Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity‐constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price‐quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price‐quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal collusion is attained with simple price‐quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding.     

Aggressive leaders

I characterize the incentives to undertake strategic investments in markets with Nash competition and endogenous entry. Contrary to the case with an exogenous number of firms, when the investment increases marginal profitability, only a “top dog” strategy is optimal. For instance, under both quantity and price competition, a market leader overinvests in cost reductions and overproduces complement products. The purpose of the strategic investment is to allow the firm to be more aggressive in the market and to reduce its price below those of other firms. Contrary to the post‐Chicago approach, this shows that aggressive pricing strategies are not necessarily associated with exclusionary purposes.     

On the Welfare Gains of Price Dispersion

Can price dispersion be associated with higher levels of welfare? To answer we compare two economies that differ only in the way prices are formed. In the first, sellers post a unique price–quantity pair, with no price dispersion. In the second, sellers post a quantity only and let prices be determined ex post by realized demand, resulting in price dispersion. We show that while agents trade lower quantities when prices are dispersed (an intensive margin effect), they also trade more often (an extensive margin effect). At low inflation, the extensive margin dominates making agents better off with price dispersion.     

How Firms Should Hedge

Substantial academic research explains why firms should hedge,but little work has addressed how firms should hedge. We assumethat firms can experience costly states of nature and deriveoptimal hedging strategies using vanilla derivatives (e.g.,forwards and options) and custom "exotic" derivative contractsfor a value-maximizing firm facing both hedgable (price) andunhedgable (quantity) risks. Customized exotic derivatives aretypically better than vanilla contracts when correlations betweenprices and quantities are large in magnitude and when quantityrisks are substantially greater than price risks. Finally, wediscuss how our model may be applied in practice.     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

Success and Failure in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the Petroleum Industry

A sample of firms from the oil industry is used to test whether managerial actions are consistent with the managerial entrenchment or shareholder interest hypothesis. While targeted firms have lower Q-ratios than non-targeted firms, not all low Q-ratio firms become targets. High levels of managerial stock ownership decrease the likelihood of a low Q-ratio firm being targeted. Managerial resistance to control events is associated with greater share price increases, but a lower likelihood of a control change occurring. Overall, the results are consistent with managers taking actions that protect their positions, possibly at shareholder expense.     

Price and Profit Regulation in Developing and Transition Economies: A Survey of the Regulators

Rate of return or cost of service regulation was the traditional means by which governments, especially in the USA, regulated profitability and prices in privately-owned public utility businesses. However, rate of return regulation was associated with efficiency disincentives. Hence, in 1983 a price cap was proposed to regulate British Telecom when it was privatized. Price caps were later introduced for other privatized utilities in the UK. Similarly, other countries that privatized their utility sectors in the 1980s and 1990s often introduced price cap regimes. This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey of the methods used to regulate profits and prices in privatized utility sectors in a sample of developing and transition economies. In addition to providing an insight into the different methods used in these economies, the article explains the difficulties that their regulators have in operating profit and price regulation regimes.     

Urban Vibrancy and Corporate Growth

We find that a firm's investment is highly sensitive to the investments of other firms headquartered nearby, even those in very different industries. A firm's investment also responds to fluctuations in the cash flows and stock prices (q) of local firms outside its sector. These patterns do not appear to reflect exogenous area shocks such as local shocks to labor or real estate values, but rather suggest that local agglomeration economies are important determinants of firm investment and growth.     

Multinational Diversification and Corporate Performance: Evidence from European Firms

We investigate the empirical relationship between accounting based measures of performance and the degree of multinational diversification for a set of European chemical industry firms. We find that for these firms, the degree of multinational diversification is strongly related to superior financial performance. The results hold for each of the three sample years. The findings suggest that multinational firms outperform purely domestic and exporting firms. The results provide strong support for gains from multinational diversification. The results indicate that while greater European unification may have eroded potential benefits of exploiting international capital and product market imperfections, the benefits of firm specific economies of scope and scale as well as managerial and financial synergies are still realised through exports.     

How Do Capital Structure Policies of Emerging Markets Differ from Those of Developed Economies? Survey Evidence from Korea

We examine the capital structure policies of Korean firms using survey data for business group (chaebol) firms and independent firms. Our results are compared with findings in earlier studies for developed economies: Graham and Harvey (2001) for the United States and Brounen et al. (2004, 2006) for Europe. Korean chief financial officers are concerned about financial flexibility and volatility of earnings when issuing debt; they are concerned about target debt ratio maintenance and recent stock price increases when issuing equity. In contrast to independent firms, chaebol firms are more concerned about differences in corporate tax rates between foreign and domestic markets and the risk of refinancing in bad times. Chaebol firms are less likely to issue debt when faced with insufficient internal funds, which indicates that active internal capital markets are at work among the firms in a business group. Our results suggest that, compared to U. S. and European firms, Korean firms are under more pressure from their peers in formulating capital structure policies, consider equity a cheap source of financing, are less concerned with the dilution of earnings per share, and less frequently provide shares to employees as compensation.     

Cost of Equity and S&P 500 Index Revisions

We examine how the cost of equity changes when firms are added to or removed from the S&P 500 Index during index revisions. Newly added firms experience a significant decline in the cost of equity, while recently removed firms show a significant increase. Liquidity improves for addition firms and declines for removed firms. Addition firms also experience a decline in shadow cost. Changes in cost of equity for included firms are explained by changes in liquidity, shadow cost, and firm size. Finally, included firms with greater investment opportunities benefit more from the reduction in cost of capital.     

Returns to scale and asset prices

The q‐theory of investment is proposed to explain firm growth effects, where previous papers identify a negative effect of firm growth, including asset growth, real investment and net share issuance, on future stock returns. This paper uses returns to scale from the production function to test the dynamic q‐theory, which predicts that the firm growth effect is theoretically weaker for firms with decreasing returns to scale (DRS) than for non‐DRS firms. Our empirical results generally support the prediction of dynamic q‐theory. However, we find that the dynamic q‐theory explains little of the value, momentum and ROE effects from the standpoint of returns to scale.     

Firm strategy and market reaction to earnings

We examine whether a firm's strategy affects the information content of the firm's earnings announcement. A cost leadership strategy is characterized by low sales margins coupled with large sales volumes, economies of scale and major investments in plant and physical assets, whereas a differentiation strategy involves high sales margins achieved through product quality and branding realized by investments in intangibles such as R&D and advertising. These characteristics of the strategies result in differential impact on investor reactions to new information that is revealed about firms. Our results show that firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy have earnings announcements that are more commonly interpreted and result in a greater change in the average belief about stock price. On the other hand, earnings announcements of firms pursuing a differentiation strategy result in more heterogeneous interpretation accompanied by a smaller change in the average belief about stock price. This paper advances our understanding of the cross-sectional variation in the market's reaction to earnings announcements. In addition, the paper demonstrates a predictable instance of divergence in the price reaction and trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement.     

IPO限价发行与新股二级市场价格泡沫——论股票市场“弹簧效应”

本文通过对比2009年7月1日至2014年6月30日IPO市场化定价发行阶段与2014年7月1日至2018年6月30日IPO限价发行阶段共1950个IPO样本,发现IPO限价发行对于新股在二级市场股价表现具有“弹簧效应”:即抑制股票一级市场发行价格会造成新股在二级市场价格短期内超涨,限价发行新股的二级市场定价显著高于市场化定价发行新股的二级市场定价。限价发行引起的过高二级市场定价最终导致股票长期回报率低下。另外,创业板公司“弹簧效应”显著强于主板公司。这些实证结果都可以被本文提出的一级市场价格压抑造成二级市场非理性投资者上涨预期一致、盲目追涨的理论模型所解释。本文的研究指出抑制股票一级市场定价虽然形式上可以解决新股发行价过高问题,但是却造成二级市场更大的价格扭曲。这一发现为进一步完善我国IPO发行定价机制提供了依据。     

On-market share buybacks, exercisable share options and earnings management

Chan et al. (2006b ) suggest that managers might announce a share buyback to manipulate investors’ perceptions and capitalize on the positive price reaction usually associated with the announcement. The incentive to do so is greater when managers have exercisable options. Prior studies document that managers engage in upwards earnings management for opportunistic reasons related to option holdings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). We examine the association between earnings management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms to investigate if earnings management in the pre‐buyback period is greater for firms with equity incentives to increase share price. Our results, using 138 buybacks over the period 1996–2003, support our prediction. We find that buyback firms with both exercisable options that are in‐the‐money prior to the buyback announcement as well as options that are exercised in the buyback period have higher discretionary current accruals than buyback firms with no exercisable options, unexercised options or with out‐of‐the‐money options. Overall, our results are consistent with buyback firms with exercisable options using earnings management and buyback announcements to maximize option payoffs, and buyback firms without exercisable options signalling undervaluation.     

Corporate investment,government control,and financing channels: Evidence from China's Listed Companies

We investigate the relation between the internally generated cash flows and fixed asset investments of Chinese firms and find that it is U-shaped. Cash flow and investment are negatively related for low levels of cash flow but positively related for high levels of cash flow. We find that government controlled listed firms have greater investment–cash flow sensitivities than do privately controlled listed companies, especially on the left-hand side of the U-shaped curve where cash flow is negative. However, the difference in sensitivities appears only among firms that possess few profitable investment opportunities. We attribute this finding to the government having multiple socio-economic objectives, which leads to increased capital expenditures by the firms it controls when internal funds are abundant and when internal funds are negative. There is no evidence that access to finance and soft budget constraints explain the differences between the investment–cash flow sensitivities of government controlled and privately controlled listed firms.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Determinants of cost efficiencies in the mutual fund industry

We evaluate determinants of cost efficiencies in the U.S. mutual fund industry for 1998-2003. Our empirical results show that cost increases in this industry have been less than proportional to increases in assets. We find that funds without a 12b-1 plan show larger economies of scale than funds with a 12b-1 plan; institutional funds show greater economies of scale than do retail funds; and that fund families that are more focused in their investment objectives reap benefits of lower fund management costs than do fund families that are more diversified in their investment objectives.     

Retail investor attention and herding behavior

In this paper, we argue that when individual investors can obtain information from public resources such as Google search, the degree of investor attention to a particular underlying company is positively linked with herding behavior for retail investors. Empirical results confirm that Google Search Volume Index can be a proxy for the information demand of uninformed individual investors. Empirical evidence also shows that reaching the price limit generates an attention-grabbing effect. Further, in general, small cap firms generate more intensive individual investor herding. In addition, we explore the asymmetric impact of abnormal search volume index on individual investor herding behavior for bull and bear markets, and confirm that the individual investor buy herding phenomenon is stronger in bull markets, especially for small capitalization firms. In bear markets, with greater price deterioration for large cap firms, we detect herding behavior on the sell side.     

Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms

In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity‐constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When firms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms. A firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all‐inclusive, colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non‐cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. Contrary to previous work, our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate‐sized firms, rather than the largest or smallest firms.