Enforcing the 1988 Basel Capital Requirements: Did it Curtail Bank Credit in Emerging Economies?

We examine whether the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtailed the supply of credit in emerging economies. Preliminarily, we identify 16 emerging economies that – according to official and impartial reports – enforced the 1988 Basel standard during the 1990s. Then we perform our twofold econometric analysis. In the former part, we use macro data to test whether, controlling for economic fundamental variables, the enforcement brought about a slowdown in aggregate credit in these countries vis-a-vis other emerging economies. We find some support for our hypothesis. In the latter part, we employ individual bank data to better identify the 'capital crunch' effect of the enforcement. Here, we find that CAR enforcement – according to the 1988 Basel standard – significantly curtailed credit supply, particularly at less well-capitalized banks. The two empirical parts together suggest that the CAR enforcement did curtail aggregate credit in the examined emerging countries and that this result is rooted in the attempt by under-capitalized banks to reduce their loans. We argue that among developing countries – where banks are often the only source of financial intermediation – the positive effect of higher capital requirements, represented by the reduction of poor quality lending, may be offset by their negative impact on bank liquidity and on the level of economic activity. Hence, our results suggest that particular care is required to avoid potential negative macroeconomic effects when phasing in new and higher capital requirements in emerging economies.
(J.E.L.: G18, G21, G28)     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Performance of Thailand banks after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis

The performance of commercial banks and government-owned specialized banks in Thailand is estimated after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Commercial banks exhibit increasing returns to scale, whereas government-owned specialized banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale, implying further increases in bank size and market concentration in the commercial bank sector but not for government specialized banks. Cost inefficiency varies by bank and is a function of the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total loans, equity to total assets and liquid assets to total assets, as well as the number of branches. On average, banks with fewer NPLs, that are well capitalized and with adequate liquidity are efficient. Thus, stricter rules to regulate credit risk management and ensure capital and liquidity adequacy would enhance efficiency in the banking sector. Although estimated input substitutability appears to be low, labour and loanable fund are substitutes. However, labour and physical capital as well as physical and loanable funds are complements in commercial banks. All the three inputs of labour, physical capital and loanable funds are substitutes for the government specialized banks.     

金融危机、货币政策与信贷供给*——基于公司层面银行信贷数据的经验研究

不同的银行特征会对金融危机和货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道产生异质性影响。本文运用2001-2015年公司层面银行信贷数据实证检验了我国货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道,随后进一步研究金融危机对不同特征银行信贷供给的影响差异。经验研究发现：我国货币政策银行信贷渠道主要通过非国有控股银行传导,并引起不同资产负债表特征银行信贷供给的异质性反应。银行规模越大、流动性越强、资本充足率越高,银行信贷供给对货币政策越不敏感。金融危机期间,银行信贷渠道的传导效率显著降低,高资本充足水平的银行和国有控股银行受金融危机的冲击较小,并且宽松的货币政策对国有控股银行信贷供给调控的效率更高。     

Distance and beyond: What drives financial flows to emerging economies?

A major theme in the empirical literature is whether country-specific ‘pull’ or external ‘push’ factors drive international capital flows. In this paper we show that pull-push interactions matter: the response of international investors to country-specific developments depends on global volatility/liquidity stress conditions. We model asset-trade behaviour of investors: with limited information, strong institutional quality ‘pulls’ asset demand; mounting tensions in global markets amplify portfolio adjustments. We derive an empirically testable equation for cross-border bank flows to emerging economies (EMEs) and focus on pull-push interactions that trigger financial vulnerabilities. We find that global volatility amplifies demand for institutional quality, prior to the recent crisis, implying that EMEs with weak institutional settings are exposed to sharp capital retrenchments. In the aftermath of the crisis, the liquidity easing in advanced economies drives down concerns for EMEs' developments, boosting flows and challenging EMEs' ability to use capital controls to mitigate unbridled flows.     

How does capital regulation react to monetary policy? New evidence on the risk-taking channel

Before the subprime crisis, financial stability was a microprudential issue addressed by capital regulation and unrelated to monetary policy. The financial crisis put this paradigm to the test and turned the spotlight on the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy. Hence, the following question arises: how does capital regulation react to monetary policy? This article seeks to answer this question. We analyze the link involving monetary policy and capital regulation through the risk-taking channel in Brazil. The findings suggest that banks react to monetary policy by changing the amount of loan provisions as well as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). An important novelty of the study is the evidence that there is no trade-off between provisions and CAR, which are important tools used by banking supervisors. The key result of the article is that banks react to the macroeconomic environment differently from what is expected by banking supervision, i.e., there exists a paradox between the microprudential view and the macroprudential view. Thus, in terms of practical implication, a banking supervision strategy for financial stability must take into account the effects of monetary policy.     

Ex ante capital position,changes in the different components of regulatory capital and bank risk

We investigate the impact of changes in capital of European banks on their risk-taking behaviour from 1992 to 2006, a time period covering the Basel I capital requirements. We specifically focus on the initial level and type of regulatory capital banks hold. First, we assume that risk changes depend on banks’ ex ante regulatory capital position. Second, we consider the impact of an increase in each component of regulatory capital on banks’ risk changes. We find that, for highly capitalized, adequately capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks, an increase in equity or in subordinated debt positively affects risk. Moderately undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less risky assets when their equity ratio increases but not when they improve their capital position by extending hybrid capital or subordinated debt. On the whole, our conclusions support the need to implement more explicit thresholds to classify European banks according to their capital ratios but also to clearly distinguish pure equity from hybrid and subordinated instruments.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

Credit in Times of Stress: Lessons from Latin America during the Global Financial Crisis

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis disrupted the provision of credit in Latin America less than in previous crises. This paper tests whether specific characteristics at both the bank and country levels at the onset of the global crisis contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in this region during the crisis. As shown, financial soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity, and bank efficiency in the pre‐crisis period, played a role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks that had expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit the most. Among country‐specific characteristics, we found evidence that balance sheet measures such as the economy's overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short‐term debt) were key variables in explaining credit growth resilience.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Liquidity management of foreign exchange reserves in continuous time

In order to cope with daily foreign currency exchange payments or trades and avoid liquidity crisis, central banks need to maintain the liquidity of foreign exchange reserves. In this paper, we develop a Foreign Exchange Reserves Liquidity Management (FERLM) model based on stochastic process by introducing a foreign exchange factor. We also generate a feasible target proportion of the liquidity reserve to total foreign exchange reserves, by seeking the balance between capital gains of holding foreign exchange reserves and losses of liquidity insufficiency.     

Disentangling the transmission channel NPLs-cost of capital-lending supply

This paper analyses the effects of non-performing loans (NPLs) on the cost of capital, and on lending and liquidity supply, for a sample of 225 Eurozone banks over the period 2002Q1-2016Q4. Our results demonstrate that NPLs increase the cost of capital, which reduces both lending supply and liquidity creation. This phenomenon is comparatively more significant for periphery county banks than for core country banks.     

The impact of macroeconomic factors on income inequality: Evidence from the BRICS

In this paper we investigate how the evolution of income growth, real interest rates, and inflation have driven income inequality across a variety of countries with particular focus on the BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) during the period 2001 to 2015. Our work suggests that, when central banks of the BRICS economies use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization, they need to consider the impact monetary policy changes have on the distribution of income in their nations. Our estimates reveal that the unintended consequence of policies that induce economic growth and higher prices is higher income inequality. We find that the positive relationship between the three macroeconomic variables and income inequality for the BRICS economies is stronger during the post-2008 period.     

TO JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN? DO BANKS THAT ARE PART OF A FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY PERFORM BETTER THAN BANKS THAT ARE NOT?

This study compares the performance of banks that are part of a financial holding company (FHC banks) with that of banks that are not (independent banks) using Taiwan data from 2002:Q1 to 2006:Q2. The comparisons are based on 14 performance ratios resulting from the concept of CAMEL (which is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings ability, and Liquidity sufficiency). To ensure that becoming part of an FHC is a random process, we used four matching methods to select the controlled banks so that the characteristic variables of banks in the two groups are statistically indifferent. By using the data before matching, it was found that FHC banks significantly defeat independent banks, regardless of their performance ratios. Conversely, when the sample was used after the matching, the results changed dramatically. Although FHC banks still beat the independent banks in terms of capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity sufficiency, FHC banks and independent banks are found to have equal profitability and management efficiency. Earlier studies that do not consider the endogeneity problem tend to overestimate the joining effect.(JEL C21, G21)     

Sovereign-Wealth Funds: the institutional dimension

In the recent past, the operations of the capital-rich Sovereign-Wealth Funds (SWFs) went on increasing in the global capital markets. As the global economic crisis that started in 2007 deepened, SWF operations dramatically spurted, leading to further progressive increase in their significance for the global capital markets. For all appearances they are going to be important financial players in the foreseeable future. This article focuses on the basic concept of SWFs, their structure and operations. It attempts to analyze and elucidate on them. Notwithstanding the fact that SWFs are an instrument of enhancing liquidity and financial resource allocation in the international capital market, they managed to become a source of controversies. Consequently they became a source of escalation in financial protectionism in several advanced industrial economies, in particular the USA. The article concludes that this was unwarranted. Recently SWFs have attempted to device an array of best practices to improve the transparency of their global financial operations. These measures are expected to enhance the acceptance of SWFs as well as global recognition of their operations. They would also help in dispelling the negative image that SWFs have held in several advanced industrial economies.

HAS INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY INCREASED IN ASIA? EVIDENCE FROM THE POST‐1997 FINANCIAL CRISIS PERIOD

This paper examines whether international capital mobility in Asia has increased after the 1997 Asian financial crisis by estimating the Feldstein‐Horioka (FH) coefficients using panel cointegration and dynamic OLS regressions. In the benchmark estimation, we find that the FH coefficients of ten Asian economies decrease significantly from 0.65 during the pre‐crisis period to 0.32 during the post‐crisis period. Furthermore, the coefficient for the post‐crisis period is less statistically significant than that for the pre‐crisis period. The extended model estimations with additional control variables controlling for the business cycle, different foreign exchange rate systems, and capital control also show the results which are consistent with the benchmark estimation results. Rolling regressions show a consistently declining trend of the FH coefficients in Asia during our sample period. These results provide consistent evidence, according to the FH proposition, of increasing international capital mobility in Asia during the post‐1997 Asian financial crisis period. (JEL F36, F37, F21)     

Banks' Capital Structure and the Liquid Asset – Policy Implication of Taiwan

Banks' size, liquidity and profitability are the main determinants of their capital ratios in Taiwan. Large banks implicitly substitute bank capital for regulator's capital and banks mainly depend on internal cash flows for capitalization. However, medium-sized banks in Taiwan use liquidity as a substitute for bank capital, and small banks with low liquidity tend to have lower capital ratios. Regulators should pay close attention to these banks since they may be undercapitalized.     

The Macroeconomics of Financial Crises: How Risk Premiums and Liquidity Traps Affect Policy Options

The paper offers an overview of what structural models of the IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming variety can tell about the macroeconomics of economic crises. In addition to demonstrating how the emergence of risk premiums in money and capital markets can generate liquidity traps at positive interest rates and may drive economies into recessions, it shows the following: (1) Fiscal policy works even in a small, open economy under flexible exchange rates when the country is stuck in a liquidity trap; (2) Near the fringe of liquidity traps, there may be perfect traps, in which neither monetary nor fiscal policy works when used in isolation but policy coordination is called for; and (3) Massive financial crises in the domestic money market may even destabilize the economy.     

Do foreign-owned banks affect banking system liquidity risk?

Existing empirical research shows that foreign-owned banks play a stabilizing role in emerging economies’ banking systems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this stabilizing role can be attributed to transnational banks’ access to more diversified sources of liquidity. There exists, however, no empirical evidence so far on transnational banks’ liquidity behavior and its effect on aggregate banking system liquidity. This paper aims at closing this gap. First, we look at the liquid assets holdings of transnational banks and show that in “normal” times they are significantly lower but in crises times higher than those of single-market banks. Second, we find evidence that transnational banks’ presence significantly reduces the risk of aggregate liquidity shortages in emerging economies.     

Management Behaviour in Vietnamese Commercial Banks

This study identifies managerial behaviour in Vietnamese banks between the years 2000 and 2014, based on the managerial framework of banks, as identified by Rossi et al. ( 2009 ). This framework is built on the interrelationships between efficiency, risk, capital and diversification. This study uses the Z‐score to measure insolvency risk, the SFA to estimate cost efficiency, the ratio of total equity to total assets to capture bank capital and the HHI index to measure the diversification of revenue and earning assets. The results from the 3SLS estimator indicate that revenue diversification has an insignificant impact on insolvency risk, capital ratio and cost efficiency, but earning assets diversification has a negative effect on these three variables, supporting ‘classical diversification’, ‘economic capital’ and ‘monitoring’ behaviours. Moreover, a decline in cost efficiency leads to a rise in insolvency risk, implying ‘bad management’ behaviour; an increase in risk results in a reduction in cost efficiency, indicating ‘bad luck’ behaviour; and a reduction in capital ratio in the poorly capitalised banks leads to a growth in risk, suggesting ‘moral hazard’ behaviour. The results remain strongly robust when using an alternative risk measurement (the loan loss provision ratio) and an alternative SFA model.