The effect of a decision aid on risk aversion in capital investment decisions

In this study we examine whether a decision aid is an effective means of reducing risk aversion within a capital investment decision context, and under what conditions. Participating in the experiment were 78 working adults (mid management) with a mean age 30 and enrolled in a leading U.S. MBA program. We predict and find that a decision aid will be most effective among individuals intolerance of ambiguity and exhibiting high negative affect.     

The effects of tone at the top and coordination with external auditors on internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments

Prior research suggests that internal auditors’ judgements are subject to management influence resulting in compromised risk assessments. This study investigates the effects of the tone at the top and coordination with external auditors on internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments. Results of an experiment involving 64 internal auditors indicate that when the tone at the top is poor, rather than favouring management, internal auditors report a higher risk of intentional misstatements and that coordination with external auditors can further reduce expectations of the incidence of intentional misstatements.     

An examination of order effects in auditors' inherent risk assessments

While recency effects have been reported in a variety of audit tasks, recent studies suggest that these effects may be mitigated under certain conditions. The importance of investigating order effects in auditors' judgments rests with its potential to impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of audits. Since current studies suggest that recency effects may not impact on all audit situations, it is necessary to identify conditions or variables in the task environment that either induce or mitigate recency.
This study examines the occurrence of order effects in auditors' inherent risk assessments, a task not previously examined. Using a case study administered to 70 auditors, this study found that auditors' judgments were not influenced by the order in which audit evidence was evaluated. Rather, the results suggest that judgments of inherent risk may be biased towards conservatism. This may not be surprising given the negative consequences associated with failing to adequately plan an audit. This may cause auditors to act cautiously and thus mitigate recency effects.     

Decision aid reliance: Modeling the effects of decision aid reliability and pressures to perform on reliance behavior

We investigate the effects of decision aid reliability and pressure to perform on decision aid reliance. A total of 403 students took part in a four (pressures to perform: one through four) by five (decision aid reliability: 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% and 90%) between-participants experiment. We test two competing models of decision aid reliance behavior: pressure-induced rationality and pressure arousal theory. Additionally, we introduce a general model of reliance on a decision aid. We find that pressure arousal theory predominantly explains decision aid reliance behavior at all but the highest level of decision aid reliability tested in this study (90%). Our results indicate that there are reliance peaks across the reliability levels as more pressure to perform is applied, and that continually increasing pressures can eventually lead to decreased, rather than increased, reliance.     

Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China

We examine the causes and consequences of falsified financial statements in China. Using bivariate probit regression analysis, we find that firms with high debt and that plan to make equity issues are more likely to manipulate their earnings and thus have to restate their financial reports in subsequent years. We also find that corporate governance structures have an effect on the occurrence and detection of financial fraud. There are significant negative consequences to fraudulent financial statements. Restating firms suffer negative abnormal stock returns, increases in their cost of capital, wider bid-ask spreads, a greater frequency of modified audit opinions, and greater CEO turnover. We also find that firms located in highly developed regions suffer more severe consequences when they manipulate their accounts.     

Enterprise risk management in financial groups: analysis of risk concentration and default risk

In financial groups, enterprise risk management is becoming increasingly important in controlling and managing the different independent legal entities in the group. The aim of this paper is to assess and relate risk concentration and joint default probabilities of the group’s legal entities in order to achieve a more comprehensive picture of a financial group’s risk situation. We further examine the impact of the type of dependence structure on results by comparing linear and nonlinear dependencies using different copula concepts under certain distributional assumptions. Our results show that even if financial groups with different dependence structures do have the same risk concentration factor, joint default probabilities of different sets of subsidiaries can vary tremendously.

The Department of Justice as a gatekeeper in whistleblower-initiated corporate fraud enforcement: Drivers and consequences

We examine drivers and consequences of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of whistleblower cases of corporate fraud against the government. We find that the DOJ is more likely to intervene in and conduct longer investigations of cases that have a higher chance of victory and yield greater monetary proceeds, indicating that DOJ enforcement is influenced by its performance measures. DOJ intervention also affects the firm- and aggregate-level fraud environment. Firms subject to DOJ intervention improve their employee relations, internal controls, and board independence, and experience lower future whistleblowing risk. Whistleblowers avoid courts and agencies with low DOJ intervention rates. In contrast, we do not find that cases pursued by whistleblowers alone affect firms' or whistleblowers' behavior, suggesting that public enforcement through DOJ intervention has a greater deterrent effect on fraud than private enforcement by whistleblowers acting alone.