INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

Firm location and corporate dividend policy: evidence from China

We investigate the relation between a firm’s geographic location and its dividend policy. We find that firms headquartered in the National Central Cities, cities with high-speed rail (HSR), and with shorter distance to the nearest National Central City pay higher dividends. We find evidence that attributes the higher dividends to an increase in the number of analysts’ site visits, greater information transparency, and a reduction in financial constraints. Finally, the observed increases in dividends tend to be stronger for firms that benefit the most from improvements in the information environment after the arrival of HSR, such as firms located in regions without regional airports, firms located in areas with a lower regional gross domestic product, firms located a greater distance to the closest National Central City, and firms that are smaller, state-owned, have a shorter listing history in the exchanges, and have a more concentrated ownership.     

The impact of privatization on firm performance in a transition economy

The Vietnamese privatization programme, launched in 1992, differs from the usual Western privatization programmes in terms of the residual percentage of shares owned by the state and the portion of shares owned by insiders. This begs the question whether these differences influence the effects of the programme on firm performance. This study measures the impact of privatization on firm performance in Vietnam by comparing the pre‐ and post‐privatization financial and operating performance of 121 former state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find significant increases in profitability, sales revenues, efficiency and employee income. Results of applying the ‘difference‐in‐difference’ (DID) method, wherein a control group of firms is used to pick up the influence of other determinants of firm performance, suggest that the performance improvements may indeed be associated with equitization. Regression analyses reveal that firm size, residual state ownership, corporate governance and stock market listing are key determinants of performance improvements.     

Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms

We examine the effect of ownership structure on firm performance, for firms listed on Vietnamese stock exchanges, using 2744 firm‐year observations over the period from 2007 to 2012. We find a non‐linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. State ownership has a convex relationship with firm performance. This paper finds that firm performance increases beyond 28.67 percent level of state ownership. Foreign ownership has a concave relationship with firm performance. We find that firm performance increases with an increase of foreign ownership up to a level of 43 percent and then decreases. Policy makers should encourage foreign ownership and widely dispersed state ownership in firms, which can help improve firm performance.     

国有企业上市对绩效的影响:一种处理效应方法

本文基于1998—2007年中国制造业企业层面面板数据,从盈利、效率和投资三个方面对中国国有企业公开上市对其绩效的影响进行研究。我们特别考察了数据中的样本选择偏差,并且引入项目评估计量经济学中非参数的处理效应估计方法以控制选择偏差以及由此导致股权结构的内生性问题。我们发现公开上市的企业的绩效在上市之前就相对良好。在控制了这种差别及其他的影响因素后,上市提高了国有企业的销售利润率、净利润水平、人均销售额和人均利润额,并促进了企业的资本支出和长期投资。这一结果与忽略选择偏差和内生性时所得到的估计结果有明显差异。     

OWNERSHIP,CONTROL, AGENCY AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS IN HEALTHCARE: INSIGHTS ON COOPERATIVES AND NON‐PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Many issues surrounding healthcare entities’ performance can be traced to their governance and ownership. Increasingly, public services are being provided by non‐profit organizations and/or cooperatives, particularly in the healthcare sector. This is not unproblematic. We draw on the conceptual separation of ownership and control, and the notion of firm ownership to derive a taxonomy of dimensions along which a contractual‐ and property rights theory of the firm can be structured, in order to determine the nature of firms’ differences. We utilize the taxonomy to illustrate important distinctions between non‐profit and cooperative firms in the primary healthcare sector and propose testable hypotheses. Funders and regulators must recognise the differences between these firms, if public funding of healthcare is to achieve the expected outcomes.     

Love conditionally: The ownership structure and bribery behavior of Chinese firms

This paper studies empirically the determinants of firm bribery activities from the perspective of ownership structure. Using data on Chinese firms obtained from the Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank, we compare the bribery activities of firms with various forms of ownership. We find that compared with private and foreign firms, state‐owned firms in China are not only more likely to receive bribe requests from government officials, but are also more likely to pay bribes. Meanwhile, firms are more likely to bribe if they are extorted, or if they expect to reduce infrastructural obstacles to their business operations. Other factors such as manager experience and external audits also exhibit significant influence upon firms’ bribery decisions.     

所有权性质、多元化经营与现金持有

笔者区分所有权性质并以股改后(2007年～2009年)上市公司非平衡面板数据为样本,检验多元化与现金持有关系,研究发现,中国上市公司多元化与现金持有不存在统计显著的相关性。但国有控股企业多元化与现金持有量显著正相关,而非国有控股企业中两者显著负相关。国有控股企业多元化反而降低了现金管理效率,而非国有控股企业通过多元化实现了更高的内部资本市场效率,从而持有更少现金。研究结果间接支持了现金持有的委托代理理论。     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

THE RESPONSE OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES TO IMPORT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS

We examine the wage and employment impact on Chinese firms of an increase in import competition associated with China's WTO accession in December 2001, with an emphasis on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that both wage and employment are negatively impacted by an increase in import competition, but firms with high state ownership cut employment less and reduce wages more than their private counterparts, suggesting that they prioritize the protection of employment over that of wages. This finding supports the notion that SOEs may have ‘multitask’ responsibilities in terms of protecting employment as well as achieving efficiency. We also find that firms with higher capital intensity reduce their wages less but cut employment more in response to intensified import competition. This provides empirical support for the efficiency wage theory.     

Effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility reports: evidence from China

This article investigates effects of corporate governance on the decision to voluntarily disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. By using a unique longitude data set of Chinese publicly traded manufacturing firms from 2010 to 2016, this study finds that ownership structure and board characteristics are significantly associated with firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. In particular, our study finds that state ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and board size are positively and significantly associated with the decision to voluntarily disclose CSR reports. However, board independence is not related to the decision. We also find CEO duality is negatively and significantly related to the decision. Our findings highlight the role of corporate governance in firms’ transparency by influencing the voluntary disclosure of additional information on firms’ CSR activities.     

The impact of private vs. public ownership on the level and structure of employment

We examine the effects of private vs. public ownership on the level and structure of employment using uncommonly rich data on the population of Portuguese firms from 1991 to 2009. We find that private ownership is associated with sizeable job losses. This occurs whether we consider privatizations or nationalizations, and the relationship tends to be stronger in the presence of foreign capital. We also find some evidence that private ownership is associated with higher skill utilization, particularly following privatizations and when foreign investment is present. The estimated job losses associated with private ownership are consistent with a theory in which the shift in ownership increases the degree of profit orientation and leads to lower job security.     

How Does the Minimum Wage Affect Firm Investments in Fixed and Human Capital? Evidence from China

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of Chinese minimum wage regulations on the firm decision to invest in physical and human capital. We exploit the geographical and inter‐temporal variations of county‐level minimum wages in a panel data set of all state‐owned and all above‐scale non‐state‐owned Chinese firms covering the introduction of the new Chinese minimum wage regulations in 2004. In our basic regressions including all Chinese firms, we find significant negative effects of the minimum wage on human capital investment rates and no overall effects on fixed capital investment rates. When grouping firms by their ownership structure, we find that these results hold for most firms. Foreign‐owned firms are an exception to some extent, because the likelihood that they invest in human capital has not decreased in response to the policy.     

Chinese overseas M&A performance and the Go Global policy1

It is well known that government plays an important role in the business activities of Chinese firms. Less certain is the effect this influence has on the wealth of those firms’ shareholders. We contribute to the literature by analysing stock market reactions to announcements by Chinese firms of overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs). OMAs are of particular interest because there can exist a conflict between the interests of the public sector in acquiring overseas assets, and the interests of the private sector in maximizing shareholder wealth. Our main dataset consists of 213 observations of 157 OMA events that occurred between 1994 and 2009, using share market returns from the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong and US markets. The aggregation of share price data across multiple markets, and the listing of firms in multiple exchanges, raise econometric issues for the standard event‐study methodology. To address these, we use a new, feasible generalized least squares (GLS) procedure developed by Gu and Reed (2012) . On the basis of an analysis using both aggregated and disaggregated samples, and of daily and cumulative abnormal returns, we find consistent evidence that (i) Chinese OMAs have not lowered the wealth of shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms, and (ii) shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms have not fared worse under under China's ‘Go Global’ policy of encouraging outward investment by Chinese firms.     

Institutional environment,ownership and firm taxation

This paper examines how ownership type and institutional environment affect firm taxation. Using a sample of Chinese‐listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we find that private firms enjoy a lower effective tax rate than local state‐owned enterprises. In addition, the preferential taxation of private firms is associated with local government incentives to promote local economic growth. We find that private firms located in regions with a lower level of privatization receive preferential tax treatment. Our results also suggest that decentralization and interjurisdictional competition lead to financial interdependence between local governments and private firms.     

The impact of equity ownership groups on investment: Evidence from Ukraine

We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability significantly affects investment; the majority presence of and increases in state ownership have a negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints), measured by cash flow interacted with a dummy variable of majority ownership of the respective group, and the extent of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and under-investment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis.     

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign‐owned firms. State‐owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

Investor recognition and liquidity: evidence from dual listing on the NYSE and NASDAQ

This article examines the impact of the NYSE firms’ decision to dual list on NASDAQ and the resultant trading liquidity, after controlling for the endogeneity of the decision. Using a simultaneous system of equations approach, we find evidence that dual listing lowers transaction costs, but does not lead to any significant improvement in investor recognition. Further, the improvement in market quality due to dual listing on NASDAQ does generate, albeit somewhat weak, positive cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the dual listing.     

Ownership structure and investment finance in transition economiesA survey of evidence from large firms in Hungary and Poland1

Using survey data on 157 large private Hungarian and Polish companies this paper investigates links between ownership structures and CEOs’ expectations with regard to sources of finance for investment. The Bayesian estimation is used to deal with the small sample restrictions, while classical methods provide robustness checks. We found a hump‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and expectations of relying on public equity. The latter is most likely for firms where the largest investor owns between 25 percent and 49 percent of shares, just below the legal control threshold. More profitable firms rely on retained earnings for their investment finance, consistent with the ‘pecking order’ theory of financing. Finally, firms for which the largest shareholder is a domestic institutional investor are more likely to borrow from domestic banks.