How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?

U.S. banks hold significantly more equity capital than required by their regulators. We test competing hypotheses regarding the reasons for this “excess” capital, using an innovative partial adjustment approach that allows estimated BHC-specific capital targets and adjustment speeds to vary with firm-specific characteristics. We apply the model to annual panel data for publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1992 through 2006, an extended period of increasing bank capital that ended just before the subprime credit crisis of 2007–2008. The evidence suggests that BHCs actively managed their capital ratios (as opposed to passively allowing capital to build up via retained earnings), set target capital levels substantially above well-capitalized regulatory minima, and (especially poorly capitalized BHCs) made rapid adjustments toward their targets.     

SOME EVIDENCE THAT BANKS USE INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS TO LOWER CAPITAL COSTS

To the extent raising external capital is especially costly for banks (as the preceding article suggests), bank managers have incentives to manage their internal cash flow in ways that minimize their need to raise external equity. One way to accomplish this is to establish bank holding companies that set up internal capital markets for the purpose of allocating scarce capital across their various subsidiaries. By “internal capital market” the authors mean a capital budgeting process in which all the lending and investment opportunities of the different subsidiaries are ranked according to their risk-adjusted returns; and all internal capital available for investment is then allocated to the highestranked opportunities until either the capital is exhausted or returns fall below the cost of capital, whichever comes first. As evidence of the operation of internal capital markets in bank holding companies, the authors report the following set of findings from their own recent studies:

• ? For large publicly traded bank holding companies, growth rates in lending are closely tied to the banks' internal cash flow and regulatory capital position.
• ? For the subsidiaries of bank holding companies, what matters most is the capital position and earnings of the holding companies and not of the subsidiaries themselves.
• ? The lending activity of banks affiliated with multiple bank holding companies appears to be less dependent on their own earnings and capital than the lending of unaffiliated banks.

The authors also report that, after being acquired, previously unaffiliated banks increase their lending in local markets. This finding suggests that, contrary to the concerns of critics of bank consolidation, geographic consolidation may make banks more responsive to local lending opportunities.     

The relative contributions of equity and subordinated debt signals as predictors of bank distress during the financial crisis

Bank supervisors utilize early warning signals to predict which banks are likely to become distressed. Previous research has found that market discipline signals do not significantly improve out-of-sample forecasts relative to accounting-based signals. Most of that evidence, however, comes from periods in the 1990s when the U.S. economy and banking system were healthy, potentially neutralizing an advantage of market signals to incorporate new information quickly. For the period between the fourth quarters of 2006 and 2012, we assess the accuracy of two market signals – expected default frequency (EDF) and subordinated note and debenture (SND) yield spreads – relative to accounting-based signals in forecasting which publicly traded BHCs would become distressed. In 2008, EDF signals were relatively more accurate, but they did not lead to economically significant reductions in missed distress events relative to other signals. Supervisors would have been better off devoting slack resources to monitor BHCs with high commercial real estate concentrations. As the crisis subsided, a failure probability model developed from bank failures in the 1980s and early 1990s was consistently the most accurate signal. For the two dozen BHCs with actively traded SNDs, yield spreads over Treasuries were extremely poor predictors of distress because the spreads were distorted by too-big-to-fail subsidies. The Tier 1 leverage ratio was the most accurate distress signal for these large BHCs. In sum, the evidence to justify systematic reliance on market signals by supervisory agencies to forecast bank distress remains weak.     

Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization

As barriers to international investment fall and technology improves, the cost advantages for a firm's securities to trade publicly in the country in which that firm is located and for that country to have a market for publicly traded securities distinct from the capital markets of other countries will progressively disappear. Securities laws remain an important determinant of whether and where securities are issued, how they are valued, who owns them, and where they trade. I show that there is a demand from entrepreneurs for mechanisms that allow them to commit to credible disclosure because disclosure helps reduce agency costs. Under some circumstances, mandatory disclosure through securities laws can help satisfy that demand, but only provided investors or the state can act on the information disclosed and the laws cannot be weakened ex post too much through lobbying by corporate insiders. With financial globalization, national disclosure laws can have wide-ranging effects on a country's welfare, on firms and on investor portfolios, including the extent to which share holdings reveal a home bias. In equilibrium, if firms can choose the securities laws they are subject to when they go public, some firms will choose stronger securities laws than those of the country in which they are located and some firms will do the opposite.     

The parent company puzzle: when is the whole worth less than one of the parts?

This paper examines seven instances in which the market value of a parent company was less than the market value of its publicly traded subsidiary. Efforts are made to explain this “parent company puzzle” in terms of taxes, agency costs, liquidity effects and noise trader risk. None of them work. The only explanation consistent with the evidence is a mispricing of the subsidiary shares associated with noise trader demand and impediments to arbitrage. As further evidence in support of this view, five corporate control transactions, all designed to exploit the apparent mispricing, were initiated while this research was in progress.     

Diversification and the cost of debt of bank holding companies

In this study, we investigate the relationship between various dimensions of diversification and the cost of debt for publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that both domestic geographic diversification of deposits and diversification of assets lead to a lower bond yield-spread. Diversification of non-traditional banking activities leads to a lower cost of debt only when yield-spread and diversification are estimated simultaneously. In addition, we find that medium-sized BHCs experience a greater reduction in bond yield-spread than small-sized and large-sized BHCs. This is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) effects in the banking industry. Furthermore, we document that the association between diversification and yield-spread is bidirectional with higher yield-spreads being associated with greater asset and activity diversification and lower geographic deposit dispersion. The effect of diversification on bond yield-spread is robust after accounting for cross-sectional and serial correlation, and the endogeneity of diversification.     

Parent-subsidiary investment layers and the value of corporate cash holdings

Our study investigates whether agency costs arising from organizational structure in terms of the number of investment layers which connect the parent firm and its lowest-tiered subsidiaries within the corporate pyramid are associated with the value of cash holdings. Using a sample of Taiwanese publicly traded firms, we find that a change of a dollar in cash holdings is associated with less than a dollar change in market value. In line with our expectation, we find that the marginal value of cash decreases with the number of investment layers, supporting the agency theory of excess cash holdings. We also find that the negative association between the number of layers and the value of cash holdings is stronger for firms with high deviation between cash flow and voting rights and for family-controlled firms.     

Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

The Beta Dilemma in Emerging Markets

In principle, emerging markets analysts employ the same analytical framework when estimating the value of businesses as their counterparts in developed economies: they forecast future cash flows and discount those to the present with appropriate costs of capital that are estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. But in practice, emerging market analysts have a more complicated job because the task of estimating costs of equity in emerging markets is more difficult. Whereas developed economies have an abundance of historical data on overall stock market movements, industry share price behavior, and many individual share price histories, emerging market economies often do not. There may be no comparable local firms that are publicly traded—or if there are, their CAPM betas may be unreliable. And if analysts instead use the beta of a U.S. competitor as a surrogate for the emerging market beta, they face the question of whether domestic betas are equivalent across borders. As a consequence, appraisers of emerging market companies confront a “beta dilemma.” Part of this is a data problem stemming from shorter share price histories in emerging markets and the absence of publicly traded companies in some industries. In such cases, analysts may be inclined to use industry betas calculated with U.S. share prices as a substitute. But this creates an equivalence problem—the possibility, as confirmed by the author's research, that domestic U.S. and emerging market betas are not statistically equivalent for most industries. The author proposes a solution to this problem that involves grouping emerging markets into a single, distinctive asset class that allows for reliable calculations of industry betas. He also suggests ways of testing emerging market industry betas to determine whether they are statistically comparable.     

Derivative activities and managerial incentives in the banking industry

Using a sample of 175 publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that managerial incentives and external monitoring affect the decision to use derivatives in the banking industry. Managers with incentives that are more closely aligned with the interests of shareholders, as reflected in a high percentage of CEO shareholdings, are less likely to use derivatives when insider holdings exceed 10%. Similarly, when outside directors own substantial equity, the firm is less likely to use derivatives. These results suggest that managers with large equity stakes take advantage of the risk-shifting opportunities of deposit insurance by not hedging. For BHCs with insider holdings below 10%, however, monitoring by outside directors is associated with a greater likelihood of derivative usage. This suggests that monitoring by outside directors may lead to more risk-averse behavior on the part of managers with small equity stakes.     

中国上市公司内部资本市场有效吗?——来自H股多分部上市公司的证据

从理论上说,外部资本市场无效或低效的情况下,企业集团可以通过构建内部资本市场有效配置资源。本文采用基于资产回报的现金流敏感性法,对H股多分部上市公司内部资本市场效率进行了直接测度。针对2000～2011年532个样本的面板数据的研究显示,上市公司内部资本市场总体有效,大部分上市公司能够通过内部资本市场持续有效地配置资源,部分上市公司具有出色的"挑选胜者"的能力。本文的研究结论符合理论预期,不仅为我国发展企业集团的经济政策提供了经验证据,而且为进一步的研究奠定了理论和方法基础。     

内部资本市场 公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析

基于内部资本市场理论,当企业集团对内部各成员部门不是100%控股时,资源在内部资本市场的转移会产生较大的摩擦,内部资本市场存在效率不足。在处于转轨时期的中国企业,公司治理尚不完善、代理问题比较严重,势必影响内部资本市场功能的正常发挥。本文以华通天香集团为例,分析了上市公司内部资本市场运作的主要路径及产生的经济后果,发现原本在于提高资本配置而存在的内部资本市场部分地被异化为进行利益输送的渠道。另外,在本例中没有发现企业进行明显的跨部门交叉补贴证据。     

Estimating Private Equity Returns from Limited Partner Cash Flows

We introduce a methodology to estimate the historical time series of returns to investment in private equity funds. The approach requires only an unbalanced panel of cash contributions and distributions accruing to limited partners and is robust to sparse data. We decompose private equity returns from 1994 to 2015 into a component due to traded factors and a time‐varying private equity premium not spanned by publicly traded factors. We find cyclicality in private equity returns that differs according to fund type and is consistent with the conjecture that capital market segmentation contributes to private equity returns.     

Segment Disclosure Transparency and Internal Capital Market Efficiency: Evidence from SFAS No. 131

Using the adoption of SFAS 131, I examine the effect of segment disclosure transparency on internal capital market efficiency. SFAS 131 requires firms to define segments as internally viewed by managers, thereby improving the transparency of managerial actions in internal capital allocation. I find that diversified firms that improved segment disclosure transparency by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131 experienced an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets after the adoption of SFAS 131. In addition, I find that the improvement in internal capital market efficiency was greater for firms that suffered more severe agency problems before the adoption of SFAS 131 and also for firms whose managers faced stronger incentives to improve efficiency after the adoption of SFAS 131. My results suggest that more transparent segment information can help resolve agency conflicts in the internal capital markets of diversified firms, thus improving investment efficiency.     

Firm Value,Information Problems and the Internal Capital Market

We examine how information problems between the firm and the investor affect the value of an internal capital market. While the extant literature finds that, on average, the diversified firm's access to an internal capital market is positively related to firm value, this paper finds that the results hold only for firms which face low levels of information problems. Firms facing the high levels of information problems realize no value from internal capital market access, consistent with the Jensen Free Cash Flow hypothesis. When information problems are large, agency costs dominate any savings that result from using an internal capital market to avoid selling under-priced securities in the external capital markets.     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.     

The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period

In this article we examine whether the federal safety net is viewed by the market as being extended beyond de jure deposits to other bank debt and even the debt of bank holding companies (BHCs). We extend previous research by focusing on the post‐FDICIA period and by examining the risk‐return relation of bonds issued directly by banks, not BHCs. Our results provide evidence that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less capitalized issuers, suggesting that proposals requiring banks to issue subordinated debt may enhance market monitoring and discipline and be useful in supplementing regulatory discipline.     

Merger-Motivated IPOs

In this paper, we find support for initial public offerings (IPOs) motivated by subsequent acquisition activity. Over a third of newly public firms enter the market for corporate control as acquirers within three years of the IPO. We find that IPOs facilitate acquisitions in a number of ways. Newly public firms benefit from the cash raised in the IPO, from subsequent access to public financing, and from ability to pay with publicly traded stock for acquisitions. IPO firms also benefit by obtaining market feedback and by taking advantage of high post-IPO stock values in making stock-based acquisitions at favorable terms.     

Information Content of Business Methods Patents

We examine the market reaction to business method patents granted to publicly traded firms. Our findings suggest that the State Street decision represents a turning point not only for the growth in the number of business method patent filings, but also in the market's awareness and perception of value creation for the filing firms. The granting of a business method patent evokes a positive average stock price reaction, especially in the post‐State Street period. Cross‐sectional differences in abnormal returns depend on the type of patent granted. The market reaction also differs based on industry classification.     

Does information asymmetry predict audit fees?

This study investigates whether and how information asymmetry in the stock market affects the quantum of audit fees paid by auditees. It is based on a sample of 218 US publicly traded companies and adopts two well-established proxies for information asymmetry, namely bid-ask spread (BAS) and probability of informed trading (PIN). Empirical results provide evidence that, after controlling for all main audit fees determinants, information asymmetry is positively related to the quantum of audit fees paid. Overall, evidence supports the contention that less transparent companies convey higher audit risk, and therefore auditors require higher compensation.