维护征信信息准确性防范征信信息失真

市场经济在某种意义上是契约经济,诚信是契约的灵魂,是市场经济的基石。随着我国市场经济的进一步发展,诚信对人们的生活,特别是商事活动的影响随处存在,个人信息作为诚信的载体也日益受到人们的重视。客户申请办理信用卡、房贷和房贷利率7折优惠等,银行一般都会登录人民银行建立的个人信用信息基础数据库,查询客户的个人信用信息。     

完善我国征信业的法律监管浅析

市场经济是契约经济,契约产生预期效果的基础是信用,信用产品是维系市场经济正常运行的特效产品。加快建立符合市场经济要求的现代信用体系,已经成了中国经济健康发展的必要前提。     

中国社会主义市场经济信用的缺失与建立

市场经济是契约经济或称为信用经济，信用是市场经济的灵魂，公民的诚信、企业的诚信、银行的诚信和政府的诚信，共同构筑起市场经济运行与发展的信用平台。由于多方面原因，中国社会主义市场经济信用缺失现象较为严重。社会主义市场经济的健康快速发展，呼吁全社会信用的建立。     

论企业会计诚信评价指标体系之建立

市场经济的本质是一种讲究诚信的契约经济,建立会计诚信评价指标体系这是市场经济发展的必需。本文笔者在实践经验的基础上,建立会计诚信评价指标、对企业评估机构的管理与建立完善的会计诚信档案制度这三方面,探索企业会计诚信评价指标体系的建立。     

征信的力量

正当冰雪覆盖的时候,我们需要一簇薪火取暖;当烈日炎炎的时候,我们需要一片树荫遮阳;当暗夜无边的时候,我们需要一点星光指引;当前途茫茫的时候,我们需要一座灯塔来导航。漫漫人生路,我们更需要一盏心灯来指引前行,那便是我们所期待的诚信之光。诚实守信,是我们中华民族的传统美德,千百年来,人们讲求诚信,推崇诚信。诚信之风质朴醇厚,历史愈悠久,诚信之气愈是充盈中华,诚信之光愈是普照华夏;诚信早已融入中华民族文化的     

中国社会转型期诚信文化重构

当代中国社会转型是我国诚信文化缺失的基本语境。随着社会转型和市场经济的逐步建立,基于儒家思想的传统诚信意识和价值规范已滞后于市场经济的发展,并逐步被社会边缘化,“见利忘信”现象频发。经济基础决定上层建筑,发展社会主义市场经济必须建设与之相适应的诚信文化价值体系,尤其需要重点关注契约诚信文化、理性诚信文化和政治权力诚信文化的建设。     

个人征信系统信息数据准确性亟待提高

自人民银行个人征信系统于2006年1月正式运行以来,其在防范信贷风险,提高个人诚信意识等方面日益发挥越来越重要的作用,商业银行已将查询申请个人信用报告作为消费信贷审查的固定程序.随着个人征信系统应用范围的逐步扩大,个人信用报告信息的准确性亦日益为人们所关注.笔者通过对本人信用报告信息准确性的核对,在分析了个人征信系统中部分信息错漏原因的基础上,提出了提交信息准确性的建议.     

以征信系统建设为突破口打造社会诚信体系

诚信在维护市场经济的有序发展中具有不可替代的作用。诚信的缺失给我国国民经济、市场经济和消费者都带来了严重损害。据统计，由于市场交易缺乏信用监督，使得国内生产总值的10～20％成为无效成本，因诚信缺失导致的直接和间接经济损失高达6000亿元。正是在这样的背景下，呼唤诚信成为中国经济界的强音。     

对建立个人征信系统的几点思考

社会主义市场经济是信用经济、法制经济,完善的社会主义市场经济体制离不开发达和完善的信用制度的支持,良好的社会信用是建立规范的社会主义市场经济秩序的保证,是有效防范金融风险的重要条件。但在目前的市场交易中,各种违约、恶意透支、恶意欠费等不诚信的行为,已经渗透到社     

关于加强个人征信体系建设的思考

一个和谐社会必然是一个诚信的社会,建立个人征信体系是社会信用体系建设的重要内容之一,对于社会主义市场经济的可持续发展和建设和谐社会都具有尤其重要的意义.本文试图从我国个人征信体系建设的现状入手,对现阶段我国个人征信系统建设中存在的问题进行深入的分析,并对如何建设个人征信体系提出相应的对策和建议.     

征信体系建设与商业银行信用风险管理

征信体系是社会信用体系的核心,也是现代金融体系运行和稳定的基石,征信体系健全与否将直接影响金融机构的风险控制水平。商业银行作为经营货币和风险的特殊企业,在目前我国征信体系尚不完善的情况下,承担了大部分的信用缺失成本,对建立完善的社会征信体系的需求更为迫切。     

Bank credit risk and credit information sharing in Africa: Does credit information sharing institutions and context matter?

The study examines credit information sharing through private credit bureaus and public credit registries and their effect on bank credit risk in low and high income countries in Africa. The study covers periods between 2006 and 2012 with 548 bank observations in Africa. Employing a Prais-Winsten panel data estimation, the study established that credit information sharing whether through private credit bureaus or public credit registries reduces bank credit risk in both low and high income countries and Africa as a whole. Further analyses reveal that credit information shared through public credit registries was only negatively and significantly related to bank credit risk when all countries that share credit information through public credit registries are observed as one unit but had no significant effect in low or high income countries. On the contrary, credit information shared through private credit bureaus reported a negative and significant effect on credit risk in low and high income countries as well as all countries that shared information through private credit bureaus. This suggests that credit information shared through private credit bureaus are more robust in dealing with bank credit risk regardless of a banks’ income bracket. Hence, countries that do not share credit information should do so especially through private credit bureaus so as to help reduce bank credit risk regardless of the income bracket differences. Again, governments in Africa must enact laws that expand the coverage and scope of credit information shared so as to enhance the effectiveness of information sharing.     

The information content of trade credit

During 1992–2007, suppliers financed almost 10% of the total assets of US listed firms. This intensive usage of trade credit is puzzling in the light of its high (implicit) costs. By arguing that trade credit use provides valuable information to outside investors, we first derive a theoretical model that predicts a positive correlation between trade credit use and the quality of the firm’s investments. Then, using several proxies for firm’s investment quality (Z-score, return on assets, and long-run abnormal returns), we show that this prediction receives strong support from a large sample of US firms.     

Is less information better information? Evidence from the credit rating withdrawal

This paper examines the stock market reaction to two different types of credit rating withdrawals by Moody’s. The first type of withdrawal occurs when a firm stops being rated. This happens, for example, when firms choose to no longer pay for a rating. We find that the stock market reaction depends on the information which remains available. The second type of withdrawal is due to Moody’s policy of removing the issuer rating and keeping the corporate family rating for the same firm. The corporate family rating is usually more favorable than the issuer rating. The paper shows that the removal of the issuer rating leads to positive stock market reaction. We conclude that lower disclosure of rating information is not necessarily associated with higher cost of equity. Instead, our findings emphasize the incentive for firms to engage in ratings shopping by publishing only the most favourable ratings.     

征信系统在金融监管信息服务中的基础地位

2004年6月，巴塞尔银行监管委员会公布了新《巴塞尔资本协议》（BaselⅡ，以下简称“新协议”），确立了国际金融业风险管理及监管的新框架。其中，为防范信用风险，新协议规定银行对借款企业必须进行信用评级，并规定了两种风险管理与资本计提方式：一种是引用外部信用评级机构评级结果，并采用固定风险权重的标准法（Standardized approach），即外部评级法；一种是依据金融机构内部评级系统，并自行估计风险权重的内部评级法（IRB approach）。这既是对银行业经营机构的要求，更是对监管机关的要求。     

The emergence of information sharing in credit markets

We provide the first systematic empirical analysis of how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones. Lenders may, however, also lose market power by sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric information in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between lenders significantly. Stronger competition between lenders reduces information sharing. In credit markets where lenders may fail to coordinate on sharing information, the degree of information asymmetry, rather than lender competition, drives actual information sharing behavior.     

Bank credit risk and structural credit models: Agency and information asymmetry perspectives

This work investigates the effects of agency and information asymmetry issues embedded in structural form credit models on bank credit risk evaluation, using American bank data from 2001 to 2005. Findings show that both the agency problem and information asymmetry significantly cause deviations in the credit risk evaluation of structural form models from agency ratings. Five independent factors explain a deviation of 42.6–78.3% and should be incorporated into future credit risk modeling. Additionally, both the effects of information asymmetry and debt-equity agency positively relate to the deviation while that of management-equity agency relates to it negatively.     

个人信用信息数据仓库设计

现代市场经济是信用经济，良好的个人信用制度是建设社会市场经济秩序，防范金融风险的有效保证。完善的个人信用制度必须在一国范围内有透明开放和允许以市场经济方式经营的征信数据，以及覆盖全社会的征信数据库。