The Simple Welfare Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy Case for Subscribership Subsidies

The goal of universal service has dominated the telecommunications policy landscape for at least the past half century. This policy objective has been promoted with cross subsidies from long-distance telecommunications services to subscribers to local telecommunications service. The economic rationale for these cross subsidies is network externalities. In this paper, we show that: (1) the presence of network externalities, even if substantial in overall magnitude, does not generally justify a subscribership subsidy, even a well-designed one; and (2) the empirical realities of telecommunications markets make it unlikely that subscribership subsidies of any kind will increase social welfare.     

The impact of economic cycles on the demand for International Telecommunications in Australia

Recently an Australian Index of Leading Indicators has been constructed which is designed to consistently anticipate economic cycles. It is shown in this investigative paper, using cross spectral techniques, that there is a strong association between international telecommunications traffic and this leading index. The findings provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that telecommunications traffic responds to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. Therefore the results suggest the appropriacy of the inclusion of the index as a putative explanatory variable in the construction of a forecasting model for telecommunications traffic.     

Enhancing the user role in the development of technical standards for telecommunications

The paper examines the actual and potential roles of business users of telecommunications services in influencing the development of technical standards. Variours institutional structures in the user community are examined as they relate to user particioation in formally constituted standards development arganizations. Discreparcies between users and suppliers in participatory motivations, strategies and resources are noted. The standardization process in telecommunications emerges as a technology-push initiative led by the suplly industries. However, structural changes in the telecommunications industries have resulted in new approaches to standards making. As a result, standards have acquired a new significane in terms of user control user technical and service evolution. Using the development of European standards for digital wireless telephony as an example, it is argued that this new standardization environment mandates a much more active role for users. However, it is also argued that the user stake in telecommunications standards is not of an equivalent nature to the supplier stake. Thus, a theortical framework is presented which that effective user involvement will require the development of a parallel institutional structure for the user community.     

Social benefit-cost analysis and telecommunications investment in developing countries

Telecommunications expansion can make an important contribution to the social and economic development of less-developed countries. But that in itself does not mean that telecommunications projects should receive top priority in a country's investment budget. This is because projects in other sectors can also make strong claims to being vital for development. This situation points to a basic problem for development planners: how to allocate scarce resources between competing projects which more than exhaust the available investment budget. The analytical technique that has been developed in answer to this policy problem is a significant extension of social benefit-cost analysis. A pertinent question at this point is: how has the application of the new technique affected budgets for telecommunications investment in developing countries? This paper addresses that question by considering how the World Bank has applied social benefit-cost analysis in the area of telecommunications.     

A Voluntary Subsidy Scheme for the Accounting Rate System in International Telecommunications Industries

This paper proposes a new scheme complementing the current accounting rate system for international telecommunications industries. From an economic standpoint, the current accounting rate system results in high service charges as well as inefficient production. This is a source of contention between developed countries and less developed countries. Although there have been discussions concerning the disadvantages of the accounting rate system, a concrete and workable alternative has not yet been proposed. In this paper, we shall propose a method, taking into account the utilization of a subsidy from a developed country to a less developed country to reduce the accounting rate in international telecommunications, and this scheme brings a second-best solution.     

Policy issues in the development of telecommunications

The paper examines the specific features of the telecommunications system which determine its character, and the regulatory issues which arise out of a situation of potential conflict between the telecommunications network operators (PITs) and the providers and consumers of value added services transacted on the network. It looks at the policy options available to reconcile such conflicts, and at how EC policies are shaping the future of the European telecommunications ststem. It concludes that current development in telematics are aimed mainly at business users, and that safeguards for the private custormer will be necessary in order to ensure the provision of a socially equitable service.     

Policy issues in the development of telecommunications

The paper examines the specific features of the telecommunications system which determine its character, and the regulatory issues which arise out of a situation of potential conflict between the telecommunications network operators (PITs) and the providers and consumers of value added services transacted on the network. It looks at the policy options available to reconcile such conflicts, and at how EC policies are shaping the future of the European telecommunications ststem. It concludes that current development in telematics are aimed mainly at business users, and that safeguards for the private custormer will be necessary in order to ensure the provision of a socially equitable service.     

The problem of market size for Canadian cable television regulation

The policy of the Canadian radio television and telecommunications commission of awarding an exclusive right to provide cable television (CATV) service within a given licensed service area (LSA) rests partly on the presumption that CATV costs reflect economies of scale that are large relative to market size. Cost estimates from crosssections of CATV operations from 1985–1991 show increasing returns to scale and suggest that many LSAs were too small to capture these economies. The results also indicate that economies of scale for basic service declined over the 1980s and that the ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics of CATV may be eroded by further technological and regulatory changes.     

基于生命周期理论的信息服务业分析

针对中国信息服务业(电信业、互联网业、软件业和数字内容业)发展现状,运用产业生命周期理论对其生命周期进行分析可知,就整体发展态势而言,中国信息服务业发展处于由成长期向成熟期过渡阶段;产业发展呈现出明显的扩张和集聚特征。     

The impact of FDI on host countries: the analysis of selected service industries in the Visegrad countries

Foreign direct investments are substantial in the services sector in the Visegrad countries. In this article, we analyse the impact of FDI on the host economy in four selected service industries in two areas: export and employment. FDI in the four selected service industries differ in terms of their vertical or horizontal nature: in business services FDI is predominantly vertical; in financial services and telecommunications it is predominantly horizontal; while in computer-related service activities both types can be found. According to our results, the impact on the host economy differs in the four service industries. We found a positive and significant impact on exports in vertical business services and in horizontal telecommunications services, and on employment in business services and, to a lesser extent, in financial services. The positive impact either diminished or disappeared during the global recession of 2008–2009. The comparison of the four Visegrad countries demonstrates the heterogeneous intensity and significance of this impact, indicating their different specialisations in the analysed services industries.     

Evaluating mobile number portability policy in the Thai mobile telecommunications market

Mobile number portability (MNP), which allows consumers to retain their mobile numbers when switching service providers, is expected to promote competition by lowering switching costs. This paper estimates switching costs and switching costs reduction from the MNP policy in Thailand using the mixed logit model with preference heterogeneity on a nationwide survey of mobile telecommunications service usages. The estimation result shows that the MNP policy reduces switching costs by 37% on average and that this benefit is heterogeneous across consumers. The considerable and persistent switching costs call for additional measures to facilitate switching.     

What drives investment in the telecommunications sector? Some lessons from the OECD countries

Regulation of telecommunications sector plays a crucial role in the political and economic agenda for both industrial and developing countries. The regulatory efforts of more developing countries in order to attract investments and enhance the level of effective competition in the industry are hindered by the absence of a sound legal framework, the weak level of regulation and the extended state interventionism. The main aim of this study is to examine the regulatory process in the telecommunications industry within the OECD countries and determine the extent to which it has affected the level of investment and economic growth. For this purpose, we use an updated data set for thirty OECD countries covering the period 1988–2010 and panel data econometric techniques. Our analysis reveals that there is a strong and positive relationship between effective regulation and investment.     

The Cost Structure of Australian Telecommunications

Since 1991 Australian telecommunications has undergone substantial reform. To a large extent, the economic correctness of pro-competitive policy depends on the non-existence of natural monopoly technology. This paper provides estimates of the Australian telecommunications system cost structure, and tests for subadditivity from 1943 to 1991. Additivity of the cost function after 1945 rejects the natural monopoly hypothesis and supports recent government policy. Diminished natural monopoly characteristics suggest that co-ordination between firms through networking can achieve similar economies as internal co-ordination within a monopoly. This finding is important, given the trend towards network unbundling, and service provision through interconnection.     

Globalization and Country‐Specific Service Links

Abstract

The Jones–Kierzkowski model of global fragmentation of production draws attention to the efficiency of ‘service links’ connecting ‘production blocks’ in different countries. Country‐specific service links include transport and telecommunications infrastructure and the overall business climate. Mobile factors of production, most prominently foreign direct investment (FDI), can shop around for countries with the most functional and inexpensive service links along with low labor costs. Those countries with favorable business climates and well‐functioning service links are able to attract FDI and other mobile inputs. We provide cross‐sectional evidence that successful exporters of manufactures, notably in East Asia, have relatively favorable service links.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

Regulating Service Quality: A Survey

This article reviews the major insights of the economics literature regarding the design of service quality regulation in public utility industries. The focus is on generic service quality issues of primary relevance in the industries, which include the electricity, telecommunications, and water industries. The instruments that public utility regulators commonly employ and the manner in which the regulators employ the instruments to secure desirable levels of service quality are emphasized.JEL classification: L51, L15I am grateful to Mark Armstrong, Sanford Berg, Michael Crew, Lynne Holt, Mark Jamison, Lilia Perez-Chavolla, Paul Sotkiewicz, Dennis Weisman, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Universal telecommunication service: A world perspective

Worldwide telecommunications demand is estimated in models for business and residential mainline telephone, and for mobile telephone service using separate models for developed and developing countries for the period 1996–2001. We test for cross-price elasticities between mainline and mobile service and find that the results are generally suggestive of current complementary relationships. We find residential monthly price elasticity to be no different than zero for a sample of developing countries, but the connection elasticity is statistically significant. Mobile monthly service elasticity is much larger than those for mainline service, suggesting that universal service in developing countries might be promoted more effectively with subsidies for mobile service. Income elasticities for the residential model are modest while the mobile service model income elasticity for developing countries is much higher. Expanding markets, income growth and enhanced education may be the ultimate universal service promoters.     

Pricing flexibility under rate-of-return regulation: Effects on network infrastructure investment

When a commodity market relies upon a regulated network service industry—e.g., telecommunications, electricity, or natural gas transmission—economic efficiency in that commodity market is a crucial consideration for regulatory design. This is because insufficient infrastructure investment relative to network demand results in congestion. The extraction of associated rents has distortionary effects on commodity spot market prices. Greater regulatory flexibility in network pricing can alleviate such issues by cultivating the incentives needed for stakeholders to invest in transmission capacity. To illustrate this effect I derive and numerically solve stylized optimality conditions for access and usage prices for a gas pipeline operator under alternative regulatory models. My results have general implications for regulation in network infrastructure industries, as energy and telecommunications markets are expected to expand considerably over the coming decades.     

The Change in Productive Efficiency in Telecommunications in the United States

The question addressed here is whether the adoption of incentive regulation, which has become an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the USA, has resulted in a change in the technical efficiency of local exchange carriers in the USA. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, a methodology for measuring technical efficiency and its change is introduced. This is a multiple-output/multiple-input distance function approach to measuring technical efficiency. The results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988–2001 period indicate that in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local loops, there was no change in technical efficiency between the 1988–1990 period and the 1991–2001 period, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to promote.