THE EFFECT OF SERVICE QUALITY AND EXPECTATIONS ON CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS*

Customer complaints measure consumers' dissatisfaction with the quality of a product or service. If product quality is unobservable ex ante, customer complaints may be driven by expectations as well as by the actually experienced quality level. I test whether the level of quality that could be expected prior to consumption affects the number of customer complaints after controlling for–ex post observable–actual quality, using data from the U.S. airline industry. I find that there are fewer complaints when actual quality is higher. Controlling for actual quality, a higher level of expected quality leads to more complaints.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

COSTLY BUYER SEARCH IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH SELLER ADVERTISING*

In this experiment, sellers simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies. Buyers either purchase at an advertised price or search sequentially for other prices. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, sellers charge a high unadvertised price or advertise a price chosen from a lower interval. Increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and affect equilibrium advertising intensity. Empirical results are consistent with most comparative static predictions. Sellers, however, price much lower and advertise more intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect information, Bertrand‐like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy equilibrium with significant seller market power.     

THE EFFECT OF MOST‐FAVORED CUSTOMER CLAUSES ON PRICES*

We study the effects of introducing a Most‐Favored Customer (MFC) clause on price competition among major consumer electronics retailers. Our data spans the periods before and after the introduction of an MFC clause by Best Buy, which occurred between April 1, 2003 and March 31, 2004. After controlling for various factors (including product life‐cycle and seasonality effects), we find that, on average, Best Buy lowered its prices by 1.6% after introducing the MFC clause. Its competitors responded by cutting prices further: Buy.com by 3.5%, Circuit City by 2.2%, CompUSA by 3.2%, and Sears by 0.4%. We conclude that Best Buy's MFC adoption reduced prices.     

ADVERTISING SUNK COSTS AND CREDIBLE SPATIAL PREEMPTION

Large sunk investments in advertising allow managers to credibly preempt potential entrants by introducing new products prior to anticipated increases in market growth. Previous investment in advertising can lower a firm's cost to introduce new products allowing it to credibly preempt potential entrants. Entrants may not have enough residual share to find it profitable to enter later, and incumbents find it profitable to keep new products in the market even if entrants choose to enter. I present empirical evidence from the RTE cereal industry.     

TARGETED ADVERTISING: THE ROLE OF SUBSCRIBER CHARACTERISTICS IN MEDIA MARKETS*

This paper seeks to establish the importance of targeted advertising in media markets. Using zip‐code level circulation for U.S. newspapers, I show that newspapers facing more competition have lower circulation prices but higher advertising prices than similar newspapers facing little or no competition. I explain this by showing that newspapers in more competitive markets are better able to segment readers according to their location and demographics. This leads to greater homogeneity in the characteristics of subscribers and raises advertisers' willingness to pay for such readers. The results imply a substantial benefit to advertisers and media firms from targeted advertising.     

ON THE VALUE OF A LARGE CUSTOMER BASE IN MARKETS WITH SWITCHING COSTS*

It is usually acknowledged that firms benefit from a large customer base in markets with switching costs. However, Klemperer [1995] argues that this may not be true if an increase in the size of a firm's customer base induces fierce price competition, making the firm worse off. This paper shows that such an outcome can be obtained under standard assumptions, such as homogeneous goods and uniformly distributed switching costs. In the model, firms have very limited incentives to fight for market shares, and the notion that switching costs make markets less competitive is stronger than previously shown.     

亚马逊的三个顾客

在西雅图,亚马逊算得上低调.在其总部的办公楼群的外面,你甚至都见不到它的Loqo.在这个高科技气息浓厚的城市里,有微软这样的软件巨头,有全球最大的在线旅游公司Expedia,它们的霓红灯牌在西雅图的夜空格外闪耀,甚至连eBay和Facebook等硅谷明星公司也在这里设立了办公室,因为这里汇聚了全美顶尖的     

CUSTOMER POWER,STRATEGIC INVESTMENT,AND THE FAILURE OF LEADING FIRMS

Why might firms be regarded as astutely managed at one point, yet subsequently lose their positions of industry leadership when faced with technological change? We present a model, grounded in a study of the world disk drive industry, that charts the process through which the demands of a firm's customers shape the allocation of resources in technological innovation—a model that links theories of resource dependence and resource allocation. We show that established firms led the industry in developing technologies of every sort—even radical ones—whenever the technologies addressed existing customers' needs. The same firms failed to develop simpler technologies that initially were only useful in emerging markets, because impetus coalesces behind, and resources are allocated to, programs targeting powerful customers. Projects targeted at technologies for which no customers yet exist languish for lack of impetus and resources. Because the rate of technical progress can exceed the performance demanded in a market, technologies which initially can only be used in emerging markets later can invade mainstream ones, carrying entrant firms to victory over established companies.     

COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE*

There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms can undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why it may be the case that only high‐quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market.     

SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY*

In our paper, the target of a proposed merger, by setting a reserve price, is able to screen prospective acquirers according to their (expected) ability to generate merger‐specific synergies. Both empirical evidence and many merger models suggest that the difference between high and low‐synergy mergers becomes smaller during booms. Thus, a target's opportunity cost for sorting out relatively less fitting acquirers increases and, hence, targets screen less tightly during booms, which leads to a hike in merger activity. Our screening mechanism not only predicts that merger activity is intense during booms and subdued during recessions but is also consistent with other stylized facts about takeovers and generates novel testable predictions.     

QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION*

We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus.     

REAL AND VIRTUAL COMPETITION*

Goods sold by electronic firms are not perfect substitutes for otherwise identical goods sold by their offline counterparts. Online purchases are associated with waiting costs, and they do not allow consumers to inspect the product prior to purchase. Visiting a conventional retailer, on the other hand, involves positive travelling costs. In this paper I extend the circular city model to include two types of firms, conventional and electronic. I show that under some parameter configurations, conventional stores actually raise their prices in response to entry of electronic firms. Moreover, economic welfare goes down.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.