Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly

We examine the effect of competition on the incentive of firms to disclose quality to consumers before trade when information disclosure is not costless. We demonstrate that no firm will disclose information in the limit, no matter how small the disclosure cost is; that is, the market outcome converges to complete concealment of information as the number of competing firms becomes larger. Nonetheless, it can be shown that under a mild condition, the equilibrium amount of information disclosure is socially excessive for any number of firms, so discouraging information disclosure by levying a tax may increase social welfare.     

A Note on Quality Disclosure and Competition

Competitive pressure is lower in markets where goods are more differentiated. I analyze how a change in the degree of horizontal product differentiation affects the incentives of duopolists to disclose quality information. If disclosure is costly, then a firm discloses high qualities but conceals low qualities in equilibrium. The higher the disclosure cost, the higher the equilibrium threshold below which firms conceal quality information. I show that the effect of product differentiation on quality disclosure depends on the cost of disclosure. For low (high) disclosure costs, a firm discloses more (respectively, less) quality information if goods become more differentiated.     

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION*

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free‐rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business‐stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.     

Investor Reaction to Covert Corporate Political Activity

Research summary : Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and subsequent developments created a covert channel for firms to allocate resources from corporate treasuries to political activity. Through the use of a financial market event study of an accidental disclosure of firms' contributions to a Republican nonprofit organization, I examine investors' reactions to covert investment in independent political expenditures. I find that, on average, contributing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the disclosure event and that these abnormal returns were more positive for firms in heavily regulated industries as well as those previously making campaign contributions to candidates. However, firms that recently faced a shareholder resolution on political spending disclosure experienced negative abnormal returns, suggesting that the controversial nature of covert activity moderated investors' reactions. Managerial summary : The purpose of this study is to examine how investors reacted to an accidental disclosure of firms' investments in “dark money,” a new form of corporate political activity allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Citizens United decision. I find that, on average, investors reacted positively toward firms identified as making these new political investments, especially if the firms previously engaged in electoral politics or operate in heavily regulated industries. However, this reaction turned negative if the firm recently faced a shareholder resolution asking that it voluntarily disclose all of its political investments. An implication for managers is that they should consider their firms' legal and information environments as fully as possible before committing resources to new and potentially controversial political tactics. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

The literature on patent license auctions in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to bid high in order to signal an aggressive output strategy in a downstream Cournot market game, and conversely bid low to signal acquiescent pricing in a Bertrand market game. The present paper examines the information revealed by publishing the winning or the losing or no bid, assuming an oligopoly with differentiated goods. We rank disclosure rules and find that it is not optimal for the innovator to disclose the winning bid, regardless of the mode of competition.     

How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure

Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The investment opportunity set and disclosure policy choice: Some Malaysian evidence

Recently researchers have shown that certain corporate and accounting policy decisions are related to the firm's portfolio of growth opportunities or its investment opportunity set (ios). This paper augments the research by examining whether the firm's ios is also predictably related to disclosure policy decisions made by the firm. We hypothesize that because agency costs between managers and shareholders are an increasing function of the firm's growth opportunities, managers in high growth firms will be motivated to disclose information about the firm's future prospects in order to commit themselves to particular courses of action and thereby limit their future managerial discretion. Our empirical results indicate that for a sample of 67 Malaysian firms, this is supported only amongst a sample of lower growth firms.The authors are Associate Professor and lecturer, respectively, at the Department of Accountancy, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. Correspondence should be addressed to S F Cahan at the above address, e-mail: S.F.Cahan@massey.ac.nz.     

Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure

We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of seller’s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post-auction investment

We consider a moral hazard issue inherent in the equity auctions of assets such as oil and gas leases and corporate takeovers. After the auction, the winning bidder decides whether to make follow-up investments in the acquired asset and makes the equity payment out of the revenue from it according to the auction outcome. Before the auction, the seller holds private information about the possible returns on that investment and must decide whether to disclose it. Larger equity payments undermine incentives to invest, reducing the impact of information revealed by the seller on expected values of the asset to a winning bidder. Thus, information disclosure makes bids less aggressive in expectation. Expected seller revenues may be higher when she does not disclose her private information than when she commits to publicly announcing it regardless of whether it is good or bad.     

Pawn to Save a Chariot,or Drawbridge Into the Fort? Firms' Disclosure During Standard Setting and Complementary Technologies Within Ecosystems

Research summary: W ithin an ecosystem, standard setting coordinates development of complementary technologies across firms. But each firm can itself own multiple of these complementary technologies. We study how a firm's own complementary technologies influence its disclosure inclination during standard setting. We identify a tradeoff: disclosure increases value‐creation of the firm's non‐disclosed complementary technologies, but also heightens expropriation risk. Using data on the U.S. communications equipment industry 1991–2008, we show that the firm's complementary technologies increase its disclosure inclination when its technological areas are less crowded, but decrease such inclination when there are SSO members with strong expropriation abilities. Findings stress that disclosure involves but a piece of the firm's portfolio; a systemic perspective of the entire portfolio provides a more comprehensive picture of value‐creation during standard setting . Managerial summary: W hy should a firm disclose its key technology to participate in standard setting within an ecosystem? We urge managers to think beyond “disclosing to ensure compatibility with other firms' complementary technologies within the ecosystem” as a motivation, to also consider how disclosure affects the firm's own complementary technologies within its portfolio. Disclosure in one technological area makes the firm's nondisclosed complementary technologies in other areas more valuable to itself, especially with fewer rivals competing in these other areas. But disclosure also renders the firm susceptible to losing these complementary technologies to rivals, especially when rivals have strong expropriation abilities. Analyzing disclosure decisions by communication equipment firms, we show that this tradeoff is indeed a relevant consideration in managers' strategic calculations when participating in standard setting . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

NETWORK SECURITY: VULNERABILITIES AND DISCLOSURE POLICY*

Software security is a major concern for vendors, consumers and regulators. When vulnerabilities are discovered after the software has been sold to consumers, the firms face a dilemma. A policy of disclosing vulnerabilities and issuing updates protects only consumers who install updates, while the disclosure itself facilitates reverse engineering of the vulnerability by hackers. The paper considers a firm that sells software which is subject to potential security breaches and derives the conditions under which a firm would disclose vulnerabilities. It examines the effect of a regulatory policy that requires mandatory disclosure of vulnerabilities and a ‘bug bounty’ program.     

Quality disclosure when firms set their own quality targets

We investigate how firms adjust their target quality levels when they - or their competitors - become subject to an information disclosure requirement. Our setting is the U.S. airline industry, where all large domestic carriers are required to report their on-time performance (OTP). OTP is measured by comparing a flight’s actual arrival time to its scheduled arrival time, which is chosen by the airline. Therefore, airlines can improve their OTP by simply increasing their scheduled flight times. We study three airlines which become subject to the disclosure requirement and find that they lengthen their schedule times by 1.4 min on average. Moreover, other airlines also increase their schedule times on routes where they compete with newly reporting airlines, by about 2.3 min, while actual flight times remain unchanged. While these numbers are small, the longer schedule times translate into a 15% improvement in OTP for previously reporting airlines. We conclude that newly reporting airlines and their direct competitors adjust their quality targets when they become subject to quality disclosure, which improves their reported quality without improving the actual time that it takes to travel from gate to gate.     

煤炭行业上市公司环境绩效信息披露研究——基于社会责任报告

在煤炭行业37家上市公司中,搜集到20家公司2008—2013年度社会责任报告94份,总披露率43.32%。对社会责任报告中环境绩效信息采用内容分析法进一步研究发现,从时间的顺序看环境绩效信息披露的形式和内容方面均显示数量和质量的提高,但地区间、市场间和公司间存在着显著差异。样本公司的环境信息披露的数量和质量仍需提高,30项环境绩效指标中每份报告平均披露仅8.93项,定量环境绩效披露率仅为18.67%。     

Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition

This paper studies firms' incentives to disclose horizontal product attributes in a competitive environment. With competition, two elements play an important role: whether (i) firms can disclose only their own product characteristics or also those of their competitors, and whether (ii) competitors can react with their pricing decisions to the type of information disclosed. In all possible cases, full revelation is an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, it is generically the unique equilibrium outcome when (i) advertising is comparative and (ii) prices are also advertised, that is, announced simultaneously with the product information. When advertising is noncomparative or prices are not advertised, many nondisclosure equilibria exist.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly

The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R & D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R & D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R & D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value.     

Business groups and corporate transparency in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from India

This study examines the difference in corporate transparency of firms affiliated with business groups and unaffiliated firms in India. Based on previous studies we measured corporate transparency using equity analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. We find that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent than unaffiliated firms. Lack of transparency leads to higher analyst forecast error and dispersion. This study also finds that business group-affiliated firms with more intra-group capital transactions have higher forecast error and dispersion. The findings of this study suggest that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent due to their reliance on internal capital markets, and therefore lack incentives to disclose information to market participants. As a result, the information asymmetry between business groups and the capital market is higher, restricting the activities of information intermediaries such as equity analysts, who play an important role in the external capital market.     

The quest for expansive intellectual property rights and the failure to disclose known relevant prior art

Expansive patent portfolios may be used by firms to fence off technological space for commercialization, impede the commercialization efforts of competitors, and enhance bargaining power in cross‐licensing negotiations. Low quality patents with claims that overlap those of other patents contribute to these portfolios and patent strategies. By failing to disclose known relevant prior art during the patenting process, inventors and their firms may be granted low quality patents with intellectual property claims which would not otherwise have been granted. We find that the failure of inventors to disclose known relevant prior art increases as they gain experience with the patenting process. Such failure is also greater among inventors employed by relatively small, poorly performing firms that rely on outsourced legal counsel during the application process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于股东利益要求及其实现方式的非财务指标关注程度研究

从股东角度出发,对股东所关注的反映其利益要求和实现方式信息的非财务指标的关注程度进行了排序研究和分组研究。研究表明：股东对不同类的反映其利益要求和实现方式信息的非财务指标的关注程度存在显著的差异。详尽必要的信息披露更易取得股东对企业的理解和支持。因此,企业除应当进行法定性披露和习惯性披露外,还应当根据本企业股东特点和本企业股东对非财务指标关注的需要以及关注程度的差异对非财务指标信息进行科学、恰当的自愿性详细披露,以满足本企业股东关注相关信息的需要。     

M&A advisory and the merger review process

Two firms propose a merger to the antitrust authority. They are uninformed about the efficiencies generated by the merger, but can hire an expert to gather information on their behalf. The authority is also uninformed about the merger’s efficiencies, but can run a costly internal investigation to learn them. We analyze the effect of the disclosure of the expert’s contract on consumer welfare, and show that consumers are not necessarily better off with disclosure. This possibility result hinges on a free-riding problem between expert and authority in the information acquisition game, and is more relevant in highly competitive industries.