Asymmetric investor behavior between buyside and sellside: Evidence from investor classes in the Sri Lankan stock market

Using unique trading data for investor classes from Sri Lanka, this study finds asymmetric investor behavior between buyside and sellside in large trades. Investors are positive feedback traders on the buyside and contrarians on the sellside. Domestic investors exhibit more feedback and contrarian behavior than foreign investors, suggesting that foreign investors are more informed on the buyside and less informed on the sellside. Individuals are more feedback and contrarian traders than institutions. Foreign institutional investor sales do not precede, coincide with, or lead to significant returns. Trades do not lead to price momentum or reversals, but leave a permanent positive price effect.     

Information percolation,momentum and reversal

We propose a joint theory of time-series momentum and reversal based on a rational-expectations model. We show that a necessary condition for momentum to arise in this framework is that information flows at an increasing rate. We focus on word-of-mouth communication as a mechanism that enforces this condition and generates short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Investors with heterogeneous trading strategies—contrarian and momentum traders—coexist in the marketplace. Although a significant proportion of investors are momentum traders, momentum is not completely eliminated. Word-of-mouth communication spreads rumors and generates price run-ups and reversals. Our theoretical predictions are in line with empirical findings.     

Profitability of time series momentum

We propose a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model consisting of fundamental, momentum, and contrarian traders to explain the significant time series momentum. We show that the performance of momentum strategy is determined by both time horizon and the market dominance of momentum traders. Specifically, when momentum traders are more active in the market, momentum strategies with short (long) time horizons stabilize (destabilize) the market, and meanwhile the market under-reacts (over-reacts) in short-run (long-run). This provides profit opportunity for time series momentum strategies with short horizons and reversal with long horizons. When momentum traders are less active in the market, they always lose. The results provide an insight into the profitability of time series momentum documented in recent empirical studies.     

Liquidity and Autocorrelations in Individual Stock Returns

This paper documents a strong relationship between short‐run reversals and stock illiquidity, even after controlling for trading volume. The largest reversals and the potential contrarian trading strategy profits occur in high turnover, low liquidity stocks, as the price pressures caused by non‐informational demands for immediacy are accommodated. However, the contrarian trading strategy profits are smaller than the likely transactions costs. This lack of profitability and the fact that the overall findings are consistent with rational equilibrium paradigms suggest that the violation of the efficient market hypothesis due to short‐term reversals is not so egregious after all.     

Limit-order submission strategies under asymmetric information

This paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit-order submissions to shocks in a pure limit-order market. In the market we study, informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads, volatility, momentum and depth. By contrast, uninformed traders are relatively insensitive to all these market conditions. The dominance of the informed over limit-order submissions is magnified by contrasts between them and the uninformed in the use of aggressively-priced limit orders.     

Informed short sales and option introductions

This study examines how the introduction of options affects the level of informed short selling. In particular, we test whether option introductions increases or decreases the level of informed short selling. Our tests are motivated by a theoretical debate in the literature. The first stream of literature argues that introducing options into markets may increase speculative trading which can result in less informed trading when informed traders perceive speculative trades as noise. The second stream argues that introducing options into markets improves the informational environment of the market because option prices provide an additional information mechanism for informed traders. We approximate informed short selling by examining (i) non-exempt short sales, (ii) contrarian short-selling activity, and (iii) the return predictability contained in shorting activity. Results show that non-exempt shorting activity increases after options become available. Further, we show that both the level of contrarian short selling and the return predictability contained in short selling increase after options are listed. Our results suggest that informed short selling increases after options are introduced.     

投资者理性预期、流动性约束与股价崩盘传染研究

“传染性”是股价崩盘三大基本特征之一,会加剧股价崩盘负面影响,甚至引发系统性金融风险,因此,本文重点关注股价崩盘传染机制研究。首先,本文基于两阶段理性预期均衡模型,提出股价崩盘传染两大假设,即投资者理性预期与流动性约束导致传染;其次,基于2000-2016年全球28个国家或地区资本市场数据,实证检验股价崩盘传染机制和传染渠道。研究显示:(1)投资者理性预期、流动性约束会导致股价崩盘发生传染;(2)股价崩盘事件会在资本市场关联国家或地区传染;(3)提高资本市场信息透明度、加强金融管制有助于降低受关联国家或地区股价崩盘传染。     

Informed speculation and hedging in a noncompetitive securities market

We examine an adverse selection model of trading in which bothinformed and uninformed traders are rational, maximizing agents.Replacing the price inelastic 'noise' or 'liquidity' traderswith strategic, utility-maximizing hedgers permits an explicitanalysis of the uninformed traders' welfare, and demonstratesthat several comparative statics obtained from the standardparadigm of Kyle (1984, 1985) are altered significantly uponendogenizing the trading motives of these agents. In contrastto extant models, market liquidity and price efficiency areboth nonmonotonic in the number of uninformed hedgers in themarket. Also, the welfare of hedgers monotonically decreaseswith the number of informed traders, despite greater competitionbetween the informed.     

News Trading and Speed

We compare the optimal trading strategy of an informed speculator when he can trade ahead of incoming news (is “fast”), versus when he cannot (is “slow”). We find that speed matters: the fast speculator's trades account for a larger fraction of trading volume, and are more correlated with short‐run price changes. Nevertheless, he realizes a large fraction of his profits from trading on long‐term price changes. The fast speculator's behavior matches evidence about high‐frequency traders. We predict that stocks with more informative news are more liquid even though they attract more activity from informed high‐frequency traders.     

Rational expectations equilibrium with uncertain proportion of informed traders

This paper introduces uncertainty regarding the proportion of informed traders in a rational expectation equilibrium model with asymmetric information. The proportion uncertainty dramatically changes the properties of the resulting equilibrium. First, it may generate multiple nonlinear rational expectations equilibria, which can help explain the excessive volatility of stock prices. Second, the expected price informativeness is a non-monotonic function of the proportion of informed traders, which suggests that the traders will have more incentive to become informed as the proportion of informed traders gets larger.     

An anatomy of trading strategies

In this article we use a single unifying framework to analyzethe sources of profits to a wide spectrum of return-based tradingstrategies implemented in the literature. We show that lessthan 50% of the 120 strategies implemented in the article yieldstatistically significant profits and, unconditionally, momentumand contrarian strategies are equally likely to be successful.However, when we condition on the return horizon (short, medium,or long) of the strategy, or the time period during which itis implemented, two patterns emerge. A momentum strategy isusually profitable at the medium (3- to 12-months) horizon,while a contrarian strategy nets statistically significant profitsat long horizons, but only during the 1926-1947 subperiod. Moreimportantly, our results show that the cross-sectional variationin the mean returns of individual securities included in thesestrategies play an important role in their profitability. Thecross-sectional variation can potentially account for the profitabilityof momentum strategies and it is also responsible for attenuatingthe profits from price reversals to long-horizon contrarianstrategies.     

Informed trading and liquidity in the Shanghai Stock Exchange

Dufour and Engle (J. Finance (2000) 2467) find evidence of increased presence of informed traders when the NYSE markets are most active. No such evidence, however, can be found by Manganelli (J. Financial Markets (2005) 377) for the infrequently traded stocks. This article investigates the issue of informed trading and its relation to liquidity in Shanghai Stock Exchange. Consistent with the hypothesis that information-based trade exists for all stocks, our findings suggest an increased presence of informed trading in both liquid and illiquid stocks when markets are active. Moreover, for the actively traded stocks, our results support the price formation model of Foster and Viswanathan (Rev. Financial Studies (1990) 593) that activities of informed traders deter uninformed investors from trading, thereby reducing market liquidity.     

The impact of competition and information on intraday trading

In a dynamic model of financial market trading multiple heterogeneously informed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade immediately, worse informed delay – even though they expect the market to move against them. This behavior generates intraday patterns with decreasing spreads, decreasing probability of informed trading (PIN), and increasing volume. We predict that policies that foster market entry improve the welfare of uninformed traders and lead to increased market participation by incumbent traders. Technological advances that lead to better signal processing also encourage market participation and increase volume but at the expense of uninformed traders’ welfare.     

The 52-Week High and Momentum Investing

When coupled with a stock's current price, a readily available piece of information—the 52‐week high price–explains a large portion of the profits from momentum investing. Nearness to the 52‐week high dominates and improves upon the forecasting power of past returns (both individual and industry returns) for future returns. Future returns forecast using the 52‐week high do not reverse in the long run. These results indicate that short‐term momentum and long‐term reversals are largely separate phenomena, which presents a challenge to current theory that models these aspects of security returns as integrated components of the market's response to news.     

The Inter-Temporal Behavior of Informed and Uninformed Traders

The purpose of this study is to investigate the inter-temporal trading behavior of informed and uninformed investors. We estimate a variation of the market microstructure model developed in Easley, Keifer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) and document the day-of-the-week pattern in informed and uninformed trading, as well as the probability of an information event and the probability of bad news. Using bootstrapped distributions, we show that the probability of trading against informed investors follows a U-shape pattern from Monday to Friday. Cross-sectional regression results suggest that inter-temporal patterns between informed and uninformed traders can generate observed patterns in liquidity provision costs.     

Information, speed vs. cost trade-offs, and order routing decisions in U.S. equity markets

Prior research indicates that both execution speed and cost are important to traders, but that these two dimensions of execution quality are negatively related across U.S. equity markets. In our paper, we examine how U.S. equity traders, who are (un)informed about future price changes, trade-off between speed and cost in their order-routing decisions. We find that informed traders are more likely to choose trading systems that allow them to trade-off lower cost for faster speed; whereas, uninformed traders are more likely to choose trading systems that allow them to sacrifice speed for lower costs. Our results indicate that traders have varying preferences for the different dimensions of execution quality based on their information levels. These differences subsequently influence order-routing decisions.     

Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices?

This paper documents strong evidence for behavioral biases among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders and investigates the effect these biases have on prices. Our traders appear highly loss‐averse, regularly assuming above‐average afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. This behavior has important short‐term consequences for afternoon prices, as losing traders actively purchase contracts at higher prices and sell contracts at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. However, the market appears to distinguish these risk‐seeking trades from informed trading. Prices set by loss‐averse traders are reversed significantly more quickly than those set by unbiased traders.     

The Paradox of Financial Fire Sales: The Role of Arbitrage Capital in Determining Liquidity

How can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well‐capitalized but nonspecialist investors? Our explanation combines rational expectations equilibrium and “lemons” models. When specialist (informed) market participants are liquidity‐constrained, prices become less informative. This creates an adverse selection problem, decreasing the supply of high‐quality assets, and lowering valuations by nonspecialist (uninformed) investors, who become unwilling to supply capital to support the price. In normal times, arbitrage capital can “multiply” itself by making uninformed capital function as informed capital, but in a crisis, this stabilizing mechanism fails.     

The Moving Average Ratio and Momentum

I show the ratio of the short‐term moving average to the long‐term moving average (moving average ratio, MAR) has significant predictive power for future returns. The MAR combined with nearness to the 52‐week high explains most of the intermediate‐term momentum profits. This suggests that an anchoring bias, in which investors use moving averages or the 52‐week high as reference points for estimating fundamental values, is the primary source of momentum effects. Momentum caused by the anchoring bias do not disappear in the long‐run even when there are return reversals, confirming that intermediate‐term momentum and long‐term reversals are separate phenomena.     

Is momentum a self-fulfilling prophecy?

The author shows in a simple framework that momentum trading can exist in equilibrium and that momentum trading is profitable. A property of the model is that the relation between risk, reward, and the intensity of momentum trading provides a natural limit to the amount of momentum trading that will exist in equilibrium. Properties of the model fit the empirics well. First, the model captures in a parsimonious manner both short-term overreaction and long-term reversals. Second, it predicts that momentum and long-term reversals should be observed in any market where there is noise. Thus, the model gives theoretical support to the empirical evidence that these anomalies are not artifacts of data snooping and to the extant empirical evidence that these anomalies are pervasive. Momentum traders observe noise shocks and trade on it as information. This trading incorporates a predictive role to the noise. That is, if agents believe a past price change to be informative of future price changes and act on this belief, it will be true and trading on this belief will be profitable. Thus, momentum trading is a self-fulfilling action.