Tax incentives and the decision to purchase long-term care insurance

This paper studies the impact of the tax incentive prescribed in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on individuals' long-term care insurance purchasing behavior. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we find that the tax incentive in HIPAA increased the take-up rate of private LTC insurance by 3.3 percentage points, or 25%, for those eligible. Despite this seemingly strong response, our results imply that even an above-the-line tax deduction would not increase the coverage rate of seniors beyond 13%, indicating that tax incentives alone are unlikely to expand the market substantially. We also present, to our knowledge, the first estimate of the price elasticity of demand for LTC insurance of around ? 3.9, suggesting that demand is highly elastic at the current low ownership rate. Finally, we evaluate the net fiscal impact of the tax incentive and find that the tax deductibility of LTC insurance premiums leads to a net revenue loss for the government, as the reduced tax revenue from granting the tax incentive exceeds the savings in Medicaid's LTC expenditures.     

A 'long march' perspective on tobacco use in Canada

Abstract.  In this paper we present a model of tobacco demand in Canada, with a view to establishing if price and tax policy on the one hand or educational, regulatory, and demographic influences on the other have been primarily responsible for the substantial drop in consumption since 1980. We address some methodological and econometric issues that have escaped the attention of some analysts to this point. Using data for the period 1972–2000, we find that non‐price developments have had a strong deterrent effect and that the price elasticity of demand is now lower than even the recently obtained low estimates propose. These findings have strong public policy content. JEL Classification: I12, C13, C22     

US state health expenditure convergence: A revisited analysis

This paper studies the evolution of US state health expenditure for a sample that covers 1966–2014. Our results provide evidence against the existence of a single pattern of behavior of personal health care expenditure across the US states. Rather, we can observe the existence of two statistically different convergence clubs. We cannot find evidence of convergence when we disaggregate health expenditure into its three main payers: Medicare, Medicaid and private health insurance expenditure, whilst we again find evidence of convergence clubs. However, the estimated clubs for Medicaid and private health insurance expenditure are statistically different that estimated for total health expenditure. Consequently, our results offer strong evidence of heterogeneity in the evolution of US health expenditure. The analysis of the forces that drive club creation shows that economic situation and some supply-side factors are important. We can also appreciate that some healthcare outcome variables are only related to private insurance health expenditure. The other health expenditures, thus, show a certain lack of efficiency which may be due to practices that have little benefit for patient health.     

Seasonality, Cointegration, and Forecasting UK Residential Energy Demand

Much of the short‐run movement in energy demand in the UK is seasonal, and the contribution of long‐run factors to short‐run forecasts is slight. Nevertheless, using a variety of techniques, including a recently developed estimation procedure that is applicable irrespective of the orders of integration of the data, we obtain a long‐run income elasticity of demand of about one third, and we are unable to reject a zero price elasticity. An econometric model is shown to provide superior short‐run forecasts to well‐known seasonal time series models ex post , but is inferior to Box‐Jenkins SARMA models when the determinants themselves have to be forecast. However, the relatively short data sample and small number of forecasts suggest caution in generalising these results.     

中国居民医疗保险购买行为研究-基于商业健康保险的角度

本文通过健康保险市场供需双方行为分析,构建居民医疗保险购买行为模型,利用中国健康与营养调查数据(2000—2006),运用部分观测的二元Probit估计方法(Bivariate Probit with partial observability),从实证的角度分析商业健康保险市场中供需双方各自的风险选择行为,以及城乡地区居民对商业健康保险的潜在需求行为及其宏微观影响因素。本文发现:(1)城乡居民都存在显著的逆向选择行为;(2)城乡社会医疗保障对居民商业健康保险需求行为有显著的促进作用;(3)影响居民商业健康保险行为的其他因素还包括,个人的风险偏好和经济购买力。     

Why Subsidise Private Health Insurance?

What are the economic rationales for the public subsidy of private health insurance? Inducing more people to purchase private cover has the potential to create a positive fiscal externality, as it frees up the limited public beds and other public resources for people who cannot afford private health insurance. Investigating this quantitatively, based on short‐run demand estimates, we find that the subsidy cannot be justified on the basis of this externality effect alone. We estimate that the optimal subsidy is actually negative, that is, a tax on private health insurance premiums. On the other hand, the externality does finance some of the costs. We then consider a long‐run dynamic version, consistent with the government's stated rationales for the reforms. In this context, the subsidy might be justified, or at least largely offset, by the fiscal externality. We then discuss other rationales for a subsidy and implementation issues.     

The determinants of the demand for private health insurance under Medicare

Since the introduction of Medicare in 1984, the proportion of the Australian population with private health insurance has declined considerably. Insurance for health care consumption is compulsory for the public health sector but optional for the private health sector. In this paper, we explore a number of important issues in the demand for private health insurance in Australia. The socio-economic variables which influence demand are examined using a binary logit model. A number of simulations are performed to highlight the influence and relative importance of various characteristics such as age, income, health status and geographical location on demand. A number of important policy issues in the private health insurance market are highlighted. First, evidence is provided of adverse selection in the private health insurance pool, second, the notion of the wealthy uninsured is refuted, and finally it is confirmed that there are significant interstate differences in the demand for private health insurance.     

Effects of tax benefits on the price elasticity of charitable contributions in South Korea

Using South Korean panel data from 2008 to 2019 and censored quantile regression method, this study calculates the effects of different tax incentives on charitable contributions. We observe price elasticity under two different tax-benefit systems in South Korea and find that, first, taxpayers tend to be more sensitive to tax incentives under a tax deduction system than a tax credit system. The price elasticity gap between a tax deduction and tax credit is approximately −2.3 to −1.0. Second, we show the existence of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ behaviour: the price elasticity of charitable contributions exhibits a convex shape, where more significant donors have lesser reactions to tax incentives. We further show that socioeconomic contexts, such as income, gender, marital status, and education, affect people's attitudes. In sum, the results are as expected: tax deductions work more efficiently than tax credits.     

THE IMPACT OF INSURANCE SUBSIDIES ON SELF‐EMPLOYMENT: DO STATE NON‐GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATIONS MATTER?

This paper tests whether the effect of tax‐based subsidies for self‐employed health insurance on the level of self‐employment differs with the type of non‐group insurance regulatory regime at the state level. Using a panel of tax returns from 1999 to 2004, we estimate fixed effects instrumental variable regressions for the probability of being self‐employed, allowing the effect of the after‐tax price of self‐employed health insurance to differ by regulatory regime. Our results suggest that states with community rating and guaranteed issue regulations had significantly smaller increases in the fraction of taxpayers reporting some amount of self‐employment income as a result of a decrease in the after‐tax price of self‐employed health insurance. However, there is suggestive evidence that heavily regulated states experienced a larger increase in exclusive self‐employment, particularly among older taxpayers. (JEL J24, H24, I18)     

Wealth effects,treasury bill financing,and stability

This note examines the stability of government financing through capital-certain, variable interest bonds in the context of a fixed price macromodel. In contrast to the financing by perpetuities, it is shown that a wealth effect on expenditures may be destabilising, particularly if the interest elasticity of money demand is low.     

Unemployment,insurance and smoking

Using recent state-level data from the United States, this article examines new influences on cigarette demand. In particular, we uniquely focus on the effects of unemployment and health insurance coverage on smoking. Results show that higher cigarette prices, a lack of health insurance and restrictions on smoking at home, all lead to reduced smoking. On the other hand, literacy, income, unemployment, workplace smoking restrictions, smokeless tobacco taxes and tobacco-producing states do not seem to have an appreciable impact. The magnitude of the price elasticity of demand is greater than that found in the pre-MSA era. Policy implications are discussed.     

Public capital, asymmetric information, and economic growth

Abstract.  We investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information. In a credit market with costly screening, we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self‐selection of borrowers. Through identifying an additional adverse effect of taxation on growth, we show that the optimal tax rate in our model is smaller than the output elasticity of public capital. Therefore, our analysis justifies a more conservative tax policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, our model suggests a number of implications that appear to be well supported by preliminary evidence in cross‐country data. JEL classification: D82, H21, O41     

Tax Base and Crowding‐in Effects of Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy

A dynamic general equilibrium business cycle model is constructed with staggered price adjustment, monopolistic wage setting and distortionary taxation. The government purchases goods, runs an unemployment benefit system and balances its budget through a proportional tax on labour income. A temporary tax‐financed increase in government expenditures can lower the tax rate through a demand‐induced widening of the tax base. It is shown analytically that this allows private consumption to rise, under realistic conditions, despite the negative wealth effect of increased fiscal spending.     

Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment.

We estimate how cost sharing, the portion of the bill the patient pays, affects the demand for medical services. The data come from a randomized experiment. A catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out-of-pocket price. The price elasticity is approximately -0.2. We reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure (for example, by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization).     

ω‐Homothetic Preferences: Theory and Applications

This paper develops a new class of homothetic preferences which generate Marshallian demand curves for individual goods which can be concave, convex or linear in own price under the assumption that agents treat aggregate price indices as given (as in Dixit‐Stiglitz, 1977). The preferences are represented by a cost function which has two parameters: one determining the curvature of the Marshallian demand; the other determining the elasticity of demand when all prices are equal. The elasticity of demand varies with relative prices. Illustrative examples are given of Cournot duopoly and exchange rate pass‐through.     

Advancing Loss Given Default Prediction Models: How the Quiet Have Quickened

We describe LossCalc™ version 2.0: the Moody's KMV model to predict loss given default (LGD), the equivalent of (1  −  recovery rate). LossCalc is a statistical model that applies multiple predictive factors at different information levels: collateral, instrument, firm, industry, country and the macroeconomy to predict LGD. We find that distance‐to‐default measures (from the Moody's KMV structural model of default likelihood) compiled at both the industry and firm levels are predictive of LGD. We find that recovery rates worldwide are predictable within a common statistical framework, which suggests that the estimation of economic firm value (which is then available to allocate to claimants according to each country's bankruptcy laws) is a dominant step in LGD determination. LossCalc is built on a global dataset of 3,026 recovery observations for loans, bonds and preferred stock from 1981 to 2004. This dataset includes 1,424 defaults of both public and private firms – both rated and unrated instruments – in all industries. We demonstrate out‐of‐sample and out‐of‐time LGD model validation. The model significantly improves on the use of historical recovery averages to predict LGD .     

Tax subsidies,the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis

An individual's optimal insurance coverage depends on balancing his gain through avoiding risk against his loss through the distortion of demand. The U.S. tax system subsidizes the purchase of excessive health insurance by excluding employer premium payments from employees' taxable incomes and by permitting the deduction of a portion of individual premiums. The current operational model of demand for health insurance shows that the tax subsidy does substantially increase insurance coverage. Since much of the rise in health care costs can be attributed to the growth of insurance, the tax subsidy is responsible for much of what is widely perceived as a health care crisis.     

Excise taxes,over-shifting,cross-elasticity,and tax revenue

This article examines cross-elasticity effects in excise taxation for markets characterized by monopolistic competition and over-shifting. Extending the constant elasticity demand model to consider cross-elasticity leads to notably different results regarding tax revenue maximization. With nonzero but weak cross-elasticity effects relative to the price elasticity, we derive a higher optimal tax-price ratio compared to prior research. With strong cross-elasticity, revenue can continually be increased by raising the excise tax. Overall, the study offers government greater incentive to use excise taxes to obtain revenue.     

Economic liberalization and price response of aggregate private investment: time series evidence from India

Abstract.  This paper presents evidence on the effects of economic liberalization of 1991 on the price responsiveness of aggregate private investment in India. The wide ranging reforms are expected to increase the price response of private investment due to (i) the Le Chatelier effect, (ii) a higher price elasticity of demand for final goods, and (iii) possible relaxation of the credit constraint. The empirical results, based on alternative specifications, estimation methods, and sample periods, show a dramatic increase in the price response; the elasticity of investment with respect to the relative cost of capital has increased five times after the dismantling of the 'Licence Raj.'