The Dynamics of Gasoline Prices: Evidence from Daily French Micro Data

Using millions of individual gasoline prices collected at a daily frequency, we examine the speed at which market prices of refined oil are transmitted to retail gasoline prices in France. For that, we estimate a reduced‐form model of state‐dependent pricing where thresholds triggering price changes are allowed to vary over time and depend on the duration since the last price change. We find that the degree of pass‐through of wholesale prices to retail gasoline prices is on average 0.77 for diesel and 0.67 for petrol and depend on local market characteristics. The duration for a shock to be fully transmitted into prices is about 10 days. There is no significant asymmetry in the transmission of wholesale price to retail prices. Finally, the duration since the last price change has a significant effect on thresholds triggering price changes but a large variance of idiosyncratic shocks on thresholds is also crucial to replicate the size distribution of price changes.     

The impact of business group affiliation on stock price informativeness: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper examines the relationship between business group affiliation and stock price informativeness in an emerging market setting. We use stock price synchronicity as a measure, and study the impact of group affiliation ‐specifically the extent of affiliation, ownership structure and existence of group bank‐ on firm specific information content. Results reveal that the amount of firm‐specific information capitalized into stock prices tends to be lower (higher) when the firm is group‐affiliated (unaffiliated), indirectly (directly) owned, and affiliated group has (does not have) a group bank. Additionally, the extent of group affiliation maintains a non‐linear relationship with synchronicity, suggesting that the perception of higher versus lower levels of group ownership differs.     

The effect of SFAS 131 on the stock market’s ability to predict industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings

This study examines the impact of SFAS 131 on the extent to which stock prices incorporate industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings. By decomposing earnings into industry‐wide and firm‐specific components, this paper finds that the firms that aggregated segments under the old rule experience significant acceleration in the incorporation of future earnings into current stock prices upon adoption of SFAS 131. However, the acceleration of future earnings is mostly driven by the improved incorporation of industry‐wide components of future earnings, which indicates the market’s ability to predict firm‐specific components is not significantly changed. Supplemental analysis suggests that the reduced geographic earnings information is one possible reason for lack of improvement in incorporating firm‐specific earnings into price.     

Reliability and competitive electricity markets

We derive the optimal prices and investment program for an electric power system when there are price‐insensitive retail consumers served by load serving entities that can choose any level of rationing contingent on real‐time prices. We then examine the assumptions required for competitive electricity markets to achieve this optimal price and investment program and the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. We analyze the interrelationships between regulator‐imposed wholesale market price caps and generating capacity obligations. The implications of potential network collapses for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices yield generation investments consistent with these reserve requirements are examined.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

External and Internal Pricing in Multidivisional Firms

Multidivisional firms frequently rely on external market prices in order to value internal transactions across profit centers. This paper examines market‐based transfer pricing when an upstream division has monopoly power in selling a proprietary component both to a downstream division within the same firm and to external customers. When internal transfers are valued at the prevailing market price, the resulting transactions are distorted by double marginalization. The imposition of intracompany discounts will always improve overall firm profits provided the supplying division is capacity constrained. Under certain conditions it is then possible to design discount rules so that the resulting prices and sales quantities are efficient from the corporate perspective. In contrast, the impact of intracompany discounts remains ambiguous when the capacity of the selling division is essentially unlimited. It is then generally impossible to achieve fully efficient outcomes by means of market‐based transfer pricing unless the external market for the component is sufficiently large relative to the internal market.     

An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination

Economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination: if downstream cost differences exist, then discrimination shifts production inefficiently, toward high‐cost retailers, so a ban increases welfare; if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist, discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases, so a ban reduces welfare. Using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by German retailers, I estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences. Simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market, and less if downstream cost differences shrink, or with less competition.     

Firm size,information acquisition and price efficiency

We present a model in a competitive market where traders choose between a small and a large firm to acquire costly private information, but they also obtain free public information by observing equilibrium share prices. Our major finding is the existence of a noisy rational expectation competitive equilibrium, in which there are more informed traders of the large firm than those of the small firm. As a result, share prices of the large firm are more informative than those of the small firm. Our empirical study supports the analytical results. By using a bivariate vector autoregressive regression, we are able to conduct a variance decomposition of share prices for different size portfolios. We find that prices of large-size portfolios are more informative because non-value-related price shocks are less important in driving price changes of large-size portfolios than in the case of small-size portfolios.     

Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

Entry,exit, and the determinants of market structure

This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short‐run price competition are important determinants of long‐run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated mean entry cost is 11 percent lower in these markets. Using simulations, we find that entry cost subsidies are less expensive per additional firm than fixed cost subsidies.     

On the Relative Pricing of Long‐Maturity Index Options and Collateralized Debt Obligations

We investigate a structural model of market and firm‐level dynamics in order to jointly price long‐dated S&P 500 index options and CDO tranches of corporate debt. We identify market dynamics from index option prices and idiosyncratic dynamics from the term structure of credit spreads. We find that all tranches can be well priced out‐of‐sample before the crisis. During the crisis, however, our model can capture senior tranche prices only if we allow for the possibility of a catastrophic jump. Thus, senior tranches are nonredundant assets that provide a unique window into the pricing of catastrophic risk.     

Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels

A prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it, fearing it will attract new rivals. In this paper, we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements, wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers, can notably alter disclosure incentives. As under prevailing views, a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors. However, entry shifts the incumbent supplier–retailer relationship: the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner, translating into lower wholesale prices. This, in turn, can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news, since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions. Our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence, firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products.     

What Drives the Owner‐Occupied and Rental Housing Markets? Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model

Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with a housing market do not explicitly include a rental market and assume a tight mapping between house prices and rents over the business cycle. However, rents are much smoother than house prices in the data. We match this feature of the data by adding both an owner‐occupied housing market and a rental market in a standard DSGE model. The intertemporal preference shock accounts for more than half of the variation in house prices and contributes to residential investment fluctuations through the liquidity constraint, and nominal rigidity in rental contracts captures the variation in the price‐rent ratio.     

Search and Wholesale Price Discrimination

Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimination softening competition through a decrease in search incentives, illustrating how price discrimination may magnify the efficiency costs of search frictions.     

Additional evidence on transparency and bank financial performance

This paper examines the relationship between volatility and the probability of occurrence of expected extreme returns in the Canadian market. Four measures of volatility are examined: implied volatility from firm option prices, conditional volatility calculated using an EGARCH model, idiosyncratic volatility, and expected shortfall. A significantly positive relationship is observed between a firm's idiosyncratic volatility and the probability of occurrence of an extreme return in the subsequent month for firms. A 10% increase in idiosyncratic volatility in a given month is associated with the probability of an extreme shock in the subsequent month (top or bottom 1.5% of the returns distribution) of 26.4%. Other firm characteristics, including firm age, price, volume and book‐to‐market ratio, are also shown to be significantly related to subsequent firm extreme returns. The effects of conditional and implied volatility are mixed. The E‐GARCH and expected shortfall measures of conditional volatility are consistent with mean reversion: high short term realizations of conditional volatility foreshadow a lower probability of extreme returns.     

A Markov‐perfect equilibrium model of the impacts of price controls on the performance of the pharmaceutical industry

I introduce a computable dynamic equilibrium model of the pharmaceutical industry, parameterize it using industry facts, and use it to predict what happens if the United States adopts price controls or one or more non‐U.S. countries abandon their controls. The model generates implications for firm value, research and development (R&D), the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare. I highlight the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about R&D costs, market size, technological opportunities, consumer heterogeneity, the extent to which choices internalize prices, barriers to entry in R&D, the extent to which R&D outcomes are correlated, and the nature of the controls.     

Pricing rainfall futures at the CME

Many business people such as farmers and financial investors are affected by indirect losses caused by scarce or abundant rainfall. Because of the high potential of insuring rainfall risk, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) began trading rainfall derivatives in 2011. Compared to temperature derivatives, however, pricing rainfall derivatives is more difficult. In this article, we propose to model rainfall indices via a flexible type of distribution, namely the normal-inverse Gaussian distribution, which captures asymmetries and heavy-tail behaviour. The prices of rainfall futures are computed by employing the Esscher transform, a well-known tool in actuarial science. This approach is flexible enough to price any rainfall contract and to adjust theoretical prices to market prices by using the calibrated market price of risk. The empirical analysis is conducted with US precipitation data and CME futures data providing first results on the market price of risk for rainfall derivatives.     

Price and Investment Dynamics: Theory and Plant-Level Data

We construct a model of a firm competing for market share in a customer market and making investments in physical capital. The firm is financially constrained and there are implementation lags in investment. Our model predicts that product prices should depend on costs and competitors' prices but respond weakly to demand shocks. Also, prices should be strongly related to investment. We estimate price and investment equations on panel data for Swedish manufacturing plants and find results that are qualitatively in line with these predictions, though the relation between investment and prices is stronger than predicted by our model.     

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity‐constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price‐quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price‐quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal collusion is attained with simple price‐quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding.     

Microdata Evidence on the Empirical Importance of Selection Effects in Menu‐Cost Models

We use microdata on product prices linked to information on the producing firms that set them to study to what extent the timing of price changes reacts to changes in marginal cost. This self‐selection of price changes is a key feature in the canonical Menu‐Cost model a la Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007), which may generate near monetary neutrality (Golosov and Lucas Jr. 2007, Karadi and Reiff 2016), but is absent in the Calvo (1983) model. We find that the microdata strongly favors the Calvo (1983) model. Thus, upstream in the supply chain, price setting is best characterized by a very low degree of self‐selection into price changes.