Voluntary disclosure practices by foreign firms cross-listed in the United States

This is one of the first large-scale studies to examine the voluntary disclosure practices of foreign firms cross-listed in the United States. We proxy for voluntary disclosure using three attributes of firms’ management earnings guidance: (1) the likelihood of issuance; (2) the frequency of earnings guidance; and (3) a guidance quality measure. After first establishing that market participants view these firms’ disclosures as credible and economically important (i.e., the disclosures are negatively related to analyst forecast errors and the implied cost of equity capital), we compare cross-listed firms’ disclosure practices with comparable US firms and explore variations in disclosure practices among cross-listed firms. We find that cross-listed firms issue less frequent and lower quality management earnings guidance than comparable US firms. We further show that the gap between US and cross-listed firms widened after passage of Regulation FD, a regulation which induced greater public disclosure of firm-specific information. Focusing on the sample of cross-listing firms, we show that firms from common-law countries disclose more than firms from code-law countries. Finally, our results indicate that cross-listed firms that do not list on an organized US exchange provide more frequent and higher quality disclosure than those that do list on organized exchanges.     

The Association of R&D and Capital Expenditures with Subsequent Earnings Variability

Abstract:  We estimate the association of investments in R&D and in physical assets (CAPEX) with subsequent earnings variability. We estimate these relations in different time periods and across industries. We find that R&D contributes to subsequent earnings variability more than CAPEX only in relative R&D-intensive industries – industries in which R&D is relatively more intensive than physical capital. In physical assets-intensive industries, we do not find similar relations. The findings suggest that with respect to subsequent earnings variability, fundamental differences between investment information about R&D and CAPEX exist. However, they are mainly noticeable in firms that operate in relatively R&D-intensive industries. The evidence also suggests there was a shift in the relations between R&D and CAPEX over time. Our findings contribute to the debate on accounting for R&D expenditures.     

Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital

We investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. We find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures (as proxied by a self‐constructed index of coded items found in 677 firms' annual reports and 10‐K filings in fiscal 2001) than firms with poor earnings quality. In unconditional tests, we find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. However, consistent with the complementary association between disclosure and earnings quality, we find that the disclosure effect on cost of capital is substantially reduced or disappears completely (depending on the cost of capital proxy) once we condition on earnings quality. Extensions probing alternative proxies show that our findings are robust to measures of earnings quality and cost of capital, but not to other measures of voluntary disclosure. In particular, we find opposite relations for voluntary disclosure measures based on management forecasts and conference calls, and we find no relations for a press release based measure.     

Causes and Consequences of Disaggregating Earnings Guidance

Whether managers should provide earnings guidance, especially quarterly guidance, has been a hotly debated policy issue. Influential organizations have urged firms to stop providing earnings guidance to reduce earnings fixation and short‐termism in the capital markets. Little attention has been paid to an alternative proposal: instead of ceasing earnings guidance, companies could provide disaggregated earnings guidance. No archival evidence exists regarding the determinants of disaggregated earnings guidance and its effects on the firm and its information environment. We find that once managers provide guidance, the decision to disaggregate this guidance is primarily driven by demand‐and‐supply factors that exhibit little change from year to year rather than by strategic factors. We find more timely analyst forecast revisions (with no compromise of forecast accuracy), a greater magnitude of revisions, and a larger reduction in analyst disagreement for disaggregating firms than for non‐disaggregating firms. These findings suggest that disaggregation enriches a firm's information environment. We also find that disaggregation helps managers align analyst expectations with their own, but firms are punished by investors for providing multiple performance targets but missing them.     

Earnings management in the pre-IPO process: Biases and predictors

We analyze a sample of 3,293 IPOs from 29 countries to investigate the firm, industry, and country characteristics related to earnings management during the IPO process. We find that IPO firms tend to have significantly positive discretionary accruals (DCA) both prior to and after the IPO, suggesting that IPO firms tend to engage in pre-IPO earnings management. However, we also find that using a proxy for earnings management in the IPO year may lead to biased conclusions concerning pre-IPO earnings management. Firms that are more likely to need access to capital markets in the future (firms with high leverage, and firms backed by a venture capitalist) are less likely to engage in pre-IPO earnings management. Firms operating in countries with a superior rule of law are also less likely to engage in earnings management. Lastly, we find that firms may engage in pre-IPO earnings management in part to avoid returning to the capital markets to raise more funds (capital market staging). This result is robust to possible endogeneity bias stemming from management self-selection.     

Family Control and Financing Decisions

This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corporate financing decisions during the period 1998–2008. We find that family firms have a preference for debt financing, a non‐control‐diluting security, and are more reluctant than non‐family firms to raise capital through equity offerings. We also find that credit markets are prone to provide long‐term debt to family firms, indicating that they view their investment decisions as less risky. In fact, our empirical results demonstrate that family firms invest less than non‐family firms in high‐risk, research and development (R&D) projects, but not in low‐risk, fixed‐asset capital expenditure (CAPEX) projects, suggesting that fear of control loss in family firms deters risk‐taking. Overall, our findings reveal that the external financing (and investment) decisions of family firms are in greater (lesser) conflict with the interests of minority shareholders (bondholders).     

Management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital

We examine the relation between management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital in a cross-section of 1,355 firms over a 4-year post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (2001 through 2004). We find evidence of a negative association between the quality of management earnings forecasting policy and cost of equity capital, and we document that the strength of the association is greater for firms with higher disclosure costs and for firms with more relevant quarterly management earnings forecasts. Our results are robust to the use of multiple methods to address both endogeneity and the measurement error in firm-specific estimates of implied cost of equity capital.     

Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy

We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the spread of corporate disclosure policies.     

Civil war, stock return, and intellectual capital disclosure in Sri Lanka

This study examines the effect of current-period intellectual capital disclosure on earnings and current annual stock return during a civil-war period. Using the top 30 firms by market capitalization listed on Colombo Stock Exchange over six years (from 1998 to 2003), this study finds that firms do not include the current-period intellectual capital disclosure in the current stock return, and the increase in the current-period intellectual capital disclosure activity has no influence on earnings included in the current stock return. Future accounting-based earnings, if stated in the current period, by contrast are included in the current stock return. The findings provide insights into the intellectual capital disclosure practice and its influence on stock return in a civil-war environment.     

Less timely earnings announcements and voluntary disclosure

The release of earnings information has become less timely in recent years partly because firms increasingly disclose earnings concurrently with their periodic reports (e.g., 10-Ks, 10-Qs). We examine whether firms use voluntary disclosure to mitigate the negative economic consequences of less timely earnings announcements (EAs). We find that firms with less timely EAs are more likely to provide voluntary 8-K filings over the period leading to the EA. We also find that investors’ demand for timely information, the nature of earnings news and litigation risk affect the extent to which firms provide voluntary disclosure to compensate for less timely EAs. The negative effect of less timely EAs on information asymmetry is attenuated when firms provide voluntary 8-K filings prior to EAs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms voluntarily communicate with investors using voluntary disclosure when their EAs are less timely.     

Causal disclosures on earnings and earnings management in an IPO setting

We examine the association of earnings management and narrative impression management as reflected in properties of causal explanations of reported earnings in the prospectus of Chinese IPO firms. Anticipated earnings management concerns are argued to be a significant incentive for causal disclosures on earnings in order to rationalize and legitimize earnings outcomes. We find evidence of close alignment of a firm’s earnings management propensity and its use of tactical causal disclosures. Stronger earnings management is associated with more intense assertive causal disclosure. On the other hand, firms exhibiting stronger earnings management tend to avoid the use of explicit defensive causal disclosure tactics. These findings are consistent with the strong background expectations of managerial agency and control that pervade an IPO setting. Our evidence holds after controlling for endogeneity within the context of an opportunistic disclosure position.     

Cash flow disaggregation and the prediction of future earnings

We examine the incremental information content of the components of cash flows from operations (CFO). Specifically the research question examined in this paper is whether models incorporating components of CFO to predict future earnings provide lower prediction errors than models incorporating simply net CFO. We use Australian data in this setting as all companies were required to provide information using the direct method during the sample period. We find that the cash flow components model is superior to an aggregate cash flow model in terms of explanatory power and predictive ability for future earnings; and that disclosure of non‐core (core) cash flows components is (not) useful in both respects. Our results are of relevance to investors and analysts in estimating earnings forecasts, managers of firms in regulators’ domains where choice is provided with respect to the disclosure of CFO and also to regulators’ deliberations on disclosure requirements and recommendations.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.     

Information leakage of ADRs Prior to company issued guidance

We examine whether the degree of selective disclosure (as measured by information leakage prior to managerial earnings guidance) of foreign firms with ADRs is different from that of U.S. firms. We find that there is no variation of leakage before earning guidance between ADRs and U.S. firms. This result is consistent with the prediction that, despite being exempt from Regulation FD, ADRs have sufficient incentives to avoid selective disclosure even without the regulatory enforcement. In addition, we attempt to determine whether the variation in selective disclosure among the foreign firms with ADRs is conditioned on the respective home country transparency and governance standards. We find that country-specific characteristics, such as corruption perception, economic freedom and the legal system origin, explain the variation in information leakage of ADRs.     

Earnings changes associated with relaxing the reconciliation requirement in non-U.S. firms’ SEC filings

We investigate the changes in earnings information content and earnings attributes for non-U.S. firms listed in U.S. equity markets following the 2007 relaxation of the SEC requirement to reconcile IFRS earnings and stockholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP in annual regulatory filings. We analyze a sample of non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges from 2005 to 2008 that use IFRS, and compare them to non-U.S. firms that continue to use domestic GAAP or U.S. GAAP. Prior literature finds no changes in informativeness following the regulatory change for IFRS-using firms. However, when we partition the IFRS-using firms into two groups based on their history of providing reconciliation information, we find that firms which previously provided more information about the differences between their reporting GAAP and U.S. GAAP had significant increases in the information content of their earnings. In contrast, there is no change in earnings informativeness for firms that provided less informative reconciliations. We regard the reconciliation informativeness as a proxy for firms’ efforts to provide more informative disclosures, which is driven by their disclosure incentives. We also document that the change in the information content of earnings for more informative reconcilers was contemporaneous with a change in earnings attributes for these firms. Consistent with no change in earnings informativeness for less informative reconcilers, there is little change in their earnings attributes. Our results underscore the importance of incorporating disclosure incentives when examining the consequences of a regulatory change.     

The use of Web sites as a disclosure platform for corporate performance

Adopting a stockholders' interests' perspective, we explore three related questions: (1) What are the scope and patterns of corporate performance disclosure on the Internet? (2) What are the determinants of the extent and scope of corporate performance disclosure on the Internet? (3) Is corporate performance disclosure on the Internet relevant for valuation of a firm's earnings? Corporate performance disclosure relates to corporate actions and initiatives that directly affect society and, ultimately, stockholders' wealth. We focus on Web (HTML) disclosure. Our sample comprises Canada's largest publicly-traded firms, many of which are also SEC registrants. The extent and scope of web disclosure by these firms is rated using a coding grid. Regarding the first question, three disclosure patterns emerge: (1) firms providing disclosure about innovation, development and growth also tend to report about customer value as well as maintaining a Web site with good capabilities (business-related disclosure), (2) disclosure about human/intellectual capital is linked to social responsibility disclosure (social-related disclosure) and, (3) the disclosure of financial performance and corporate governance practices are both closely linked together (financial-related disclosure). Regarding the second question, firms apparently take into account variables proxying for information costs and benefits accruing to stockholders when determining the extent of their Web disclosure. Finally, regarding the third question, a firm's web-based performance disclosure appears to affect its earnings valuation multiple, although in a differential manner according to the nature of the information being conveyed.     

Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure

While the influence of earnings performance on disclosure is a fundamental issue in the disclosure literature, our understanding of this influence is limited. In this paper, I examine a comprehensive set of disclosures from a sample of firms experiencing an extended period of seasonally adjusted earnings increases. I study how these firms adjust disclosure in response to earnings increases, how disclosure changes as the period of strong earnings performance nears an end and how firms disclose during a subsequent period of earnings decline. I find an increase in disclosure during the period of increased earnings. This increase is pervasive across all types of disclosure and tends to be bundled with earnings announcements. The market responds positively to this disclosure. Firms continue to disclose at a high level as they approach earnings declines. However, they shift to disclosures that focus on the positive short-term results and do not discuss the impending decreases. While this behavior is systematic, the market does not appear to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines. Once the firms announce earnings declines, the magnitude of disclosure returns to the level provided prior to the increased earnings.     

IFRS adoption,reporting incentives and financial reporting quality in private firms

This study examines financial reporting quality (FRQ) effects around voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoptions by German private firms across two important dimensions, earnings quality and disclosure practices. To capture differences in the motivations for IFRS adoptions, we identify four different types of IFRS adopting firms based on a comprehensive set of firm characteristics. We observe earnings quality improvements around IFRS adoptions primarily for one type of firm, which is young, fast growing and seeking access to public equity markets. Using a matched sample of private German GAAP and IFRS reporting firms, we find some evidence suggesting that IFRS also contribute to higher earnings quality. Recognizing that our earnings quality metrics are only incomplete measures of FRQ, we also compare the disclosure practices of IFRS and German GAAP firms. We find that all IFRS firm types disclose significantly more information in their financial reports and show a higher propensity to publish their financial reports voluntarily on the corporate website. Our findings indicate that failure to identify earnings quality changes around IFRS adoption cannot be automatically interpreted as IFRS adoption having no effect on the FRQ of (private) firms. Collectively, our results suggest that both incentives and accounting standards shape private firms’ FRQ.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

Does external finance pressure affect corporate disclosure of Chinese non-state-owned enterprises?

We examine whether external finance pressure influences information disclosure of Chinese non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which are often entrepreneurial firms. Existing Chinese stock exchange regulations stipulate that firms need to meet certain earnings performance criteria to qualify for rights issue or avoid delisting. These regulatory criteria create pressures for firms in need for external equity financing to manipulate earnings in order to meet and beat the performance targets. To examine this, we exploit an exogenous event of Chinese accounting standards change in 2007, when firms are given greater accounting disclosure discretion. Following this change, we find evidence consistent with increased earnings manipulation among NSOEs that barely meet these performance targets. This effect is also more pronounced among such NSOEs with weaker political connections, which increases their dependence on the capital market for external financing. Our findings have policy implications for the financing of NSOEs and entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies.