Does Corporate Headquarters Location Matter for Firm Capital Structure?

This paper studies the impact of corporate headquarters location on capital structure policies. We show that firms exhibit conformity in their financing policies to those of geographically proximate firms and that the location of corporate headquarters helps explain the cross‐sectional variation of capital structure in the United States. The location effect is robust to local credit market conditions and to state laws on corporate takeover and payout restrictions. The results suggest that noneconomic factors, such as local culture and social interactions among corporate executives, play a significant role in influencing corporate financial policies of firms headquartered in the same metropolitan area.     

R2: Does it Matter for Firm Valuation?

A considerable amount of research has been devoted to why R² differs across firms or markets, but little attention has been paid to the consequences of this difference. We fill this gap by investigating how differing R² affects investors’ assessment of firm value. Using a sample of 90,111 firm‐year observations from 1970 to 2004, we find that higher R² leads to higher firm valuation and that, on average, high‐R² firms experience significant underperformance in the long run. These results suggest that high‐R² firms tend to be overpriced.     

Does Competition Affect Bank Risk?

Although policymakers often discuss trade-offs between bank competition and stability, past research provides differing theoretical perspectives and empirical results on the impact of competition on risk. We employ a new approach for identifying exogenous changes in the competitive pressures facing individual banks and discover that an intensification of competition materially boosts bank risk. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that competition reduces banks’ profits, pricing power, and charter values and increases banks’ provision of nontraditional, riskier banking services and lending to riskier firms.     

Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?

We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements.     

Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?

In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks that allows us to explore the impact of interbank lending when exposures are long term and interbank borrowers are small banks. The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks.     

Does Risk Sharing Motivate Interdealer Trading?

We use unique data from the London Stock Exchange to test whether interdealer trade facilitates inventory risk sharing among dealers. We develop a methodology that focuses on periods of extreme inventories—inventory cycles. We further distinguish between inventory cycles that are unanticipated and those that are anticipated because of worked orders. The pattern of interdealer trade during inventory cycles matches theoretical predictions for the direction of trade and the inventories of trade counterparts. We also show that London dealers receive higher trading revenues for taking larger positions.     

Why Does Implied Risk Aversion Smile?

Implied risk aversion estimates reported in the literature arestrongly U-shaped. This article explores different potentialexplanations for these "smile" patterns: (i) preference aggregation,both with and without stochastic volatility and jumps in returns,(ii) misestimation of investors’ beliefs caused by stochasticvolatility, jumps, or a Peso problem, and (iii) heterogeneousbeliefs. The results reveal that preference aggregation andmisestimation of investors’ beliefs caused by stochasticvolatility and jumps are unlikely to be the explanation forthe smile. Although a Peso problem can account for the smile,the required probability of a market crash is unrealisticallylarge. Heterogeneous beliefs cause sizable distortions in impliedrisk aversion, but the degree of heterogeneity required to explainthe smile is implausibly large. (JEL: G12, G13)     

Centralisation versus Decentralisation of Public Policies: Does the Heterogeneity of Individual Preferences Matter?*

This paper explores the role of the heterogeneity of fiscal preferences in the assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government (decentralisation versus centralisation). With reference to a sample of European countries, a median‐voter mechanism of collective decision is assumed to work at both a national and a supranational level. Using data from a large international survey (the International Social Survey Programme, ISSP), a series of econometric models are estimated in order to make individual attitudes representative of different categories of public expenditure and of different countries. The dominance of decentralisation over centralisation or vice versa is determined on the basis of the utility loss that each individual suffers in connection with the distance between his or her own most preferred level of public expenditure and that chosen by the national/supranational median voter. The main finding is that, differently from the predictions of Oates's decentralisation theorem, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level (centralisation) for a number of public expenditure programmes (healthcare, education, unemployment benefits) dominates (or is close to dominating) decentralisation, even in the absence of economies of scale and interregional spillovers. However, when the possibility of interjurisdictional mobility is explicitly considered, in line with the predictions of Tiebout's model, decentralisation dominance becomes more and more substantial and also prevails in the sectors where, under the nonmobility assumption, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level is efficient.     

Does Inefficient Risk Sharing Increase Public Self-Protection?

This paper studies how the risk of having an unequal distribution of income across the population affects the investment in a public self-protection policy, such as financial regulation or climate change mitigation. Two economies are compared. In the first economy, there is perfect risk sharing, i.e., individuals can credibly commit on a set of transfers that will remove ex-post inequalities in consumption. In the second economy, no risk sharing takes place. By referring to the literature on background risks, I determine some conditions in terms of change in risk aversion and prudence, which guarantee an increase in self-protection under inefficient risk sharing. Generally speaking, if self-protection reduces the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when either the probability of a catastrophic event and/or the risk of inequality are sufficiently low. If self-protection increases the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when both the probabilities of aggregate loss and the increase in the risk of inequality are sufficiently small.     

Does Integrated Reporting Matter to the Capital Market?

Integrated reporting (<IR>) is an emerging international corporate reporting initiative to address limitations to extant corporate reporting approaches, which are commonly criticized for being both voluminous and disjointed. While <IR> is gaining in popularity, current momentum has been limited due to a lack of clear evidence of its benefits. Utilizing the most suitable setting currently available, being discretionary disclosures made by listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, this study provides evidence that analyst forecast error reduces as a company's level of alignment with the <IR> framework increases. Further, the improved alignment is associated with a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital for certain reporting companies. The results are obtained after controlling for factors relating to financial transparency and the issuance of standalone non‐financial reports, which suggests that <IR> is providing incrementally useful information to the capital market over and above existing reporting mechanisms.     

Does Financial Distress Risk Drive the Momentum Anomaly?

This paper brings together the evidence on two asset pricing anomalies—continuation of prior returns (momentum) and the market mispricing of distressed firms—using UK data. Our analysis demonstrates both these effects are driven by market underreaction to financial distress risk. In particular, we find momentum is proxying for distress risk, and is largely subsumed by our distress risk factor. We also find, as with US studies, no evidence that size and book-to-market (B/M) effects in stock returns are linked to financial distress .     

Does Default Probability Matter in Latin American Emerging Markets?

We analyze the impact of default probability in four leading Latin American stock markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. We find no positive default-risk premium except in the case of Brazil, and in fact we find a negative risk premium for Argentina and Mexico. The latter effect tends to fade when the analysis accounts for size and book-to-market variables. Although we find no size effect in any of the markets considered, the book-to-market effect is very strong in all of them, and our results reveal a consistent relationship, analogous to that found in more developed markets, between default probability and the size and book-to-market variables.     

Do Data Revisions Matter for DSGE Estimation?

This paper checks whether the coefficient estimates of a famous dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model are robust to macroeconomic data revisions. The effects of revisions are captured by rerunning the estimation on a real‐time data set compiled using the latest time series available each quarter from 1997 through 2015. Results show that estimates of the structural parameters are generally robust to changes in the data that have occurred over the past 20 years. By comparison, standard error estimates are more sensitive to revisions. The latter implies that judgments about the statistical significance of certain parameters depend on which data vintage is used for estimation.     

Does Focus Really Matter? Specialized vs. Diversified REITs

REITs that limit their holdings to a single property type typically defend their lack of diversification by claiming the management possesses special investment expertise in that particular property type. This paper investigates whether property type specialized REITs outperform diversified REITs thus providing evidence of superior management expertise associated with specialized REITs. We compare the performance of specialized versus diversified REIT portfolios during 1997–2006 by examining abnormal returns using CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model with momentum. We find no evidence of superior performance associated with REITs specializing in a single property type. On the contrary, diversified REITs somewhat outperform specialized REITs, but not by a statistically significant margin. Also, consistent with theory, we find that specialized REITs have higher market risk than diversified REITs.     

Bank Ownership and Lending: Does Bank Ownership Matter?

Using the Central and Eastern European (CEE) bank-level data covering 2004–12, this article examines the differences in foreign-owned banks’ loan growth and its determinants in comparison with privately-owned domestic banks. The results indicate the greatest differences in the context of bank capital and liquidity. Bank capital remains an important loan growth determinant only for domestic private banks during the non-crisis periods and bank liquidity is of greater importance to domestic private banks during the crisis periods. This highlights local regulatory authorities’ limited ability to harness loan growth and excessive risk-taking during the non-crisis periods and points at the benefits of multinational banking groups’ internal capital markets during the crisis periods.     

Does a Bank’s Loan Screening and Monitoring Matter?

We investigate the relationship between the borrower’s abnormal loan announcement return and the bank’s loan screening and monitoring using a new ex-ante proxy for loan screening and monitoring. While recent studies have suggested that bank loan relationships and related loan screening and monitoring services may no longer matter, we find significant loan announcement returns over the 1995–1999 period and, controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, a statistically significant positive relationship between the proxy and the borrower’s standardized CAR. While consistent with a bank’s loan screening and monitoring adding value to the borrower, the economic effect is relatively small.

When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value?

It is well known that risk increases the value of options. Thisarticle makes that precise in a new way. The conventional theoremsays that the value of an option does not fall if the underlyingasset becomes riskier in the conventional sense of the mean-preservingspread. This article uses two new definitions of "riskier" toshow that the value of an option strictly increases (i) if theunderlying asset becomes "pointwise riskier," and (ii) onlyif the underlying asset becomes "extremum riskier."