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1.
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning system itself is a common good which can be exploited. Most investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose fines on those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves. Only a minority considered so-called pool punishment. In this scenario, players contribute to a punishment pool before engaging in the joint enterprise, and without knowing who the free-riders will be. Theoretical investigations (Sigmund et al., Nature 466:861–863, 2010) have shown that peer punishment is more efficient, but pool punishment more stable. Social learning, i.e., the preferential imitation of successful strategies, should lead to pool punishment if sanctions are also imposed on second-order free-riders, but to peer punishment if they are not. Here we describe an economic experiment (the Mutual Aid game) which tests this prediction. We find that pool punishment only emerges if second-order free riders are punished, but that peer punishment is more stable than expected. Basically, our experiment shows that social learning can lead to a spontaneously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome the free rider problem.  相似文献   

2.
机制设计理论:基于社会互动的一种理解   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
基于理性选择范式、博弈论和社会选择理论等范式预设和分析工具,通过深入比较分析市场及各类非市场机制和制度对个人理性选择和社会互动的影响,机制设计理论探讨知识分散、选择权利和激励相容约束条件下有助于促进个人、集体和社会利益和谐共振的最优机制.作为一个理解制度的一般性理论框架,机制设计理论在拍卖、税收、政府管制、公共物品供给、投票过程等研究领域得到广泛应用,为人们思考改革开放过程中的机制设计和制度安排提供了一个有益的理论工具.  相似文献   

3.
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the equilibrium of the game. We show that as the cost of information acquisition for one adversary increases, that person collects less evidence whereas the other adversary collects more evidence. We then test the results in a controlled laboratory setting. The behavior of subjects is close to the theoretical predictions. Mistakes are relatively infrequent (15%). They occur in both directions, with a higher rate of over-sampling (39%) than under-sampling (8%). The main difference with the theory is the smooth decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium. Comparative statics are also consistent with the theory, with adversaries sampling more when their own cost is low and when the other adversary??s cost is high. Finally, there is little evidence of learning over the 40 matches of the experiment.  相似文献   

4.
Erkal  Nisvan  Wu  Steven Y.  Roe  Brian E. 《Experimental Economics》2022,25(1):140-140
Experimental Economics - A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09712-z  相似文献   

5.
Erkal  Nisvan  Wu  Steven Y.  Roe  Brian E. 《Experimental Economics》2022,25(1):111-139
Experimental Economics - We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we...  相似文献   

6.
Many studies report on a systematic disparity between the willingness to pay for a certain good (WTP) and the willingness to accept retribution payments in exchange for giving up this good (WTA). Thaler [Thaler RH (1980) J Econ Behav Organ 1:39–60] employs prospect theory to explain this disparity. The literature contains two different interpretations of his endowment effect theory. Accordingly, the disparity is caused either by the disutility from parting with one’s endowment and/or by an extra utility from ownership which is not anticipated by individuals who are not endowed with the good. So far, the empirical evidence on the applicability of endowment effect theory is limited to private goods. This paper reports on an experiment which finds a significant ownership utility effect for a publicly provided good. This result indicates that prospect theory applies to publicly provided goods even though consumers do not have exclusive property rights.   相似文献   

7.
博弈论原理在社会有关领域中的应用   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
孙广毅 《经济师》2007,(11):37-38
文章利用博弈论的原理、理论工具将其应用在社会中的公安战线、经济领域、环境冶理、家庭关系等方面进行了论述,同时指出博弈论应用范围很广,深入掌握和运用它对于提高效益具有十分重要的意义。  相似文献   

8.
In this paper we extend the slack-based directional distance function introduced by Färe and Grosskopf (Eur J Oper Res 200(1):320–322, 2010) to measure efficiency in the presence of bad outputs and illustrate it through an application on data of Vietnamese commercial banks. We also compare results from the slack-based directional distance function relative to the directional distance function, the enhanced hyperbolic efficiency measure (Färe et al. in Rev Econ Stat 71(1):90–98, 1989) and the Farrell-type technical efficiency and confirm that it has greater discriminative power.  相似文献   

9.
It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.   相似文献   

10.
Twin deficits: squaring theory, evidence and common sense   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
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11.
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of industry concentration in common value auctions. Greater concentration of information among fewer bidders reduces competition but increases the precision of private estimates. We demonstrate that this generally leads to more aggressive bidding. However, the reduction in competition dominates the informational effects, resulting in lower prices. We examine these hypothesized effects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions with constant informational content but distributed among a varying number of bidders. The experimental results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. The authors would like to thank Octavian Carare, Eric Friedman, Luke Froeb, Ron Harstad, Toshi Iizuka, Mike Rothkopf, Charles Thomas, and two anonymous referees, for many useful comments and suggestions.  相似文献   

12.
Our purpose here is to engage in a cross-disciplinary discussion between Austrian economics and social network theory. In particular, we ask what role social networks play in the extended order in regard to both individual discovery and whether social networks can be the source of widespread unintended cooperation among individuals unknown to one another. Although Austrians have examined the function that market prices play in generating social cooperation, such discussions tend to steer clear of non-priced environments, such as interaction within social networks. We seek to explore this gap. While we acknowledge that non-price information feedback mechanisms such as status and reputation lack the calculability so crucial to market coordination, we argue that they can nonetheless mimic other important qualities of market prices and generate widespread unintended social cooperation among people unknown to one another. After a general discussion, we apply these ideas to online philanthropic communities.  相似文献   

13.
14.
The importance of referral hiring, which is workers finding employment via social contacts, is nowadays an empirically well documented fact. It also has been shown that social networks for finding jobs can create stratification. These analyses are, by and large, based on exogenous network structures. We go beyond the existing work by building an agent-based model of the labor market in which the social network of potential referees is endogenous. Workers invest some of their endowments into building up and fostering their social networks as an insurance device against future job losses. We look into the manner in which social networks and inequality respond to increased uncertainty in the labor market. We find that larger variability in firms’ labor demand reduces workers’ efforts put into social networks, leading to lower inequality.  相似文献   

15.
We develop a model in which social pressure on a firm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO differ in how they trade-off business versus environmental interests and also have access to different instruments in pursuit of their objectives. In particular, while the EPA will typically have the tools for detecting misbehaviour, the NGO can influence the intensity of social hostility directed towards those found to have misbehaved. EPA and NGO efforts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiroles’s (Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 74(2):361–366, 1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests different to their own.  相似文献   

16.
The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updating a common prior based on individual information. We dispose of the common prior assumption for a homogeneous oligopoly market with uncertain costs and firms entertaining arbitrary priors about other firms’ cost-type. We show that true prior beliefs can not be evolutionarily stable when truly expected profit measures (reproductive) success.  相似文献   

17.
18.
In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices, two outcomes that are important for financial stability. Compensation schemes can drive a wedge between how investors and traders value the asset. Limited liability makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and increase prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors increase liquidity provision and asset price bubbles are larger. Bonus caps have no clear effect on liquidity provision and they fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving traders skin in the game fosters financial stability.  相似文献   

19.
Why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not? Do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions? In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country. Among graduate students we could not. In 2007, we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the UK was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe, although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour. We conclude that, while corruption may, in part, be a cultural phenomenon, individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin.  相似文献   

20.
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term. This suggests that enriching the economic model commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter is not needed.  相似文献   

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