Spinning the industrial revolution

The prevailing explanation for why the industrial revolution occurred first in Britain during the last quarter of the eighteenth century is Allen's ‘high wage economy’ view, which claims that the high cost of labour relative to capital and fuel incentivized innovation and the adoption of new techniques. This article presents new empirical evidence on hand spinning before the industrial revolution and demonstrates that there was no such ‘high wage economy’ in spinning, which was a leading sector of industrialization. We quantify the working lives of frequently ignored female and child spinners who were crucial to the British textile industry with evidence of productivity and wages from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth century. Spinning emerges as a widespread, low‐productivity, low‐wage employment, in which wages did not rise substantially in advance of the introduction of the jenny and water frame. The motivation for mechanization must be sought elsewhere.     

Why the industrial revolution was British: commerce,induced invention,and the scientific revolution1

Britain had a unique wage and price structure in the eighteenth century, and that structure is a key to explaining the inventions of the industrial revolution. British wages were very high by international standards, and energy was very cheap. This configuration led British firms to invent technologies that substituted capital and energy for labour. High wages also increased the supply of technology by enabling British people to acquire education and training. Britain's wage and price structure was the result of the country's success in international trade, and that owed much to mercantilism and imperialism. When technology was first invented, it was only profitable to use it in Britain, but eventually it was improved enough that it became cost‐effective abroad. When the ‘tipping point’ occurred, foreign countries adopted the technology in its most advanced form.     

The lure of aggregates and the pitfalls of the patriarchal perspective: a critique of the high wage economy interpretation of the British industrial revolution

The new meta‐narrative of the industrial revolution contends that Britain was a high wage economy and that this itself caused industrialization. Contemporary inventions, although derived from scientific discoveries shared with mainland Europe, could only be profitable in the context of Britain's factor prices. Therefore, important inventions were only developed in Britain where they enabled access to a growth path that transcended trajectories associated with more labour‐intensive production methods. The criticism presented here concerns perspective and methodology. The account of the high wage economy is misleading because it focuses on men and male wages, underestimates the relative caloric needs of women and children, and bases its view of living standards on an ahistorical and false household economy. A more accurate picture of the structure and functioning of working‐class households provides an alternative explanation of inventive and innovative activity in terms of the availability of cheap and amenable female and child labour and thereby offers a broader interpretation of the industrial revolution.     

Wages,prices, and technology in early Catalan industrialization

Catalonia was the only Mediterranean region among the early followers of the British industrial revolution. The roots of this process can be traced back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the Catalan economy became integrated into international trade, and a successful printed calico industry concentrated in the city of Barcelona. Although the factory system was largely adopted by the cotton industry in the 1840s, the diffusion of the spinning jenny in Catalonia had occurred earlier, in the 1790s. In line with Allen, this article explores whether relative factor prices played a role in the widespread adoption of the spinning jenny in Catalonia. First, series of real wages in Barcelona are supplied for the period 1500–1808. Second, the prices of labour and capital are compared and the potential profitability of the adoption of the spinning jenny is analysed. Findings show that although Catalonia was not a high wage economy in the way that Britain was in the second half of the eighteenth century, evidence from the cotton spinning sector confirms the relevance of relative factor prices in the adoption of new technology. Within the booming cotton sector after the 1780s, high wages created strong incentives for the adoption of the labour‐saving spinning jenny.     

Party politics,political economy,and economic development in early eighteenth‐century Britain

Economic growth and change in eighteenth‐century Britain, both the expansion of pre‐industrial commercial society and the industrial revolution itself, have been explored using a variety of approaches. This article highlights a relatively ignored aspect of the problem, arguing that the state, politics, and political economic ideology played a central role. In particular, the early eighteenth‐century political victory of a version of political economy associated with the Whig party, which centred on manufacturing and consumption, was a prerequisite for the economic developments later in the century. The article begins by describing a political economy of manufacturing and its rival, a political economy of re‐exporting associated with the Tory party. It then explains how and why a political economy of manufacturing became dominant, examining both political elites and ordinary voters and petitioners. The growth of manufacturing and consumption must be understood, therefore, as political as much as economic events.     

Protestant Refugees,the Calvinist Ethic and the Industrial Revolution

Atlantic Economic Journal - In this paper, it is argued that the industrial revolution in eighteenth century Great Britain had its origins in the arrival of 100,000–140,000 Protestant...     

Lancashire,India, and shifting competitive advantage in cotton textiles, 1700–1850: the neglected role of factor prices1

In the early eighteenth century, wages in Britain were more than four times as high as in India, the world's major exporter of cotton textiles. This induced the adoption of more capital‐intensive production methods in Britain and a faster rate of technological progress, so that competitive advantage had begun to shift in Britain's favour by the late eighteenth century. However, the completion of the process was delayed until after the Napoleonic Wars by increasing raw cotton costs, before supply adjusted to the major increase in demand for inputs.     

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare's Bank and its customers, 1702–241

The financial revolution improved the British government's ability to borrow, and thus its ability to wage war. North and Weingast argued that it also permitted private parties to borrow more cheaply and widely. We test these inferences with evidence from a London bank. We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the early eighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, the government reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of private clients that could be served profitably.     

Rehabilitating Arthur Young

Young was the most prolific and quantitative agricultural writer in England in the eighteenth century. Generally highly regarded by his contemporaries, his reputation among British agricultural historians is at an all-time low. This article charts and explains Young's fall from grace. It rebuts the criticisms made of his methods and writings, and shows that Young is a well-informed, accurate, reliable, and reasonable historical source. It demonstrates that the Farmer's tour is based on a broadly representative sample of English farms during the industrial revolution and argues that modern techniques of data analysis can overcome any errors or biases in Young's data.     

Real wages once more: a response to Judy Stephenson

This article examines Judy Stephenson's claim that institutional wage series such as those of Greenwich Hospital overstate the earnings of building workers by 20 to 30 per cent, and it is argued here that the conclusion is unpersuasive. Whatever adjustments to existing wage series are necessary in view of her new evidence would have no significant implications for real wages in England compared to the rest of the world. Consequently, Stephenson's findings do not call into question the high wage explanation for the industrial revolution.     

Falling behind and catching up: India's transition from a colonial economy

India fell behind during colonial rule. The absolute and relative decline of Indian GDP per capita with respect to Britain began before colonization and coincided with the rise of the textile trade with Europe. However, the fortunes of the traditional textile industry cannot explain the decline in the eighteenth century and stagnation in the nineteenth century as India integrated into the global economy of the British Empire. Inadequate investment in agriculture and consequent decline in yield per acre stalled economic growth. Modern industries emerged and grew relatively fast. The reversal began after independence. Policies of industrialization and a green revolution in agriculture increased productivity in agriculture and industry. However, India's growth in the closing decades of the twentieth century has been led by services. A concentration of human capital in the service sector has origins in colonial policy. Expenditure on education prioritized higher education, creating an advantage for the service sector. At the same time, the slow expansion of primary education lowered the accumulation of human capital and put India at a disadvantage in comparison with the fast‐growing economies of East Asia.     

Childhood and child labour in the British industrial revolution1

Quantitative and qualitative analysis of a large number of autobiographies by working men who lived through the industrial revolution has demonstrated that there was an upsurge in child labour in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with children's work entrenched in traditional sectors as well as spreading in newly mechanized factories and workshops. I have interpreted this rise in terms of the appearance of a new equilibrium in the early industrial economy with more and younger children at work. The new equilibrium, in turn, was related to a number of co‐incidental developments including: an increase in the relative productivity of children as a result of mechanization, new divisions of labour, and changes in the organization of work; the dynamics of competitive dependence linking labour market and families; high dependency ratios within families; stumbling male wages and pockets of poverty; family instability; and breadwinner frailty. The establishment of these links forges a new synchronization between revised views of the industrial revolution and a revisionist history of child labour.     

The industrial revolution and the Netherlands: Why did it not happen?

Why was the Netherlands not a leader in the first Industrial Revolution (1760-1830) despite its advanced economy in the eighteenth century? This paper argues that the Industrial Revolution in its early stages required a close cooperation between knowledge of nature and its application to technology. The closeness of natural philosophers, engineers, and entrepreneurs was a key to success in Britain. In the Netherlands, a combination of cultural relics from the Golden Age and unfortunate political events after 1780 combined to delay the technological development. As a small, open economy, the country eventually overcame its obstacles and joined modern western industrial progress after 1860.     

The timing and pattern of real wage divergence in pre‐industrial Europe: evidence from Germany,c. 1500–1850

This study uses price information relating to 12 towns and wage information from 18 towns to develop a real wage index for unskilled urban labourers in Germany during the three‐and‐a‐half centuries preceding the onset of rapid industrialization. Combining the new series with information from other parts of Europe establishes two stages of real wage divergence during the seventeenth to nineteenth century. The first occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century when real wages in centres of trade and finance located on the rim of the North Sea rose far above the level prevailing in their hinterland. The second stage unfolded from the second quarter of the eighteenth century when the real wage in south England, northern and central Italy, and Germany began to diverge; Germany followed a middle path between the other two countries. The second commercial revolution, which improved business techniques and promoted Smithian growth, goes a long way towards accounting for this development.     

Women's work and structural change: occupational structure in eighteenth‐century Spain

This article uses the declarations of householders in the Cadaster of Ensenada (1750–5) to calculate labour participation rates for women and men from 22 localities in inland Spain. The article establishes the actual levels of women's market activity, which are much higher than commonly assumed. This unique source also makes it possible to analyse the region's occupational structure. Due to the labour‐intensive character of manufacturing work, the abundant supply of cheap labour, the diffusion of cottage industries, and the demand for commodities from internal and colonial markets, a large portion of the region's population worked in manufactures in the eighteenth century. This finding challenges standard interpretations of the Spanish economy at this time as mostly agricultural, which rely on sources that exclude women workers. Most workers in the manufacturing sector were women, and their market activity was concentrated in textile manufacturing. Once women are included in the analyses, the industrial share of employment follows a U‐shaped trajectory from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century. The article concludes that the standard interpretation of structural change, based solely on empirical evidence for male workers, gives a misleading picture of when, where, why, and how structural change occurred.     

Engels’ pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the british industrial revolution

The paper reviews the macroeconomic data describing the British economy from 1760 to 1913 and shows that it passed through a two stage evolution of inequality. In the first half of the 19th century, the real wage stagnated while output per worker expanded. The profit rate doubled and the share of profits in national income expanded at the expense of labour and land. After the middle of the 19th century, real wages began to grow in line with productivity, and the profit rate and factor shares stabilized. An integrated model of growth and distribution is developed to explain these trends. The model includes an aggregate production function that explains the distribution of income, while a savings function in which savings depended on property income governs accumulation. Simulations with the model show that technical progress was the prime mover behind the industrial revolution. Capital accumulation was a necessary complement. The surge in inequality was intrinsic to the growth process: technical change increased the demand for capital and raised the profit rate and capital’s share. The rise in profits, in turn, sustained the industrial revolution by financing the necessary capital accumulation. After the middle of the 19th century, accumulation had caught up with the requirements of technology and wages rose in line with productivity.     

‘The city has been wronged and abused!’: institutional corruption in the eighteenth century

Corruption by office holders in eighteenth‐century British institutions, from state to local level, played an instrumental role in the emergence of modern bureaucracy, and the development of accountable, professionalized systems of administration. Due to the similarities between the institutional culture of eighteenth‐century Britain and those within many contemporary developing societies, social scientists have also sought to draw lessons from Britain's historical experience of corruption. Yet little is known about the extent, impact, and causes of corruption by eighteenth‐century office holders. This article presents the first detailed research into the topic. It utilises the rich administrative and financial records associated with the institution charged with funding and undertaking the maintenance of London Bridge—the Bridge House—to conduct a systematic qualitative and quantitative study of corruption by office holders. The article identifies an ingrained culture of corruption amongst Bridge House officers, and provides quantitative evidence of the substantial impact corruption had on the organization's finances. However, contrary to existing studies on corruption, this article concludes that, although extensive and significant, corruption did not perform a functional role in the context of this institution. The article also provides a methodology and comparator for future studies into this topic.     

The development of real wages in Norway about 1730–1910

Abstract

Prior to about 1850, the classes in Norway living in households where the living standard of household members was wholly or largely determined by the size of an annual wage paid in cash were numerically speaking marginal. In 1801, for example, the aggregate urban population of Norway formed no more than about 10% of the country's total population of 883,000. During the industrial revolution in Norway the subsistence economy was to a large extent replaced by the cash economy, but around 1910 about 360,000 of the occupationally active total of 880,000 were still employed in primary occupations.     

Identifying the woes of the cotton textile industry in Bengal: tales of the nineteenth century

This article seeks to answer three basic questions about the nineteenth‐century cotton textile industry in Bengal that still remain unresolved in the literature; namely, when did the industry begin to decay, what was the extent of its decay during the early nineteenth century, and what were the factors that led to this? In the absence of data on production, this article seeks to settle the debate on the basis of the industry's market performance and its consumption of raw materials. It contests the prevailing hypothesis that the industry's perpetual decline started in the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century. Instead, it is argued that the decline started around the mid‐1820s. The pace of its decline was, however, slow though steady at the beginning, but reached crisis point by 1860, when around 563,000 workers lost their jobs. Regarding the extent of its decay, this article concludes that the industry was diminished by about 28 per cent by the mid‐1800s. However, it survived in the high‐end and low‐end domestic markets. Evidence is also gathered in favour of the hypothesis that, although British discriminatory policies undoubtedly depressed the industry's export outlet, its decay is better explained by technological innovations in Great Britain.