货币政策、利率联动效应与银行风险承担

守住不发生系统性金融风险底线，关键在于宏观货币政策与微观银行体系。在人民币国际化背景下，基于货币政策的银行风险承担渠道以及17家银行的非平衡动态面板数据，通过构建中介效应模型，实证检验了在岸离岸人民币利率联动在货币政策银行风险承担传导机制中的中介效应。研究发现，宽松的货币政策提高了银行风险承担水平；利率联动在宽松货币政策的银行风险承担渠道中发挥了完全中介效应，但在期限、渠道与微观特质三维度上呈现显著异质性。研究结论对于全面考察货币政策通过利率联动效应影响银行风险承担的核心逻辑、实时监测预警利率联动冲击下的银行风险承担水平、妥善解决“大而不能倒”风险等提供了有益的启示。     

我国货币政策的银行风险承担渠道检验——基于中国16家上市银行数据的动态GMM实证分析

文章使用16家上市银行的年度数据进行实证分析,运用动态面板模型检验银行如何对货币政策立场的转变做出反馈并调整其承担风险的程度。研究表明,基于我国银行体系银行风险主动化和个体风险系统化的发展趋势,货币政策工具能够对我国商业银行风险承担产生显著影响,且商业银行风险承担的变化对信贷投放总量以及社会总产出也会造成影响。同时,风险定价效应、追逐利益效应、习惯效应、杠杆效应作为我国货币政策银行风险承担渠道的重要作用机制,在货币政策传导中发挥着重要作用。     

税收非对称性与银行风险监管关系研究

通过将银行收入税的非对称性引入模型,分析银行在存在风险的情况下如何确定最优贷款期限以及收入税将如何影响银行决策者的决策过程,然后采用一个动态博弈的框架来讨论最优的银行监管政策。结果表明,非对称性的收入税对银行的贷款风险大小产生影响,它使得银行开始关心并减少风险,为银行业的监管和减少不良贷款提供了一个思路。     

关于商业银行员工行为动态管理的研究

银行员工行为既关系到银行的利润,也影响银行的风险,然而,随着环境的变化,员工行为也在不断变化,加强员工行为的动态管理,就显得尤为重要。文章从商业银行员工行为入手,分析了员工行为的模式、行为变化的特点,由此引出商业银行员工行为动态管理,并提出预警机制,监测员工行为的动态变化,最后对员工行为管理提出了对策。     

中小企业担保贷款的违约风险中性定价与担保费率厘定

基于风险中性原理,研究银行的贷款定价模型和担保机构的费率厘定方法,最终给出贷款利率与担保费率简单实用的表达式。基于风性中性的违约风险定价模型与担保费率厘定具有科学的理论依据,能够避免结构化模型的复杂性与高成本,排除简化模型中回收率设定不合理所带来的定价偏差。本文的研究为担保贷款利率的确定与担保费率的厘定提供了实务上的参考,有助于银行和担保机构动态调整利率和费率,节约管理成本。     

信息不对称下的银企信贷融资策略研究——基于动态博弈模型分析

银行与中小企业之间的信息不对称,使得商业银行"惜贷",中小企业融资难。文章从动态博弈论角度,通过对银行与中小企业信贷融资成本与收益的分析,深入研究了这种现象产生的动因及约束条件,探索一种有效且适宜银行信贷风险控制的管理激励机制,并根据博弈模型的分析,提出针对政府、银行及中小企业三方优化信贷融资的具体建议。     

我国银行风险管理

<正>“银行是通过风险管理而实现收益的金融企业”。一般是风险越大,预期收益越大;风险与收益呈正相关关系。风险管理系统是从银行经营的“三性”:流动性、安全性和盈利性出发,根据外部环境、内部因素等的变动趋势,综合运用表内外业务工具,从资产和负债两个方面对银行资产进行动态调整,从而实现银行在自身的风险偏好下的利益最大化。     

利率市场化进程中银行业竞争与风险的动态相关性研究

本文在我国利率市场化逐步深化的背景下系统地考察了银行业竞争与风险之间的动态关系,通过构建连续的利率市场化指数,并运用门槛面板模型实证研究发现,行业竞争与银行风险承担的相关性状态依赖于利率市场化水平,即当利率市场化程度低于临界值时,行业竞争与银行风险承担水平负相关,“风险转移效应”显著大于“特许权价值效应”;当利率市场化程度超过临界值时,银行风险承担的“风险转移效应”显著被削弱,这种现象非国有商业银行比国有商业银行表现得更为突出。因此,伴随利率市场化改革逐步深化,为了有效抑制银行风险承担的动机,监管当局应适度把握行业竞争水平并且引导规范有效的竞争模式。     

银行竞争与货币政策的银行风险承担渠道

本文使用勒纳指数衡量银行竞争程度,基于56家商业银行2010—2019年的动态面板数据,实证分析银行竞争对货币政策银行风险承担渠道的影响。为进一步探究这种影响是否因银行类别和竞争程度不同而存在差异,将样本分别按照银行类型和竞争程度高低分组进行回归分析。研究结果显示：宽松的货币政策激励银行承担更多的风险;银行的竞争程度越高,资产规模越小,流动性水平和资本充足率越低,货币政策对其风险承担的影响越强;竞争加剧对这种影响的强化作用,主要体现在股份制银行和城农商行中;对于竞争程度较高的银行而言,流动性水平和资产充足率越高,对宽松货币政策的反应越审慎。     

政府融资过程中政府和银行间的信号博弈

针对政府融资平台的融资特点,讨论了政府融资过程中政府和银行之间的信号博弈问题,并以政府和银行的利益最大化为目标建立了动态信号博弈模型且进行了实证分析。在分析的过程中发现,均衡的效率与政府的伪装成本及期望的风险成本高低有关,融资过程中政府的干预对均衡效率有一定的影响。因此,在相应的政策建议中要求提高企业伪装的成本及加大银行的惩罚力度。     

关于中国银行集中度风险的实证研究

本文采用熵值法分析银行业的集中程度。实证结果表明,熵值与银行业的风险是正相关,而熵值与银行集中度是负相关,也就是说银行的集中度越高,风险就越小,银行系统也就越安全。由此可以得出以下结论:开放经济情况下,银行业集中度的提高可以降低风险,尤其是在外部经济不确定的情况下,更应保持金融力量的集中,以此来对抗危机的冲击。     

Factors influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial crisis

We use a dynamic panel data model to analyze bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the euro area. The selected time span, from 2001 to 2012, considers the impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis on the Eurozone banking system. Our results indicate that capitalization, profitability, efficiency and liquidity are inversely and significantly related to bank risk. However, the recourse to wholesale funding by banks seems to increase their risk. We also find that less-concentrated markets, lower interest rates, higher inflation rates and a context of economic crisis (with a falling GDP) increase bank risk.     

How important can bank lending shocks be for economic fluctuations?

We analyze the quantitative importance of bank lending shocks on real activity fluctuations in Norway and the UK, using structural VARs estimated on quarterly data from 1988 to 2010. We find that an adverse bank lending shock causes output to contract, and that such shocks can account for a substantial share of output volatility. This suggests that financial intermediation is an important source of shocks. The empirical analysis comprises the Norwegian banking crisis (1988–1992) and the recent period of banking failures in the UK. However, the results are also non-trivial when omitting periods of systemic banking distress from the sample.     

Systemic risk in banking networks: Advantages of “tiered” banking systems

This paper studies the risk and potential impact of system-wide defaults in a tiered banking network, where a small group of head institutions has many credit linkages with other banks, while the majority of banks have only a few links. A network is random and displays a given distribution of the number of banks׳ linkages, known as degree. We model tiering by a negative correlation between degrees of neighboring banks and by a scale-free degree distribution. The main findings of the paper highlight the advantages of tiering. Both the risk of systemic crisis and the potential scope of the crisis are lower in systems with negative correlation of bank degrees than in other types of systems. Similarly, in scale-free networks, the resilience of the system to shocks is increasing with the level of tiering.     

The interest rate spreads in the Czech Republic: Different loans,different determinants?

We analyze the determinants of interest rate spreads of different loan categories in the Czech Republic during 2004–2011. We employ a detailed bank supervisory dataset that allows us to construct the actual spreads for four loan categories, namely small and large corporate loans, consumer loans and mortgages, on a monthly basis. Our regression analysis shows that bank and macroeconomic characteristics matter more for setting the spreads for small corporate loans and mortgages rather than for large corporate loans and consumer loans. Interest rate risk determines the spreads for all loan categories. The global financial crisis has, to a certain extent, increased the responsiveness of spreads to interest rate risk and liquidity risk.     

Robustness of banking networks to idiosyncratic and systemic shocks: a network-based approach

We propose a network-based structural model of credit risk to demonstrate how idiosyncratic and systemic shocks propagate across the banking system and evaluate the costs. The banking system is built as a network of heterogeneous banks which are connected with one another. In such a system, single credit events propagate through the interbank market from debtors to creditors and across the system. The shock is imposed as an unexpected event. We demonstrate that while idiosyncratic shocks cannot substantially disturb the banking system, a systemic shock of even a moderate magnitude can be highly detrimental. Such shock includes a huge contagious potential. We demonstrate that the costs of the shock are largely determined by the extent of contagion and range from negligible to catastrophic. The results imply that a severe crisis has to be initiated by a systemic shock of at least moderate magnitude. Capital ratio and the bank size are two additional factors of the banking system stability. Finally, credit risk analysis is sensitive to the network topology and exhibits a profound nonlinear characteristic.     

Systemic risk and bank business models

In this paper, we decompose banks' systemic risk into two dimensions: the risk of a bank (“bank tail risk”) and the link of the bank to the system in financial distress (“systemic linkage”). Based on extreme value theory, we estimate a systemic risk measure that can be decomposed into two subcomponents reflecting these dimensions. Empirically, we assess the relationships of bank business models to the two dimensions of systemic risk. The observed differences in these relationships partly explain why micro‐ and macroprudential perspectives sometimes have different implications for banking regulation.     

Taking financial frictions to the data

We estimate a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with various financial frictions and analyze how well the model explains the Great Recession. Predictive analysis shows that the model can only slightly better explain the large deviation from trend during the crisis relative to a model without financial frictions. Specifically, the risk premium shock, which is a shock to the external finance premium of the entrepreneurs׳ leverage, explains the largest part of the investment downfall during the crisis. However, the ‘balance sheet’ channel of financial frictions in the model, which structurally links balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries and nonfinancial borrowers to their borrowing rates, is estimated to be weak. We examine alternative prior specifications for how the financial frictions enter the model and continue to find a limited role for these frictions. Rolling-window estimation provides evidence for substantial time variation in parameters governing financial frictions. We conclude that the well-known financial frictions studied in this paper are not able to explain the financial crisis in a linearized and estimated model.     

股东关联贷款对商业银行发展的影响研究

股东关联贷款对商业银行发展的影响与银行贷款危机密不可分。文中分析了股东关联贷款与银行贷款危机之间的关系，着重就股东关联贷款对商业银行影响进行研究，并提出了防范和降低商业银行股东关联贷款风险的政策建议。     

Did covenants distort risk signals from bank subordinated debt yields before the financial crisis?

Restrictive covenants on bank debt require a bank to take or refrain from specific actions that affect the riskiness of that debt. Although covenants all but disappeared in the 1990s, they re-emerged after 2004 with an increase in bank risk leading up to the financial crisis. Subordinated debt yields potentially enable better risk monitoring by supervisors, but covenants can shift risk from bondholders to stockholders without reducing overall bank risk. This can distort the risk signal used by market participants to discipline excessive risk taking. Because covenants are endogenous and increase during periods of bank stress, the yield signal is dampened the most precisely when regulators most need accurate risk monitoring.