Islamic financial markets and global crises: Contagion or decoupling?

This paper investigates the contagion effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) on Islamic equity and bond markets. Using a sample of Islamic stock indices from various developed and emerging markets and the global Islamic stock and bond (sukuk) indices, we explore asymmetric conditional correlation dynamics across stable and crisis periods and across the two crises. The results fail to provide strong contagion evidence between conventional and Islamic equity and bond indices, supporting the decoupling hypothesis of the Islamic securities. Our findings imply that Islamic equities and bonds may provide a cushion against risk and instability, particularly in periods of turmoil. The small number of contagion cases mostly relates to the ESDC and developed Islamic stock indices. The findings also show that the Islamic emerging stock indices in the BRICS provide the most effective international portfolio diversification benefits compared to the Islamic developed indices.     

Are all financial crises created equal? Wholesale funding and two financial crises

We use financial information on banks from Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania to examine the role of wholesale funding on the transmission of financial crises to bank lending, as well as to study the response of financial institutions in different regions during the crises. We consider the role of wholesale funding during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Our results suggest that during the GFC, wholesale funding dependence had a negative effect on loans growth across regions, but with substantial regional heterogeneity. The growth of loans from financial institutions in Asia and Europe was consistently sensitive to wholesale funding dependence. Although wholesale funding did not play a significant role in the transmission mechanism of the AFC, a subsample of financial institutions in Asia, who depended more heavily on wholesale funding, experienced a faster loan growth and may have been able to better withstand the crisis.     

Predatory cells and puzzling financial crises: Are toxic products good for the financial markets?

We advance the idea that the predator-prey dynamics that take place among key market agents play an important role in explaining financial crises. As such, we posit that financial markets evolve through fault lines involving toxic behaviors (such as deceit), toxic products (such as predatory mortgages) and inefficient regulations. We provide data to show that the puzzle of the lack of congruence between the market behaviors and what some economic models predict at times of financial crises may be the result of predator-prey interplays, and of so-called “predatory cells”, which are under the influence of financial accelerators.     

Portugal’s banking and financial crises: unexpected consequences of monetary integration?

Portugal’s current financial crisis might be related to a banking crisis resulting from joining the Euro. The new-currency eliminated the exchange rate risk, but not the credit or liquidity risks within the Euroarea. However, Portuguese banks acted as if all of these risks had disappeared. They began pumping money in Portugal, by borrowing intensively in Euros abroad at low interest rates. The ensuing liquidity generated a capital-flow bonanza boom that culminated in a bust phase. Private and sovereign debt dramatically increased, which further soared when the government rescued banks. Portugal was then compelled to take extreme measures to address extraordinary debt-levels.     

To what extent real exchange rate appreciation contributed to the shrinking of China's trade surpluses following the global financial crises?

In this paper, we investigate the extent to which real appreciation of the Chinese currency contributed in a meaningful way to the drop of its trade surpluses during the great recession subsequent to the financial and economic crises beginning in 2007. Chinese currency appreciated 14.75% in real terms during April 2008 and December 2011. The beginning of 2008 witnessed the most significant part of this real appreciation, after then the appreciations slowed through the crisis and recovery and has included intervals of real depreciation. Using data on exports and imports for Foreign owned firms in China and Chinese owned firms, disaggregated for 29 provinces, spanning the period 2007–2012, we find significant impact which differs from regions also. The results are robust to including a common factor and when compared with impact in the pre-crisis period, before 2006.     

Stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners: does trade intensity matter?

We investigate the extent and manner of stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners and examine whether this is affected by trade intensity. Based on trade intensity, we classify Australia’s trading partners into major, medium and minor partners. We hypothesize that markets with greater (lower) trade intensity will be more (less) interdependent with Australia. We perform correlation (unconditional and conditional) analyses between Australia and its trading partners. Our results indicate that most of the markets that are highly correlated with Australia are its major trading partners. We conduct panel regression analysis to investigate whether trade intensity has any impact on the stock market correlations between Australia and its trading partners. The results show that trade intensity significantly and positively affect the correlations of Australia with its major trading partners. Thus, the results confirm our hypothesis that trade intensity drives stock market interdependence between Australia and its trading partners.     

Do financial distress and liquidity crises affect value and size premiums?

This study investigates the impact of liquidity crises on the relationship between stock (value and size) premiums and default risk in the US market. It first examines whether financial distress can explain value and size premiums, and then, subsequently, aims to determine whether liquidity crises increase the risk of value and size premium investment strategies. The study employs a time-varying approach and a sample of US stock returns for the period between January 1982 and March 2011, a period which includes the current liquidity crisis, so as to examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and value and size premiums. The findings indicate that the default premium has explanatory power for value and size premiums, which affect firms with different characteristics. We also find that liquidity crises may actually increase the risks related to size and value premium strategies.     

Did financial deregulation help consumers? Access to market-yield instruments

The maturity effect (ME) of futures prices postulated by Samuelson (1965) is re-examined using three nonparametric tests. The consistent entropy asymmetry test by Racine and Maasoumi (2007) indicates that variance is an appropriate risk or uncertainty measure for ME, and value-at-risk and expected shortfall are also adopted. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov dominance test and Wilcoxon rank sum and signed rank test are employed to rank the estimates of the three risk measures under a moving-window framework. The testing outcomes are contingent on futures type, testing method and risk measures. The testing outcomes show mild support for ME.     

Metals: resources or financial assets? A multivariate cross-sectional analysis

Metals are very important resources for industrial production, but recently they have attracted more and more attention from investors. While certainly industrial producers, consumers, and financial investors do have some influence on metal price development, the role of relevant price factors is not yet quite clear. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the explanatory power of various fundamental factors and characteristics known from financial markets, specifically on the expected returns in a unique data sample of 30 metals. We apply—to our knowledge for the first time in this context—the widely accepted method of characteristic-sorted portfolios, extended by the very recent method of two-way portfolio sorts as an alternative to classical multivariate regressions. This mostly nonparametric approach, combined with portfolio aggregation, provides very robust results. Our major finding is that the financial characteristics value and momentum have a very high predictive power for monthly returns of metal portfolios. Metal-specific fundamental factors like stocks, secondary production, apparent consumption, country concentration, mine production, or reserves perform depending on the interpretation moderately well or rather poorly, regarding some economically interpretable transformations and when using multivariate two-way sorts. Hence, from the perspective of expected returns, metals are predominantly assets, while fundamental metal-specific factors still play a non-negligible role. Thus, to a much lesser extent, metals can still be regarded as resources. Overall, the combination of financial characteristics and metal-specific fundamental factors yields the best results. With these robust results, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of metal prices and their underlying factors.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

Capital inflow-terms of trade ‘nexus’: Does it lead to financial crisis?

The paper models the nexus of foreign capital inflow and dynamic terms of trade to explain financial crisis in the form of sudden stop or reversal of capital inflow. Crisis in this structure is rooted in the role played by dynamic terms of trade rather than informational imperfections as generally found in the existing literature. Inspite of satisfying the regularity conditions for model consistency episodes of sudden crises get magnified due to the non-linearity of the equilibrium relations. This is the novelty of this paper and differentiates it from the standard theoretical literature, and well captures empirical evidence documented in the literature. Non-linearity plays a very important role in the model. Expectation of the exchange rate depreciation has higher potential to generate a financial crisis than shift in the risk perception of foreign lenders or supply shock in the borrowing country.     

Did foreign banks stay committed to emerging Europe during recent financial crises?

Our objective is to investigate empirically the behavior of foreign banks with respect to real loan growth during periods of financial crisis for a set of countries in which foreign banks dominate the banking sectors due primarily to having taken over large existing former state-owned banks. The eight countries are among the most developed in emerging Europe, their banking sectors having been modernized by the middle of the last decade. We consider a data period that includes an initial credit boom (2005 – 2007) followed by the global financial crisis (2008 & 2009) and the onset of the Eurozone crisis (2010). Our two innovations with respect to the existing literature on banking during the financial crisis are to separate foreign banks into two categories, namely, subsidiaries of the Big 6 European multinational banks (MNBs) and all other foreign-controlled banks, and to take account of the impact of exchange rates during the period. Our results show that bank lending was impacted adversely by both crises but that the two types of foreign banks behaved differently. The Big 6 banks remained committed to the region in that their lending behavior was not different from that of domestic banks supporting the notion that these countries are treated as a “second home market” by these European MNBs. Contrariwise, the other foreign banks active in the region were involved in fueling the credit boom but then decreased their lending aggressively during the crisis periods. Our results also indicate that bank behavior in countries having flexible exchange rate regimes differs from that in those in (or effectively in) the Eurozone. Our results suggest that both innovations matter for studying bank behavior during crisis periods in the region and, by extension, to other small countries in which banking sectors are dominated by foreign financial institutions having different business models.     

Peaks or tails – What distinguishes financial data?

We argue against the view that it is mostly the peaks of the empirical densities of stock returns (and of other risky returns as well) that set such data aside from “normal” variables. We show that peaks depend on sample size and on the way returns are standardized, and that for given data sets of stock returns, both higher peaks and lower peaks than in a standard normal case can be obtained. First version received: March 1998/Final version received: April 2000     

Gini’s transvariation analysis: an application on financial crises in developing countries

The damage and the recurrence of financial crises have increased the concern of investors and policymakers on one hand and the interest of macroeconomists on the other. This paper presents an original non parametric methodology, whose aim is to give a very intuitive and rigorous method for variable selection in order to analyse financial crises. Transvariation analysis compares the distributions of two different groups of countries (sound and distressed) with respect to a single macroeconomic variable and selects the indicators on the basis of a low transvariation probability index. The current account deficit to GDP ratio, differently from other studies on financial crises, seems to be a suitable variable in discriminating distressed countries from sound ones, and the case of Argentina and Turkey confirms this finding.     

The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?

Many have argued that financial markets are crucial in ensuring that governments maintain sustainable fiscal balances - the so called ‘market discipline hypothesis’. A recent version of this theory holds that both fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are necessary to enable markets to discipline overspending governments. I argue, however, that while these fiscal institutions are effective at improving governments fiscal balances, financial markets are likely not the causal mechanism which discipline governments’ fiscal policies. Instead, I propose that fiscal rules and transparency promote better budget balances because domestic political actors use fiscal institutions to constrain executive policymaking. I test these competing hypotheses of why these fiscal institutions are effective – financial markets vs political competition – and find that country budget balances are increased not as a consequence of financial markets, but when the level of political competition and civil society engagement is sufficiently high. These results are robust to accounting for the possible selection bias of who adopts fiscal institutions.     

Volunteering and life or financial shocks: does income and wealth matter?

Volunteering is a dominant social force that signals a healthy state. However, although the literature on volunteering is extensive, knowledge on how life’s discontinuities (life and financial shocks) affect volunteering is limited because most studies work with static (cross-sectional) data. To reduce this shortcoming, we use longitudinal data from Australia (HILDA) that track the same individuals over time to assess how individuals from different income and wealth groups respond to life and financial shocks with respect to volunteering. Although both income and wealth can act as buffers against life shocks by providing stability and reducing vulnerability – which decreases the need to actually change behaviour patterns – we observe more heterogeneity than expected and also stickiness at the lowest income levels. Response delays in post-shock volunteering also suggest that volunteering habits may be driven and influenced by strong commitment and motivation that are not shattered by life or financial shocks. In fact, the amount of time spent volunteering tends to increase after negative income shocks and decrease after positive income shocks.     

Currency crises and foreign credit in emerging markets: Credit crunch or demand effect?

Currency crises of the past decade highlighted the importance of balance-sheet effects of large devaluations. Currency crisis literature identified a decline in credit as one of the channels through which such crises affect real economic activity. We find empirical evidence of the existence of this channel and quantify its extent and persistence: controlling for a host of fundamentals, we find a decline in foreign credit to emerging market private firms of about 25 percent in the first year following large depreciations. This decline is especially large in the first five months, is less pronounced in the second year, and disappears entirely by the third year. We show that only about a quarter of the initial decline in credit could be attributed to the “credit crunch,” while the rest of the decline is due to contracting demand. After six months, however, most of the credit decline could be attributed to supply effects.