Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power

We show that political geography has a pervasive effect on the cross-section of stock returns. We collect election results over a 40-year period and use a political alignment index (PAI) of each state's leading politicians with the ruling (presidential) party to proxy for local firms’ proximity to political power. Firms whose headquarters are located in high PAI states outperform those located in low PAI states, both in terms of raw returns, and on a risk-adjusted basis. Overall, although we cannot rule out indirect political connectedness advantages as an explanation of the PAI effect, our results are consistent with the notion that proximity to political power has stock return implications because it reflects firms’ exposure to policy risk.     

Tracking down distress risk

This paper shows that exposure to aggregate distress risk is the underlying source of the premiums for the Fama-French size (SMB) and value (HML) factors. Using a unique data set of aggregate business failures of both private and public firms from 1926 to 1997, I build portfolios that track news about future firm failures. These tracking portfolios optimally hedge aggregate distress risk and earn a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha of approximately −4% a year. Both HML and SMB predict changes in future failure rates. Small stocks have lower returns than large stocks and value stocks have lower returns than growth stocks when the market expects an increase in future failure rates. Finally, a two-factor model with the market and the tracking portfolio for aggregate distress as factors does as well as the Fama-French three-factor model in pricing the 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios.     

Uninsurable risk and financial market puzzles

We compare the empirical performances of three risk-sharing arrangements involving idiosyncratic skill shocks: (a) where individuals are unable to directly insure their consumption against individual-specific shocks, (b) where agents strike long-term insurance contract with financial intermediaries involving a truth revelation constraint as in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), (c) full risk sharing. Based on the widely accepted assumption of cross-sectional log-normality of individual consumption levels, we work out closed form expressions of the pricing kernels for (a) and (b). We put these three models to test four financial market anomalies, namely the equity premium, currency premium, risk-free rate, and consumption-real exchange rate puzzles simultaneously in an integrated framework. We find that the pricing kernel associated with (a) outperforms the other two models in terms of the produced estimates of the agent’s preference parameters and the model ability to predict the equity and currency premia, the risk-free rate, and the log growth in the exchange rate. However, the predictive ability is still far from satisfactory for all three models under scrutiny.     

Measuring portfolio credit risk correctly: Why parameter uncertainty matters

Why should risk management systems account for parameter uncertainty? In addressing this question, the paper lets an investor in a credit portfolio face non-diversifiable uncertainty about two risk parameters – probability of default and asset-return correlation – and calibrates this uncertainty to a lower bound on estimation noise. In this context, a Bayesian inference procedure is essential for deriving and analyzing the main result, i.e. that parameter uncertainty raises substantially the tail risk perceived by the investor. Since a measure of tail risk that incorporates parameter uncertainty is computationally demanding, the paper also derives a closed-form approximation to such a measure.     

Internal liquidity risk,financial bullwhip effects,and corporate bond yield spreads: Supply chain perspectives

This study explores internal liquidity risk (ILR) and financial bullwhip effects on corporate bond yield spreads along supply chain counterparties by employing American market data from year 1997 to 2008. This study finds that the ILRs of suppliers and customers positively affect a firm’s bond yield spreads and the effects of customers’ ILRs are greater. This research also finds a financial bullwhip effect that the ILR effect becomes greater upwardly along the supply chain counterparties. The results are robust when controlling for well-known spread determinant variables.     

Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

The term structure of banking crisis risk in the United States: A market data based compound option approach

We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to estimate banking crisis risk for the United States based on market data on bank stocks on a daily frequency. We contribute to the literature by providing separate information on short-term, long-term and total crisis risk instead of a single-maturity risk measure usually inferred by Merton-type models or barrier models. We estimate the model by applying the Duan (1994) maximum-likelihood approach. A strongly increasing total crisis risk estimated from early July 2007 onwards is driven mainly by short-term crisis risk. Banks that defaulted or were overtaken during the crisis have a considerably higher crisis risk (especially higher long-term risk) than banks that survived the crisis.     

Optimal portfolios with minimum capital requirements

We propose a novel approach to active risk management based on the recent Basel II regulations to obtain optimal portfolios with minimum capital requirements. In order to avoid regulatory penalties due to an excessive number of Value-at-Risk (VaR) violations, capital requirements are minimized subject to a given number of violations over the previous trading year. Capital requirements are based on the recent Basel II amendments to account for the ‘stressed’ VaR, that is, the downside risk of the portfolio under extreme adverse market conditions. An empirical application for two portfolios involving different types of assets and alternative stress scenarios demonstrates that the proposed approach delivers an improved balance between capital requirement levels and the number of VaR exceedances. Furthermore, the risk-adjusted performance of the proposed approach is superior to that of minimum-VaR and minimum-stressed VaR portfolios.     

Entrepreneurial activity, risk, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes a model in which the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity implies that the amount of such activity is procyclical and results in amplification and intertemporal propagation of productivity shocks. In the model risk averse agents choose between a riskless project and a risky project with higher expected output (‘the entrepreneurial activity’). Agents who become entrepreneurs need to bear part of the project-specific risk for incentive reasons. More agents become entrepreneurs when productivity is high, because agents are more willing to bear risk and need to bear less risk for incentive reasons. Furthermore, cross-sectional heterogeneity can be countercyclical.     

Granularity adjustment for mark-to-market credit risk models

The impact of undiversified idiosyncratic risk on value-at-risk and expected shortfall can be approximated analytically via a methodology known as granularity adjustment (GA). In principle, the GA methodology can be applied to any risk-factor model of portfolio risk. Thus far, however, analytical results have been derived only for simple models of actuarial loss, i.e., credit loss due to default. We demonstrate that the GA is entirely tractable for single-factor versions of a large class of models that includes all the commonly used mark-to-market approaches. Our approach covers both finite ratings-based models and models with a continuum of obligor states. We apply our methodology to CreditMetrics and KMV Portfolio Manager, as these are benchmark models for the finite and continuous classes, respectively. Comparative statics of the GA reveal striking and counterintuitive patterns. We explain these relationships with a stylized model of portfolio risk.     

Competition and the cost of debt

This paper empirically shows that the cost of bank debt is systematically higher for firms that operate in competitive product markets. Using various proxies for product market competition, and reductions of import tariff rates to capture exogenous changes to a firm's competitive environment, I find that competition has a significantly positive effect on the cost of bank debt. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the effect of competition is greater in industries in which small firms face financially strong rivals, in industries with intense strategic interactions between firms, and in illiquid industries. Overall, these findings suggest that banks price financial contracts by taking into account the risk that arises from product market competition.     

The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets

We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions in place, namely, the political system and political constraints, are important determinants of residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. Unlike previous evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of privatization policies in developed countries, we find that right- or left-oriented governments do not behave differently in developing countries. These results confirm that privatization is politically constrained by dynamics that differ between countries.     

Are hedge fund managers systematically misreporting? Or not?

A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity and the bounding of yields at zero can generate distribution discontinuities as well. Therefore, we conclude that the observed hedge fund return discontinuities are not direct proof of manipulation.     

Do small shareholders count?

We hypothesize that age similarity among small shareholders acts as an implicit coordinating device for their actions and, thus, could represent an indirect source of corporate governance in firms with dispersed ownership. We test this hypothesis on a sample of Swedish firms during the 1995-2000 period. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that compared with shareholders of differing ages, same-age noncontrolling shareholders sell more aggressively following negative firm news; firms with more age-similar small shareholders are more profitable and command higher valuation; and an increase (decline) in a firm's small shareholder age similarity brings a significantly large increase (decline) in its stock price. The last effects are more pronounced in the absence of a controlling shareholder.     

Mergers increase default risk

We examine the impact of mergers on default risk. Despite the potential for asset diversification, we find that, on average, a merger increases the default risk of the acquiring firm. This result cannot solely be explained by the tendency for generally safe acquirers to purchase riskier targets or by the tendency of acquiring firms to increase leverage post-merger. Our evidence suggests that managerial motivations may play an important role. In particular, we find larger merger-related increases in risk at firms where CEOs have large option-based compensation, where recent stock performance is poor, and where idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. These results suggest that the increased default risk may arise from aggressive managerial actions affecting risk enough to outweigh the strong risk-reducing asset diversification expected from a typical merger.     

The performance of emerging hedge funds and managers

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.     

Debt financing: Does it boost or hurt firm performance in product markets?

Previous research seeks to establish whether debt boosts or hurts a firm's product market performance. This paper proposes that both of these outcomes can be observed: debt can boost and hurt performance. I first model a nonmonotonic relation between debt-like finance and competitive conduct. I then empirically examine the within-industry relation between leverage and sales performance using data from 115 industries over 30 years. My tests deal with the endogeneity of debt in a novel fashion: I use creditors’ valuation of assets in liquidation to identify financial leverage. I find that moderate debt taking is associated with relative-to-rival sales gains; high indebtedness, however, leads to product market underperformance.     

The effect of leverage on the cost of capital of US buyouts

This paper addresses the problem to assess the effect of leverage on the cost of capital for buyout performance analyses. It draws on a unique and proprietary set of data on 133 US buyouts between 1984 and 2004. For each of them, we determine a public market equivalent that matches it with respect to its timing and its systematic risk. We show that under realistic mimicking conditions, the average cost of capital is below the commonly used benchmark S&P 500. Thereby, we control for two important aspects: for the risks taken by lenders in the buyout transactions (which affects the sponsors’ risks), and for the corresponding cost of debt (which lowers the return of the public market equivalent). Only with borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate is the average cost of capital close to the average index return. This finding is particularly important as existing literature on that topic tends to rely on benchmarks without a proper risk-adjustment.     

Commonalities in investment strategy and the determinants of performance in mutual fund mergers

This paper examines the determinants of cross-sectional variation in post-merger mutual fund performance. Mergers between funds with similar management objectives, as reflected by average portfolio book-to-market ratio, price–earnings ratio, beta and market capitalization values, outperform mergers between funds with dissimilar strategies. This superior performance transcends lower portfolio rebalancing costs which might be realized between merging funds which hold more assets in common. These results suggest that mutual fund mergers create collaborative benefits between funds with similar strategies. We also examine if fund governance structures influence the fund pairing process, testing if stronger fund oversight mitigates pairing mismatches. We find that less independent boards of trustees and boards with higher compensation are related to greater strategic mismatches between funds. These results suggest that more entrenched boards are more tolerant of fund mismatches which benefit the investment company, yet are not in investor’s best interests.