Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Advertising,industry innovation,and entry deterrence

With the advent of the Internet and social media platforms, advertising has become cheaper and more effective in reaching consumers. This paper studies the effect of better informative advertising on innovation and industry growth. This paper finds that improvements in informative advertising can lead to costly entry deterrence. Because advertising and innovation are complementary, better advertising raises the threats of entry. When innovation spillover is present in an industry, an incumbent firm has incentives to strategically lower its own innovation to deter entry. As a result, better advertising in innovation-intensive industries can have negative consequences on industry growth and consumer welfare. This paper also investigate the role of innovation spillover on entry deterrence.     

Content and advertising in the media: Pay-tv versus free-to-air

We compare the advertising intensity and content of programming in a market with competing media platforms. With pay-tv, media platforms have two sources of revenues, advertising revenues and revenues from viewers. With free-to-air, media platforms receive all revenues from advertising. We show that if viewers strongly dislike advertising, the advertising intensity is greater under free-to-air television. We also show that free-to-air television tends to provide less differentiated content whereas pay-tv stations always maximally differentiate their content. In addition, we compare the welfare properties of the two different schemes.     

Why Do Established Firms Enter Some Industries and Exit Others? Empirical Evidence on Italian Business Groups

In this paper the determinants of entry and exitdecisions are analysed empirically on a sample of wellestablished business groups operating in Italianmanufacturing. The focus is on the role of sunk costsas entry barriers. Two competing hypotheses aretested. On the one hand, setup costs, R & D andadvertising outlays act as barriers to entry for bothnew and already established firms because of theirindustry-specific commitment value. On the other hand,they may induce established firms, which operate insimilar industries, to enter. This is the case if R & Dand advertising are firm-specific investments whichgenerate externalities to be efficiently exploited inadjacent industries. Overall results suggest that thesecond hypothesis gives a better picture of thebehaviour of our sample of firms.     

Multi-sided platforms in B2B contexts: The role of affiliation costs and interdependencies in adoption decisions

Multi-sided platforms, enabling interactions between different user sides, hold an important place in the contemporary economy. Current literature, focusing on established and successful platforms, has neglected to study B2B multi-sided platform adoption mechanisms. In this article, we analyze these mechanisms by investigating the case of dematerialization platforms for B2B transactions between the multiple actors involved in public works contracts. Various qualitative materials, including 28 semi-structured interviews, were gathered over a thirty-month period. Adopting a business user perspective, this study contributes to the literature on multi-sided platforms in various ways. We show that platform adoption, in project-based B2B contexts, is mainly constrained by a high level of affiliation costs and the existence of tight-interdependencies between users' activities at project level. Thus, a consecutive adoption path would result in negative cross-group network externalities and undermine the platform's attractiveness. Conversely, a concurrent adoption path would activate positive network externalities and encourage platform adoption decisions.     

Dynamic Informative Advertising of New Experience Goods

This paper analyzes the optimal advertising and price policies of a monopolist who sells a new experience good over time to a population of heterogeneous forward‐looking buyers. We consider advertising that can complement or substitute for learning‐by‐purchasing, and we show that the advertising intensity always peaks during the early stages when the price extracts surplus from the buyers who are yet to learn their valuation for the good. We also show that even though informative advertising may temporarily raise prices and slow down the learning process, an advertising ban can reduce welfare.     

Foreign Entry and Firm Advertising Intensity: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of advertising intensity at the firm level by focusing on the role of foreign entry. In a monopolistically competitive market with heterogeneous firms, we show that foreign entry affects the expected advertising intensity of domestic firms through its impact on the cost of resources, brand image, and productivity spillovers and its impact on firms’ exit behaviour. Then, using comprehensive firm-level data from China’s manufacturing sector between 2005 and 2007, we test this hypothesis and find that foreign entry significantly affects advertising intensity.     

Economies of scale,strategic advertising and fully credible entry deterrence

Recent work on entry deterrence has emphasized the distinction between a monopolist’s reversible and irreversible preentry strategic moves (e.g., limit pricing) will not credible deter a rational potential entrant. Dixit (1980) and other have demonstrated, however, that irreversible preentry capacity investments can result in credible deterrence. In this paper, we examine preentry advertising investments which irreversibly alter postentry demand conditions. Using an infinite horizon model, we show that preentry investments in advertising may result in credible deterrence even for the extreme case where an entrant expects a collusive postentry price, and the monopolist ceases all advertising at the moment of entry.     

Simulating media platform mergers

The empirical analysis of media platforms economics has often neglected the multi-homing behaviour of advertisers. Assuming away the cross-substitutability and/or complementarity between the advertising slots of different platforms could damage the quality and the robustness of counterfactual analysis. To evaluate the consequence of such an abstraction, we compare the simulation results of hypothetical platform mergers when the demand on the advertising side is derived from a Translog cost model which allows for multi-homing, and when it is approximated by using a simple log-linear inverse demand model that ignores the differentiation among media platforms’ advertising slots. Ignoring the existence of substitutes or complements on the advertising side would result in overpredicting the losses of the viewers’ surplus and in underpredicting the gains in platforms’ revenues.     

Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry

This paper develops a model of pricing to deter entry by a sole supplier of a network good. We show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a preemptive function similar to that of an investment in capacity if the entrant's good is incompatible with the incumbent's good and there are network externalities in demand. Consequently, the threat of entry can lead the incumbent to set low prices. We identify some factors that should be considered in thinking about the welfare effects of entry deterrence in this and similar models.     

The Welfare Effect of Advertising Restrictions in the U.S. Cigarette Industry

The welfare effect of advertisingrestrictions in the U.S. cigarette industry dependsupon the impact of advertising on consumer and producer surplus, the transfer to consumers for being exposed to utility-reducing advertising, and smoking externalities. We estimate a demand equation and a supply relation simultaneously and use the parameter estimates to generate predictions of the impact of advertising restrictions on social welfare. Our results show that advertising restrictions benefit producers by limiting competition and generating higher industry profits, and such restrictions lower social welfare if the external cost of cigarette smoking is sufficiently low.     

Pricing response to entry and agglomeration effects

In contrast to the traditional approach that typically views entry solely as a threat, we argue that our understanding of this important phenomenon will remain incomplete until we consider the possibility that entry may also provide opportunity for incumbent firms. Drawing from agglomeration theory, which describes the benefit from colocating with competitors, we explicitly examine the combined impact of the competitive and agglomeration effects of entry using a unique dataset of Texas hotels. We find that incumbent establishments price higher when facing entrants whose agglomeration benefits are more likely to outweigh their competitive effects. This association is stronger for incumbents that have greater experience with entry. Our results bring a new perspective to the entry response literature helping clarify inconsistent empirical results. Further, we apply agglomeration theory to a new question, incumbent behavior, and demonstrate that experience appears to play an important role in recognizing situations that generate agglomeration externalities. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints

Motivated by a recent merger proposal in the French outdoor advertising market, we develop a model in which firms are initially endowed with some advertising capacities and compete on two fronts. First, firms compete to acquire additional advertising capacities on an upstream market; a first stage modeled as a second-price auction with externalities. Second, those firms, privately informed on their own costs, use their capacities on the downstream market to supply advertisers whose demand is random; a second stage modeled by means of mechanism design techniques. We study the linkages between the equilibrium outcomes on both markets. When a firm is endowed with more initial capacity, through the acquisition of a competitor for instance, whether it becomes more or less eager to acquire extra capacity on the upstream market depends a priori on fine details of the downstream market. Under reasonable choices of functional forms, we demonstrate that a downstream merger does not create any bias in the upstream market towards the already dominant firm.     

Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com

Research Summary : Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against them. Using data from Amazon.com to study Amazon's entry pattern into third‐party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow, suggesting that complementors' platform‐specific investments influence platform owners' entry decisions. While Amazon's entry discourages affected third‐party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the platform, it increases product demand and reduces shipping costs for consumers. We consider the implications of these findings for complementors in platform‐based markets. Managerial Summary : Platform owners can exert considerable influence over their complementors' welfare. Many complementors with successful products are pushed out of markets because platform owners enter their product spaces and compete directly with them. To mitigate such risks, complementors could build their businesses by aggregating nonblockbuster products or focusing on products requiring significant platform‐specific investments to grow. They should also develop capabilities in new product discovery so that they could continually bring innovative products to their platforms.     

An analysis of B2B ingredient co-branding relationships

The proliferation of co-branding in consumer markets has been given considerable attention in the literature, yet attention to the practice in business-to-business markets has been limited, despite the growing attention to the role of relationships in the B2B arena. In an examination of co-branding in the industrial sector, this paper discusses the use of ingredient co-branding and uses an econometric modeling approach to offer a rationale for why it occurs. The analysis provides insight into why downstream manufacturers participate in a relationship that strengthens the supplier's position in the market. We find that under the threat to the supplier of entry from a competitor whose costs are unobservable, co-branding relationships will be entered into resulting in a reduced probability of entry. This co-branding arrangement benefits both the incumbent supplier and the downstream manufacturer. The incumbent supplier benefits from the reduced probability of competitor entry, and the downstream manufacturer is rewarded with a lower price. Further, we find that the cost of the co-branded product is lower, due to a mitigation of double marginalization in a vertically-integrated solution. We examine co-branding relationships with and without advertising support and find that co-branding relationships with advertising support tend to be superior.     

Industry Platforms and Ecosystem Innovation

This paper brings together the recent literature on industry platforms and shows how it relates to managing innovation within and outside the firm as well as to dealing with technological and market disruptions and change over time. First, we identify distinct types of platforms. Our analysis of a wide range of industry examples suggests that there are two predominant types of platforms: internal or company‐specific platforms, and external or industry‐wide platforms. We define internal (company or product) platforms as a set of assets organized in a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop and produce a stream of derivative products. We define external (industry) platforms as products, services, or technologies that act as a foundation upon which external innovators, organized as an innovative business ecosystem, can develop their own complementary products, technologies, or services. Second, we summarize from the literature general propositions on the design, economics, and strategic management of platforms. Third, we review the case of Intel and other examples to illustrate the range of technological, strategic, and business challenges that platform leaders and their competitors face as markets and technologies evolve. Finally, we identify practices associated with effective platform leadership and avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of this important phenomenon and what firms can do to manage platform‐related competition and innovation.     

Disrupting the Disruptors or Enhancing Them? How Blockchain Reshapes Two-Sided Platforms

The importance of platform-based businesses in the modern economy is growing continuously and becoming increasingly relevant. Specifically, the deployment of digital technologies has enhanced the applicability of two-sided business models, enabling companies to act not just as builders and owners of assets, but also as orchestrators of external resources. Management research has, therefore, focused increasingly on the unique aspects of this model. At the center of a two-sided platform there is a platform provider that enables a transaction between the sides, reducing the relative transaction costs. However, in recent years, a new technology emerged that challenges some of the underlying assumptions of this model: the blockchain. Blockchain enables the creation of a peer-to-peer network that is able to authenticate transactions, upon which applications and services may be built. It allows users to conduct transactions without the need for a central platform. We explore how blockchain technology reshapes two-sided platforms, focusing in particular on the role of the platform provider. The research is based upon multiple case studies, using an inductive approach to explore this emerging phenomenon. Our findings show there is a significant shift in the role of the central player that links the two sides of a transaction using blockchain. We frame this as a shift from a “platform provider” to a “service provider,” leveraging the blockchain as a Platform-as-a-Service. Our work examines the peculiarities of this model, unveiling new dynamics in these businesses. Specifically, we show that different variables must be considered to classify two-sided platforms using blockchain. Furthermore, the essential characteristics of two-sided platforms must also be enlarged. For example, traditional platform theories emphasize the importance of cross-side network externalities in creating value. In blockchain-enabled platforms however, we show the use of “tokens” play a key role in creating different types of externalities between the two sides.     

Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry

We develop a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. We show that downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two‐tier structure while upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We analyze how two‐part tariffs and resale price maintenance shape the endogenous market structure and study their welfare effects. In contrast to previous literature, we find that welfare under linear prices can be larger than under twopart tariffs although the latter avoids double marginalization. This is because linear prices induce more downstream market entry.     

网络外部性下的电子商务平台竞争与规制——基于双边市场理论的研究

双边市场的相关问题研究是近年来产业组织领域的前沿与热点之一,本文在已有的经典文献基础上,系统思考了网络外部性在双边市场中的作用和影响,并对电子商务平台这一典型的双边市场平台企业进行分析,研究了电子商务平台的定价与竞争机制。通过对转移成本、兼容性和模块化的研究,本文认为互联互通和模块化经营可以降低网络外部性因素引起的市场进入壁垒,减少厂商运用市场势力排斥竞争行为的可能性,在知识经济条件下,使电子商务产业形成以技术创新为主导的竞争性垄断的市场结构。