Search Costs,Behavioral Biases,and Information Intermediary Effects

In many markets, buyers, sellers, and their agents have differential information about the quality of heterogeneous assets. We study negotiated transaction prices in the commercial real estate market, which is characterized by heterogeneous assets, illiquidity, and highly segmented local markets, all of which increase the importance of asymmetric information in negotiated pricing outcomes. Using 114,588 industrial, multi-family and office sale transactions that occurred during 1997–2011, we document that distant commercial real estate buyers pay, on average, premiums of 4 % to 15 % relative to local buyers, controlling for individual property characteristics as well as time fixed-effects. We also examine the extent to which the sources of these observed premiums are a product of higher search costs/information asymmetry problems associated with distance (search cost channel) or a result of reference-dependence preference/anchoring based on the price levels in the investors’ local market (behavioral biases channel). Our results suggest the observed price premiums are explained by distant investors who face higher search costs and are at an information disadvantage compared to investors located in closer proximity to the property. In contrast, anchoring plays a more muted role in explaining observed premiums. The use of an intermediary (broker) increases, on average, the acquisition prices of buyers and decreases the disposition prices of sellers by 3 % to 8 %. This result is consistent with the incentive real estate agents have to convince sellers to dispose of their properties too quickly and to convince buyers to search less and therefore pay higher prices.     

Inflation and Welfare in Retail Markets: Prior Production and Imperfectly Directed Search

This paper considers the effect of monetary policy and inflation on retail markets: goods are dated and produced prior to being retailed; buyers direct their search on price and general quality; buyers’ match‐specific tastes are private information. Sellers set the same price for all buyers, some of whom do not value the good highly enough to buy it. The market economy is typically inefficient as a social planner would have the good consumed. Under free entry of sellers, the Friedman rule is optimal policy. When the upper bound on the number of participating sellers binds, moderate levels of inflation can be welfare improving.     

Pricing and commitment by two‐sided platforms

I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two‐sided markets with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each other; (ii) sellers arrive before buyers; and (iii) platforms can charge both fixed fees and variable fees (royalties). I show that a monopoly platform may prefer not to commit to the price it will charge buyers at the same time it announces its seller price if it faces unfavorable seller expectations. With competing platforms, commitment makes the existence of an exclusive equilibrium (in which sellers register with only one platform) less likely, but it has no impact on multi‐homing equilibria (in which sellers support both platforms) whenever these exist.     

An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with “Third Party” Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance

In markets in which sellers know more about product quality than buyers, but cannot convey their superior information either by directly issuing costly signals of the Spence type or by successfully funding the production of information, I suggest another way in which the informational asymmetry problem can be resolved; a third party can produce the necessary information at a cost and use it to price a service consumed by the sellers. Buyers can then observe a seller's choice of service consumption level and be well informed in equilibrium. In this framework I construct a model in which a borrower's choice of insurance coverage signals its default probability to lenders, and explore the properties of the resulting signalling equilibrium in a variety of cases.     

Marketmaking Middlemen

This article develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. There are two representative modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets: one is a middleman mode where an intermediary purchases inventory from the wholesale market and resells to buyers; the other is a market-making mode where an intermediary offers a platform for buyers and sellers to meet and trade. We show that a marketmaking middleman, who adopts a mixture of these two intermediation modes, can emerge in a directed search equilibrium and discuss implications for the market structure.     

Reputation and adverse selection: theory and evidence from eBay

How can a marketplace introduce mechanisms to overcome inefficiencies caused by adverse selection? In this article, I use a unique data set that follows eBay sellers to show that reputation is a major determinant of price variations. I develop a model of sellers' dynamic behavior where sellers have heterogeneous qualities unobservable by buyers. Using reputation as a signal of quality, I structurally estimate the model to uncover buyers' utility and sellers' costs and underlying qualities. I show that removing the reputation mechanism increases low‐quality sellers' market share, lowers prices, and consequently reduces sellers' profit by 66% and consumer surplus by 35%.     

Consumer‐surplus‐enhancing collusion and trade

That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated‐product duopoly operates in two geographically separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel, relative to duopolistic competition, raises the price of the imported good and lowers the price of the home good. This raises welfare for most consumers and increases aggregate consumer surplus. A similar possibility result applies to autarky. Our analysis applies beyond the spatial setting.     

Price,quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment

We examine the link between price, quality, seller claims, and seller reputation in Internet auctions. After purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded, we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality. They pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and, in fact, are defrauded more often. Online seller reputation is effective for identifying good‐faith sellers. But conditional on completed auctions, reputable sellers do not provide better quality. Evidence also suggests that high‐claim sellers target less‐experienced buyers. We attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the eBay rating system. We benefited from the comments of Austan Goolsbee, Raphael Thomadsen, John Shea, Dan Vincent, David Reiley, Larry Ausubel, Peter Cramton, V. Joseph Hotz, Jeff Smith, Jimmy Chan, Vincent Crawford, Mark Duggan, and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences. We are particularly grateful to Seth Sanders and John List for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research, to Timothy Bresnahan, Rachel Kranton, and Thomas Hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions, and to Editor Ariel Pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings. Special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets, and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry. Excellent research assistance from Randy Alexander Moore and Krzysztof Fizyta is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are ours.     

Platform Externality,Asymmetric Information,and Counterfeit Deterrence in E-Commerce

The fight against online sales of counterfeit goods has received much attention. To the best of our knowledge, existing literature on online counterfeiting lacks a theoretical framework. To fill this gap, this article proposes a two-period model with sellers, buyers, and a platform. We focus on the relationship among platform structure (characterized by the ratio of buyers to sellers), asymmetric information, deterrence strength, and the ratio of counterfeits. Cross-network externalities of platform make platform managers worry about potential exodus of buyers and sellers due to counterfeits. This externality provides platform with strong incentives to fight counterfeits by itself, even without external regulatory requirement. We further show that the higher the ratio of buyers to sellers, the lower the ratio of counterfeits. Moreover, a lower degree of information asymmetry or a higher degree of punishment can reduce the ratio of counterfeits. We suggest that governments and e-commerce platforms work together in the fight against counterfeiting.     

Days on market and home sales

In 2006, Massachusetts adopted a new policy that prohibits home sellers from resetting their properties’ days on market through relisting. Massachusetts homes exposed to the policy change experienced a $16,000 reduction in sale price relative to Rhode Island homes. Slow‐moving homes suffered a greater reduction, but newer listings only had a small increase in sale price. One reason is that some buyers were unaware of sellers’ manipulation of days on market and thus unable to recognize authentically new listings. Sellers reacted to the new policy by cutting listing prices, although in towns where listing price history was transparent, sellers raised listing prices to dampen the stigma of slow sales.     

Buyers' and sellers' agents in the housing market

We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are better off. We identify two characteristics that give rise to sellers' agents and show that markets that do not have such agents are missing at least one of these characteristics.     

Pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle: Explaining the sign of the market risk premium

In this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium, defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts, depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers. In commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short-term and long-term horizons. We show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium. We apply our model to the German electricity market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors. Firstly, the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers, and secondly, how the market power of producers, relative to that of buyers, affects forward prices with different delivery periods.     

Speed of Issuance,Lender Specialization,and the Rise of the 144A Debt Market

Using a large sample of convertible and straight debt issues in the public, 144A, and bank loan markets from 1991 to 2004, we find that the 144A market has risen largely at the expense of the nonshelf public market, the overwhelming majority of the 144A issues are subsequently registered, and straight debt issuers with the highest credit quality and transparency tend to use the shelf public market. Our findings suggest that firms’ preference for speed of issuance drives the growth of the 144A market, and banks and qualified institutional buyers have advantages over public lenders in handling credit risk and information asymmetry.     

Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency

Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection. Second, nontransparency helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from lower‐tier certification. Third, transparency does not help screen among heterogeneous sellers. Strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down the certification pecking order and lead to the stigmatization of the lower tiers. Mandating transparency benefits the sellers but has an ambiguous impact on buyers, who actually become less informed about product quality.     

Optimal Portfolio Choices, House Risk Hedging and the Pricing of Forward House Transactions

This paper develops a utility indifference model for evaluating various prices associated with forward transactions in the housing market, based on the equivalent principle of expected wealth utility derived from the forward and spot real estate markets. Our model results show that forward transactions in the housing market are probably not due to house sellers?? and buyers?? heterogeneity, but to their demand for hedging against house price risk. When the imperfections of real estate markets and the risk preferences of market participants are taken into consideration, we are able to show that the idiosyncratic risk premium, which mainly depends on the participants?? risk preferences and the correlation between the traded asset and the real estate, is a remarkable determinant of house sellers?? and buyers?? forward reservation prices. In addition, we also find that the market clearing forward price usually will not converge toward the expected risk-neutral forward price. The sellers?? or buyers?? risk aversion degrees and market powers are also identified to play crucial roles in determining the clearing forward price.     

Formulaic Transparency: The Hidden Enabler of Exceptional U.S. Securitization

Why does the securitization of residential mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and other such consumer debt in the U.S. exceed the securitization of such debt in Europe by several trillion dollars? The author points out that lemon problems do not stop the sale of used cars but they do prevent the operation of a market in which buyers place sight‐unseen bids for used cars offered by unknown sellers. Buyers prefer to know who the seller is and test‐drive vehicles. Similarly until the 1980s, creditors were willing to forgo the information they could secure in private transactions to get tradability mainly in the case of bonds issued by governments or a few blue‐chip companies. U.S. government policy encouraged the securitization of trillions of dollars of loans made to millions of borrowers. U.S. rules—rather than new financial or information technologies—have strongly encouraged originators of mortgages and other consumer loans to rely on credit scores (commonly referred to as FICO scores) produced by credit bureaus. And reliance on scores that loan originators use but don’t produce helps overcome the information asymmetry problems that would otherwise constrain securitization. The argument turns the usual concern about securitization on its head: transferring risks to investors is normally expected to discourage careful screening of borrowers, but the author’s analysis suggests that formulaic, FICO‐based screening actually enables risk transfer by reducing information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while limiting screening reduces the upfront costs of lending, it also increases loans made to uncreditworthy borrowers. And because increasing loans made to bad borrowers raises the rates good borrowers have to pay (to compensate investors for higher defaults), U.S. rules that sacrifice information for more “complete” markets may be a bad bargain.     

Experimental Tests of Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices.This article reports the results of several studies that examined the degree to which people behave according to the notions of self-selection and screening. Subjects played the role of either insurance buyers or sellers. The results of these studies provide partial support for the hypothesis that subjects use self-selection and screening in insurance markets. Our study also points at the importance of learning in experimental studies. In one-stage experiments where subjects did not get feedback, screening was not detected. When multistage experiments were conducted, and the subjects learned from experience and were also taught the relevant theories, their decisions were more aligned with screening.     

Information, Search, and House Prices: Revisited

Buyers pay different prices for nearly identical homes. One explanation for this is that housing markets are thin, resulting in price bargaining between sellers and buyers. If the relative bargaining power of buyers varies, so will sales prices. One hypothesis is that the relative bargaining strength of buyers coming from outside the local market relative to that of local residents is weak, because distant buyers have high search costs and may know less about the nuances of the local market. Our results, based upon a large number of single-family home transactions from the state of Florida, lend support to this hypothesis. Another related hypothesis is that buyers?? price expectations are anchored to prices they were accustomed to at their previous residence. Hence, if they come from high price markets they will tend to pay more for their new home. This hypothesis is also supported by our results.     

Audit quality and information asymmetry between traders

In this study, we investigate the association between audit quality and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. We employ three proxies for information asymmetry – absolute price differences, absolute volatility differences, and absolute differences in the long/short ratio of trades – between US stock and options markets and represent audit quality through the appointment of Big n and industry specialist auditors. For a sample of 4062 firm‐years between 2002 to 2005, our results indicate that the appointment of Big n and industry specialist auditors is associated with lower information asymmetry measures. Our results are consistent with audit quality playing a role in the quality of financial reporting information and flowing through to the allocation of information among traders.     

GLAMOUR VERSUS VALUE: TRADING BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

We design a new metric to measure the net buying and selling by institutions and individual investors and find that from 1980 to 2004 institutional investors were net buyers of growth stocks and net sellers of value stocks, implying that individual investors were net buyers of value stocks and net sellers of glamour stocks. The institutional preference for glamour and value stocks seems to be related to sell‐side analysts' recommendations and recent favorable stock price performances, especially during the post‐1994 period. Finally, the institutional buying of growth stocks and sale of value stocks was not based on superior information.