Wilhelm Röpke and Richard C. Koo On Secondary Deflations and Balance Sheet Recessions

The concept of a ‘secondary deflation’ was developed in the 1930s by the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, who saw it as something different from a normal depression. While a primary deflation is a necessary reaction to the inflation from a boom period, a secondary deflation is independent and economically purposeless. Röpke argued that secondary depressions occurred in the US, Germany, France and Switzerland during the 1930s, but was vague on what made them follow primary depressions. Recently, the Taiwanese–American economist Richard C. Koo has claimed to have discovered the ‘Holy Grail of macroeconomics’, that is, what made the Great Depression so deep and long. During the Great Depression, the bursting of the asset price bubble resulted in private sectors having more debt than assets; as they shifted from maximising profits to minimising debt, the consequent debt deflation shrank the economy. According to Koo, Western economies today are suffering from a similar ‘balance sheet recession’. Strengthened by the notion of a balance sheet recession, Röpke's long‐lost insights might advance our understanding of the business cycle in general and the present crisis in the US and the Eurozone in particular.     

The impact of monetary policy in the midst of big shocks

This paper studies the impact of Federal Reserve policies that created the largest deviations from price stability during the Fed׳s first 100 years: the post-World War I deflation, the deflation of the Great Depression, the inflation of World War II, and the Great Inflation of the 1970s. In terms of their macroeconomic impacts, I find that deflation was uniquely depressing in the 1930s because of cartel policies that prevented nominal prices and wages from adjusting to clear markets, and not because deflation is generically depressing. I find that the biggest impact of monetary policy during World War II was in debasing debt through inflation. I find that the main drivers of the 1970s economy were long-run changes in productivity and the labor market, and that there may have been little that the Fed could have done at this time to expand employment and output. More broadly, I find that macroeconomic performance would have been better over the Fed׳s first century had the Fed followed a monetary policy to deliver stable prices.     

Bad news in the Great Depression,the Great Recession,and other U.S. recessions: A comparative study

In economic recessions consumption usually drops in tandem with other aggregate quantities as output or employment. Following the permanent income hypothesis, these drops can be rationalized by the idea that consumers have pessimistic views about their long-run income. Using a standard signal-extraction model, we show that this pessimism can be due either to a persistent fall of aggregate productivity before and during the recession (signaling a future decline of income), or to other negative information unrelated to contemporaneous fundamentals, which we label “bad news”. We classify U.S. recessions (from 1919 to 2015) according to a (bad) news index reflecting this negative information. We find that both the Great Depression and the Great Recession score highest in this index. The index is such that we can rule out that this is due merely to the length or the depth of these recessions. Instead, these two recessions are similar in that both were aggravated by a wave of pessimism about future income which cannot be related to contemporaneous fundamentals.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global deflation – a genuine risk?

• The notable decline in inflation in the Eurozone, US and UK since mid-2013 has led to suggestions that a period of widespread price deflation across the major economies is a risk. Adding to these concerns has been the trajectory of producer prices – already declining in the Eurozone and China and showing very subdued growth elsewhere.
• Our global GDP forecasts do not, in isolation, point to a worldwide deflation risk. We expect growth at 2.8% this year and 3.2% next, little changed from last month.
• But the starting point for this growth matters, specifically the gap between actual and potential output last year. Even with reasonable growth, an initially large output gap would imply downward pressure on inflation over the next two years.
• Unfortunately, the size of the output gap is very uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates for the major economies, especially Japan. Part of the problem is that it is hard to know how much potential output was (or was not) permanently lost during the global financial crisis and recession.
• Assuming substantial permanent losses, output gaps might be relatively modest now, but a more optimistic view of the supply side of the economy would suggest output gaps could be quite large – and arguably this fits better with the recent evidence from inflation.
• Overall, while we see a genuine risk of deflation in the Eurozone (with around a 15% probability) we are more upbeat about the other major economies, where growth in the broad money supply and nominal GDP do not seem to be signaling deflation risks.
• But the difficulty of measuring ‘slack’ in the economy for us underlines the case for central banks to err on the side of caution when setting monetary policy, and either not tightening too soon or easing further. This month we have built in a further ECB rate cut to our Eurozone forecast. In Japan, we have revised down growth for 2014–15 with recent data strengthening the case for additional monetary easing this year.

     

Fiscal and monetary interdependence

Where classical economics integrates the quantity theory of money with the concept of Ricardian equivalence, the tendency of recent macroeconomic presentations is to focus either upon money and inflation or upon taxation and debt. That neglect of classical monetary–fiscal integration is surprising, given an initiative by the International Monetary Fund that set credit, money, and fiscal policy within a single structure. This article places those ‘credit counterparts of broad money’ in the context of the Great Depression and the recent global financial crisis. The upshot is a set of conclusions: that, to counter the prospect of deflation, quantitative easing is a weak policy response; that fiscal deficits are better; and that cuts in taxation are preferable to increased government spending.     

REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION: A CRITICAL SURVEY

Abstract.  Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in the Great Depression of the 1930s. Among the differing new interpretations, the real business cycle (RBC) approach is particularly significant. It represents an outstanding methodological innovation in trying to cast the Great Depression within an 'equilibrium' framework. This paper critically reviews the RBC interpretation of the Great Depression, clarifying its theoretical and methodological foundations, and paving the way for future assessments of its validity.     

What Would Milton Friedman Have Thought of the Great Recession?

Milton Friedman died in 2006 , right before the onset of the Great Recession. Unfortunately, we will never know how Friedman would have interpreted this event. However, we can draw some inferences from his published views on the Great Depression, as well as his views on more recent monetary policy, especially in Japan. It seems likely that Friedman would have blamed the Fed for insufficiently expansionary monetary policy during 2008 and 2009, a view that is quite different from the conventional conservative interpretation of events.     

DSGE forecasts of the lost recovery

The years following the Great Recession were challenging for forecasters. Unlike other deep downturns, this recession was not followed by a swift recovery, but instead generated a sizable and persistent output gap that was not accompanied by deflation as a traditional Phillips curve relationship would have predicted. Moreover, the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy generated an unprecedented policy environment. We document the actual real-time forecasting performance of the New York Fed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model during this period and explain the results using the pseudo real-time forecasting performance results from a battery of DSGE models. We find the New York Fed DSGE model’s forecasting accuracy to be comparable to that of private forecasters, and notably better for output growth than the median forecasts from the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections. The model’s financial frictions were key in obtaining these results, as they implied a slow recovery following the financial crisis.     

西岭秋喝银多金属矿矿床地质特征及找矿前景分析

西岭秋喝银多金属矿位于鄂拉山中段,是青海省铜、铅、锌、锡、金、银矿的重点规划区之一。长期以来,矿区仅进行金矿的普查工作,工作思路单一、局限性大,虽发现了多处金异常区,但没有实质的突破。通过对区内的以往资料的综合研究分析,结合邻区(索拉沟银多金属矿床)的找矿模式,进行了综合找矿,并取得了一定的突破。但从目前的矿体规模看,均为小矿体,因此能否在已有矿体的周围找到新类型矿床(就矿找矿),在浅成热液矿床或矿化蚀变的深部取得找矿的重大突破十分必要。在此基础上建立了该区的成矿地质特征,并对该区的成矿前景进行了浅析。     

从夏塞银矿发现与勘查谈川西义敦地区银矿找矿

夏塞银矿为四川西部重要的矿床类似之一。岩浆活动为夏塞银矿的形成提供了充分的矿源,断裂构造对矿体的产出控制明显,成矿元素及矿石组合分带清楚,具典型的热液型矿床特征。本文通过对夏塞银矿的成矿地质背景及控矿条件分析、类比,提出辛果隆巴等找矿靶区,并结合夏塞银矿的发现与勘查评价经验,对找矿靶区找矿思路、方法、手段等进行了探讨。     

Would the Bundesbank have prevented the Great Inflation in the United States?

Policy counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs routinely suggest that bringing Alan Greenspan back in the 1970s United States would not have prevented the Great Inflation. We show that a standard policy counterfactual suggests that the Bundesbank—which is near-universally credited for sparing West Germany the Great Inflation—would also not have been able to prevent the Great Inflation in the United States.The implausibility of this result sounds a cautionary note on taking the outcome of SVAR-based policy counterfactuals at face value, and raises questions on the reliability of such exercises.     

宝钞崩坏、白银需求与海外白银流入——对明代白银货币化的考察

明代民间白银货币的大量应用与大明宝钞的逐渐崩坏是相互伴随的,共同促进了白银货币化的进程。从民间开始的自下而上的白银货币化趋势冲击着明代的货币制度,最终明政府不得不以法令的形式认可了白银的货币地位。明代中国产银数量远远不足以满足政府和民间巨大的白银需求,明政府被迫开放海上贸易,凭借外贸出超优势,巨额海外白银滚滚流入国内,满足了明代中后期不断扩大的白银货币需求。     

The tale of two great crises

The Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 have been the two big events of the last 75 years. Not only have they produced serious economic consequences but they also changed our view of economics and policymaking. The aim of this work is to compare these two great crises and highlight similarities as well as differences. Monetary policy, the exchange rate system and the role of banks are our fields of investigation. We find interesting parallels between the two big events but also differences in their specific developments.     

An Evaluation of Keynes's Projected Possibilities

Abstract . At the onset of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes made some startlingly optimistic predictions about the economic possibilities his grandchildren might face a century later. Within the next 100 years, Keynes proclaimed, technological progress would solve the economic problem facing human beings, individuals would devote themselves to noneconomic pursuits instead, and no one would continue to strive for relative goods. Was Keynes right? This article examines each of Keynes's three main prophecies and concludes that, even though over 75 years have transpired since they were made, and even though they were founded in part on the belief held by most classical economists in the value of technological progress and economic growth, not one of Keynes's predictions has been realized.     

THE GREAT CONTRACTION

Many historians in the United States (and many teachers in US high schools and colleges) still attribute the Great Depression to the following: the breakdown of capitalism; excessive reliance on laissez-faire policies; inequality of wealth; overproduction and stock market speculation. These purported causes led to the implementation of the New Deal: well-intended, but ultimately ineffective, policies that actually prolonged the duration of the depression. A retrospective analysis of the actions taken by the Federal Reserve, in fact, demonstrate that the Great Depression was caused, in large part, by a massive contraction of the money supply.     

Liquidity traps and large-scale financial crises

This paper estimates a nonlinear Threshold-VAR to investigate if a Keynesian liquidity trap due to a speculative motive was in place in the U.S. Great Depression and the recent Great Recession. We find clear evidence in favor of a breakdown of the liquidity effect after an unexpected increase in M2 in the 1921–1940 period. This evidence, which is consistent with the Keynesian view on a liquidity trap, is shown to be state contingent. In particular, it emerges only when a speculative regime identified by high realizations of the Dow Jones index is considered. A standard linear framework is shown to be ill-suited to test the hypothesis of a Keynesian liquidity trap. An investigation performed with the same data for the period 1991–2010 confirms the presence of a liquidity trap just in the speculative regime. This last result emerges significantly only when we consider the federal funds rate as the policy instrument and we model the Divisia M2 measure of liquidity.     

Quantifying Structural Change in U.S. Agriculture: The Case of Research and Productivity

Previous work on structural change in agriculture has failed to distinguish long-run trends from structural breaks leading to new trends. We measure structural changes as statistically significant breaks in either stochastic or deterministic time trends, and apply these measures to agricultural productivity and research. Productivity has a break in 1925 accompanying agriculture's early experience with the Great Depression. Research trends shifted in 1930 as the Depression and new technology began to strongly influence efficient farm size and capitalization. After modeling lags between research and productivity impacts in a vector autoregression (VAR), we compare our results to earlier work by developing a procedure to estimate the rate of return to research from the impulse response function of the VAR.     

On the Time-Varying Effects of Economic Policy Uncertainty on the US Economy

We study the impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on the US Economy by using a VAR with time-varying coefficients. The coefficients are allowed to evolve gradually over time which allows us to discover structural changes without imposing them a priori. We find three different regimes, which match the three major periods of the US economy, namely the Great Inflation, the Great Moderation and the Great Recession. The initial impact on real GDP ranges between −0.2% for the Great Inflation and Great Recession and −0.15% for the Great Moderation. In addition, the adverse effects of EPU are more persistent during the Great Recession providing an explanation for the slow recovery. This regime dependence is unique for EPU as the macroeconomic consequences of Financial Uncertainty turn out to be rather time invariant.     

The Great Depression versus the Great Recession in the U.S.: How fiscal,monetary, and financial polices compare

This study reviews the financial distress that triggered and amplified the financial crises of the Great Depression and Great Recession and compares macroeconomic and financial policy responses. Shadow banking funded the build-up of the financial excesses that preceded both. The quicker and forceful response of monetary and fiscal policy during the Great Recession and stronger action to restore market functionality mitigated the downturn and aided recovery. Nevertheless, actions to address the mortgage debt overhang were slower. Post-Depression reforms focused on preventing deposit runs and post-Great Recession reforms on preventing runs on bank debt and shadow banks while boosting capital buffers.     

Lessons from the Snowy Slope: Vision and Politics in American Social Insurance

The enactment of social insurance, a fundamental departure from means‐tested welfare programs, was born out of the crisis of the Great Depression. Policy options to strengthen Social Security are mathematically simple, but ideologically contentious. Arguments against the program, remarkably consistent since its inception, have been gaining traction in the current political climate. As the debate proceeds, it is useful to examine the history of opposition and review the case for universal social insurance.