An options-based approach to evaluating the risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac assume a significant amount of interest and prepayment risk and all of the credit risk for about half of the $8 trillion U.S. residential mortgage market. Their hybrid government-private status, and the perception that they are too big to fail, make them a potentially large, but largely unaccounted for, risk to the federal government. Measuring the size and risk of this liability is technically difficult, but important for the debate over the appropriate regulation of these institutions. Here we take an options pricing approach to evaluating these costs and risks. Under the base case assumptions, the estimated value of the guarantees is $7.9 billion over 10 years, with a combined .5 percent value at risk of $122 billion. We evaluate the sensitivity of these estimates to various modeling assumptions, and also to the regulatory regime, including forbearance policies and capital requirements. The analysis highlights the benefits, but also the challenges, of taking an options-based approach to evaluating the value of federal credit guarantees.     

The Interest Rate Risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This paper evaluates the interest rate risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) and develops related public policy proposals. F&F merit special attention due to (1) their potentially very large interest rate risk, and (2) their status as U.S. government sponsored enterprises. The analysis focuses on the dynamic hedging strategy and extensive use of interest rate derivatives employed by F&F to control their interest rate risk. While dynamic hedging is highly cost effective for F&F, it creates imperfect hedges and thus could impose significant costs on U.S. taxpayers in a potential future F&F bailout. The policy discussion includes proposals to modify the F&F interest rate disclosures and the OFHEO stress test, and to create rate interest risk standards for F&F.     

Comment: Some Notes of the Effects of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Mortgage Markets

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics -     

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Risk-Taking and the Option to Change Strategy

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - We analyze causes of the surge in defaults experienced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the Great Recession. Our data are consistent with the...     

Charter Value, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Emerging Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This paper examines two forces that may soon increase competition in the U.S. secondary conforming mortgage market: (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchase programs, and (2) the adoption of revised risk-based capital requirements for large U.S. banks (Basel II). We argue that this competition is likely to reduce the growth and relative importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hence reduce their charter values and effective capital. Such developments could, in turn, lead to more risky behaviors by these two companies. This last consequence warrants greater supervisory awareness and legal authorities.     

An Analysis of the Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and An Evaluation of the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises that are central players in U.S. secondary mortgage markets. Over the past decade, these institutions have amassed enormous mortgage- and non-mortgage-oriented investment portfolios that pose significant interest-rate risks to the companies and a systemic risk to the financial system. This paper describes the nature of these risks and systemic concerns and then evaluates several policy options for reducing the institutions’ investment portfolios. We conclude that limits on portfolio size (assets or liabilities) would be the most desirable approach to mitigating the systemic risk posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.     

Focusing on Fannie and Freddie: The Dilemmas of Reforming Housing Finance

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are unique and controversial participants in the housing finance system of the United States. Because of these enterprises' federal government charters, the financial markets believe that the government would not allow Fannie and Freddie to fail to honor their debt obligations, and they are thereby able to borrow more cheaply in credit markets; in turn, they lower interest rates for residential mortgages. If the financial markets are right, however, Freddie and Fannie also create a contingent liability for the government. Though there are positive externalities from home ownership, the Fannie/Freddie route is far too broad and unfocused to address those externalities effectively. Privatization, accompanied by targeted federal assistance for potential first-time low- and moderate-income home buyers, would be a superior policy direction.     

Liquidity Pools, Risk Sharing, and Financial Contagion

This paper reevaluates the Allen–Gale (2000) analysis of interbank deposits to explain financial contagion. This paper modifies the pecking order of asset liquidation developed in Allen–Gale, which is essential in fragility analysis. Furthermore, we also provide a claim structure called liquidity pool that can both achieve risk sharing and prevent financial contagion across regions when asymmetric information about bank assets is absent. This model can partly explain why bank panics reduced substantially after the founding of the Fed and the role of IMF in regional financial crises.     

Risk shifting and regulatory arbitrage: Evidence from operational risk

We document a robust negative relation between operational risk exposure and bank capital levels for a sample of large U.S. banks under the Basel I Capital Accords. The results are consistent with the notion that capital-constrained banks increased operational risk exposure at the time when Basel I regulations did not require an explicit capital charge for operational risk. More broadly, our results show new channel by which financial regulations incentivize banks to shift their risk taking to less regulated risk areas. We focus on the case of operational risk because it went from a largely unregulated risk type to a major risk that accounts for about 25% of large U.S. banks’ risk-weighted assets.     

Knowledge transfer costs and dependence as determinants of financial reporting

Abstract This paper examines the circumstances in which financial reporting exists. Jensen and Meckling (1995 ) observe that where there are high knowledge transfer costs, then decentralisation is necessary; and that where decentralisation occurs there is a control problem, which can be addressed by providing a control system. I predict that where there are high knowledge transfer costs there will be a control system; if the control system uses financial reports, these will occur for activities with high knowledge transfer costs. The ability to decentralise is reduced where dependence makes it potentially costly to allow a subordinate to make decisions about the activity. The paper predicts that high dependence will be negatively associated with the existence of financial reports. The results confirm the predictions that financial reports are positively associated with knowledge transfer costs and negatively associated with dependence.     

融资约束与企业成本粘性——基于我国工业企业的经验证据

针对现有研究忽略了企业融资成本这一调整成本的缺陷,本文提出融资约束也会对企业的成本粘性产生影响。本文利用中国工业企业数据库,分别采用企业所有权性质、负债比率、企业规模、地区市场化进程指数、地区金融市场化指数以及这些变量合成的综合因子作为企业融资约束程度的代理变量,研究结果支持了我们提出的研究假设,即融资约束会对企业的成本粘性产生影响,企业面临的融资约束越强,企业的成本粘性越弱。本文的研究意义不仅在于为揭示并解释企业的成本管理行为提供了一个新的视角,而且有助于全面了解融资约束对企业尤其是中小企业产生的影响。     

Employee firing costs and auditors’ going-concern opinions: Evidence from wrongful discharge laws

This paper examines the impact of employee firing costs on auditors’ going-concern (GC) reporting decisions by exploiting the wrongful discharge laws (WDLs) adopted by U.S. states. We find that auditors are more likely to issue GC opinions to financially-distressed clients headquartered in states that have adopted the laws, in particular the good faith exception, than to clients in states that have not. This finding is robust to controlling for the state-level economics, the strictness of legal liability rules, audit office fixed effects, as well as alternative definitions of financial distress and estimation methods. The impact is concentrated in labor-intensive clients and clients in industries with a higher proportion of nonunionized or permanent employees. We further find that the increased propensity to issue GC opinions is attenuated when the auditor is economically dependent on the client, and is driven by auditors who possess labor-specific expertise. Overall, these findings are consistent with higher firing costs increasing auditors’ propensity to issue GC opinions.     

选择权贷款应对中小企业融资难——基于企业的收益成本分析

中小企业融资难已经成为学术界和实业界的普遍共识,银行融资的选择性和资本市场融资的局限性导致中小企业难以合理的成本融资用于发展。选择权贷款是将银行贷款与资本市场融资相结合的新型金融产品,能够克服商业银行贷款短视性和收益局限性,提高中小企业融资能力。本文总结选择权贷款的特性,并对中小企业从选择权贷款中获得的收益和成本进行详细分析,还提出了中小企业在使用选择权贷款中还需要考虑的其他因素。     

Accounting and prudential regulation: from uncomfortable bedfellows to perfect partners?

Recent initiatives to improve the public information about individual firms have brought to the fore significant differences in perspective between accountants and prudential regulators. We examine the reasons for these differences and propose ways in which they could be reconciled within a broader framework aimed at identifying the type of information conducive to the proper functioning and stability of the financial system. We argue that such information should concern three characteristics: estimates of current financial condition; estimates of risk profile; and measures of the uncertainty surrounding those estimates. So far, efforts have mainly focused on the first characteristic, with the second having drawn attention only recently and the third having been largely neglected. We propose a strategy to reconcile different perspectives based on two principles: first, in the long-term, the “decoupling” of the objective of accurate financial reporting by the firm from that of instilling the desired degree of prudence in its behaviour; second, a “parallel transition” process towards that objective so that at all points the prudential measures can neutralise any undesirable implications of changes in financial reporting standards on financial stability.     

金融调控中的物价稳定与金融稳定:从分离到融合的逻辑演进

从历史上考察,中央银行实施货币政策和充当最后贷款人,客观上使其具有了保持物价稳定和维护金融稳定的职能。20世纪80年代以后,许多国家的金融调控出现了明显变化,逐步向稳定物价的单一目标方向发展,金融监管则出现了"去央行化"的趋势,使中央银行失去了维护金融稳定的能力和手段。经济全球化产生了很多影响物价稳定与金融稳定的新因素,要求中央银行在保持物价稳定的同时,对金融稳定给予更多关注。全球金融危机后,国际社会和主要经济体加快了宏观审慎管理体系的构建,这为解决物价稳定与金融稳定的协调配合提供了新思路。如果将物价稳定与金融稳定纳入到宏观审慎管理的视野,就有可能在金融调控中二者兼顾,建立起新的金融调控范式。     

Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market

We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants of lending specialization (e.g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more (less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks provide important and useful services.

房地产投资与金融效率——金融资源“脱实向虚”的地区差异

通过构建一个包含投资结构和金融发展的内生增长模型,本文发现,房地产投资占固定资产投资的比重偏离其最优结构且继续上升,对金融效率具有抑制效应,不利于金融支持实体经济发展。而且,这一抑制效应在房地产外部性越弱的地区越强。基于2003-2013年地级市层面的样本,采用两阶段系统广义矩估计法和工具变量法的实证分析结果均支持了模型的结论。进一步的分析表明,房地产投资对金融效率的抑制作用在西部地区、经济欠发达地区和房地产销售状况较差的地区更强。     

2000-2010年我国金融体系脆弱性的分析与测度

基于国家金融信息平台＂新华08＂从2000年到2010年我国金融监管当局和统计部门的数据,结合十年来我国实际经济运行状况和全球经济形势,在前人研究的基础上,本文对影响我国金融体系脆弱性水平的指标进行了选择,并且采用因子分析法做出了定量的测度。结果表明,十年来我国金融体系脆弱性水平有了长足的改善,其中流动性风险逐渐减少,信用风险和外汇风险不断波动。基于此,本文提出相关政策建议：防止突然的流动性反转、严控房地产市场的波动带来的信用风险、提高汇率风险管理水平和管理工具的操作水平以合理配置外汇资产。