The Role of Political Instability in Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: The Case of Greece

This article examines empirically the relationship between stock market development, political instability and economic growth in Greece. We measure socio-political instability by constructing an index which captures the occurrence of various phenomena of political violence using time-series data. The main advantages of analysing political instability in a case study framework using time-series, in contrast with the widely used cross-country empirical studies, are: (a) a more careful and in-depth examination of institutional and historical characteristics of a particular country; (b) the use of a data set comprised of the most appropriate and highest quality measures; and (c) a more detailed exposition of the dynamic evolution of the economy. The empirical results indicate the existence of a strong negative relationship between uncertain socio-political conditions and the general index of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and support the theoretical hypothesis that uncertain socio-political conditions affect economic growth negatively, is true for the Greek case.
(J.E.L.: G10, G14, O40, C32)     

Natural persons,corporate actors,and constitutions

Extending the concept of efficiency beyond economic markets to social transactions generally, this paper asks the question whether social efficiency might not be better realized by removing the barriers to transactions between political and economic resources. With political rights (i.e. resources) held by natural persons, and economic resources held by corporate actors, such transactions could in principle replace taxation for redistribution, as a more efficient method of redistribution, intrinsic to the socio-political system. Such politico-economic transactions would supplement the primary means of distribution of the social product in an economic system, that is wages for productive labor. In the paper it is argued that this primary means of distribution is increasingly ineffective as the economy becomes increasingly interdependent. This change places an increasing burden on the “second round” of distribution through taxation, and forces consideration of a less defective and more theoretically sound means of supplementary income distribution. Paper was presented at the Organizations, Constitutions, and Liberty conference sponsored by the Liberty Fund, June 21–24, 1990 at the Sheraton Hotel in Crystal City, Virginia.     

Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review,Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

The study investigates how judicial review of policy and judicial independence affect the relative size of government. Judicial oversight of policy is the authority of courts to check the legality of policy measures and annul measures which are incompatible with the constitution or are enacted without following the procedures laid down by the law. Using a model of constitutional political economy, where policy making is subject to judicial oversight, it is predicted that the relative size of the public sector decreases as judicial review and judicial independence increase. The theoretical predictions are tested in an international cross section sample of 52 countries. Controlling for the effects of real income, age dependency, openness of the economy, the legal origins of a country and other socio-political variables the results show that the checks and balances provided by the judiciary lead to a smaller relative size of taxes in the economy.JEL Classifications: D70, D72, D74, D78, H30, K41.     

ELIMINATING THE INFLATIONARY FINANCE TRAP IN A POLITICALLY UNSTABLE COUNTRY: DOMESTIC POLITICS VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

This paper presents an intertemporal political economy model of public finance relevant for developing and transition countries where there is inherent political instability. As in Cukierman et al. (1992) , it is shown that political instability causes myopic behaviour by a rational government resulting in high levels of revenue from seigniorage. It is then argued that inflationary finance also increases barter and currency substitution, but if the government tries to suppress them, seigniorage taxation rises even more. Only international financial pressure can help eliminate the inflationary finance trap, but becomes less effective as the instability increases.     

A socio-political approach to exploring the innovation culture in post-socialist countries: the case of Croatia

Innovation culture and the social determinants of national innovation capacities have rarely been empirically researched in innovation-weak post-socialist countries despite the fact that innovation is considered one of the main drivers of their economic growth and convergence. Applying an alternative approach to identifying the factors that shape a national innovation culture is challenging as there has been little empirical research in the area. Moreover, the global cross-cultural concepts of national innovation culture hold little relevance for post-socialist countries. The trans-disciplinary socio-political approach employed in this article relies on the qualitative analysis of the dominant concepts used in political economy and sociology to identify the socio-cultural and political aspects of Croatia’s post-socialist transformation into a capitalist country. This is presented as one of the critical formative determinants of innovation culture. Croatia is chosen as a typical innovation-weak post-socialist country, where innovation remains weak. The analysis presented here suggests that transition-induced factors dominated by ‘crony variance of capitalism’ have an equal, if not a greater, suppressive impact on the current innovation culture than standard explanations based on the socio-cultural heritage of socialism and cultural inertia.     

Globalisation—New Demands on Public Enterprises

The globalisation of the economy and society reduces the economic policy capabilities of the state with its public enterprises considerably, but at the same time it triggers fundamental pressure on the government to compensate for the negative economic, political and social effects of the globalisation process. Using a system-theoretic framework, requirements for the public economy can be developed reaching from a social coordination function to an evolutionary-based industrial policy function of public enterprises. These functions and instrumental targets have to be implemented in a system of an internationalised public economy based on an appropriate institutional foundation. This in turn means focusing on a mixed system of public and non-profit organisations combined with market type institutions. By no means is an erosion of the public sector in the sense of radical privatisation strategies as propagated by the IMF and other prominent institutions implied. Rather a social need for public action must be considered mainly due to the public interest (Gemeinwohl). In this context, the socio-political competence of the public and nonprofit economy can be revitalised in an innovative way.     

Gender and central banking

Female Central Bank chairs represent but a tiny minority. To understand why, this article analyzes socio-economic and socio-political characteristics of the countries where women have chaired Central Banks. Then, it suggests that gender differences in preferences as regards monetary policy goals may have some influence. This hypothesis is based on an empirical analysis showing that female Central Bank chairs focus more than their male counterparts on achieving the price stability goal. This means, then, that women are more resistant than men to political pressures. Finally, it concludes that gender differences in degree of conservatism may be an explanatory factor in female underrepresentation in the Central Bank chairs.     

Political Economy and the Idea of Development

This paper explores the questions: what are the main organizing concepts of the older political economy of Smith and Marx; and how do they differ from those typical of more recent work in political economy? Special emphasis is placed on the importance of an idea of development in the older political economy, and on how that idea has been replaced in the newer political economy by notions of power and interest. The paper considers how the absence of a concept of development in the newer versions of political economy limits the scope and depth of these versions. Recent criticism of the idea of development is also considered. In light of this criticism, the paper considers weaknesses in the concept of development in the older political economy. However, rather than fully accepting the critique of the idea of development, the paper suggests that weaknesses in the classical construction can be corrected by paying closer attention to how we understand the ends of the development process.     

The Institution,the Economy and the Market: Karl Polanyi's Institutional Thought for Economists

This paper aims to clarify the logical structure of Karl Polanyi's concept of institution, especially with regard to his most important contribution to political economy—the conception of self-regulating markets as institutions. Although Polanyi did not provide a well-developed concept of institution, this article argues that such a concept exists in his work. Moreover, there is in Polanyi's work a sophisticated institutionalist account of the self-regulating market that has been largely overlooked as Polanyi does not present it explicitly. Analyzing the economy as an institutionalized process, as Polanyi does, reveals that the market is neither a natural nor a spontaneous phenomenon—a conclusion that runs counter to conventional economic thinking. Polanyi's approach enables us to view capitalism (the ‘market society’ in Polanyi's language) through a highly specific cultural fact: the fiction of the self-regulating market. This institutional perspective needs to be reassessed beyond new-institutionalist theoretical constructions.     

Theoretical foundations of sustainable economic welfare indicators — ISEW and political economy of the disembedded system

The conceptual foundations of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) are surveyed and critiqued. It is argued that the three underlying theories of community, psychic income, and social welfare economics supply certain theoretical foundations for the ISEW. The focal point of the theories is to evaluate the positives and negatives of economic growth, with the hope of achieving a practical measure of sustainable economic welfare. However, they are not as well developed as they should be: the three theories have partial, underdeveloped explanations of the benefits (services) and costs (disservices) generated in the system. The theoretical particulars of ISEW abstract from the workings of the capitalist system, because the ISEW advocates have not specified a society in the socioeconomic system which we currently have. Specifically, there is no underlying linked systems view of the disembedded economy — where the exchange economy tends to dominate other aspects of culture. Without a systematic understanding of the political economy of capitalism, the ISEW is potentially flawed in design. Therefore, there is a need to search for a critical approach to sustainable economic welfare. As a point of departure, it is better to have a political economy theory. The political economy of the disembedded system provides an alternative theoretical approach to ISEW.     

全球一体化背景下统一战线工作的战略思路

以经济为主导的全球一体化时代已经到来，伴随着全球化的发展，我国与其他国家和地区间的政治、经济、文化、社会等领域的联系不断加深，不同政府组织、政党、企事业单位、社会团体间的相互交往、交流、合作等活动更加频繁，统一战线工作的重要性由此更加凸现，统战工作的范围和难度逐步拓宽和增加。在全球一体化的大背景下，做好统一战线工作不仅有益于我国的国家安全，更关系到中华民族的复兴。同时，从事和致力于统战工作的人员要始终牢记和遵循党和国家的统战政策和策略，认清统战工作面临的新形势，进一步增强统战工作人员的责任感和使命感，找准立足点，拓宽工作渠道和平台，以卓有成效的工作成果服务于国家的发展大局。     

Regulatory Contracts and Stakeholder Regulation

Abstract **: This paper examines the application of the concept of a regulatory contract in the analysis of UK utilities regulation. It argues that there are serious problems in conceiving of regulatory relations as analogous to contracts, though particular contracts may be a useful tool in the regulatory armoury. This is partly due to problems with principal/agent theory, which has been conceived in different ways by economists and lawyers, and partly due to the essentially political nature of regulatory relations, which make it difficult to tie down regulatory discretion in ways which resemble contractual relations. There is also ambiguity as to who is principal and who is agent, with the danger of adopting a single theoretical category for relationships which are radically different. The early legal structures adopted for UK utility regulation did have elements of a regulatory contract, but with the growth of competition and social regulation, a different model, that of a network of stakeholders, has largely replaced it. This offers the opportunity to develop more sophisticated regulatory procedures, but does not replace the need for substantive values drawn from economics but also from public service values as guides for regulatory decisions .     

Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?

This paper discusses the need and scope for an active fiscalstabilization policy. It is argued that the effectiveness offiscal policy as a short run stabilizer does not depend on thelong run multipliers of (balanced budget) fiscal policies. Tothe extent that activity can be affected by aggregate demandin the short run, there is a case for a fiscal stabilizationpolicy in terms of temporary variations in taxes or public consumptioncontingent on the state of the economy. The effectiveness offiscal policy is supported by empirical evidence. However, anappropriate policy intervention depends both on the nature ofthe shock and the structure of the economy. There are thus fundamentalinformation problems in pursuing discretionary fiscal policieson top of political economy concerns, and fiscal fine-tuningis not to be recommended. Automatic stabilizers do not to thesame extent suffer from these problems, but their strength isnot by design but the net result of other policy considerations.Hence, there is a need to consider the structure and size ofautomatic stabilizers. (JEL E6)     

Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics

This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, would offer a useful extension of the research program. Such an extension could be related to the concept of robust political economy, according to which the case for paternalism should be subjected to ??worst-case?? assumptions, such as policymakers being less than fully rational.     

From Neoliberalism to Neo-developmentalism? The Political Economy of Post-crisis Argentina (2002–2015)

Argentina’s post-crisis political economy was viewed as part of the emergence of a post-neoliberal governance and the rise of New Left governments in Latin America in the past decade that marked a renewal of state activism in economy and poverty reduction. Using the concept of ‘new developmentalism’ described by Bresser-Pereira, this article offers a more nuanced approach to post-neoliberalism in Argentina. It argues that the post-neoliberal project or neo-developmentalism in Argentina does not mark a distinct departure from neoliberalism. Instead, it embodies a hybrid and complex process that maintains the core elements of economic liberalism. This article aims to contribute to the debates on post-neoliberalism and the New Left in Latin America.     

Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.     

The Scottish Political Economy Tradition and Modern Economics

The purpose of this article is to re-examine the notion of a Scottish tradition in political economy in the light of recent developments in the methodology of economics. Consideration is given to the concept of tradition itself, which puts the focus on approach to theorising and the relationship between theory and reality rather than theoretical content. It is argued that the Scottish approach provided the foundations for much of modern political economy. Further, modern discussion of constructivism and critical realism can both be seen to have precedents in the Scottish tradition. Indeed the Scottish political economy tradition provides an exemplar of a constructive blending of the two strands.     

深化学科认知与构建中国特色社会主义政治经济学理论体系

对学科的认知包括认识学科内涵、学科性质与任务、学科发展进路等核心问题,关系到如何构建学科体系,是学科建设的重要内容.从深化学科认知的视角,中国特色社会主义政治经济学的学科发展与理论体系构建,要坚持几个重大原则,包括把中国特色社会主义政治经济学建立在历史唯物主义的基础之上;要以生产关系分析为核心来构建中国特色社会主义政治...     

Banks as Continuous Reinvention

Of the several debates that revolve around the work of the economic historian and political economist Karl Polanyi, one that continues to exercise minds concerns his analysis of, and political attitudes toward, post-war capitalism and the welfare state. Simplified a little, it is a debate with two sides. To borrow Iván Szelényi's terms, one side constructs a ‘hard’ Karl Polanyi, the other a ‘soft’ one. The former advocated a socialist mixed economy dominated by redistributive mechanisms. He was a radical socialist for whom the market should never be the dominant mechanism of economic coordination. His ‘soft’ alter ego insisted that the market system remain essentially intact but be complemented by redistributive mechanisms. The ‘double movement’ – the central thesis of his ‘Great Transformation’ – acts, in this reading, as a self-correcting mechanism that moderates the excesses of market fundamentalism; its author was positioned within the social-democratic mainstream for which the only realistic desirable goal is a regulated form of capitalism. In terms of textual evidence there is much to be said for both interpretations. In this article I suggest a different approach, one that focuses upon the meaning of Polanyi's concepts in relation to their socio-political and intellectual environment.     

Classical political economy: the subsistence wage,and job guarantee concerns

Abstract:

In the theoretical framework of classical political economy, including the revisions of Marx and the more recent work of Piero Sraffa and others, the concept of the subsistence wage figures prominently. Here, following a recounting of this concept and demonstrating its significance not only for classical theory but also for larger social concerns, I argue that the “base wage” (as it is sometimes termed) as articulated within a “Job Guarantee” program, is (or should be) comparable to the subsistence wage but requires modification to make it (roughly) equivalent. It will be demonstrated that adherents of the classical approach did not rest their wage theory on a quasi-neoclassical supply–demand approach (with some primitive marginal productivity notion lying behind a supposed demand for labor schedule), but understood wages as socially determined where institutional and historic forces established a normative standard around which market wages gravitated. Such an approach was shared by, among others, Thorstein Veblen and John Maynard Keynes.