Wage-setting institutions and corporate governance

We present a model in which wage-setting structures explain cross-country variation in corporate governance. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the levels of firm ownership concentration and investor protection legislation. Low and high degrees of centralization yield less concentrated ownership and more investor protection than intermediate degrees. Like recent research, this paper highlights labor as a key constituent in shaping corporate governance. However, our theory can resolve an important puzzle this research confronts, namely, why Scandinavian countries with higher than average labor strength also have higher than average investor protection legislation.     

Adverse selection and corporate governance

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse selection component than non-GLCs.     

Insider trading legislation and corporate governance

This paper analyzes the impact of insider trading legislation on corporate governance. In a context where large, dominant shareholders can monitor underperforming companies, managers have an incentive to give early warnings about adverse developments to dominant shareholders. This information is effectively a bribe to induce dominant shareholders to sell their stock and refrain from intervention. If insider trading is unregulated, dominant shareholders collude with management at the expense of small shareholders. The optimal regime forces the company to disclose all material information to the market. Private contracting between companies and shareholders leads to optimal insider trading regulation only if initial shareholders can enter a binding commitment, otherwise large shareholders and managers recontract at the expense of small shareholders. Enforcement also matters. European Union legislation requires inside information to be precise. Such a narrow definition creates a grey zone, where information is private but cannot be classified as inside information. As a result the effectiveness of corporate governance and firm value are reduced. Regulation in the US that treats shareholders with a stake exceeding 10% as insiders is potentially harmful.     

Beta-convergence and sigma-convergence in corporate governance in Europe

This paper tests for beta-convergence and sigma-convergence in the corporate governance models, using a sample of corporate governance ratings for 198 European corporations listed on the FTSE Eurofirst 300 index. A piecewise linear regression is deployed to select a model and the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator is also applied to estimate an exponential model. It concludes that there is statistical evidence of beta- and sigma-convergence within countries and the results suggest that institutional differences between countries are statistically relevant.     

论公司治理中的会计控制

会计控制作为公司治理中一项重要的制度安排,是包含企业在内的所有组织和机构正常运转的制度基础。会计控制的执行和作用的发挥离不开公司治理,只有将会计控制置于公司治理的环境中加以考虑,才能更好地理解会计控制在经济生活中的角色和地位,才能找出现实中存在的问题,并加以解决。     

中国公司治理结构的现状

本文介绍了我国公司治理结构的发展与现状,并针对所存在的问题提出了一些改进意见.通过此文,可以使读者对公司治理结构有一个全面的认识,从而有助于国内企业公司治理结构的完善与发展.     

中国公司治理结构的现状

本文介绍了我国公司治理结构的发展与现状，并针对所存在的问题提出了一些改进意见。通过此文，可以使读者对公司治理结构有一个全面的认识，从而有助于国内企业公司治理结构的完善与发展。     

Reforming corporate governance: redirecting the European agenda

Corporate governance reform is in the air. This article warns against partial and hastily conceived interventions in complex and fragile governance arrangements. Reformers should step back and analyse the fundamental links between corporate law and corporate finance, and between corporate governance and the rest of the economic and legal system. Reform efforts should not meddle with specific ownership and control structures. Specific problems like the poor liquidity of particular stock markets and poor protection of minority shareholders in some countries should be addressed directly. Fundamental reform of corporate governance is probably desirable in certain countries, but will require far-reaching and country-specific changes in the economic system. Reform is thus best handled at the level of individual member states. Initiatives to harmonize the structure and control of corporations at the European Union level are bound to fail, and the prospects for specific proposals like the European company statute are bleak at best. A European Commission 'Corporate Governance Policy' should focus on promoting transparency and the dissemination of information.     

Earnings distribution,corporate governance and CEO pay

We investigate the relationship between earnings differentials and the pay of CEOs of 190 British companies between 1970 and 1990. We find that (i) changes in the differential between the 90th and 50th weekly earnings percentiles for non‐manual adult male workers [90:50] explain changes in the level of real CEO salary and bonus in our sample of companies; (ii) changes in this differential also account for changes in the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size; (iii) a broader measure of earnings inequality does far worse than 90:50 at explaining changes in both the level and the firm size elasticity of CEO pay; (iv) fitting the model on data for 1970–1983 and predicting pay levels for the period starting with the widespread adoption of executive share option schemes in 1984, we find a structural break in the relationship between lower management pay differentials and the pay of the CEO. We conclude first that top executive pay prior to 1984 was a stable function of both firm size and earnings differentials lower on the administrative ladder, consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Herbert Simon in 1957; and second that the use of share options from 1984 onward represents not simply a change in the mode of top executive compensation, but a de‐linking of the pay of top executives and that of their subordinates.     

Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

内部资本市场功能异化与公司治理

内部资本市场缓解了企业集团的融资约束,提升了投资效率,但也增加了公司治理的难度.在缺乏有效公司治理机制的情况下,内部资本市场的功能部分地被异化为经理人寻租或控股股东进行"利益输送"的渠道.本文讨论了内部资本市场功能异化与公司治理的关系,分析了内部资本市场的部分功能异化的原因,提出了治理的建议.     

内部资本市场功能异化与公司治理

内部资本市场缓解了企业集团的融资约束,提升了投资效率,但也增加了公司治理的难度。在缺乏有效公司治理机制的情况下,内部资本市场的功能部分地被异化为经理人寻租或控股股东进行“利益输送”的渠道。本文讨论了内部资本市场功能异化与公司治理的关系,分析了内部资本市场的部分功能异化的原因,提出了治理的建议。     

中国公司治理基本理论研究的回顾与反思

中国上市公司治理问题层出不穷和股市屡遭重创的一个重要原因,就是中国上市公司治理基本理论研究滞后于实践的发展。在对公司治理理论流派划分、公司治理体系界定、公司目标确定和公司治理研究主线与研究方法等问题研究进展情况回顾与反思的基础上,提出了对这些问题独特的看法。     

Financial liberalisation,corporate governance and the efficiency of firms in Indian manufacturing

In this paper, we argue that the way in which a firm is financed will affect its efficiency. Firms obtaining finance from the government are likely to be less efficient than firms obtaining finance from banks or foreign financial institutions (FFIs). We analyse these issues by estimating a stochastic frontier for firms in seven manufacturing industries in India where these differences have been reinforced by financial de-regulation. Our results indicate that the government is generally less effective in monitoring the firms that it lends to than either banks or Indian Financial Institutions (IFIs), but neither of these institutions is particularly efficient either. Though the impact of FFIs on firm efficiency is insignificant, foreign ownership has a positive impact in a majority of the industries. Finally, likelihood ratio tests confirm that while the government and IFIs have a similar impact on firm efficiency, banks are quite distinct in a majority of industries.     

关于健全和完善我国上市公司治理结构几个关键问题的思考

健全和完善我国公司治理结构,前提是必须确定我国公司治理结构的目标就是“股东利益的最大化”,关键是改变国有股“一股独大”的畸形股权结构,核心是保证公司董事会的“独立性”,并建立充分履行其职能的运行机制,重点是要建立一个与公司治理结构相适应的公司外部治理机制,条件是要创造一种良好的公司治理文化。     

中国上市公司治理的主要问题探讨

本文首先界定了公司治理的概念和研究范畴,然后阐述了上市公司治理问题的理论分析框架及各国不同的治理模式。在此基础上,结合我国实际分析了上市公司治理存在的主要问题,得出了结论：我国上市公司治理所面临的主要问题与西方国家有很大的区别,西方国家成熟的公司治理理论不能完全照搬到我国,必须结合我国实际,从上市公司治理问题产生的根源入手,才能真正改善我国上市公司治理。     

The effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia

This study investigates the effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia using a sample of 164 companies listed on the Main Board in Bursa Malaysia from 5 different industries （consumer, trading ＆ services, industrial, constructions and properties） within 2001 to 2005. Throughout, this study will use correlation and regression analysis in the SPSS software to determine the effects of corporate governance practices on Market Valuation. In analyzing firms＇ market valuation, we will use the Tobin＇s Q formula and for the corporate governance compliance, we will look at 4 criteria to compare with market valuation, which are （1） Board of Director＇s composition, （2） Board of Director＇s remuneration （salaries）, （3） Board of Director＇s training and development, （4） Board of Director＇s meeting. In order to determine the effects between the corporate governance compliance and market valuation, we will use regression analysis. Based on the correlation analysis, the first null hypothesis must be rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, in which dependent variable and independent variables are significantly correlated with BOD remuneration and BOD training availability. Overall, there is a significant relationship between Tobin＇s Q and independent variables （BOD remuneration and BOD training）. This study also recommends that for the company who did not comply with the code, they should follow the best practice because it will be a pivotal weapon in facing with the fierce competition in era globalization.     

围绕公司治理的需要,拓展管理会计体系

21世纪是知识经济占主导地位、以迅速发展的计算机技术和现代网络技术为代表的信息革命向社会生活的深度和广度渗透的时代.为适应时代的要求,企业管理创新已取得方方面面的进展,而管理会计创新却显得力度不够.笔者立足公司治理的实际需要,探讨了如何拓展管理会计体系.