政府、环保部门、企业环保行为的动态博弈分析

本文首先建立了一个关于环保部门检查与不检查、企业治污与不治污、环保部门滥用职权与不滥用职权、企业行贿与不行贿的两方动态博弈模型,并将信誉机制引入模型,求出模型的均衡解。然后根据对均衡解的分析得出环保部门与企业之间容易产生寻租行为,由此提出政府对环保部门进行监督的重要性,并建立了政府与环保部门的动态博弈模型以及得出该模型的均衡解。最后通过对两个动态博弈模型均衡解的分析,提出了治理污染和保护环境的对策。     

上市公司并购重组中主并方寻租的博弈分析

文章以市场主导的并购重组行为为研究对象,探讨企业基于寻租的目的进行并购重组的战略决策。通过建立博弈模型,研究上市公司主并方企业与审核部门之间的博弈行为,得出不同假设条件下的均衡解,并对不同的博弈结果进行分析,最后通过剖析影响均衡解因素对审核部门如何避免寻租提出建议:加强对主并方寻租行为的惩罚力度,完善审核部门的内审体系,变并购重组从事前审查为事后监督,向真正的市场机制转变。     

装备采办市场中寻租行为的博弈分析

我国装备采办市场上的垄断问题依然存在,由于政府对市场的干预性较强,非生产性的寻租行为仍然存在.本文建立了装备采办市场中采购方与供应方寻租行为的博弈模型,分析求解不同条件下博弈双方的最优策略以及混合策略下的纳什均衡解,进而讨论分析了模型相关结果并得出结论,对制约寻租行为具有一定的现实意义.     

寻租均衡理论的最新进展

本文对寻租均衡模型研究进行了较为系统的归纳和整理,从不确定性、进入成本和政治决策等三个方面,较为全面地综述了寻租均衡理论的研究成果。本文认为,在拓宽现有均衡模型研究范围的基础上,运用实证研究方法检验现有模型的有效性或将均衡模型从静态分析转向动态分析将是未来的研究重点。     

寻租理论与政府行为的分析

寻租是现代市场经济国家普遍存在的一种经济现象。对寻租活动中的政府行为进行分析 ,可以说是对寻租理论的深入研究。本文首先介绍了寻租理论的含义 ;然后具体分析了政府在寻租活动中所充当的角色 ,即政府的创租行为 ;最后指出了限制寻租活动 ,规范政府行为的具体措施。     

非均衡条件下寻租理论的博弈模型分析

本文通过对西方寻租理论内涵的分析,借鉴寻租理论中有关制度分析的思路,对我国当前非均衡条件下寻租活动产生的原因进行了研究.同时,以博弈论为分析工具,在理性经济人和风险中性的假设下,建立政府官员和监督机关二者之间的博弈模型,通过求解纳什均衡给出各参数变量的政策含义,进而给出了寻租活动的治理对策.     

基于药厂-医院的我国药品市场价格管理博弈分析

我国药品市场的定价问题受到了各界的关注.针对不同的药品市场结构,对利益方药厂与医院两方之间的博弈关系进行了透彻的分析.在买方垄断、卖方竞争的市场,制药企业与医院之间的寻租行为在一定程度上打破了博弈的强弱力量对比,但制药企业并未达到与医院同等的地位;在卖方垄断、买方竞争的市场,通过分阶段博弈模型,分析得出对于不同的情况能得出不同的博弈均衡解,这取决于双方的决策.     

国有资产管理中的寻租行为及对策分析

国有资产管理中的寻租行为将导致资源配置的扭曲和国有资产的流失。文章由委托代理理论推导出国有资产管理中寻租行为的参与人,国家、官员和国企管理人员,并以博弈论为工具,建立三方博弈模型。通过求解纳什均衡,给出各参数变量的具体含义,并在此基础上提出解决寻租行为的对策建议。     

生产者、保护者与分利者:贫困村基层组织的多重角色

通过采用生产、保护和分利模型,并利用全国范围的行政村数据,对我国贫困村进行的实证研究发现:在不同条件下,贫困村基层组织可能承担着生产者、保护者和分利者的多种角色,在较低的生产力水平、较高的分利技术或寻租动力以及较多的潜在分利者情况下,贫困村的经济资源将以高比例保护、低比例生产的配置方式实现均衡,从而导致寻租行为与经济发展之间的恶性循环,贫困村由此陷入了一个低水平均衡收益的贫困陷阱。为走出贫困陷阱,政府应当采取加大扶贫力度,完善扶贫监督机制,将扶贫资金、项目和贷款制度化等各项措施。     

低工资误区与劳动力市场的“柠檬均衡”

本文从教育市场的可寻租性假设出发,分析了低工资情形下劳动力市场的多次均衡结果。结论是:当信息不对称和教育信号可寻租性并存时,劳动力市场中的“柠檬均衡”就会出现,进而教育市场的“产品质量”会出现恶性循环,最终造成企业实际经营成本的上升。文章最后给出了模型的若干政策涵义。     

Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes

When a decision process involves discretion, it may also be open to influence by various actors. If a single prize is at issue, then this influence can be modelled in the context of a rent-seeking game. However, the basic rent-seeking model needs to be extended in order to examine the amount of influence exerted when more than one prize is at stake. In this paper, we investigate the effect of several factors which may affect rent-seeking in this multi-prize framework but are not accounted for in single-prize models; examples here are the number of prizes, the division of the prize mass and the distribution mechanism which is employed.     

Bargaining over loan contracts with signaling

This paper combines a sequential bargaining game between an enterprise and a fixed number of banks with a signaling game through which the enterprise reveals her project quality as well as her market-speed on the lending market. We characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium loan contracts that are supported by separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the signaling game. In contrast to existing models of lending markets, low-quality investment projects might be rewarded with more favorable equilibrium loan contracts than high-quality projects. Also in contrast to existing models, an increase in the competitive pressure between banks reduces the aggregate welfare in our model. The reason is that more favorable loan conditions come with a greater incentive for the ‘strong’ entrepreneur to distinguish herself from her ‘weak’ counterpart through socially wasteful signaling costs.     

地方政府、企业行为与污水排放——基于西部各省的面板数据分析

通过建立的寻租博弈模型从微观视角对西部地区地方政府和企业行为与污水排放量的关系展开探讨可知,由于地方政府和企业之间有一定的利益共融性,寻租现象可能存在。对西部各省面板数据进行实证分析可知,寻租程度和西部污水排放量存在着正相关关系。     

Cooperation by Asymmetric Agents in a Joint Project

The object of study is cooperation in joint projects where agents may have different desired sophistication levels for the project and where some of the agents may have low budgets. In this context, questions concerning the optimal realizable sophistication level and the distribution of the related costs among the participants are tackled. A related cooperative game, the enterprise game, and a non‐cooperative game, the contribution game, are both helpful. It turns out that there is an interesting relation between the core of the convex enterprise game and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Special attention is paid to a new rule inspired by the Baker–Thompson rule in the airport landing fee literature. For this rule, the project is split up in a sequence of subprojects where the involved participants pay amounts which are, roughly speaking, equal, but not more than their budgets allow. The resulting payoff distribution turns out to be a core element of the related enterprise game.     

Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights

In an economy with weak economic and political institutions, the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators. The conventional wisdom presumes that as rent-seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves, institutions such as property rights will emerge spontaneously. We explicitly model a dynamic game between the oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent-seeking. The oligarchs choose either a weak dictator (who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch) or a strong dictator (who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs). In equilibrium, no dictator can commit to both: (i) protecting the oligarchs' property rights from the other oligarchs and (ii) not expropriating oligarchs himself. We show that a weak dictator does not limit rent-seeking. A strong dictator does reduce rent-seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs. We show that even though eliminating rent-seeking is Pareto optimal, weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent-seeking continues. This outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile.     

The optimal sequencing of carrots

When aid organizations contract with local agents aid funds have the potential to be diverted to purposes other than the intended project. A multi-stage game is presented where the benefit from the project is cumulative, with the application of funds in each stage increasing both the agent's and the organization's benefit from the project. As the agent's utility of diversion increases, the allocation in each stage decreases and the project takes more stages to complete. When contracting with agents with high utilities of diversion the optimal contract involves bloated projects and a side payment to the agent upon completion. If the organization's commitment to the contract is not credible both the agent's and the organization's benefit is reduced.     

土壤重金属污染治理多方演化博弈研究

土壤重金属污染严重制约了中国经济的高效优质发展,第三方治理模式的引入在促进污染治理专业化的同时,引发相关利益主体关系扭曲,因而厘清各主体关系有助于解决土壤污染整治的现实困境。基于演化博弈理论,构建政府、污染企业、第三方治理企业演化博弈模型,探讨其博弈均衡和演化趋势,并进行仿真分析。研究表明,罚款数额和监管成本、寻租成本和治理费用、政府奖励和寻租收益是分别影响政府、土壤污染企业、第三方治理企业演化稳定策略的关键因素;在各主体博弈中,政府能够以行政管制遏制污染企业违法行为,第三方治理企业严格治理会改变污染企业理性预期,以期共同打造“政府尽责、企业担责和第三方治理主体负责”的理想演化均衡策略。     

金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因

本文以改革进程中的非规范融资交易为研究对象 ,通过银行 -借款企业动态博弈和经验研究 ,归纳如下主要结论 :第一 ,在金融交易中 ,金融机构的腐败体现为利用资金配置权进行的两类寻租行为 ;第二 ,银行的寻租程度取决于改革进程中中央银行和财政对银行的转移支付和内控制度建设的相对力度比较 ,因而遏制融资腐败的方法是严格转移支付纪律 ,加强内控制度 ;第三 ,企业借款行为是在自筹资金和银行借款间进行的相对成本比较 ,企业被动选择行贿 (交租 ) ,因而其真实融资成本远远高于名义法定金融机构贷款利率 ;第四 ,由于存在转移支付机制 ,企业与银行的非规范金融交易的实质是对中央银行和财政转移支付的分割 ;第五 ,根据以上结论 ,民间借贷与正规金融价格实际是均衡的 ,不能简单定义民间借贷是高利贷 ,如果如此定义 ,则正规金融也同样具备高利贷特征。     

投资决策中个人理性与集体理性博弈分析及对策研究

针对近期多起曝光的企业对外投资、担保大案,本文应用博弈论分析方法,在强调个人理性与集体理性矛盾的基础上研究投资决策中两者的完全信息博弈及无限阶段重复博弈,并建立相应的定量分析模型,通过分析博弈参与人均衡行为,指出投资决策中寻租的存在的必然性及巨大危害,并针对性的提出了适合实际操作的对策建议.     

The influence of perceived uncertainty on entrepreneurial action in the transition to a low-emission energy infrastructure: The case of biomass combustion in The Netherlands

The transition towards renewable energy production will not occur without the involvement of entrepreneurs who dare to take action amidst uncertainty. In an earlier article, a conceptual model was introduced for analyzing how perceived uncertainties influence the decisions and actions of entrepreneurs involved in innovation projects that aimed at developing and implementing renewable energy technologies. In this article, the conceptual model is applied to stand-alone biomass combustion projects in the Netherlands. Although none of the biomass combustion projects has been abandoned, some entrepreneurs clearly have more difficulty to turn their project into a success than others. To create insight into the underlying dynamics of these projects, the article analyzes what types of positive or negative interaction patterns occur over time between (internal or external) factors in the project environment, perceived uncertainties, motivation and entrepreneurial action and how these patterns can be stimulated or prevented. The results provide several lessons to take into account when designing policies for stimulating the development and implementation of biomass combustion.