Why do banks choose to finance with equity?

A majority of U.S. banks between 1973 and 2012 held equity capital significantly beyond the required minimum. We study the risk-return tradeoff in connection with a bank’s capital structure, and identify several new significant market factors that drive the level of equity capital in banks. During normal growth periods, bank leverage is negatively related to a level of competition and loan portfolio diversification, while high bank leverage is associated with low past liquidity. During recessions and expansions, the roles of those factors change following distortions in risk-return tradeoff. In distress, when banks approach regulatory capital requirements, market determinants of book leverage lose their significance; however, leverage does not decrease until a bank is within 1% of the minimal capital threshold.     

Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm?

This study investigates firms that repurchase their stock to finance an acquisition. Since research shows that cash-financed acquisitions perform better than stock-financed acquisitions, why do firms that have available cash initiate the extra transactional step. I find these firms are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. On average, these firms have negative abnormal returns prior to their repurchase announcements and thus may choose repurchasing to signal undervaluation. Furthermore, the stock acquisition step allows these firms to share risk, counteract the negative effects of dilution, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts.

Why do CEOs agree to the discipline of dividends?

This study investigates dividend initiation as the product of the imbalance of power between shareholders and management in U.S. firms from 2003 to 2012. We find that dividend initiation is associated with a stronger governance structure (strong shareholders' rights and board independence), in accordance with the outcome model. We do not identify a single motivation for dividend initiation. Dividend-initiating firms tend to rely on various forms of governance balanced by the interests and ownership of CEOs and directors. Firms with institutional owners are more likely to initiate dividends concurrent with the turnover of the CEO. Dual CEOs initiate dividends when they own more shares, and boards of directors initiate dividends with a higher personal ownership stake when shareholders' rights are weak. We also find that when initiation is due to stronger governance, it is significantly related to the firm's investment opportunities, while for weak governance firms, that relationship is not observed. We interpret this as evidence that, under weaker governance, the decision to initiate dividends is motivated by agency conflicts rather than investment or capital structure considerations.     

Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?

We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.     

Why do companies issue sukuk?

This paper investigates the determinants for firms to choose sukuk over conventional bond. We investigate the potential impact of information asymmetries through moral hazard and adverse selection to explain why firms prefer using sukuk. We perform logit regressions of the choice of debt type to determine which characteristics lead a firm to issue a sukuk rather than a bond. We use a dataset of sukuk and conventional bond issuances in Malaysia from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of the influence of information asymmetries and adverse selection on the choice of the sukuk market.     

Why do accruals predict earnings?

Higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings. We show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales, profits, and working capital respond to changes in a firm's product markets. Empirically, high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long-lasting drop in both profits and profitability. Accruals also predict an increase in future competition, suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high—and, in equilibrium, transitory—true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry. Overall, the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product-market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment.     

Why do intermediaries divert search?

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.     

Why do traders choose dark markets?

We examine U.S. equity trader use of dark and lit markets. Marketable orders executed in the dark have lower information content and smaller fill rates. Dark orders take longer to execute, but they execute at more favorable prices. Traders are more likely to go dark when the bid-ask spread is wider and those with higher dark participation are more sophisticated. Although market regulators have expressed concern over the rise in dark trading, our results indicate that dark markets provide important benefits to traders that lit markets do not.     

Why do private firms adopt IFRS?

Do private firms voluntarily adopt IFRS? If so, why? Answers to these questions have been very limited so far, mainly due to the absence of financial data on private firms. In this paper, I exploit the German setting where the financial statements of private firms are widely available. I estimate multi-period logit regressions on the choice between national GAAP and IFRS for the consolidated financial statements of nearly 3000 German private firms with more than 14,000 firm-years in the period 1998–2010. My results suggest that the expected net benefits of IFRS adoption vary substantially across the group of private firms, depending on their financing needs, governance system, and organizational and informational complexity. Specifically, I find that private firms using IFRS have more growth opportunities, are more leveraged, are externally rated, seek to raise external capital by issuing public bonds or equity, are registered as a stock corporation, are characterized by private equity (PE) involvement, have more international sales and operations, and have a Big Five auditor. These insights should be of great interest to both preparers and regulators in the current debate about the future of financial reporting in private firms.     

Why do fund managers increase risk?

This paper examines the relationship between the increase in fund risk and subsequent cash flows. We attempt to test the hypothesis that an increase in fund risk actually increases the net flows of equity funds, which is a basic assumption of risk shifting. We find that a change in fund risk has a positive and convex relationship with the fund's net flows. The effect of risk changes on net flows is a natural consequence of its effects on inflows and outflows. This paper's empirical results are robust to return frequency, fund age, and fund size. Our findings create incentives for managers to shift risk as documented in the mutual fund literature.     

Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?

We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms.     

Why do bank-dependent firms bear interest-rate risk?

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.     

Why do investors discount earnings announced late?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Holding earnings surprises constant, investors react negatively to delayed earnings announcements. One standard deviation of delay (5 days)...     

Why do stock repurchases change over time?

Recent studies have shown the time trends of firm stock repurchase behavior. We examine these time changes for stock repurchase through the lens of real activities earnings management. Managers appear more likely to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, suspect firms that just missed analyst earnings per share forecasts have higher incentives to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases. The results are not driven by changes in corporate governance associated with the passage of SOX. Overall, our results suggest earnings management can be a significant determinant of the dynamics of stock repurchases.     

Do regulatory policies matter to corporate innovation?

This paper examines the relationship between regulation and innovation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical model focuses on the role of competition policy (measured by increases in the number of firms) and the strength of intellectual property rights in fostering cost-reducing R&D, under both R&D competition and R&D cooperation. It is shown that, theoretically, competition policy and intellectual property rights are complements under R&D competition, while they are substitutes under R&D cooperation. Moreover, under R&D competition, innovation is maximized through strict competition policy and strong intellectual property rights; whereas under R&D cooperation, innovation is maximized through strict competition policy and weak intellectual property rights. The empirical model tests the effect of several regulatory policies on innovation in several MENA countries. The results of dynamic panel data regressions point that competition policy and intellectual property rights are complements. In addition to competition policy and intellectual property rights protection, the following country/regulation characteristics are considered: human capital, government efficiency, foreign direct investment, natural resources dependence, labor market regulations, and GDP level. The paper finds that the extent of regulations in all categories has statistically significant effects on R&D, except FDI. One explanation is that most FDI to the MENA region flows to natural resources and non-tradable sectors, which are less relevant to R&D than other sectors (e.g., manufacturing and information and communications technology sectors).     

Why do contagion effects vary among bank failures?

Many of the previous studies on contagion effects in the banking industry focused on the failure of a large bank to determine whether the adverse effects spread to other banks. Yet, little is known whether other publicized bank failures cause contagion effects, and why the effects may vary among bank failures. Given the changes in the banking environment over time, contagion effects could be conditioned on the characteristics of the failing bank and of the banking environment at that time. We assess 99 publicized bank failures over the 1980–1996 period, and find that contagion effects exist in general for the surviving rivals of the failed bank. The degree of contagion effects varies over time (among bank failures), and is stronger when the failed bank is a multibank holding company, when the failed bank is publicly held, when the failed bank is relatively large, when the rivals are relatively small, and when the rivals have relatively low capital levels. The contagion effects are less pronounced in the period following the passage of FIRREA. Furthermore, the total risk-shifts of surviving rival banks in response to the announcement of a failed bank are inversely related to their capital level, and total risk-shifts of rival banks are less pronounced for failures occurring just after the passage of FIRREA. The results suggest that a bank’s exposure to possible contagion effects due to a bank failure can be partially controlled by a bank’s managerial policies and by regulatory policies.     

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.     

Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion.     

Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) is life insurance purchased by bank holding companies (BHCs) for key employees, whose proceeds can be shared by the...     

To what extent do financing constraints affect Chinese firms' innovation activities?

We investigate the extent to which financing constraints affect the innovation activities of over 120,000 mainly unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000–2007. Based on a variety of specifications and estimation methods, we document that Chinese firms' innovation activities are constrained by the availability of internal finance. Specifically, private firms suffer the most, followed by foreign firms, while state-owned and collective enterprises are the least constrained. Moreover, the availability of internal finance represents a particularly binding constraint on the innovation activities of small firms, located in the coastal provinces, with low political affiliation, and fewer state shares, as well as for sole proprietorship firms.