Do Investor Demand and Market Timing Affect Convertible Debt Issuance Decisions by REITs?

The unique regulatory environment of REITs casts doubt on the traditional theoretical process by which REIT managers base their convertible debt issuance decisions on issuer condition and prospects. Anecdotal evidence shows that REITs may have catered to demand by investors, including a demand by convertible bond arbitrageurs when issuing convertible debt. This study examines the rationale behind convertible debt issuances by REITs, focusing on the possible impacts of investor demand and market timing. The results suggest that investor demand significantly affects convertible debt issuance decisions by REITs while certain unknown factors appear to have contributed to the sudden increase of convertible debt offerings in 2006 and 2007. REITs also time the market to conditions in the public debt market. The results only partially support the offered risk-shifting, risk-uncertainty, backdoor-equity, and sequential-financing hypotheses.     

What Drives the Issuance of Putable Convertibles: Risk-Shifting,Asymmetric Information,or Taxes?

This paper presents the first empirical analysis of firms’ rationale for issuing putable convertible bonds in the literature. We distinguish between three possible rationales for the issuance of putable convertibles: 1) the risk-shifting hypothesis, 2) the asymmetric information hypothesis, and 3) the tax savings hypothesis. The results of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, putable convertible issuers are larger, less risky firms, having larger cash flows, smaller growth opportunities, and lower bankruptcy probabilities as compared to ordinary convertible issuers. Second, putable convertible issuers have lower preissue market valuations, more favorable announcement effects, and better postissue operating performance when compared to ordinary convertible issuers. Third, putable convertible issuers have better postissue long-run stock return performance as compared to ordinary convertible issuers. Finally, putable convertible issuers typically have greater tax obligations and better credit ratings than ordinary convertible issuers. Overall, the results of our univariate as well as multivariate analyses provide support for the asymmetric information and tax savings hypotheses, but little support for the risk-shifting hypothesis.     

What Drives Housing Markets: Fundamentals or Bubbles?

This study applies the dynamic Gordon growth model which is in the circumstance of rational bubbles to decompose log price-rent ratio into three parts, i.e., rational bubbles, discounted expected future rent growth rates and discounted expected future returns. The latter two terms represent housing fundamentals. The magnitudes of the components of price-rent ratio’s variance are estimated to distinguish the relative impact of the three parts on housing prices. Using time series data from the housing markets in the four largest cities in China (1991:Q1–2011:Q1 for Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; 1993:Q2–2011:Q1 for Beijing), this paper presents a number of empirical findings: (a) the variance of rational bubbles is much larger than the variance of price-rent ratio, and rational bubbles contribute more fluctuations directly to price-rent ratio than the expected returns or the expected rent growth rates do; (b) the covariance between rational bubbles and expected returns or expected rent growth rates is also large; (c) the positive covariance of rational bubbles and expected returns implies that high expected returns coexist with bubbles, which differs from previous findings that lower expected returns drive asset prices; (d) the negative covariance of rational bubbles and expected rent growth rates indicates that the larger the bubbles are, the lower the expected rent growth rates are; (e) the positive covariance of expected returns and expected rent growth rates reveals under-reaction of the housing markets to rents.     

Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemons problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. When such premium gets too high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007–2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) “flight to overnight” in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.     

Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know,and When Do They Know It?

We study put option sales on company stock by large firms. An often‐cited motivation for these transactions is market timing, and managers' decision to issue puts should be sensitive to whether the stock is undervalued. We provide new evidence that large firms successfully time security sales. In the 100 days following put option issues, there is roughly a 5% abnormal stock return, with much of the abnormal return following the first earnings release date after the sale. Direct evidence on put option exercises reinforces these findings: exercise frequencies and payoffs to put holders are abnormally low.     

What Drives Anomaly Returns?

We decompose the returns of five well-known anomalies into cash flow and discount rate news. Common patterns emerge across the five factor portfolios and their mean-variance efficient (MVE) combination. Whereas discount rate news predominates in market returns, systematic cash flow news drives the returns of anomaly portfolios and their MVE combination with the market portfolio. Anomaly cash flow and discount rate shocks are largely uncorrelated with market cash flow and discount rate shocks and with business cycle fluctuations. These rich empirical patterns restrict the joint dynamics of firm cash flows and the pricing kernel, thereby informing models of stocks' expected returns.     

Job Market Signaling: What Drives the Productivity of Finance Ph.D.s?

We study the research productivity of new finance Ph.D.s as measured by the number of quality publications. A commonly accepted notion is that the highest ranked schools produce the candidates with the greatest potential for high‐quality publications. Our results, however, find publications or revisions in top‐tier journals during the doctoral program are a stronger measure of potential research productivity than the school attended. Our findings demonstrate how candidates outside of the top schools can signal their future research productivity. Even though we examine the specialized labor market, our results have broader implications for markets outside academics.     

Prices or Knowledge? What Drives Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets?

Financial development is critical for growth, but its microdeterminants are not well understood. We test leading theories of low demand for financial services in emerging markets, combining novel survey evidence from Indonesia and India with a field experiment. We find a strong correlation between financial literacy and behavior. However, a financial education program has modest effects, increasing demand for bank accounts only for those with limited education or financial literacy. In contrast, small subsidies greatly increase demand. A follow‐up survey confirms these findings, demonstrating that newly opened accounts remain open and in use 2 years after the intervention.     

Technology,Utilization, and Inflation: What Drives the New Keynesian Phillips Curve?

We argue that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve literature has failed to deliver a convincing measure of real marginal costs. We start from a careful modeling of optimal price setting allowing for nonunitary factor substitution, nonneutral technical change, and time‐varying factor utilization rates. This ensures the resulting real marginal cost measures match volatility reductions and level changes witnessed in many U.S. time series. The cost measure comprises conventional countercyclical cost elements plus procyclical (and covarying) utilization rates. Although procyclical elements seem to dominate, the components of real marginal cost components are becoming less cyclical over time. Incorporating this richer driving variable produces more plausible price‐stickiness estimates than otherwise and suggests a more balanced weight of backward‐ and forward‐looking inflation expectations than commonly found. Our results challenge existing views of inflation determinants and have important implications for modeling inflation in New Keynesian models.     

What Drives the Property Price-Trading Volume Correlation? Evidence from a Commercial Real Estate Market

The significant price-trading volume correlation found in the residential property market presents a challenge to the rational expectation hypothesis. Existing theories account for this fact with either capital market imperfection (down-payment effect or loss-aversion consideration) or imperfect information (search theoretic models). This paper employs data from a commercial real estate market, which face a different degree of severity of capital market constraint than the residential market, and thus provide an indirect but effective test for alternative theories. Policy implications are also discussed.     

The Interbank Market after August 2007: What Has Changed,and Why?

After the onset of the financial crisis, spreads between interbank interest rates on unsecured and secured deposits for the major world currencies became exceptionally large and volatile. First, we find that the phenomenon was mainly driven by aggregate—rather than bank‐specific—factors, notably risk aversion, and accounting practices; by contrast, funding liquidity, capital shortage, and central bank interventions were not important determinants. Second, prior to August 2007, the spread was broadly insensitive to key borrower characteristics, whereas afterward it became somewhat more reactive to measures of creditworthiness. Third, conditions for big borrowers became relatively more favorable during the crisis, suggesting that moral hazard risks related to the “too‐big‐to‐fail” argument have increased. These results are discussed in the light of theories on the interbank market during a crisis.     

Supervisor and Market Analysts: What Should Research be Seeking?

This article is primarily directed towards examining the desirability of incorporating market signals in the process of supervision of commercial banks by regulators and insurers. But the ideas developed here can also be applied to the general problem of using market information to assess the solvency and safety of any financial or non-financial institution.Market prices and yields of securities anticipate actions by regulators, central banks, and other players due to the fact that such actions may materially influence the risk and the expected return associated with investment decisions pertaining to those securities. It is well known that the yield curve of government securities such as T-bills, T-notes and T-bonds reflect the market's consensus regarding the actions that the Federal reserve may take as they pertain to the valuation of such securities. The extent to which the market has already discounted the future actions of the central bank will no doubt play a role in the way in which the central bank may think about its actions, its actual effect and how it relates to its intended effects.The extent to which market prices can provide useful guides depends on the underlying market structure and the practices in the industry.While markets may do lot of the hard work in aggregating and incorporating future actions, the task of supervision and regulation can never be put on automatic pilot. Ideally, supervisory policies should effectively combine the market signals with initiatives that serve to maintain the safety and the soundness of the underlying markets. I will begin by exploring the extent to which equity prices may be used as a signal of bank credit risk. I will then explore the advantages and disadvantages of using subordinated debt securities to derive a market signal.     

Margin Requirements, Volatility, and Market Integrity: What Have We Learned Since the Crash?

This study assesses the state of the policy debate that surrounds the federal regulation of margin requirements. A review of the literature finds no undisputed evidence that supports the hypothesis that margin requirements can be used to control stock return volatility and correspondingly little evidence that suggests that margin-related leverage is an important underlying source of excess volatility. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that there is a stable inverse relationship between the level of Regulation T margin requirements and stock returns volatility nor does it support the hypothesis that the leverage advantage in equity derivative products is a source of additional returns volatility in the stock market.     

What Drives the Relationship Between Financial Flexibility and Firm Performance: Investment Scale or Investment Efficiency? Evidence from China

Financial flexibility helps improve firm performance. By using data from Chinese listed companies, we examine whether investment scale or investment efficiency drives the relationship between financial flexibility and firm performance via a special mediator testing method that is widely used in the psychology literature (Baron and Kenny, 1986). We find that financial flexibility has a significant and positive effect on both investment and firm performance. However, investment scale rather than investment efficiency seems to drive firm performance. This finding helps us understand that Chinese companies tend to emphasize investment expansion more than they do investment efficiency to improve firm performance.     

What Does the Corporate Bond Market Know?

Do related markets reflect new information simultaneously? For high‐yield bonds, a large abnormal price decline in a corporation's most liquid bond over a month is followed by an average abnormal stock price decline of ?1.42%. This effect is larger for stocks that have increased in value and for volatile stocks. It is also larger for bonds with high coupons and shorter maturities. These results support the view that high‐yield corporate bonds have an informational edge when news is negative and stock returns are noisy, and add to the growing literature on the substantial lags in price discovery between related markets.     

What Drives Acquisitions in the EU Banking Industry? The Role of Bank Regulation and Supervision Framework,Bank Specific and Market Specific Factors

We investigate the determinants of commercial bank acquisitions in the former fifteen countries of the European Union by evaluating the impact of bank‐specific measures, such as size, growth and efficiency of banks, and external influences reflecting industry level differences in the regulatory and supervision framework, market environment and economic conditions. Our empirical analysis involves multinomial logit estimation at various levels in order to identify those characteristics that most consistently predict targets and acquirers from a sample of over 1400 commercial banks. The overall results indicate that, relative to banks that were not involved in the acquisitions, (i) targets and acquirers were significantly larger, less well capitalized and less cost efficient, (ii) targets were less profitable with lower growth prospects, and acquirers more profitable with higher growth prospects, (iii) external factors have affected targets and acquirers differently, and their effects have not been consistent or robust to sample size changes.     

Nature or nurture: What determines investor behavior?

Using data on identical and fraternal twins’ complete financial portfolios, we decompose the cross-sectional variation in investor behavior. We find that a genetic factor explains about one-third of the variance in stock market participation and asset allocation. Family environment has an effect on the behavior of young individuals, but this effect is not long-lasting and disappears as an individual gains experience. Frequent contact among twins results in similar investment behavior beyond a genetic factor. Twins who grew up in different environments still display similar investment behavior. Our interpretation of a genetic component of the decision to invest in the stock market is that there are innate differences in factors affecting effective stock market participation costs. We attribute the genetic component of asset allocation—the relative amount invested in equities and the portfolio volatility—to genetic variation in risk preferences.     

What Style Liquidity Timing Skills Do Mutual Fund Managers Possess?

Recent studies claim that mutual fund managers demonstrate strong MARKET liquidity timing skills. We extend their liquidity timing tests to the four‐factor case and investigate liquidity timing skills with respect to the MARKET, SIZE, VALUE and MOMENTUM factors. Contrary to these claims, we find no evidence that fund managers adjust market exposure in anticipation of market liquidity changes. We find rather strong evidence that fund managers successfully overweight small stocks as market liquidity increases. Our study also demonstrates that it is easy to misidentify SIZE liquidity timing as MARKET liquidity timing in models that focus only on MARKET liquidity timing.     

Marking‐to‐Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?

Financial institutions have been at the forefront of the debate on the controversial shift in international standards from historical cost accounting to mark‐to‐market accounting. We show that the trade‐offs at stake in this debate are far from one‐sided. While the historical cost regime leads to some inefficiencies, marking‐to‐market may lead to other types of inefficiencies by injecting artificial risk that degrades the information value of prices, and induces suboptimal real decisions. We construct a framework that can weigh the pros and cons. We find that the damage done by marking‐to‐market is greatest when claims are (1) long–lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior. These are precisely the attributes of the key balance sheet items of banks and insurance companies. Our results therefore shed light on why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of the shift to marking‐to‐market.