Implementing just and efficient decision-making

In an economy with one public good, one private good and quasi-linear utilities we explore decision-making mechanisms to non-cooperatively implement an efficient outcome. By auctioning the leadership role among agents, one implements egalitarianism, namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo. A refinement of this mechanism (so-called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds) allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome: it achieves egalitarianism above the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision.     

Implementing efficient conservation portfolio design

Modern tools for cost-effective conservation reserve site planning require the planner to have information about spatial distributions of conservation costs and benefits. Climate change creates unprecedented uncertainty about future land values and species habitat ranges, such that conservation scientists cannot map costs and benefits with certainty anymore. This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of conservation in the face of climate change uncertainty. It advances a new method for using modern portfolio theory to choose lands to protect that yield total conservation returns with less uncertainty. It explores the implications for portfolio recommendations of variation in the correlations between ecological and land-value responses to climate change. It also tests the robustness of the method to shortcuts that might be taken to simplify analysis, identifying problems that arise if conservation costs are ignored in portfolio analysis and demonstrating when portfolio recommendations are sensitive to how ecological benefits are quantified.     

Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation

In a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model, the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 12 (1988) 3)), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.     

Input-output models, directed graphs and flows in networks

This article demonstrates that a dual pair of input-output price and quantity models, taken together, constitutes a composite network flow model. The network flow model has become a dominant analytical tool within the fields of operations analysis and electrical engineering, and the aim of the article is to enable input-output users within non-standard applications to take advantage of the large body of literature within these disciplines. Through a simple example it is shown that the solution of a dual pair of input-output models is a special case of the general problem of finding a minimum cost circulation in a transportation network. Second, it is shown that the common method of determining quantities and prices in input-output models is identical to the classical node method for determination of currents and voltages in an electrical network. The theory of transportation networks offers well developed methods for analysis of capacity constraints on the network flows, while the theory of electrical networks supplies methods for analysis of models with price sensitivities and for dynamic analysis. In addition, the elegant symmetry of currents and voltages in electrical networks contributes significantly to a better understanding of the logical relationship between price and quantity models.     

Implementing Bank Privatisation in Slovenia

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

Implementing Electricity Restructuring

Electricity is one of the last U.S.industries in which competition is replacingregulation. We briefly review the technologyfor producing and delivering power, the historyof electricity policy, and recent state andinternational experience. We then outline themajor questions facing policymakers as theydecide whether, when, and how to implementrestructuring. We conclude with some thoughtson the California electricity crisis and otherpolitical controversies. Although theCalifornia experience has come to define whatit means for electricity markets to fail, mostof the problems it raised are among those weknow how to solve or prevent. The stillunresolved make-or-break issue remains whetherthe cooperation necessary to maintainreliability is compatible with the degree ofcompetition necessary to bring about greaterefficiency and lower prices.     

Implementing Hansen's Proficiencies

The authors describe the framework their department has adopted to incorporate the attainment of Hansen's (1986) proficiencies into the curriculum. Major changes include the identification of tools students should be able to use to complete specific activities, significant changes in prerequisites for upper-division courses, and the development of a capstone experience designed to bring together the various tools the student has been introduced to as he or she proceeds through the major. They believe that the design characteristics of their capstone experience promote the achievement of Hansen's proficiencies, and the framework described here could be easily adopted by other departments.     

实践党内民主(下)

近年来,党内民主的思想受到了越来越多的关注。本文探讨了党内民主的优缺点,考察了政党在采用更具内部包容性的决策程序时可能遇到的一些具体问题。作者认为,由于政党所处环境及其政治观点的不同,党内治理并不存在一套“最佳实践”方案。政党领导人应该根据各种党内民主程序的实际效果,理智地评估它们的优缺点。     

Implementing Market Access

This paper examines ex post subsidies as a means of enforcing market share targets. Subsidies set after firms make their strategic decisions are shown to create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices. These effects are stronger when targets, and hence subsidies, are specified on a firm-specific rather than industry-wide basis. This occurs because firms perceive themselves as subject to more competition (i.e., more elastic demand) in the latter case.     

Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees

The alternative vote procedure (the single transferable vote system) can be implemented as the subgame perfect equilibrium of a kingmaker tree. We call the implementation procedure “the method of descending chains.” A number of examples are given.     

企业绿色技术创新探析

在诠释绿色技术创新概念基础上,探讨了绿色技术创新机制相对传统创新机制的特色及注意问题。     

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.     

Implementing the Friedman rule

In cash-in-advance models, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with zero nominal interest rates and Pareto optimal allocations place restrictions mainly on the very long-run, or asymptotic, behavior of the money supply. When these asymptotic conditions are satisfied, they leave the central bank with a great deal of flexibility to manage the money supply over any finite horizon. But what happens when these asymptotic conditions fail to hold? This paper shows that the central bank can still implement the Friedman rule if its actions are appropriately constrained in the short run.     

Segregation in networks

Schelling [Schelling, T., 1969. Models of segregation. American Economic Review 59, 488–493; Schelling, T., 1971a. Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1, 143–186; Schelling, T., 1971b. On the ecology of micromotives. The Public Interest 25, 61–98; Schelling, T., 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton and Company, New York] considered a model with individual agents who only care about the types of people living in their own local neighborhood. The spatial structure was represented by a one- or two-dimensional lattice. Schelling showed that an integrated society will generally unravel into a rather segregated one even though no individual agent strictly prefers this. We generalize this spatial proximity model to a proximity model of segregation, examining models with individual agents who interact ‘locally’ in a range of more general social network structures. The levels of segregation attained are in line with those reached in the lattice-based spatial proximity model.     

关于贯彻落实《政府会计制度》的思考

2017年10月24日财政部印发了《政府会计制度——行政事业单位会计科目和报表》,通知规定从2019年1月1日起执行政府会计制度。新政府会计制度实施在即,我们财务人员要从思想上、行动上做好充分准备,首先要深刻领会政府会计制度改革的必要性,再全面了解政府会计制度变化的主要内容,做好政府会计改革的衔接工作,采取有效措施保障政府会计制度的顺利贯彻实施。     

Implementing a medical self-care program

Medical self-care is a type of wellness program that encourages employees to decide what to do for themselves with or without provider assistance. This article provides a tool for assessing the value of such a program for cost containment.     

Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

The bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that are used by all non-winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner's proposal. That procedure non-cooperatively implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.