Economic migration and business cycles in a small open economy with matching frictions

With the free movement of labour in Europe, economic migration has become an important determinant of labour supply. Cyclical migration exceeds one percent of the population in many countries and affects (un)employment and wage setting. The main contribution of this paper is that it models migration as an endogenous decision in a search-and-matching framework, where labour market institutions play an important role. It shows that, contrary to typical beliefs, migration can amplify business cycles. After a positive shock to the economy, immigration increases the labour force and initially unemployment. The latter reduces a worker's outside option in wage negotiations, resulting in a lower wage increase than when there is no migration. With cheaper labour firms post more job vacancies, which increases the probability that unemployed workers find jobs and attracts new workers to immigrate. Attenuated response of wages and the stronger response of employment to shocks result in a flatter Phillips curve.     

Financial frictions and stabilization policies

After the financial crisis of 2007, in many economies, public and private debt have moved in opposite directions, as opposed to pre-2007 evidence. Private deleverage and public debt build-up may affect the recovery path of countries after a recession. In a new Keynesian model with financial frictions, we show that when the economy is hit by a credit risk shock, the negative correlation arising between public and private debt amplifies the response of GDP. In our setup, the traditional monetary-fiscal policy mix is not enough to offset this private-public debt mechanism and therefore bring back economic stability. When macroprudential policy is part of the policy mix, the private-public debt channel can be broken. Interestingly, depending on the macroprudential instrument, a trade-off may arise between private debt and output stabilization.     

Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions

We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition.     

Pricing and signaling with frictions

We study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites. Observing sellers? choices of prices and sites, but not quality, buyers choose which site to visit. A seller?s choices of prices can direct buyers? search and signal quality. A unique equilibrium exists and is separating. When the quality differential is large, the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information. Otherwise, the quality of goods and/or the number of sites created is inefficient, due to a conflict between the search-directing and signaling roles of prices.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

Contractual frictions and margins of trade

A recent body of work has shown that quality of national institutions that enforce written contracts plays an important role in shaping a country’s comparative advantage. The current paper contributes to this literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms through which institutional frictions affect the pattern of aggregate trade flow by distinguishing its effect on the intensive and extensive margins. We find that better contracting institutions not only increase the probability of exporting (the extensive margin) but also enhance the export sales after entry (the intensive margin), particularly in industries where relationship-specific investments are most important. With around two-third to three-fourth share (depending on the definition used), the contribution of institutions along the intensive margin dominates that along the extensive margin. The benefits of improved institutions, particularly via the intensive margin, favor the less developed countries over the more developed ones. In addition, better contracting institutions increase the probability of survival of export products in more contract-intensive industries in particular. These findings are robust to measuring the intensive and extensive margins using a more granular export data based on firm-level aggregates, as well as the variety and destination based definitions.     

Search frictions and labor market participation

Cross-country differences in labor market participation are often larger than differences in unemployment rates. The same holds true across demographic groups within a given economy. We argue that the interaction between labor force participation decisions and labor market frictions can help us understand these patterns. This interaction highlights dynamic aspects of the participation decision, in contrast to standard textbook treatments that emphasize static costs and benefits of participation. We extend the standard labor market search problem to allow for a third state—non-participation—and assumes that stochastic participation costs precipitate flows into and out of non-participation. We fully characterize the worker's decision problem and use numerical simulations to demonstrate how participation patterns vary with individual characteristics and with labor market conditions.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

Financial frictions and changing macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the impact of changing financial frictions on the Great Moderation using an estimated, nonlinear New Keynesian model. The model features financial frictions, parameter drift, and stochastic volatility. The estimation results show that financial frictions fell during the 1980s and remained low throughout the Great Moderation. Based on counterfactual studies, the reduction in financial frictions was an important reason for the reduction in volatility observed during the Great Moderation. The results show little role for changing monetary policy or reduced shock volatility, two common explanations, in causing the Great Moderation.     

Reciprocity and practical comparability

Reciprocity does not require exactness but only a certain equilibrium in the things reciprocated: it is often overabundant. In addition, reciprocity may be fulfilled by returning something of a different kind that may be heterogeneous and incommensurable with the thing received. The reason of this “uneven response” of reciprocity is that in these situations the exchange of means aims at manifesting some values that are ends for the persons involved. Hence, the consideration of reciprocity supposes a reinsertion of ends in economics. The paper firstly defines reciprocity. Next, it summarizes a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in economics. After that, it explains the differences between the rationalities of means and ends. A key difference lies in the problem of incommensurability of ends. This problem will be then tackled and a possible way to overcome it will be proposed. It will be finally sustained that practical comparability allows for incommensurable fair reciprocation.     

Reciprocity Game

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one‐period game and the infinitely repeated game.     

Financial frictions and the futures pricing puzzle

In perfect capital markets, the futures price of an asset should be an unbiased forecast of its realized spot price when the contract matures. In reality, futures prices are often higher for some assets and lower for others. However, there is no stability in the relationship between futures prices and the realized spot prices. This instability has been a puzzle in the existing financial literature. The key to this puzzle may lie in the nature of the model and the lack of market imperfections. In this study, we take a theoretical approach in a dynamic multi-period environment. We incorporate competition between disparate economic agents and impose financial frictions (i.e., imperfections) that are in the form of hedging and borrowing limits on them. Our model gives rise to multiple equilibria, each with unique market clearing prices, with the market switching between these equilibria. Our analysis incorporates a comprehensive consideration of the risks faced by the futures markets participants (i.e., speculators and hedgers) and leads to a better understanding of the puzzle.     

A theory of self-selection in a market with matching frictions: An application to delay in refereeing times in economics journals

A matching market with imperfect information is studied. With imperfect information, it is shown that friction in a meeting process can facilitate self-selection and thus may improve the matching outcome. As an application, the effect of delay in refereeing time on publication outcome is analyzed in a publication process in economics journals. Though the delay causes efficiency loss by postponing the dissemination of new research, it will better sort the papers to each journal by their qualities by preventing mediocre papers from being submitted to a prestigious journal and published by luck. If an assortative outcome (good papers in prestigious journals and mediocre papers in less prestigious journals) is efficient, the delay may actually improve the publication outcome. Other matching market examples are also discussed.     

Product diffusion and pricing with market frictions

Summary. We study pricing and product diffusion in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with product market frictions. Ongoing R&D activity leads, with an endogenously determined probability, to continual improvements in product quality. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with endogenous product diffusion in which a number of different goods co-exist on the quality ladder. We show that the severity of the economy's market frictions is a crucial determinant of the pricing structure, the product diffusion pattern, the level of R&D investment, the rate of endogenous growth, the length of Schumpeterian product cycles and the possibility of multiple growth paths. Eliminating market frictions leads to a degenerate product ladder of precisely one step, containing only the most recent product, as in the monopolistic competition literature. Received: August 16, 1999; revised version: March 6, 2001     

Labor market frictions and the international propagation mechanism

The paper studies the role of labor market frictions in accounting for international business cycle comovement. To this aim, we embed labor market search and matching frictions in a two-country New Keynesian model. We show that labor market frictions amplify the international propagation of supply and demand shocks. In terms of cyclical properties then, they raise the cross-country output correlation. Adding labor market search in the New Keynesian model thus improves its ability to account for the business cycle comovement observed in G7 countries in the recent decades. Nominal wage rigidity substantially contributes to this result. Labor market institutions also play a role. Yet, their impact is not unequivocal depending on the institution considered. Business cycle synchronization is thus found to increase with the generosity of the unemployment benefits system, whereas it decreases with the strictness of employment protection.