Audit committee financial expertise and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

An important role of financial accounting information is to aid financial statement users in forming expectations about the firm's future earnings. Prior research finds that accounting financial expertise of the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. We extend this literature by examining the association between audit committee financial expertise and analysts' ability to anticipate future earnings. We find a significant association between accounting financial expertise on the audit committee and analyst earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less dispersed. In contrast, we do not find a significant association between non-accounting financial expertise (i.e., supervisory expertise) and forecast accuracy or forecast dispersion. These findings contribute to our understanding of the benefits of accounting expertise in audit committees by demonstrating an association between accounting financial expertise and improvements in analyst earnings forecasts.     

An exploratory study of the effects of the European Union 8th Directive on Company Law on audit committees: Evidence from EU companies listed on the US stock exchanges

Member States in the European Union will be required to establish audit committees for all public-interest entities, according to the EU 8th Directive on Company Law. This EU 8th Directive creates a convergence of corporate oversight for both audit processes and financial reporting process and thus provides an opportunity to examine and contrast associations that exist among audit committee, board of directors characteristics with audit committee alignment, and the impact of such alignment on earnings management. Results of a logistic regression analysis suggest that firms with audit committees possessing greater financial expertise, with larger boards and more independent boards are less likely to engage in audit committee alignment while firms with audit committees possessing greater governance expertise are more likely to engage in alignment. In addition, we find that firms associated with audit committee alignment engage in less earnings management.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

The effect of audit committee shareholding,financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures

In recent years, corporate failures and accounting irregularities have led to concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees in the financial reporting process. In response, corporate governance committees in different countries have made specific recommendations designed to enhance the role of the audit committee in executing its financial reporting oversight duties. We investigate in this study, the effect of some of these recommendations by empirically examining the relationship between selected audit committee characteristics and the level of disclosure in interim reports of a sample of 262 UK listed companies. Specifically, the audit committee characteristics examined are shareholding of audit committee members (as a proxy for audit committee independence), audit committee size and audit committee financial expertise. Employing both a weighted and unweighted index to measure interim disclosure, the results indicate a significant negative association between shareholding of audit committee members and interim disclosure. Our results provide evidence of a significant positive association between interim disclosure and audit committee financial expertise. We find no significant relationship between audit committee size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Overall, however, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics have an impact on its monitoring effectiveness of the financial reporting process. These results have important implications for corporate governance policy-makers who have a responsibility to prescribe appropriate corporate governance structures to ensure that shareholders are protected.     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.     

Audit Committee Regulation in Australia: How Far Have We Come?

This paper presents a synopsis of the major developments in corporate governance regulations and recommendations for Australian audit committees, categorised into three distinct periods of regulation from 1976 to 2004. Earlier Australian research on audit committee formation, composition and diligence is summarised and compared. The research is then extended by presenting the results of an empirical study of 188 of the top 300 ASX listed companies with a financial year end of 30 June 2004, the first year of the third period of regulation. The results indicate that compliance with corporate governance regulations and recommendations had improved substantially with respect to: audit committee formation; the number of audit committee members, non‐executive directors on the audit committee; financial expertise of audit committee members; and the frequency of audit committee meetings. However, the number of independent directors on audit committees was well below ASX best practice guidelines.     

Financial expertise on audit committees of loan applicants: a research note to test the effects on lending decisions

The purpose of this study is to examine whether audit committee financial expertise matters when making commercial lending decisions. Commercial lenders rely on audited financial statements in making lending decisions, and the quality of these financial statements is impacted by the capabilities of audit committees having oversight of financial reporting. It is widely believed that this oversight is enhanced when audit committees contain members with financial expertise. A behavioural experiment is conducted where commercial lending officers make risk assessments and provide probabilities of granting loans based on a hypothetical scenario. This paper finds insufficient evidence to conclude that the existence of financial expertise on audit committees makes a difference to lenders. When replacing audit committee members, however, financial expertise does appear to matter to lenders in some cases.     

Earnings conservatism and audit committee financial expertise

Using an Australian sample of 494 firm‐year observations, this study finds that accounting financial expertise is the primary type of expertise that influences earnings conservatism, rather than nonaccounting financial expertise. The association between accounting financial expertise and conservatism holds only when the accounting financial expert(s) on audit committees is (are) independent. Overall, results suggest that audit committee accounting financial expertise is important in recognising the asymmetrical timeliness of losses. Findings provide a better understanding of the dynamics between audit committee financial expertise and earnings conservatism and demonstrate the importance of accounting financial expertise in improving financial reporting quality.     

Voluntary formation of audit committees by large municipal governments

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires that publicly-traded U.S. corporations have an audit committee in their internal control structure. In contrast to publicly-traded commercial firms, municipal governments are not required to form audit committees. Given that regulators believe it is a crucial aspect of internal control, we examine the extent to which city governments feature audit committees in the internal control structure. Based on a survey of financial managers from cities with populations greater than 100,000, we find that approximately 58% of the municipalities have such committees. Results indicate that larger and more financially viable cities are more likely to have audit committees. However, the form of municipal government and the quality of the local government’s financial reporting and audit processes are not significant determinants of the presence of an audit committee.     

Audit committee characteristics and financial statement comparability

Financial statement comparability enables weighing the similarities and differences in financial performance between firms. Prior studies mainly focus on the role of accounting standards in the production of comparability, but the role of economic agents has been largely overlooked. We find that a firm's audit committee size and financial expertise affect its financial statement comparability. Financial information tends to be more comparable among industry peers when audit committees are larger and more members have financial and accounting expertise. The effect of audit committee expertise on comparability is stronger for firms with less independent and smaller boards, for firms with non-Big 4 auditors and for firms with CEOs serving as the chairperson of the boards.     

Audit committee characteristics and firm performance during the global financial crisis

We address the question ‘do governance enhancing audit committee (AC) characteristics mitigate the firm performance impact of significant‐adverse‐economic events such as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)?’ Our analysis reveals that smaller audit committees with more experience and financial expertise are more likely to be associated with positive firm performance in the market. We also find that longer serving chairs of audit committees negatively impacts accounting performance. However, accounting performance is positively impacted where ACs include blockholder representation, the chair of the board, whose members have more external directorships and whose chair has more years of managerial experience. We contribute to the growing body of research on the impact of audit committee governance attributes on performance during times of financial distress.     

The impact of audit committee expertise on audit quality: Evidence from UK audit fees

Governance regulators currently place great emphasis on ensuring the presence of financial expertise on audit committees (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code 2010–2016). Underlying this is a belief that greater expertise enhances the effectiveness of audit committees and, by extension, the quality of the external audit. This study investigates the impact of audit committee expertise on one measure of audit quality - audit fees paid by FTSE350 companies. Our analysis finds that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated with higher audit fees. When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-accounting, we find that the positive impact identified is driven by non-accounting expertise. Furthermore, when we separate FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms we find the impact of financial expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms. Our findings are important as they highlight the usefulness of segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-specialists, something which regulators in the UK and in the USA currently do not do. Our findings also highlight the potential value of audit committee expertise in smaller as opposed to larger listed firms, suggesting that the value of expertise to audit quality depends on the specific financial reporting challenges firms face.     

The effect of audit committee characteristics on intellectual capital disclosure

This paper, using data from 100 UK listed firms, investigates the relationship between audit committee characteristics and intellectual capital (IC) disclosure. We find that overall IC disclosure is positively associated with audit committee characteristics such as the size and frequency of meetings, and negatively associated with audit committee directors' shareholding. We find no significant relationship between IC disclosure and audit committee independence and financial expertise. We also observe that the association between audit committee characteristics and IC disclosure varies with the IC components (i.e. human capital, structural capital and relational capital), suggesting that the underlying factors that drive various components of IC disclosure are different. These results have important implications for policy-makers in that they confirm that the effectiveness of audit committees in the corporate reporting processes is a function of certain characteristics.     

The Composition and Effectiveness of Audit Committees in the Presence of Large Controlling Shareholders

The authors' study of audit committees in 450 large East Asian companies (150 each in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) finds a strong positive correlation between the “cash flow” ownership (as opposed to just the voting rights) of large shareholders and the percentage of independent audit committee members. The study also reports a strong positive correlation between the “cash flow” ownership of large shareholders and the percentage of audit committee members with financial expertise and experience. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that larger cash flow ownership provides large shareholders with strong incentives for more effective governance. Conversely, the lower percentages of independent or professional audit directors at companies with large disparities between cash ownership and voting rights is consistent with the authors' hypothesis that entrenched large shareholders prefer inferior governance structures that pose fewer obstacles to their tendency to exploit the wealth of minority shareholders. Furthermore, the authors find higher valuations (market‐to‐book ratios) for companies with audit committees that consist entirely of independent directors and have larger percentage of members with financial expertise. And when viewed as a whole, the authors' findings provide support for the argument that ownership structure affects the composition of audit committees, and that independent and professional audit committees can help increase firm value.     

The effect of disclosure committees on non-GAAP reporting quality

I examine whether company-implemented disclosure committees help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. I find that firms with disclosure committees provide higher quality non-GAAP performance metrics and that the exclusions used to calculate their non-GAAP numbers are less persistent for future operating income and operating cash flows. Moreover, I find that firms with disclosure committees are less likely to receive SEC comment letters about non-GAAP disclosure. For firms that receive comment letters about non-GAAP reporting, disclosure committees can help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. Comparing the influence of audit committees and disclosure committees, I find that audit committee financial experts have stronger monitoring effects than those on disclosure committees. Meanwhile, legal experts on disclosure committees provide similar monitoring compared to audit committees’ financial experts. Finally, the interaction between audit committee financial experts and disclosure committee legal experts produces the strongest effect on non-GAAP reporting quality. In sum, my analyses suggest that disclosure committees can provide important monitoring of non-GAAP reporting.     

Audit committee composition and the use of an industry specialist audit firm

Independent, competent boards of directors and audit committees are said to be important mechanisms of corporate governance. The purpose of the present study is to empirically examine the association between audit committee composition and audit quality. Specifically, the link between the proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee, financial qualifications of directors and the number of audit committee meetings held in a year are investigated and expected to have a positive association with the quality of the audit firm used. Audit quality is proxied by industry specialization. The results support the link between a higher proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee and use of an industry specialist audit firm. Other measures of audit committee quality (those with a higher proportion of directors with financial qualifications and those that meet more frequently) are not significantly associated with the use of an industry specialist audit firm. Sensitivity analysis shows that the presence of an audit committee is linked to use of an industry specialist audit firm.     

Audit Committee Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality: Implications for Auditor Independence

Auditors participating in a survey identified oversight of financial reporting and the external audit process, and ensuring quality internal controls, as the most important functions of effective audit committees. Financial literacy or expertise, independence, and a strong commitment to perform the job effectively were noted as important attributes. The results also suggest that although audit committees have enough power to confront management on contentious issues, they are not very effective in helping to resolve financial reporting disputes. Management was identified as a key influence in affecting the nature, extent, and quality of communication between the auditor and the audit committee. Most auditors believe that it is not important for each member of the audit committee to be an expert, but it is important that they are financially literate.     

Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

Audit Committee Members: What Goes on Behind Closed Doors?

Using a qualitative research paradigm, this study examines audit committee effectiveness from the perspective of audit committee members of New Zealand listed companies. The findings reveal that audit committee members perform a range of overlapping tasks and justify their existence in their audit committees by fulfilling the ‘expectations’ that are placed on them. Many quantitative research studies have examined the association between different dimensions of audit committee inputs and financial reporting outputs. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed and remains far from conclusive (Bédard and Gendron 2010). One of the primary reasons for the inconsistent findings is the lack of understanding of the actual process by which audit committees perform their responsibilities. Using a qualitative research paradigm, this study examines audit committee activities, processes and effectiveness from the perspective of audit committee members of New Zealand listed companies. The study argues that performing audit committee duties is an intended process, whereby audit committee members justify their actions and the effectiveness of their audit committees. The paper contributes to the limited literature on how audit committees operate and, by doing so, provides possible explanations for the inconsistent findings of the quantitative audit committee research. In particular, the paper invites further discussion on whether audit committee members can be (or should be assumed to be) independent when discharging their role of overseeing auditing and financial reporting‐related matters.