The Influence of Regulation and Disruptive Potential on Incumbents' Submarket Entry Decision and Success in the Context of a Network Industry

This paper uses the theoretical perspectives of disruptive innovation, network externalities, and regulation to study the submarket strategies of incumbent firms that operate in a regulated network industry. In this setting, the impact of potentially disruptive innovations might be different because of the tighter regulation of incumbent firms. By analyzing the entry and success patterns of incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) in the public hotspot markets in 17 Western European countries, we focus on how regulation and network effects as well as disruption factors influence the incumbent firms' strategies. In doing so, this paper departs from prior research that has primarily focused on unregulated industries and combines contradicting explanations from disruptive innovation theory, the motivation/ability framework, regulation theory, as well as network effects to provide a comprehensive analysis on how incumbents behave in a regulated network industry that is being confronted with a potentially disruptive innovation. In particular, while disruptive innovation theory predicts that the incumbents' vast experience in an industry could cause them to avoid entering new submarkets created by potentially disruptive innovations, the desire to avoid regulation could encourage such submarket entry. Furthermore, in regulated network industries, incumbent firms might have a stronger motivation to enter new submarkets as the importance of single customers and high market shares could be substantially different. These contrasting insights are used to develop an integrative research model and to derive hypotheses on incumbents' submarket entry decision and success. Drawing on cross‐sectional, multicountry data of 62 MNOs that operate in 17 Western European countries, this study uses logit and tobit regressions to test the impact of disruption factors, regulation, and network externalities on the entry decision and success of incumbent firms. The results reveal that the incumbent MNOs are caught in an area of conflict between the regulated industry context and their international technology strategy. The findings suggest that the incumbent MNOs' motivation and ability to escape regulation positively influenced their submarket entry and success in the public hotspot market. Thus, the potentially disruptive scenario was successfully turned into a potentially sustaining one as the incumbent MNOs could enhance their presence in the mobile broadband market. The testing on a multicountry basis as well as the positive influence of ethnocentric technology strategies for public hotspots, which are devised in the headquarters' location and are then brought out internationally, shed new light on an industry that has typically been characterized by country‐by‐country decisions. These findings may also reveal challenges for future research on disruptive innovations in multinational industries and expose future challenges for regulative authorities and managers. This paper thereby adds to the theory of disruptive innovation as it includes the influence of regulation on incumbents in network industries. Additionally, this study expands on previous findings on the disruptive potential of wireless local area network technology by employing a multi‐country analysis in 17 Western European countries.     

The Number of Firms and Production Capacity in Relation to Market Size

Many oligopoly theories predict a positive correlation between market size and the equilibrium number of firms and some also imply that competition is more intense in larger markets. We test these predictions on a sample of driving schools in 250 Swedish regional markets by estimating the relation between the number of firms, production capacity, and market size. The number of firms increases less than proportionally with market size. Market size per capacity unit is smaller in large markets. Since firms produce a fairly homogenous good, we argue that this is evidence that profits per capita is decreasing in market size.     

Accounting for ARPU: New evidence from international panel data

Average revenue per user (ARPU) is commonly used by regulators and industry observers to compare the performance of mobile telephony markets. Under the new EU electronic communications regulatory framework, some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) have linked higher ARPU with ‘significant market power’. This paper empirically examines the determinants of ARPU in a systematic way, taking account of service quality, market environment, regulation and quantity of service. The robust results suggest that concentration may not be a reliable indicator of competition in mobile markets; there are economies of density in mobile markets; and higher GDP per capita increases ARPU.     

Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.     

Marking Single–Family Property Values to Market

This paper is the text of the 2001 Presidential Address for the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. House price prediction accuracy is a function of: (1) the procedure used to identify within–metropolitan–area housing submarket boundaries, (2) the econometric technique used to estimate the parameters of the house price model and (3) the characteristics of the local housing market. This paper empirically examines several procedures for delineating within–metropolitan–area housing submarket boundaries. In addition, the paper examines the increase in prediction accuracy that can be achieved by employing spatial econometric techniques to spatially adjust ordinary least squares house price predictions. Finally, the paper examines the influence that local housing market characteristics have on house price prediction accuracy. Housing market characteristics examined here are: (1) structural characteristics of neighborhood properties, (2) heterogeneity of the neighborhood housing stock and (3) housing market liquidity. Prediction accuracy is examined using hedonic house price equations with over 40,000 single–family transactions for Dallas, Texas.     

Market share inequality,the HHI,and other measures of the firm-composition of a market

Data for individual markets suggest that the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index does not fully account for the inequality of market shares and the number of firms in a market. An empirical investigation is conducted to determine whether share inequality, number of firms, and major firm presence affect market profit rates independent of the HHI. The analysis controls for efficiency, among other things. Test results based on 1,684 banking markets during 1990–1992 indicate that the HHI, market share inequality, and the importance of major firms are positively related and the number of firms is negatively related to profit rates. Results on several other variables also suggest that market imperfections exist in local banking markets.     

Urban Housing Markets Modelling: Short-Run Equilibrium Implications

This paper tests for the existence of short-run equilibrium in the urban housing market in Metropolitan Toronto. The alternative hypothesis is the housing market segmented with respect to locational and structural attributes. We found insignificant differences in attribute prices across hypothesized submarkets. This implies that an unstratified hedonic price regressions model, based on the assumption of short-run equilibrium, is equally efficient in the analysis of housing prices as a model based on a number of subsamples stratified along lines of segmentation.     

National food safety control systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Uganda’s aquaculture control system meet international requirements

Stringent food safety requirements set by developed country markets, which require exporting countries to establish effective national food control systems (NFCS) that guarantee safety of the products to the market, pose a challenge to Sub-Saharan countries in development of aquaculture products as alternative exports following the decline of capture fisheries. In the study, four components of Uganda’s NFCS including legislation, competent authority, inspection services, and laboratory services were evaluated for compliance with FAO/WHO, European Union (EU), and the United States (US) market recommendations for guaranteeing aquaculture product safety. Using a checklist, component elements were benchmarked and scored, and components ranked for compliance with the recommendations. On a scale of 0–5, where 0 denotes none, 1 very low, 2 low, 3 some, 4 almost total, and 5 full compliance, only laboratory services had a barely acceptable score of 3.3 (some compliance). The rest including legislation which is central in setting the level of controls by the other three components scored below three, and the combined score for all components was only 2.2, indicating that Uganda’s NFCS was still short of the requirements to allow entrepreneurs to access markets in the EU and other developed countries. The low score is partly attributed to the dynamics of this country’s fledgling aquaculture industry and the rapidly evolving food safety requirements in the international markets.     

Market structure and market outcomes in deregulated rail freight markets

Using cross-section data on a national sample of city-pair markets for rail freight, I examine correlations between prices, quantities, and the number of single-line and interline firms serving markets. I estimate the reduced form of a structural model in which rail rates and quantities depend on the number of firms. I find that rates increase as the number of firms serving the market falls, and quantities shipped rise as the number of firms falls. The result is consistent with market power for rail freight shippers that causes markups to rise when fewer firms serve the market, and is not consistent with other explanations of the relationship between number of firms and rates and quantities. Interline shipment is much more costly than single-line, suggesting that mergers may be desirable even if they exacerbate market power problems.     

Compatibility and competition in airlines demand side network effects

Network effects arising in air transport markets are usually viewed as resulting from the implications of joint production on the cost side. In this paper, we focus on network effects originating on the demand side. We consider a network that links three cities involving two direct and one indirect connection. Two carriers, with asymmetric traffic rights on this network compete sequentially: at the first stage, they choose their departure times; at the second, they set prices. We show that in order to compensate its network disadvantage the ‘weak’ carrier chooses its departure time as close as possible to its competitor's. This is in contrast to the usual maximum differentiation principle. The network effect intensifies price competition. Depending on the size of the market and on consumers valuation of waiting time, various subgame perfect equilibrium configurations are exhibited.     

Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers

A striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms. Items on eBay, for instance, are frequently offered through auctions, posted prices, and buy-it-now auctions. In this article, I study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers. I specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets, in which I consider both sides of the market: On the demand side, buyers' choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game. On the supply side, sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices. I estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on eBay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets: the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed-price listings, respectively. I find that the addition of auctions to fixed-price markets hurts sellers and risk-averse buyers but benefits risk-neutral buyers. Additionally, the consumer surplus increases when buy-it-now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further. I discuss the intuition for the cause of this result.     

Production costs, scope economies, and multi-client outsourcing under quantity competition

Two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi-client outsourcing (MCO) phenomenon. Analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers’ high in-house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor. Under certain conditions, if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously, collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria; if both firms make decisions sequentially, collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of MCO with regard to diverse market parameters. Finally, it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when MCO occurs. This research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls, supply chain cities, and the China price.     

Strategic Complementarities in Bank Branching Decisions*

I study how complementarities between rival banks’ branching decisions impacts banking deregulation. I use an instrumental variables approach to separately identify a bank’s strategic response to rivals’ branching decisions from common market factors. The results indicate that some bank types are more likely to open additional branches if their rivals do. This has important implications for expansion and merger policies. These are explored using a model of consumer demand for bank services and bank branch network choices. I find that strategic complementarities in branching decisions augment the effects of a merger or expansion, leading many banking markets to become over-branched.     

When Do Large Buyers Pay Less? Experimental Evidence

The rise of mega‐retailers has precipitated a growing literature on large‐buyer discounts. According to Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] and Snyder [1998], large buyers' ability to obtain price discounts depends on their relative size and the degree of seller competition. I test experimentally implications of this theory concerning the number of sellers and the sizes of buyers in the market. The results track the comparative‐statics predictions to a surprising extent. Subtle changes in the buyer‐size distribution or number of sellers can create or negate large‐buyer discounts. The results highlight the previously unexplored role of the demand structure in determining buyer‐size discounts.     

Fertilizer market liberalization and private retail trade in Kenya

This paper examined the factors influencing the entry and sales decision of private traders in fertilizer retail trade in a liberalized market using survey data from Kenya. A two-stage econometric model is used to examine traders’ entry and sales decision. The results provide insights into factors that are associated with private retail traders’ entry and sales decisions in an era of liberalized fertilizer markets. It shows substantial entry into fertilizer retail trade following market liberalization. Relatively limited investments in trading assets and equipment are predicted to hold back firm expansion. Implications drawn from the study provide insights into likely research and policy interventions.     

On Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition

Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place significant emphasis on measures of firm size, such as sales revenue or market share. Such objectives have an important—yet thus far unquantified—impact on market performance. With n symmetric firms, equilibrium welfare losses are of order 1/n⁴, and thus vanish extremely quickly. Welfare losses are less than 5% for many empirically relevant market structures, despite significant firm asymmetry and industry concentration. They can be estimated using only basic information on market shares. These results also apply to oligopsonistic competition (e.g., for retail bank deposits) and strategic forward trading (e.g., in restructured electricity markets).     

Conduct in a Banking Monopoly

Extending previous empirical work on concentrated markets, this paper appliesa Rosse–Panzar revenue test to quarterly data from a monopoly bank. The testrejects the hypotheses of static monopoly pricing or perfectly contestablepricing. Other tests suggest that the bank was in long-run equilibrium duringthe sample period and did not exhibit particular forms of expense-preferencebehavior. Possible interpretations of the bank's conduct include limit pricingto deter entry or an objective other than maximizing static profit. The resultsraise new questions about conduct among monopoly banks or in declining markets.     

An Approach to Industrial Real Estate Market Segmentation and Valuation Using the Arbitrage Pricing Paradigm

This paper investigates whether a segmented market exists for industrial real estate with respect to risk and return characteristics. Given the existence of industrial market segmentation, the next issue examined is whether a submarket perspective or an integrated real estate market orientation provides better rate of return estimates for individual industrial properties using an Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) framework. The results support the existence of regional markets for industrial real estate. A submarket orientation rather than an integrated perspective is also found more appropriate in predicting returns on industrial real estate.     

Sunk Costs,Market Contestability,and the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper we offer a new economic explanation for the observed inter-industry differences in the size distribution of firms. Our empirical estimates based on three temporal (1982, 1987, and 1992) cross-sections of the four-digit US manufacturing industries indicate that increased market contestability, as signified by low sunk costs, tends to reduce the dispersion of firm sizes. These findings provide support for one of the key predictions of the theory of contestable markets: that market forces under contestability would tend to render any inefficient organization of the industry unsustainable and, consequently, tighten the distribution of firms around the optimum.