The changing international transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks: Is there evidence of contagion effect on OECD countries

We study the changing international transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks to 14 OECD countries over the period 1981Q1–2010Q4. The U.S. monetary policy shock is defined as unexpected change in Effective Federal Funds Rate (FFR). We use a time varying parameter factor augmented VAR approach (TVP-FAVAR) to study the EFFR shocks together with a large data set of 265, major financial, macroeconomic and trade variables for U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Japan, Australia, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and New Zealand. Our main findings are as follows. First, negative U.S. monetary policy shocks have considerable negative impact on GDP growth in the U.S., Canada, Japan and Sweden while most of the other member countries benefits. Second, the transmission to GDP growth has increased in OECD countries since the early 1980s. We also detect a more depressed GDP over medium term in the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, Norway and Sweden over the recent global financial crisis. Third, the size of U.S. monetary policy shocks during financial turmoil periods were unusual than normal periods and varies overtime. The financial crisis (2008–2009) is evidenced by decline in residential investment in the U.S. and propagation of this shock to Canada, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand over the recent period. U.S. monetary policy shocks reduce share prices in most of the OECD countries; this impact is more pronounced over the turmoil period. Asset prices, interest rates and trade channel seem to play major role in propagation of monetary policy shocks.     

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF EARNINGS INEQUALITY FOR MEN IN THE 1980s

In this paper we present a comparative analysis of earnings inequality during the 1980s among prime age men who headed households and worked year-round, full-time from five industrialized countries-Canada, Sweden, Australia, West Germany, and the United States. The data were obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, a multinational collection of microdata sets from various countries which have been assembled for the primary purpose of making cross-national comparisons of economic and social well-being. The results of the comparison indicated that during the mid-1980s, the United States had the most unequal distribution of earnings and Sweden the least unequal. Between the early 1980s and mid-1980s, however, the earnings distributions in all five countries showed evidence of becoming more unequal, especially in the United States, Canada, and Sweden.     

Factor Components of Inequality: A Cross‐Country Study

This paper uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study to examine some of the forces that have driven changes in household income inequality over the last three decades of the twentieth century. We decompose inequality for six countries (Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.) into the three sources of market income (earnings, property income, and income from self‐employment) and taxes and transfers. Our findings indicate that although changes in the distribution of earnings are an important force behind recent trends, they are not the only one. Greater earnings dispersion has in some cases been accompanied by a reduction in the share of earnings which dampened its impact on overall household income inequality. In some countries the contribution of self‐employment income to inequality has been on the rise, while in others, increases in inequality in capital income account for a substantial fraction of the observed distributional changes.     

INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION: A MICRODATA ANALYSIS FOR SEVEN COUNTRIES

This paper reports the detailed results of a comparison of the distribution and redistribution of income in seven countries using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. Use of LIS facilitates comparisons of inequality in respect to similarly-defined variables, permits methodological alternatives to be used, and allows the countries to be compared on aspects of income ranking and policy equity in ways not otherwise possible.
The results indicate a pattern of inequality in which Sweden is the most equal, followed by Norway, the U.K. and Canada, while among the less equal countries Israel is generally more equal than Germany-or the USA., whose relative inequality depends on the measure chosen. Use of the LIS database also allows a more detailed explanation of these results, noting, for example, the role of cash benefits in increasing equality in Sweden and the U.K., and in aiding the bottom quintile in Germany; and the important part played by self-employment income in contributing to the high top quintile shares in Germany and Israel, and in rendering the Norwegian distribution less equal than that of its Scandinavian neighbour.
The wealth of the database, however, means that methodological issues need to be treated both more explicitly and more carefully than is possible with more restrictive data. To interpret the data also requires a considerable degree of knowledge about the institutional features of tax and social provisions in each country, so that an income microdatabase could usefully be completed by one focused on the details of such provisions.     

Accounting for Cross‐Country Differences in Wealth Inequality

There is considerable cross‐country variation in levels of household wealth and in wealth inequality. This paper assesses the extent to which these differences can be accounted for by differences in the distributions of households' demographic and economic characteristics. A counterfactual decomposition analysis of micro data from five countries (Italy, U.K., U.S., Sweden and Finland) is used to identify the effects of characteristics on component wealth holdings, their value and their distribution. The findings of the paper suggest that the biggest share of cross‐country differences is not attributable to the distribution of household demographic and economic characteristics but rather reflect strong unexplained country effects.     

INEQUALITY AND MOBILITY OF WEALTH IN SWEDEN 1983/184–1992/193

Using longitudinal data which include real estate wealth, financial assets as well as consumer durables, changes in the distribution of wealth in Sweden are related to major changes in asset prices and in incentives to hold various assets in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Our analysis of the mobility of wealth indicates that decile mobility is higher in Sweden than in the U.S., while the analysis of who is gaining and who is loosing shows results similar to those of previous studies.     

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH PATTERNS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

We find that household wealth is distributed more unequally in the U.S. in 1983 than France in 1986. The Gini coefficient is 0.77 for the U.S. and 0.71 for France. There are also significant differences in the composition of wealth. Owner-occupied housing accounted for half of total assets in France, and only 30 percent in the U.S., while corporate stock and financial securities amounted to 19 percent in the U.S. and 8 percent in France. The debt-equity ratio was 0.13 in France and 0.20 in the U.S. The age-wealth profile in the two countries had the characteristic hump-shape predicted by the life-cycle model, but the profile was much flatter in France and peaked for families aged 50–59 in France, compared to 60–69 in the US.     

HOW SHOULD WE MEASURE THE “ECONOMIC” ASPECTS OF WELL‐BEING?

The Human Development Index (HDI) uses GDP per capita to measure “command over resources,” which implicitly makes the strong value judgment that inequality and insecurity do not matter. This paper presents revised estimates of the Index of Economic Well‐Being (IEWB) for the United States, the U.K., Canada, Australia, Germany, Norway and Sweden for the period 1980 to 2001 and demonstrates that replacing an index of the log per capita incomes with our IEWB as the “command over resources” component in the Human Development Index (HDI) affects the level and trend of the HDI, even among affluent nations. Because the IEWB recognizes four dimensions of command over resources (Current effective per capita Consumption flows, Net societal Accumulation of stocks of productive resources, Income Distribution and Economic Security), its use has a particularly large impact where underlying trends in these components diverge (e.g. the U.K. or the United States).     

Wealth inequality in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from household survey and rich lists’ data combined*

We study how the problem of the ‘missing rich’, the underrepresentation of the wealthiest in household surveys, affects wealth inequality estimates for the post‐socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The survey data from the second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) are joined with the data from the national rich lists for Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. Pareto distribution is fitted to the joined survey and rich lists’ data to impute the missing observations for the largest wealth values. We provide the first estimates of the top‐corrected wealth inequality for the CEE region in 2013/2014. Despite a short period of wealth accumulation during the post‐1989 market economy period, our adjustment procedure reveals that wealth inequality in the Baltic countries is comparable to that of Germany (one of the most wealth‐unequal countries in Europe), while in Poland and Hungary it has reached levels observed in France or Spain. We discuss possible explanations of these findings with reference to the speed and range of privatization processes, extent of income inequality, and the role of inheritances and wealth taxes in the region.     

Inequality and business cycles in the U.S. and European Union countries

This paper derives the business cycle properties of some aggregate and disaggregate inequality indices for the U.S. and three European Union countries (United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece). The findings suggest that inequality indices move countercyclically with output in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, a procyclical behavior prevailed in Greece, and a mixed cycle influenced Italy. A common countercyclical pattern of inequality indices with inflation and unemployment characterizes the three large economies (U.S., United Kingdom, and Italy). Also, in most countries, the top income group seems to lose at the benefit of the rest during inflationary periods while, in all four countries, the poor will gain from inflation and suffer from unemployment.     

CREDIT,HOUSING COLLATERAL,AND CONSUMPTION: EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN,THE U.K., AND THE U.S.

The consumption behavior of U.K., U.S., and Japanese households is examined and compared using a modern Ando‐Modigliani style consumption function. The models incorporate income growth expectations, income uncertainty, housing collateral, and other credit effects. These models therefore capture important parts of the financial accelerator. The evidence is that credit availability for U.K. and U.S., but not Japanese, households has undergone large shifts since 1980. The average consumption‐to‐income ratio rose in the U.K. and U.S. as mortgage down‐payment constraints eased and as the collateral role of housing wealth was enhanced by financial innovations, such as home equity loans. The estimated housing collateral effect is similar in the U.S. and U.K. In Japan, land prices (which proxy house prices) continue to negatively impact consumer spending. There are negative real interest rate effects on consumption in the U.K. and U.S. and positive effects in Japan. Overall, this implies important differences in the transmission of monetary and credit shocks in Japan versus the U.S., U.K., and other credit‐liberalized economies.     

Quantifying globalization

Globalization is much debated, but is it possible to make reliable ranks of which countries are the most integrated internationally? Traditionally resort is taken to trade measures, but even considering only economic integration this measure disregards a number of aspects. This paper proposes a single measure or index of globalization based on several indicators of economic integration combined by use of the multivariate technique of factor analysis. The index is calculated for 23 OECD countries, and among the findings are that Ireland is ranked as the most globalized country during the 1990s, while the UK was at the top during the 1980s. Some of the most notable changes in the rankings are the decline of the USA, Canada, and to a lesser extent Japan and Norway. There are notable improvements in the ranking for Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. For Portugal and Spain the changes seem to follow EU membership in the mid-1980s.     

基于地缘经济利益的北极航道各利益相关主体的综合实力评价

从地缘角度出发,在界定北极航道引致的地缘经济利益的基础上,采用层次分析法构建综合实力评价指标体系,并结合灰色关联法,对北极航道利益相关主体的综合实力以及影响因素进行聚类比较分析。结果表明：（1）中、日、美、俄是北极航道各利益相关主体中综合实力最强的,传统航线受益国的综合实力最弱;北极理事会观察国中,德、韩、英、法、意的综合实力较强,与美俄之外的环北极国家相当,而西班牙、印度、新加坡的实力则相对较弱;（2）北极航道各利益主体的综合实力主要由其获得能力决定,其中,远洋航行技术是首要因素,经济实力的重要性与地理区位相当,军事实力的影响最小。     

United States income inequality: The concept of countervailing power revisited

This article uses some of the conceptual infrastructure associated with J.K. Galbraith’s “countervailing power” argument to explore the deep history of U.S. income inequality. Two explanatory variables—institutional power and distributive conflict—have played an integral role in the shifting patterns of U.S. income inequality since the late nineteenth century. The “commodified” power of large firms, manifested in aggregate concentration and the markup, exacerbates inequality while the “countervailing” power of organized labor, manifested in union density and strike activity, mitigates inequality. One implication of this research is that U.S. income inequality is unlikely to diminish unless the labor movement (or a comparable social movement) is strengthened.     

Japanʼs intangible capital and valuation of corporations in a neoclassical framework

This paper estimates the economic value in the 1980s and 1990s of corporate assets in Japan, including both tangible and intangible assets, based on the neoclassical framework of McGrattan and Prescott (2005). Our estimates use a new micro-data set that comprises the accounting statements of all listed, non-financial companies in Japan. We find that in 1980–1986, a period that immediately preceded Japan?s so-called “bubble economy”, our assessed value of corporate productive assets, net of the value of corporate debt, is approximately equal to the actual stock market value of Japanese corporate equity. The finding differs from previous results based on studies of aggregate data sets or based on studies of micro-data sets that neglected intangible capital. We also show that the Japanese ratio of the amount of intangible capital stock to the amount of tangible capital stock is comparable to the analogous ratios for the U.S. and U.K.     

Decomposing differences in health and inequality using quasi-objective health indices

People in Canada and the United States often make claims regarding whose country has a better health system. Several researchers have attempted to address this question by analysing subjective health measures in the two countries, thus assuming a common definition of ‘good’ health. Using data from the Joint Canada/US Survey of Health, which provides rich and comparable health information for the two countries, I generate two quasi-objective health indices and show that Canadians and Americans define ‘good’ health differently. After controlling for cross-country reporting heterogeneity, health differences between Americans and Canadians are eliminated for intermediate health statuses, while health differences at the tails of the health distribution lead to slightly better average population health in Canada. With respect to health inequality, my results show that income and education gradients increase steeply with poor health in both countries. Hence, considering differences along the health distribution is crucial when assessing population health or health inequality.     

FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

Sectoral Patterns of Distribution in Slowly Growing Economies: The case of nine OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s

Slow productivity growth has put pressure on the distribution of income between wages and profits in ways that are not amenable to a US versus Europe dichotomy but vary between sectors (especially between manufacturing and service activities) as well as among countries. Over the 1980s and the 1990s, wage flexibility and profit margin flexibility in service sectors-characterised, respectively, by high shares of total employment and high shares of total profits-outlined three growth patterns: countries adjusting to slow productivity growth by means of considerable flexibility in relative wages in services (as in the US, the UK and Germany); adjustment through flexibility in relative profit margins (as in France, Canada and Sweden); and finally, an absence of change in the sectoral structure of distribution (as in Japan, Italy and Belgium). These patterns may be associated with either changes in wage and profit rates or structural adjustments (such as changes in the share of part time jobs, or changes in the composition of the capital stock). They are shown to be an important influence on the prospect of a resumption of high productivity growth.     

Are securitised real estate markets efficient?: New international evidence based on an improved automatic Portmanteau test

We re-examine the efficiency of real estate markets based on the Escanciano-Lobato (2009) autocorrelation test which we improved by means of wild bootstrapping. Through Monte Carlo simulation, we find that the wild bootstrap-based autocorrelation test has very good performance even in small samples. We apply the improved test to examine the efficiency of 14 international securitized real estate markets—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. Our results show that only six of these markets—Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United States are efficient while the rest are inefficient. We also find that the degree of efficiency or inefficiency of each of these markets varies considerably across time. These findings indicate that real estate markets are relatively less efficient as compared to stock and bond markets in general and may also offer an explanation as to why existing studies on real estate market efficiency have mixed results.