存款保险制度的国际比较及启示

存款保险制度是指为了维护金融体系的稳定发展、保护存款人利益，对商业银行及其他存款机构（以下简称银行）所吸纳的存款提供保险所需要的一系列保障和管理措施等的制度安排。建立存款保险制度已经成为当前世界各国构建现代金融制度的必要选择，各国借鉴罔际经验．结合本国实际建立了多种类型的存款保险制度，在各自的制度设计中对存款保险的组织运行机制、存款保险的保护程度、保险基金及其融资方式等各方面各有不同．其效果也不尽相同。     

FDIC发布《存款保险改革的可选方案》

<正>报告对存款保险制度改革的三种可选方案进行了评估，有针对性的保障在减轻许多不良后果的同时，也获得了因扩大保障范围对金融稳定产生的好处当地时间2023年5月1日，在美国硅谷银行、签名银行等银行出险后，美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）发布《存款保险改革的可选方案》，对美国存款保险制度的改革与完善进行了分析。     

对存款保险的功能、国际经验与制度设计的思考

存款保险制度作为公共金融稳定网的重要环节,在保护小额存款人利益、防止银行挤提与恐慌等方面具有重要作用.存款保险制度的实施会产生道德风险与逆向选择等问题,但可以通过对存款保险制度的合理设计来减少或避免.分析世界各国实施存款保险制度的基本情况,总结国际上存款保险制度成功实施的经验,在此基础上,结合国情提出设计中国存款保险制度的一些看法.     

存款保险研究新进展:定价和制度效应

存款保险制度的主要作用是应对挤兑风险,加强公众对银行体系的信心。通过对现有关于存款保险定价和存款保险制度效应的文献进行梳理发现：基于期权定价法的存款保险定价方法虽较少在实践层面应用,但促进了存款保险制度的完善;存款保险制度受金融环境、制度设计及银行自身等影响而产生不同的效应,良性的制度运转与金融体系的完善相辅相成。未来的研究将着重考虑中小银行费率的厘定及存款保险制度与金融安全网之间的协同作用。     

东亚存款保险制度发展分析

存款保险制度作为一国金融安全网的重要组成部分,在保持公众信心、防止银行挤兑及维护金融稳定方面发挥着重要的作用。目前东亚地区大多数国家都建立了存款保险制度。本文从存款保险制度的一般原理出发,以地区整体为视角,对东亚各经济体的存款保险制度的确立及其特征做一概括性的分析。此外,本文也探讨了东亚各国存款保险机构之间信息交流与合作以及各国保险存款体制协调的可能性。     

金融双语

存款保险制度 存款保险制度主要是通过建立存款保险机构,运用风险补偿机制来保护存款人免受因金融机构破产而导致的财物损失,从而提高公众对银行部门的信任,有助于金融系统的稳定.同时,通过防止流动性恐慌,存款保险还可以使实体经济避开银行体系不稳定造成的部分恶劣影响.存款保险制度有隐性的和显性的两种.在隐性存款保险制度中,由政府提供存款保护,但这种保护的方式和力度根据政府的考虑相机抉择;显性存款保险制度则可以保证偿还参加保险的存款及产生的利息.     

韩国存款保险公司救助和处置机制及启示

<正>近年来,韩国多次发生储蓄银行倒闭风波。韩国存款保险公司综合运用多种处置方式,成功缓释了储蓄银行风险,实现了对倒闭机构及时有序合理的处置,维护了金融稳定。借鉴韩国存款保险制度成功经验,对我国研究建立存款保险制度具有一定的参考价值。一、韩国存款保险制度概况韩国曾经实行隐性存款保险制度,1983年建立第一个存款保险基金以来,曾先后建立覆盖银行、证券和保险等6个行业的强制性存款保险基金~①。1995年12月,韩国出台了     

构建中国存款保险体系的若干思考

银行业是一个国家国民经济体系的重要组成部分,在一个国家的经济生活中发挥着重要的作用。但由于其资产负债业务的特点,银行业出现流动性问题甚至发生倒闭,都是不可避免的事情。为此,许多国家都建立了存款保险制度,以此来增强公众对银行业的信心,维护金融稳定。各国的实践证明:存款保险制度在保护存款人利益,有效处置有问题金融机构,维护金融经济乃至社会的稳定方面发挥了巨大作用,已成为金融安全网的重要组成部分。设立存款保险制度最大的障碍和阻力来自道德风险。道德风险渗透在存款保险制度的许多技术性环节甚至制度本身,如果制度设计不科学、不合理,会加重道德风险的遗患,甚至抵消存款保险制度的作用。这是任何一个正在准备或已经建立了存款保险制度的国家必须正视的问题。在我国,近几年,建立存款保险制度的呼声越来越高:中小商业银行的发展需要公众对其建立信心;国有独资商业银行要真正走向市场,必须建立社会化的存款保险体系;中央银行在对有问题银行实施市场退出中也要有法可依。中国人民银行在1997年年底便开始着手对存款保险的研究,但要真正建立独立的存款保险体系,还有许多问题要解决,还有许多工作要做。     

存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于风险共担视角的再检验

完善存款保险制度是深化金融供给侧结构性改革的制度保障，是实施金融安全战略的关键举措。从风险共担的视角出发研究存款保险制度防范银行风险的作用机制，并利用我国2012年至2021年商业银行面板数据，设计并应用双重差分法检验了存款保险制度防范银行风险的有效性。研究发现：首先，由“风险共担效应”产生的正面效应会抑制由“道德风险效应”产生的负面效应，存款保险制度的实施会降低银行风险；其次，双重差分法结果说明存款保险制度的实施能够有效降低资本相对丰裕银行的风险承担水平；再次，机制检验说明，我国存款保险制度的建立推动银行从优化股份结构、提高独立董事占比、扩大监事会规模和增强管理层激励等四个维度强化银行内部治理机制和架构，促使“风险共担效应”发挥作用抵消了存款保险制度产生的道德风险等负面效应，使得银行风险显著降低。     

对我国建立存款保险制度问题的探究

存款保险制度是市场经济条件下金融领域的一项重要的基础性制度安排。在西方,许多市场经济国家,为保障存款人的利益和银行业金融机构的经营安全,都普遍建立了存款保险制度,藉此来增强社会公众对银行业的信心,切实维护金融稳定。2009年6月18日,巴塞尔银行监管委员会和国际存款保险协会联合颁布了《有效存款保险制度核心原则》,在总结各国存款保险制度应对金融危机经验的基础上,提出了建立有效存款保险制度的准则,为各国加强存款保险制度提供相应的指导。     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence

Do banks’ responses to changes in deposit insurance vary across countries even if the countries have comparable institutions? If so, by how much? Using data on the financial performance of large banks in 15 financially and economically developed countries, we find that where deposit insurance has an effect, it is large and varies depending on the level of economic freedom, rule of law and corruption in the bank’s home country. As in prior papers, we show that during stable economic periods, increases in deposit insurance are associated with higher bank risk, both problem loans and leverage. In most, but not all, cases stronger institutions temper these effects. The institutions’ effects are substantial. For example, average changes in the rule of law double the impact of a change in deposit insurance on bank leverage. We contribute to the substantial literature in this area by showing that the institutional effects are significant even across a set of countries with comparable institutions; by conducting a careful calibration of the economic significance of the effects; by providing evidence that during stable periods changes in deposit insurance only affect bank risk and not other measures of performance; and finally by showing that the effects of both deposit insurance and institutions vary across stable and crisis economic periods. The stable period results are consistent with the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, while the crisis period results are consistent with endogeneity concerns that poor bank performance could drive changes in regulations.     

经济转轨国家存款保险制度的建立与实施

存款保险制度对转轨国家可以起到防止银行“挤兑传染”,达到金融体系稳定的目的;有利于建立平等竞争的市场环境;有利于构建有效的市场退出机制;有利于促进金融业的对外开放等。计划经济体制下隐性存款保险制度存在着影响公平、影响效率、滋生道德风险等问题。转轨国家存款保险制度的特点是:成立的时间较短;专门机构经营;强制性保险和设立保险额度等。     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Prudential,Pragmatic, and Prescient,Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes

This article examines current initiatives in respect of bank financial distress in response to the 2008‐2009 financial crisis, suggesting that there is considerably more work to be undertaken before bank regulatory oversight, bank corporate governance, and bank resolution regimes have the appropriate preventive safeguards, governance, and timely, efficient and fair responses to bank financial distress. The corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs from the governance of corporations because of prudential regulation, banks' significance to the financial system, the different nature of stakeholders with investments at risk, and the existence of deposit insurance. The article offers a number of policy options in respect of how banks and other financial institutions could enhance their prudential, prescient, and pragmatic oversight and governance in a way that protects creditors, deposit holders, and other stakeholders, as well as the public interest in a healthy and sustainable financial sector. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Does Information Disclosure Affect Bank Systemic Risk in the Presence of a Deposit Insurance System?

ABSTRACT

This article establishes a dynamic game with incomplete information to theoretically analyze the influence mechanism of information disclosure on systemic risk in the presence of a deposit insurance system. To verify the mechanism, we use panel data on 247 global banks in 41 countries during the period 2006 to 2015 in an empirical analysis. Our article finds that a high degree of information disclosure can reduce deposit insurance premiums and weaken the negative incentive from a bailout by regulatory authorities. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on financial stability is not apparent, but the synergistic effect of deposit insurance and information disclosure reduces bank systemic risk. Furthermore, different deposit insurance designs affect bank behavior, so it is crucial for bank supervisors to create proper deposit insurance systems, which are helpful in strengthening market discipline and preventing moral hazard thus contributing to a stable financial environment. Therefore, under the deposit insurance system, regulatory authorities should strive to improve the standard of information disclosure to ensure systemic stability.     

存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后,全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐,2015年5月,我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据, 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担,表现为道德风险效应。此外,本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论,提出相关政策建议。。     

Explicit deposit insurance design: International effects on bank lending during the global financial crisis✰

Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.     

BANK FAILURE AND CONTAGION EFFECTS: EVIDENCE FROM HONG KONG

In this paper the influence of three Hong Kong bank failures on stock prices of the colony's banking industry is examined. As deposit insurance is nonexistent in Hong Kong, the world's fourth-largest financial center, an interesting environment is provided for testing contagion effects of bank failure on other healthy financial institutions. By examining contagion effects in an environment void of explicit deposit insurance, this study should provide interesting insights into the resiliency of modern-day financial markets. In turn, insights should also be provided into debates concerning the role and reform of deposit insurance and the rationale for regulation of the financial services industry in general. The results indicate that unexpected bank failure causes significant negative stock price reactions within the banking industry; yet, some banks are less affected than others.     

A New Development Database. Deposit Insurance around the World

In the past two decades, in a series of banking crises aroundthe world, banks have become systematically insolvent. Thesecrises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike.To make such financial system breakdowns less likely and tolimit their costs if they occur, policymakers feel the needfor financial safety nets. These include such policies as implicitor explicit deposit insurance, a lender of last resort functionof the central bank, bank insolvency resolution procedures,and bank regulation and supervision. Of these policies, explicitdeposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years.Since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit depositinsurance schemes almost tripled, with most OECD countries andan increasing number of developing economies adopting some formof explicit depositor protection. In 1994 deposit insurancebecame the standard for the newly created single banking marketof the European Union. Establishing an explicit deposit insurancescheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advicegiven to developing economies.