned ex ante on applicants being unable to work and ex post on recipients not working. The awards test makes Type I/II errors. If the ex post condition is (i) not enforced, the optimal categorical benefit is positive only if the awards test has discriminatory power, while maximum welfare falls with both error propensities; but if (ii) fully enforced, the optimal categorical benefit is positive always and maximum welfare can increase with the Type II error propensity.     

Bargains,Barter, and Money

We examine a search money model in which there is a symmetric coincidence of wants in all barter matches. However, when bargaining outcomes are asymmetric across matches, the barter economy is inefficient. Then a robust monetary equilibrium exists provided that money holders enjoy adequate bargaining terms. Fiat money may be welfare improving. In contrast to the literature, it is the asymmetry in bargains across matches rather than asymmetry in demands that generates these results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, E40.     

Jack of All Trades or a Master of One? Specialization,Trade, and Money*

We consider a model of decentralized exchange where individuals choose the set of goods they produce. Specialization involves producing a smaller set of goods and doing it more proficiently. In doing so, agents reduce production costs, but also reduce the ease of trading their output. We derive the equilibrium degree of specialization and examine how it is affected by underlying fundamentals. Due to the existence of a hold‐up problem, individuals specialize too little relative to the social optimum. Introducing money leads to more specialization relative to barter and increases welfare.     

Foreign Money Shocks and the Welfare Performance of Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes*

The welfare properties of monetary policy regimes for a country subject to foreign money shocks are examined in a two‐country sticky‐price model. Money targeting is found to be welfare superior to a fixed exchange rate when the expenditure switching effect of exchange rate changes is relatively weak, but a fixed rate is superior when the expenditure switching effect is strong. However, price targeting is superior to both these regimes for all values of the expenditure switching effect. A welfare‐maximising monetary rule yields lower output and exchange rate volatility than price targeting for a wide range of parameter values.     

Can growth-enhanced monetary policy improve welfare when people seek social status?

This paper examines the growth and welfare effects from an increase in the rate of money supply in an Ak type growth model with a relative wealth-enhanced social status motive, production externalities, and liquidity constraints. When only consumption is constrained by liquidity, fast money supply can hasten output growth unless seigniorage revenue is wasted and production externalities do not exist. We find that even though money growth normally promotes economic growth, it does not improve welfare when capital stock is over-accumulated. In general, an optimal monetary policy minimizes seigniorage. Our results also conclude that the optimal monetary policy rarely follows the Friedman rule.