论存款保险制度下的风险防范

存款保险制度是一种金融保障制度。建立存款保险制度有利于降低金融风险,防止挤兑发生及危机扩散。当个别银行出现流动性风险时,存款人因为有了相关的法律制度作保证,不再产生巨大的恐惧心理,能避免发生挤兑风潮。同时,建立存款保险制度有利于保护存款人的利益。在投保银行面临支付危机时提供救助,在投保银行破产倒闭时依法清偿存款人的存款,从而保护了存款人的利益。     

民以食为天:关于农业保险研究的一个文献综述

本文对有关农业保险的中外历史文献进行了全面回顾,并在此基础上评估和回答了可能会影响中国农业保险试验的若干问题:第一,为什么会有农业保险?第二,农业保险市场为什么会失灵?为什么各国政府都对农业保险大加补贴?而农民对待农业保险又会有怎样的反应?第三,既然农业保险产品设计的核心问题是费率厘定,那么有关此项的研究有哪些进展?第四,中国政府在发展农业保险的过程中,尤其需要注意哪些事项?本文的目的在于,提醒各级政府部门要积极参与农业保险试点,认真解决试点过程中发现的各种问题,立足长远,真正建立起农业保险这个褔惠三农的风险保障机制。     

我国商业医疗保险中的道德风险及对策

医疗行为的信息不对称以及疾病的客观性、严重性、复杂性、多样性等本质特征导致医疗保险成为道德风险发生频率最高、造成损失最大、又最难以有效规避风险的险种。道德风险是医疗保险市场失灵的重要表现。本文通过分析我国医疗保险市场逆选择和事后道德风险的不同形成原因,以期探讨有效的风险控制方法,从而降低商业医疗保险的经营风险,为促进其合理发展并最终满足居民更全面的健康需求提供帮助。     

存在道德风险的医院等级选择与最优公共医疗保险合同

通过构造一个医疗服务系统的均衡模型,分析了医院等级、居民道德风险与最优公共医疗保险合同之间的关系。研究表明只存在公共医疗保险体系时,如果政府部门之间缺乏协调机制,各自为政,中国的公共医疗保险支付方式将不能实现社会最优并消除道德风险;公共医疗保险合同可能引起社会福利的损失或引致道德风险。政府应该完善医院评价系统,对不同医院的水平给予准确的评级,特别是要建立起政府各部门之间的协调机制;理顺医疗服务价格体系;鼓励更多市场参与主体进入医疗保险领域,建立合理的疾病风险分担机制。     

我国车险市场道德风险的博弈分析

车险已成为我国产险的龙头险种,但由于信息不对称,车险市场道德风险已严重制约产险业的发展。各利益主体为自身效用最大化不断博弈的最终结果,使得车险市场整体运行效率大打折扣。本文运用博弈论的研究方法,通过构建博弈模型,对投保人、保险人、保险代理人以及汽车修理商四方行为主体的道德风险进行博弈分析,探寻其最优策略,并给出对策建议。     

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

农险市场中的保险公司道德风险研究

在过往十余年我国农业保险的跨越式发展中,保险公司的道德风险问题日益凸显。本文通过微观案例界定保险公司道德风险的内涵与类别,基于博弈视角分析其产生机理,结果发现:在政府和保险公司的委托代理关系中,由于二者的目标诉求不同,若政府对保险公司的农业保险业务不能给予有效监管,则保险公司不遵守经营规范所得收益要大于其遵守经营规范所得收益,从而导致保险公司出现违规经营业务的道德风险问题;相关部门可以通过完善监管政策、整合监管资源、优化协办机制、加大监管力度、设置差异化保险合约等措施来减少农业保险市场中保险公司的道德风险。     

从博弈论看保险市场信息不对称的本质及规范举措

博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法。保险业作为信息不对称最为集中的行业，保险人与被保险人之间存在着严重的信息不对称，特别是被保险人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险人的违规操作等现象普遍存在，长期困扰着保险界。     

创业企业中的双边道德风险与最优融资合约

创业家和创业资本家都付出不可观察的努力来提高企业的效率,创业企业面临双边道德风险.本文解释了创业企业融资合约中常见的可转换证券的融资安排.当创业家和创业资本家的联合努力有助于提高项目的收益时,双方的努力程度与投资的数量相关.论文证明当投资者的投资比例低时,她必须被赋予普通股,而当其投资比例高时,她获得可转换债券或优先股.此外,通过比较三种创业投资市场结构下最优合约的特征,本文表明在创业投资市场中,垄断比竞争更能有效率地控制双向道德风险.     

Residential real estate brokerage as a principal-agent problem

We analyze the terms of the brokerage contract between a house seller and his agent, using the established literature on the principal-agent problem. Considering the influence of moral hazard and adverse selection, we predict a number of features of the contract. Many of these features are not present in observed contracts. To account for this discrepancy, we discuss certain aspects of the real estate market which are not included in the standard principal-agent model but may explain the difference. Standard principal-agent theory neglects important contract design considerations, namely robustness and costs of complexity. In general, the commission contract performs poorly by failing to allocate risk efficiently or to provide agent incentives. It favors established agents and precludes contractual diversity. Finally, we contrast the brokerage contract for real estate with the dealership contract for used cars, but find no compelling answer as to why there are few used house dealers.     

Coalition-Proof Allocations in Adverse-Selection Economies

We reexamine the canonical adverse selection insurance economy first studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]. We define blocking in a way that takes private information into account and define a coalition-proof correspondence as a mapping from coalitions to allocations with the property that allocations are in the correspondence, if and only if, they are not blocked by any other allocations in the correspondence for any subcoalition. We prove that the Miyazaki allocation—the Pareto-optimal allocation (possibly cross-subsidized) most preferred by low-risk agents—is coalition-proof.     

生态公益林保险的定价与设计

目前针对火灾、泥石流等突发性事件引起的生态公益林的毁坏,许多省份给予每亩500—700元的定额赔偿金,并且保险定价有一定的随意性。由于林改后对生态公益林的补贴一般每亩只有10—20元,相对于保险赔偿金则过低,如此便产生了生态公益林保险的变相融资道德风险倾向,即：林农很可能为套取保险资金而消极防御火灾,甚至故意纵火。运用林农效用函数,通过确定性等价收入等理论定出生态公益林的保险价格,设计出一套实物支付与分期付款相结合的保险方案,有效地规避了此类道德风险的发生。     

社会保险市场上的逆向选择与公共政策干预:国际研究动态述评

随着社会经济的进步与发展,提供社会保险日益成为现代政府的重要任务,而信息不对称带来的逆向选择这一市场失灵问题是政府提供社会保险的主要经济依据之一。由此,近年来国际学术界涌现出一大批关于社会保险市场上逆向选择与公共政策干预问题的研究文献,在将理论与数据相结合以分析公共政策的福利影响方面出现了很多研究进展。本文就尝试对这一领域的研究进行总结与分析,为国内学术研究的开展与公共经济政策的设计提供有益借鉴。     

国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险问题研究

存款保险制度的道德风险问题是指商业银行在存款保险制度的保护下有动机承担过度风险、追求超额利润、从而可能导致银行业危机的问题,是存款保险制度的核心理论问题,也是存款保险制度能否持续的关键问题,更是一国政府如何对商业银行进行监管的重大问题。对国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险的相关文献进行综述和分析的基础上,认为传统的存款保险制度存在严重的道德风险,其制度运行成本高昂,需要对存款保险制度进行改革和加强对商业银行的监管。建议我国建立存款保险制度需要考虑避免道德风险问题。     

How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting

Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This paper seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk-shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.     

Effects of Deposit Insurance Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking

In cross sections of US banks before the deposit-insurance system was reformed in the early 1990s, bank risk-taking was positively associated with bank size and negatively associated with the value of bank charters and bank capital. These empirical associations have an easy theoretical interpretation. Bank size is positively related, while charter value and capital are negatively related, to the moral hazard associated with flat insurance premiums and other aspects of a laxly administered system. Hence the observed associations of risk-taking with size, charter value, and capital reflected the expected positive relation between moral hazard and risk-taking. We test the hypothesis that the three associations became weaker after reform. In the case of unsystematic risk, we find no evidence of significant changes for any of the three. In the case of systematic risk, we find that risk-taking associated with lower charter values and larger size is indeed significantly weaker after reform. Risk-taking associated with capital ratios is also weaker after reform, though not significantly so. Since systematic risk is undoubtedly the more appropriate measure, reform seems to have reduced moral hazard.