Putting leaders on the couch. A conversation with Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries. Interview by Diane L. Coutu

Much of the business literature on leadership starts with the assumption that leaders are rational beings. But irrationality is integral to human nature, and inner conflict often contributes to the drive to succeed. Although a number of business scholars have explored the psychology of executives, Manfred F.R Kets de Vries has made the analysis of CEOs his life's work. In this article, Kets de Vries, a psychoanalyst, author, and instead professor, draws on three decades of study to describe the psychological profile of successful CEOs. He explores senior executives' vulnerabilities, which are often intensified by followers' attempts to manipulate their leaders. Leaders, he says, have an uncanny ability to awaken transferential processes--in which people transfer the dynamics of past relationships onto present interactions--among their employees and even in themselves. These processes can present themselves in a number of ways, sometimes negatively. What's more, many top executives, being middle-aged, suffer from depression. Mid-life prompts a reappraisal of career identity, and by the time a leader is a CEO, an existential crisis is often imminent. This can happen with anyone, but the probability is higher with CEOs, and senior executives because so many have devoted themselves exclusively to work. Not all CEOs are psychologically unhealthy, of course. Healthy leaders are talented in self-observation and self-analysis, Kets de Vries says. The best are highly motivated to spend time on self-reflection. Their lives are in balance, they can play, they are creative and inventive, and they have the capacity to be nonconformist. "Those who accept the madness in themselves may be the healthiest leaders of all," he concludes.     

The failure-tolerant leader

"The fastest way to succeed," IBM's Thomas Watson, Sr., once said, "is to double your failure rate." In recent years, more and more executives have embraced Watson's point of view, coming to understand what innovators have always known: Failure is a prerequisite to invention. But while companies may grasp the value of making mistakes at the level of corporate practices, they have a harder time accepting the idea at the personal level. People are afraid to fail, and corporate culture reinforces that fear. In this article, psychologist and former Harvard Business School professor Richard Farson and coauthor Ralph Keyes discuss how companies can reduce the fear of miscues. What's crucial is the presence of failure-tolerant leaders--executives who, through their words and actions, help employees overcome their anxieties about making mistakes and, in the process, create a culture of intelligent risk-taking that leads to sustained innovation. Such leaders don't just accept productive failure, they promote it. Drawing from their research in business, politics, sports, and science, the authors identify common practices among failure-tolerant leaders. These leaders break down the social and bureaucratic barriers that separate them from their followers. They engage at a personal level with the people they lead. They avoid giving either praise or criticism, preferring to take a nonjudgmental, analytical posture as they interact with staff. They openly admit their own mistakes rather than trying to cover them up or shifting the blame. And they try to root out the destructive competitiveness built into most organizations. Above all else, failure-tolerant leaders push people to see beyond traditional definitions of success and failure. They know that as long as a person views failure as the opposite of success, rather than its complement, he or she will never be able to take the risks necessary for innovation.     

Leadership and the psychology of turnarounds

Turnaround champions--those leaders who manage to bring distressed organizations back from the brink of failure--are often acclaimed for their canny financial and strategic decision making. But having studied their work closely, Harvard Business School's Rosabeth Moss Kanter emphasizes another aspect of their achievement. These leaders reverse the cycle of corporate decline through deliberate interventions that increase the level of communication, collaboration, and respect among their managers. Ailing companies descend into what Kanter calls a "death spiral," which typically works this way: After an initial blow to the company's fortunes, people begin pointing fingers and deriding colleagues in other parts of the business. Tensions rise and collaboration declines. Once they are no longer acting in concert, people find themselves less able to effect change. Eventually, many come to believe they are helpless. Passivity sets in. Finally, the ultimate pathology of troubled companies takes hold: denial. Rather than volunteer an opinion that no one else seems to share, people engage in collective pretense to ignore what they individually know. To counter these dynamics, Kanter says, and reverse the company's slide, the CEO needs to apply certain psychological interventions--specifically, replacing secrecy and denial with dialogue, blame and scorn with respect, avoidance and turf protection with collaboration, and passivity and helplessness with initiative. The author offers in-depth accounts of how the CEOs at Gillette, Invensys, and the BBC used these interventions to guide their employees out of corporate free fall and onto a more productive path.     

Worse than enemies. The CEO's destructive confidant

The CEO is often the most isolated and protected employee in the organization. Few leaders, even veteran CEOs, can do the job without talking to someone about their experiences, which is why most develop a close relationship with a trusted colleague, a confidant to whom they can tell their thoughts and fears. In his work with leaders, the author has found that many CEO-confidant relationships function very well. The confidants keep their leaders' best interests at heart. They derive their gratification vicariously, through the help they provide rather than through any personal gain, and they are usually quite aware that a person in their position can potentially abuse access to the CEO's innermost secrets. Unfortunately, almost as many confidants will end up hurting, undermining, or otherwise exploiting CEOs when the executives are at their most vulnerable. These confidants rarely make the headlines, but behind the scenes they do enormous damage to the CEO and to the organization as a whole. What's more, the leader is often the last one to know when or how the confidant relationship became toxic. The author has identified three types of destructive confidants. The reflector mirrors the CEO, constantly reassuring him that he is the "fairest CEO of them all." The insulator buffers the CEO from the organization, preventing critical information from getting in or out. And the usurper cunningly ingratiates himself with the CEO in a desperate bid for power. This article explores how the CEO-confidant relationship plays out with each type of adviser and suggests ways CEOs can avoid these destructive relationships.     

Looking ahead: implications of the present

On its seventy-fifth anniversary, HBR asked five of the business world's most insightful thinkers to comment on the challenges taking shape for executives as they move into the next century. In "The Future That Has Already Happened," Peter Drucker examines the effects of the increasing underpopulation of the world's developed countries. With growing imbalances in labor resources worldwide, he writes, executives in the developed countries will need to improve the productivity of knowledge and of knowledge workers to maintain a competitive advantage. Esther Dyson's article "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall" reveals the mind shift executives will need to make in a networked world, where companies will be known for what they do rather than for what they say. Executives will have to respond openly and intelligently to feedback about their organizations. The old language of property and ownership no longer serves executives, writes Charles Handy in "The Citizen Corporation." The corporation should be thought of no longer as property but as a community, where members are regarded as citizens. Technology has given executives more information than today's machines can help them understand, explains Paul Saffo in "Are You Machine Wise?" Machine-wise executives will know when to turn their computers off and take their own counsel, he writes. Peter Senge's article "Communities of Leaders and Learners" urges executives to reject the myth of leaders as isolated heroes and instead to build a community of leaders. Sustained institutional learning, he writes, requires organizations to reintegrate their typically fragmented learning processes.     

A report card on diversity: lessons for business from higher education.

Institutions of higher learning in the United States have long played a disproportionate role in supplying leadership talent to the world's business and professional organizations. For 30 years, the most selective schools have been working to increase diversity in their student bodies. New research by the former presidents of Princeton and Harvard suggests that the experiences and initiatives of these academic institutions can provide business leaders with insight into how to create diverse organizations that succeed. The first insight has to do with clarity of mission. It is not enough to pursue diversity because it is "the right thing to do." In an insert, Raymond Gilmartin, the CEO of Merck, echoes that view, discussing the relationship between diversity and Merck's competitiveness. The second insight concerns recruiting. The authors challenge what they call "the myth of pure merit," the notion that recruiting is a precise science based only on grades and test scores. Instead, they argue, merit is about assembling a team by deciding which applicants, considered individually and collectively, will contribute most to achieving the company's goals. The third insight concerns how organizations help employees perform to their potential. Of the factors contributing to high graduation rates at the most selective schools, higher expectations and the efforts of mentors stand out as most important. Finally, the fourth insight is about how to achieve accountability in a corporate setting. Boards must ask: Are our recruiting policies working? and How are recruited employees doing?     

Integration managers: special leaders for special times

Although the integration of an acquired company with the parent organization is a delicate and complicated process, traditionally no one has ever been responsible for that process--for charting how the two companies will combine their operations, for seeing to it that the integration project meets its deadlines and performance targets, and for educating the new people about the parent company and vice versa. Some enlightened companies have recognized this gap and have appointed a guide--the integration manager--to shepherd everyone through the rocky territory that two organizations must cross before they can function effectively together. The authors have interviewed a number of these leaders in depth, as well as some of the people with whom they've worked. They've determined that integration managers help the merger process in four principal ways: they speed it up, create a structure for it, forge social connections between the two organizations, and help engineer short-term successes. In this article, the authors detail five acquisitions--at TI, General Cable, Meritor Automotive, Lucent, and Johnson & Johnson--and discuss the role that integration managers played in each. They describe exactly what sort of person should do this job. The integration manager must be able to jump into complex situations quickly, relate to many levels of authority smoothly, and bridge gaps in culture and perception. The ever-changing organizations of the Internet age will need leaders with similar skills. In fact, the authors contend, the integration manager should be considered a prototype for the leader of the future.     

It's so hard to be fair

When employees believe they are being treated fairly-when they feel heard, when they understand how and why important decisions are made, and when they believe they are respected-their companies will benefit. Research shows that practicing process fairness reduces legal costs from wrongful-termination suits, lowers employee turnover, helps generate support for new strategic initiatives, and fosters a culture that promotes innovation. What's more, it costs little financially to implement Yet few companies practice it consistently. Joel Brockner examines this paradox, exploring psychological and other reasons that cause managers to resist embracing process fairness. The fact that it's relatively inexpensive to implement, for instance, may be why some numbers-oriented executives undervalue it. Many managers believe that they practice process fairness, but 360-degree feedback tells another story. Some corporate policies actually undermine it--such as when the legal department won't let managers fully explain decisions for fear that disclosure could expose the firm to lawsuits. And, frequently, managers simply follow the all-too-human tendency to avoid uncomfortable situations. But the good news is that organizations can take concrete steps to promote greater process fairness. Many studies have shown that training programs make a big difference, and the author describes the most effective format. In addition, warning your managers that they may experience negative emotions when practicing fair process will help prepare them to cope with those feelings. Finally, role modeling fair process on the executive level will help spread the practice throughout the organization. The fact is, process fairness is the responsibility of all executives, at all levels and in all functions; it cannot be delegated to HR. The sooner managers realize that and work to make it a company norm, the better off the organization will be.     

Failing by design

It's hardly news that business leaders work in increasingly uncertain environments, where failures are bound to be more common than successes. Yet if you ask executives how well, on a scale of one to 10, their organizations learn from failure, you'll often get a sheepish "Two-or maybe three" in response. Such organizations are missing a big opportunity: Failure may be inevitable but, if managed well, can be very useful. A certain amount of failure can help you keep your options open, find out what doesn't work, create the conditions to attract resources and attention, make room for new leaders, and develop intuition and skill. The key to reaping these benefits is to foster "intelligent failure" throughout your organization. McGrath describes several principles that can help you put intelligent failure to work. You should decide what success and failure would look like before you start a project. Document your initial assumptions, test and revise them as you go, and convert them into knowledge. Fail fast-the longer something takes, the less you'll learn-and fail cheaply, to contain your downside risk. Limit the number of uncertainties in new projects, and build a culture that tolerates, and sometimes even celebrates, failure. Finally, codify and share what you learn. These principles won't give you a means of avoiding all failures down the road-that's simply not realistic. They will help you use small losses to attain bigger wins over time.     

How much stress is too much?

"There is no question that a certain amount of stress is good," says one of the chief executives quoted in this article. "If I have a particularly easy week, I can feel an ache or pain, but if I get really busy, I feel really much better." But when managers feel themselves under too much stress, the executive adds pessimistically, then "not only will they burn out in time, but they get erratic and their judgment goes all to hell." These insights reflect one of the authors' main themes: medical research finds stress productive up to a point (which of course varies with the manager), but beyond that point it can be disastrous. The trouble in corporate life seems to be that leaders appreciate the first part of the relationship but not the second. As a consequence, both individiuals and organizations suffer--and suffer greatly. This penalty is unnecessary, the authors believe, because a newly tested, proved, and relatively simple approach to managing stress is available to any corporation that wants to use it.     

The harder they fall

The past decade may well be remembered as the era of the high-flying, aggressive leader. Corner-office titans like Kenneth Lay, Dennis Kozlowski, and Bernard Ebbers graced the covers of business magazines. They captured the public's fascination with their bold business moves and charismatic sound bites. Then scandal set in, and the stars fell to earth. In this article, social psychologist Roderick M. Kramer asks an important question: Why do so many leaders--not just in business, but also in politics, religion, and the media--display remarkable adeptness and ability while courting power, only to engage in even more remarkable bouts of folly once that power has been secured? Kramer, who has spent most of his career researching how leaders get to the top, says there is something about the process of becoming a leader that changes people in profound ways. The systems through which we select our leaders force executives to sacrifice the attitudes and behaviors that are essential to their survival once they have reached the top. Society has learned to consider risk taking and rule breaking as markers of good leadership. As a result, CEOs and other leaders lack the modesty and prudence needed to cope with the rewards and trappings of power. They come to believe that normal limits don't apply to them and that they are entitled to any spoils they can seize. The leaders who do remain grounded--who get to the top and stay there--exhibit five common psychological and behavioral habits: They simplify their lives, remaining humble and "awfully ordinary." They shine a light on their weaknesses instead of trying to cover them up. They float trial balloons to uncover the truth and prepare for the unexpected. They sweat the small stuff. And they reflect more, not less.     

They're not employees, they're people

In this essay, business thinker Peter Drucker examines the changing dynamics of the workforce--in particular, the need for organizations to take just as much care and responsibility when managing temporary and contract workers as they do with their traditional employees. Two fast-growing trends are demanding that business leaders pay more attention to employee relations, Drucker says. First is the rise of the temporary, or contract, workers; 8 million to 10 million temp workers are placed each day worldwide. And they're not just filling in at reception desks. Today, there are temp suppliers for every kind of job, all the way up to CEO. Second, a growing number of businesses are outsourcing their employee relations to professional employee organizations (PEOs)--third-party groups that handle the ever mounting administrative tasks associated with managing a company's employees. (Managers can easily spend up to one-quarter of their time on employee-related rules, regulations, and paperwork.) Driving these trends, Drucker observes, is the shift from a dependency on manual labor to create wealth and jobs to a dependency on specialization and knowledge. Leaders are increasingly trying to keep up with the needs of many small groups of product or service experts within their companies. Temps and PEOs free up leaders to focus on the business rather than on HR files and paperwork. But if organizations outsource those functions, they need to be careful not to damage relationship with their people in the process, Drucker concludes. After all, developing talent is business's most important task--the sine qua non of competition in a knowledge economy.     

Collaboration rules

Corporate leaders seeking to boost growth, learning, and innovation may find the answer in a surprising place: the Linux open-source software community. Linux is developed by an essentially volunteer, self-organizing community of thousands of programmers. Most leaders would sell their grandmothers for workforces that collaborate as efficiently, frictionlessly, and creatively as the self-styled Linux hackers. But Linux is software, and software is hardly a model for mainstream business. The authors have, nonetheless, found surprising parallels between the anarchistic, caffeinated, hirsute world of Linux hackers and the disciplined, tea-sipping, clean-cut world of Toyota engineering. Specifically, Toyota and Linux operate by rules that blend the self-organizing advantages of markets with the low transaction costs of hierarchies. In place of markets' cash and contracts and hierarchies' authority are rules about how individuals and groups work together (with rigorous discipline); how they communicate (widely and with granularity); and how leaders guide them toward a common goal (through example). Those rules, augmented by simple communication technologies and a lack of legal barriers to sharing information, create rich common knowledge, the ability to organize teams modularly, extraordinary motivation, and high levels of trust, which radically lowers transaction costs. Low transaction costs, in turn, make it profitable for organizations to perform more and smaller transactions--and so increase the pace and flexibility typical of high-performance organizations. Once the system achieves critical mass, it feeds on itself. The larger the system, the more broadly shared the knowledge, language, and work style. The greater individuals' reputational capital, the louder the applause and the stronger the motivation. The success of Linux is evidence of the power of that virtuous circle. Toyota's success is evidence that it is also powerful in conventional companies.     

The tests of a prince

When a CEO takes office, stakeholders dissect his or her intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities as they try to gauge whether the new leader will help them fulfill their aspirations and protect them from trouble. For the heir to a family business, the challenge of turning stakeholders into followers is particularly thorny: He or she must manage many constituencies--family members, directors, senior executives, investors, trade unions--that may not be convinced the successor has earned the right to hold the top spot. Making matters worse, says Lansberg, a family business expert, corporate scions usually ignore or greatly underestimate stakeholders. They don't realize that, particularly after they are formally anointed as CEOs, they must establish their credibility with and authority over these spheres of influence. Smart CEOs understand that their success depends on how well they respond to the iterative testing process that stakeholders use to make judgments about would-be leaders. This article offers a road map for managing the four kinds of tests that constitute iterative testing: Qualifying tests are assessments based on criteria--such as formal education, work experience, and professional awards--that executives can cite as evidence of suitability for the top job. Self-imposed tests are expectations that leaders themselves set and against which they assume stakeholders will measure their performance. Circumstantial tests are unplanned challenges or crises, during which stakeholders can observe the leader coping with the unexpected. And political tests are challenges from rivals who want to enhance their own influence, often by undermining the leader.     

How leaders create and use networks

Most people acknowledge that networking-creating a fabric of personal contacts to provide support, feedback, insight, and resources--is an essential activity for an ambitious manager. Indeed, it's a requirement even for those focused simply on doing their current jobs well. For some, this is a distasteful reality. Working through networks, they believe,means relying on "who you know" rather than "what you know"--a hypocritical, possibly unethical, way to get things done. But even people who understand that networking is a legitimate and necessary part of their jobs can be discouraged by the payoff--because they are doing it in too limited a fashion. On the basis of a close study of 30 emerging leaders, the authors outline three distinct forms of networking. Operational networking is geared toward doing one's assigned tasks more effectively. It involves cultivating stronger relationships with colleagues whose membership in the network is clear; their roles define them as stakeholders. Personal networking engages kindred spirits from outside an organization in an individual's efforts to learn and find opportunities for personal advancement. Strategic networking puts the tools of networking in the service of business goals. At this level, a manager creates the kind of network that will help uncover and capitalize on new opportunities for the company. The ability to move to this level of networking turns out to be a key test of leadership. Companies often recognize that networks are valuable, andthey create explicit programs to support them. But typically these programs facilitate only operational networking. Likewise, industry associations provide formal contexts for personal networking. The unfortunate effect is to give managers the impression that they know how to network and are doing so sufficiently. A sidebar notes the implication for companies' leadership development initiatives: that teaching strategic networking skills will serve their aspiring leaders and their business goals well.     

Developing your leadership pipeline

Why do so many newly minted leaders fail so spectacularly? Part of the problem is that in many companies, succession planning is little more than creating a list of high-potential employees and the slots they might fill. It's a mechanical process that's too narrow and hidebound to uncover and correct skill gaps that can derail promising young executives. And it's completely divorced from organizational efforts to transform managers into leaders. Some companies, however, do succeed in building a steady, reliable pipeline of leadership talent by marrying succession planning with leadership development. Eli Lilly, Dow Chemical, Bank of America, and Sonoco Products have created long-term processes for managing the talent roster throughout their organizations--a process Conger and Fulmer call succession management. Drawing on the experiences of these best-practice organizations, the authors outline five rules for establishing a healthy succession management system: Focus on opportunities for development, identify linchpin positions, make the system transparent, measure progress regularly, and be flexible. In Eli Lilly's "action-learning" program, high-potential employees are given a strategic problem to solve so they can learn something of what it takes to be a general manager. The company--and most other best-practice organizations--also relies on Web-based succession management tools to demystify the succession process, and it makes employees themselves responsible for updating the information in their personnel files. Best-practice organizations also track various metrics that reveal whether the right people are moving into the right jobs at the right time, and they assess the strengths and weaknesses not only of individuals but of the entire group. These companies also expect to be tweaking their systems continually, making them easier to use and more responsive to the needs of the organization.     

The path of kyosei

Many global companies believe they have a moral duty to respond to the world's problems but are unsure how to do that and still pursue a reasonable profit for their shareholders. Ryuzaburo Kaku, honorary chairman of Canon, the Japanese technology company, suggests that companies consider kyosei, a business credo that he defines as a "spirit of cooperation" in which individuals and organizations work together for the common good. Kyosei, Kaku claims, has helped Canon make a significant and positive impact on many world problems as the company has grown to become one of the world's preeminent innovators and manufacturers of technology. The implementation of kyosei can be divided into five stages, with each stage building on the preceding one. In the first stage, companies must work to secure a predictable stream of profits and to establish strong market positions. From this foundation, they move on to the second stage, in which managers and workers resolve to cooperate with each other, recognizing that both groups are vital to the company's success. In the third stage, this sense of cooperation is extended beyond the company to encompass customers, suppliers, community groups, and even competitors. At the fourth stage, a company takes the cooperative spirit beyond national boundaries and addresses some of the global imbalances that plague the world. In the fifth stage, which companies rarely achieve, a company urges its national government to work toward rectifying global imbalances. For each stage, Kaku provides detailed examples from Cannon's own experience in putting the ideas of kyosei into practice.     

无锡新区:跨国公司业务代表谈如何面对WTO

不久前,在无锡新区国际咨询顾问委员会召开的第三届年会上,不少委员(这些委员大都是已在无锡新区投资的跨国公司亚太区或中国区的高级行政管理人员和长期以来始终关注无锡新区发展的国外跨国公司和投资咨询机构的高级管理人员等)就中国加入WTO与无锡新区跨世纪发展等重大问题进行了广泛、深入地讨论与论证。这些意见可供有关部门参考。本刊择其部分发言摘要刊发于后,以飨读者。     

The geography of trust

Leaders who rely forever on the same internal advisers, entrusting them with issues of ever greater sensitivity and consequence, run the risk of being sold short and possibly betrayed. Alternatively, lone-wolf leaders who trust no one may make enormous, yet preventable, mistakes when trying to sort through difficult decisions. A sophisticated understanding of trust can protect leaders from both fates. During the past decade, author and consultant Saj-nicole Joni studied leadership in more than 150 European and North American companies. Her research reveals three fundamental types of trustpersonal trust, expertise trust, and structural trust. Executives may persevere in relationships that are based on personal trust, no matter how exalted their leadership roles become. But such relationships are unlikely to remain static. They also probably won't provide the kinds of deep, often specialized knowledge leaders need. In circumstances where advisers' competence matters as much as their character, expertise trust--reliance on an adviser's ability in a specific subject--enters the picture. In organizations, leaders develop expertise trust by working closely with people who consistently demonstrate their mastery of particular subjects or processes. Structural trust refers to how roles and ambitions influence advisers' perspectives and candor. It shifts constantly as people rise through organizations. High-level structural trust can provide leaders with pure insight and information--but advisers in positions of the highest structural trust generally reside outside organizations. These advisers provide leaders with insights that their organizations cannot. High-performing leaders' most enduring--and most valuable--relationships are characterized by enormous levels of all three kinds of trust.     

Enterprising nonprofits

Faced with rising costs, more competition for fewer donations and grants, and increased rivalry from for-profit companies entering the social sector, nonprofits are turning to the commercial arena to leverage or replace their traditional sources of funding. The drive to become more businesslike, however, holds many dangers for nonprofits. In the best of circumstances, nonprofits face operational and cultural challenges in the pursuit of commercial funding. In the worst, commercial operations can undercut an organization's social mission. To explore the new possibilities of commercialization and to avoid its perils, nonprofit leaders need to craft their strategies carefully. A framework-what the author calls the social enterprise spectrum--can help such leaders understand and assess their options. Nonprofits first must identify potential sources of earned income; then they should set clear and realistic financial objectives. Commercial programs don't need to be profitable to be worthwhile. They can instead improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of organizations by reducing the need for donated funds; by providing a more reliable, diversified funding base; and by enhancing the quality of programs by instilling market discipline. In the end, commercial operations will not--and should not--drive out philanthropic initiatives. But thoughtful innovation in the social sector is essential if organizations are to leverage limited philanthropic resources.