Measurement of knowledge structures acquired through instruction,experience, and decision aid use

This study investigates a method for measuring knowledge structure development in novice accountants by extending Bonner and Walker [Bonner, S. and P. Walker. 1994. The effects of instruction and experience on the acquisition of auditing knowledge. The Accounting Review 69: 157–178.], which examined the effects of instruction and experience on the acquisition of declarative and procedural knowledge. We employ Pathfinder network scaling, a recently developed and validated measure of knowledge structure acquisition, to determine whether the combinations of instruction and experience previously found to be effective in promoting declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition result in the development of expert-like knowledge structures. Further, we examine the effectiveness of a simple decision aid in promoting the acquisition of expert-like knowledge structures through experience with the decision aid. Results from two laboratory experiments indicate that Pathfinder-based measures of knowledge structure can effectively capture the effects of training and decision aid use on the development of expertise. The findings suggest that assessments of knowledge structures are valuable tools for measuring the effectiveness of training programs, and such assessments can be applied in decision domains where traditional measures of knowledge acquisition are insufficient or infeasible. Finally, the results indicate that properly designed decision aids can impart expert-like knowledge structures to novice decision makers, and these knowledge structures are the key to expertise.     

Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk

This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the  difference  between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.     

Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.     

The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Auditor Expertise and Human Capital Development

Two critical aspects of the model of auditor expertise development in Tan and Libby [1997] are that audit firms do not value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors but do value it in experienced auditors. We update the former and extend the latter. Our paper predicts and finds that audit firms now do value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors, especially when their supervisors have higher tacit knowledge. Our proxies of value include higher promotability assessments, annual evaluations, and cash bonuses. Our paper also extends Tan and Libby [1997] by positing that enhanced development of expertise and audit firm human capital are two reasons audit firms value tacit knowledge in experienced auditors. As predicted, higher tacit knowledge in experienced auditors is positively associated with higher tacit knowledge acquisition by their inexperienced subordinates and with stronger firm commitment of inexperienced subordinates having higher tacit knowledge.     

Bayesian Fraud Risk Formula for Financial Statement Audits

In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.     

CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud

We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.     

Financial fraud,director reputation,and shareholder wealth

We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm also exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.     

Internal audit reporting lines,fraud risk decomposition,and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.     

The effects of system design alternatives on the acquisition of tax knowledge from a computerized tax decision aid

Accounting firms are intensifying their reliance on experiential learning, and experience increasingly involves the use of computerized decision aids [Messier, W. (1995) Research in and development of audit decision aids. In R. H. Ashton & A. H. Ashton, Judgment and decision making in accounting and auditing (pp. 207–230). New York: Cambridge University Press]. Accountants are expected to learn from automated decision aid use, because the aids are not always available when dealing with the aid's topical matter, and the knowledge inherent in the aid is needed for competency on broader issues. To facilitate knowledge acquisition and explain the logic of the underlying processes, computerized decision aids provide the rationale for their calculations in the form of online explanations. We study how the location of explanations in a computerized decision aid affects learning from its use. Specifically, this research extends the existing literature by using a framework for the study of learning from decision aid use and by using cognitive load theory to explain the failure of certain decision aid design alternatives to promote learning. We define learning as the acquisition of problem-type schemata, and an experiment is performed in which cognitive load is manipulated by the placement of explanations in a computerized tax decision aid to determine its effect on schema acquisition. Schemata are general knowledge structures used for basic comprehension, and cognitive load refers to the burden placed on working memory when acquiring schemata. We find that increased cognitive load produced by the location of explanations in a decision aid leads to reduced schema acquisition. Our results indicate that when explanations in a computerized decision aid are integrated into its problem solving steps, cognitive load is reduced and users acquire more knowledge from aid use. This appears to be an important design consideration for accounting firms buying or building computerized decision aids.     

Is Director Industry Experience Valuable?

We investigate whether investor reactions to the announcement of a new outside director appointment significantly depend upon the director's experience in the appointing firm's industry. Our sample includes 688 outside director appointments to boards of S&P 500 companies from 2005 to 2010. We find significantly higher announcement returns upon appointments of experienced versus inexperienced directors. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use the deaths of 200 directors holding 280 outside directorships as an identification strategy and find significantly more negative announcement returns associated with the deaths of experienced versus inexperienced directors. However, while our results are robust to accounting for time‐fixed unobservable director and firm characteristics, we still cannot completely rule out endogenous firm‐director matching driving our results.     

Sustainability Northwest: An Integrative Case of a Not‐for‐Profit Organization

Sustainability Northwest (SNW) is a fictional not‐for‐profit organization (NPO) that seeks to develop thought leaders for a sustainable future. This instructional case allows professors to assign students with up to six different roles, including SNW's chair of the board, executive director, volunteer treasurer, and the external auditor. Unique learning objectives include (i) the application of the CPA Canada Handbook, Accounting—Part III to prepare an NPO's financial statements using fund accounting, (ii) the development of recommendations to improve an NPO's board of directors, (iii) the analysis of system flow documents to identify control weaknesses, and (iv) the preparation of an audit planning memo. Instructors can use this case in several milieus. First, professors can foster a student's ability to integrate technical knowledge by (i) assigning students all six roles in a capstone course to promote integration within an individual course or (ii) assigning multiple roles across multiple courses to promote integration across a program of studies. Second, instructors can focus on a particular technical skill by assigning specific roles. This case is ideal for senior‐level undergraduate students or graduate students.     

The effects of experience and explicit fraud risk assessment in detecting fraud with analytical procedures

This paper reports the results of an experiment that examined the effects of audit experience and explicit fraud risk assessment instructions on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in detecting financial statement fraud. The results of this study suggest that audit managers are more effective than audit seniors in assessing the risk of fraud with analytical procedures. Additionally, explicit fraud risk assessment instructions resulted in more effective assessments of the presence of fraud. These results have implications for the assignment of auditors to tasks and the structuring of these tasks.     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

The effect of investor sophistication on the influence of nonfinancial performance indicators on investors’ judgments

This paper presents an experiment that examines how enhanced disclosure of nonfinancial performance indicators affects the stock‐price estimates of nonprofessional and professional investors. Participants were provided with a case study containing excerpts from a hypothetical company’s annual report. The experiment was a 2 (nonprofessional and professional) × 3 (positive nonfinancial performance indicators, negative nonfinancial performance indicators, and financial information only) between‐subjects design. Consistent with conservatism, the nonprofessional investors underreacted in their stock‐price estimates to the positive nonfinancial disclosures, compared with professional investors with task‐specific knowledge. The results from this study suggest that the value of enhanced disclosure of this type may not flow equally to all users of financial reports, if conservatism, and lack of task‐specific knowledge, adversely affect their decision‐making.     

Effects of the fraud triangle on students’ risk assessments

This study is motivated by Bailey’s [Bailey, C. D. (2004). An unusual cash control procedure. Journal of Accounting Education, 22, 119–129]. A disappointing 89% of Bailey’s 502 students appear to have overestimated the risk of an asset misappropriation. This study presents the results of two quasi-experiments that test whether students’ risk assessments are affected by the type of model presented to them immediately preceding their risk assessments. One group was provided an overview of the widely used Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), Internal Control—Integrated Framework and the second group was provided a briefing on the Fraud Triangle, a model originally developed by criminologist, Donald R. Cressey (1973). As predicted, students who were provided an overview of the fraud triangle committed fewer Type I and Type II errors than students who were provided an overview of COSO. The results from this study contribute to the literature on risk assessment by demonstrating how the fraud triangle could, in some situations, lead to better risk assessments.     

Why are first‐year accounting studies inclusive?

This study is motivated by the increasing diversity among first‐year accounting students and the increasing number of first‐year accounting students whose majors are not in accounting related areas in UK universities. The main contribution of this study is that it uses student data over four consecutive academic years from a first‐year accounting course at a UK university to provide empirical evidence in support of the theoretical framework proposed by Rankin et al. (2003). Our results show the effects of metacognitive knowledge and content knowledge on academic performance as well as highlighting the inclusiveness of the first‐year accounting course. For instance, regardless of the choices of secondary subjects, students who have good prior academic achievement are the best performers on the first‐year accounting course. The influence of content knowledge on academic performance is strongly felt when the assessments of the course changed from a 100 per cent final exam to a combination of mid‐term coursework and a final exam. The results suggest that well‐designed mid‐term coursework is academically beneficial to accounting students, especially non‐native English‐speaking students.     

The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge

We test the effects of the independence and financial knowledge of directors on risk management and firm value in the gold mining industry. Our original hand‐collected database on directors’ financial education, accounting background, and financial experience allows us to measure the effect of financial knowledge on risk management activities. We show that directors’ financial knowledge increases firm value through the risk management channel. This effect is strengthened by the independence of the directors on the board and on the audit committee. Extending the dimension of education, we show that, following unexpected shocks to gold prices, firms with financially educated directors are more effective in hedging than average firms in the industry. Firms that hedge more also attracts highly educated directors on their board and audit committee. As a policy implication, our results suggest adding the experience and education dimensions to the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange requirements for better governance.     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

Go before the whistle blows: an empirical analysis of director turnover and financial fraud

This study investigates whether outside directors are aware of financial fraud. Our analysis focuses on the abnormal turnover of these directors during the fraud committing period, before fraud is discovered and before lawsuits are filed. Our empirical analysis shows that, during the fraud committing period, outside directors in fraud firms exhibit an abnormal level of turnover. Examining the characteristics of outside directors and boards at these fraud firms, we find strong evidence that female directors, directors who have greater stock ownership in the firm, and directors with multiple directorships at other firms are more likely to depart fraud firms. We also find some evidence that board size, number of meetings, and fraction of financial experts are related to abnormal turnover in fraud firms during the fraud committing period. We show that abnormal director turnover is significantly higher for fraud that is considered more egregious (i.e., involving fictitious transactions and disclosure problems). Lastly, directors are more likely to depart fraud firms with more serious fraud, as proxied by higher ex-post settlement amounts and longer fraud duration.     

Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China

This paper examines how independent directors’ social capital, as measured by their social network, affects corporate fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis. This result is robust to a battery of tests. Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment, for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members. Moreover, we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension. Overall, our findings suggest that independent directors’ social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.